APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises out of a personal injury suit, wherein the plaintiff and Dewayne Duffer filed suit against a trucking company for injuries suffered in an accident and for loss of consortium as a result of the accident. Plaintiff’s employer intervened to recover worker’s compensation benefits paid to plaintiff. Soon thereafter, the trucking company discovered that plaintiff was male, had filed the action using an assumed female identity, and had lied throughout the discovery process. The trucking company filed a motion for summary judgment. The court granted the motion and dismissed plaintiff’s and employer’s complaints,finding that plaintiff had committed a fraud upon the courtand thatemployerhad failed to file suitwithin the applicable statute of limitations because plaintiff’scomplaintwas rendered void ab initio. Plaintiff and employer appeal. We affirm the dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint but reverse the dismissal of employer’s complaint.
 

The mother of a five year old boy alleged that the boy’s father had sexually abused him, and she petitioned the juvenile court to have the father’s visitation privileges revoked. After a long course of proceedings that included an investigation by the Department of Children’s Services, testimony by a number of mental health professionals, and a report by the guardian ad litem, the court concluded that the Mother’s allegations were unfounded, that her hostility against the father was having a detrimental effect on the child, and that it was in the child’s best interest that the father be named as the child’s primary residential parent in place of the mother. The mother raises numerous procedural issues on appeal, and she also contends that her allegations of abuse against the father were true, or at the very least that she had a good faith belief in their truth. Having carefully considered the mother’s allegations and her arguments, we affirm the trial court.
 

In this appeal, numerous beneficiaries under a will challenge the trial court’s order awarding attorney’s fees of $9,024.75 out of the funds of the estate to another beneficiary who is their adversary. At an earlier time, the court had entered an order setting the attorney’s fees of that beneficiary at $34,669.25 without specifying who was responsible for the payment of those fees. On the motion of that beneficiary, the court granted a new trial on the subject of attorney’s fees. When the matter came on for the “new trial,” the court announced that it would listen to argument but would not receive substantive evidence on the subject. Following that “hearing,” the court awarded the fees now before us. The court’s order does not articulate any findings with respect to whether the attorney’s services were reasonable, necessary or benefited the estate. The “challenging” beneficiaries filed a notice of appeal. We vacate the order awarding attorney’s fees and remand to the trial court with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing and enter an order on attorney’s fees complying with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01.

A Putnam County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Matthew Kinnard, charging him with one count of aggravated child abuse. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of reckless aggravated assault. He received a sentence of three years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for probation or some other form of alternative sentence. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A grand jury indicted appellant for possession of a substance containing .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell within 1,000 feet of a school, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-417 (a)(4), a Class A felony. Following an unsuccessful motion to suppress the evidence, appellant entered a guilty plea to possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced appellant to eight years and 270 days and placed him on probation. As a condition of the plea agreement, appellant reserved the right to certify several questions of law challenging the validity of the search that yielded the evidence against him. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This action was filed after the defendant, a life insurance company, denied payment of benefits on the grounds that the decedent/insured made material misrepresentations in her application for life insurance. The specific basis for the denial was that the insured allegedly failed to disclose “methadone treatment for a narcotic addiction.” The trial court found there was no proof that the insured was taking methadone at the time of the application or that she was ever treated for “drug related problems.” On this basis, the trial court concluded the insured did not make anymisrepresentations in her application for life insurance and ordered the defendant to pay the death benefit plus pre-judgment interest. We affirm.
 

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court concluded that it was in the best interests of the child to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse. On appeal, the sole issue presented by Mother is whether the trial court erred in determining that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the child. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm.
 

The Petitioner, Robert Jason Burgess, appeals from the Marshall County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of rape and two counts of possession with intent to sell a controlled substance, for which he is serving an effective twenty-six-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel. He also contends that the trial court erred in treating his letters as a petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The parental rights of the parents of three children were terminated on two statutory grounds, persistence of conditions pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(3), and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(2), and the finding that termination of their parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Both parents appeal contending the trial court erred in finding any ground existed for termination and that termination of their parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Finding no error, we affirm.
 

Mary G. (“Foster Mother”) filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Putnam County (“the Trial Court”) to adopt Haily A. S. (“the Child”), then under the guardianship of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). The Child’s paternal grandparents, Marvin S. and Sandra S. (“the Grandparents”), filed an intervening petition to adopt the Child and shortly thereafter filed a motion to intervene. DCS filed a motion to dismiss the Grandparents’ petition. After a hearing at which the parties’ respective counsels made their arguments, the Trial Court granted DCS’s motion to dismiss the intervening petition for adoption. The Grandparents appeal, arguing that the Trial Court should have permitted them to present evidence on the issue of the Child’s best interest. We hold that because DCS, the Child’s guardian, did not consent to the Grandparents’ adoption of the Child, the Grandparents’ intervening petition properly was dismissed. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.
 

The Defendant-Appellant, Keisha M. Howard, was indicted for theft of property valued at $60,000 or more and for violating the Tennessee Computer Act, both Class B felonies. She entered guilty pleas to the offenses as charged in the Bradley County Criminal Court, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of her sentence as well as the amount of restitution, if any. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103, -105(5), -602(a)(1) (2006). The trial court sentenced Howard as a Range I, standard offender and imposed concurrent sentences of eight years. Under the special conditions in the theft judgment, the court ordered that Howard “may apply to Community Corrections” and that she “owes $215,000 [and] cannot pay that amount but must pay no less than $200 a month.” Howard filed a motion to clarify the total amount of restitution owed, and the trial court, in determining that its previous judgment regarding restitution violated Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-304(c), ordered Howard to pay $1,000 per month for eight years, for a total of $96,000 in restitution. On appeal, Howard argues that the trial court’s order requiring her to pay $96,000 in restitution was unreasonable, given her financial resources and ability to pay. Upon review, we reverse the trial court’s order that Howard pay $1,000 per month for eight years for a total of $96,000 in restitution, and we amend the judgments to show that the victim’s loss in this case is $156,951.30 and that the restitution, based on the proof established of Howard’s present ability to pay, is reduced to $48,000, which shall be paid at the rate of $500 per month for eight years. In all other respects, the trial court’s judgments are affirmed.

The great aunt and the great-grandmother of a little girl obtained an emergency order giving them temporary custody of the child when she was less than eight months old. The child’s mother was informed that she was entitled to appear at a preliminary hearing and an adjudicative hearing on a more permanent custody order, but she failed to appear for those hearings. The trial court found that the child was dependent and neglected, and awarded custody of the child to her two older relatives. They subsequently filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the mother on the grounds of abandonment and of persistence of conditions. The trial court found that both grounds were proved and granted the petition. We affirm the termination on the ground of persistence of conditions.
 

This case arose from a dispute between neighbors over the ownership of an elaborate stone and metal gate used for entry into both their residential properties. The predecessors-ininterest of the defendants installed the gate at their own expense, placing it on an easement over the plaintiffs’ adjoining lot. The plaintiffs decided to sell their house, and included a picture and a description of the gate in their real estate listing and advertisements. The defendants asserted that they owned the gate and compelled the plaintiffs’ realtor to remove all mention of the gate from sales materials. The plaintiffs then filed a complaint to quiet title. After a bench trial, the court found that the gate belonged to the defendants and dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint. The plaintiffs argue on appeal that the trial court erred because the gate is a fixture and, thus, that it has become part of the plaintiffs’ property by operation of law. We affirm the trial court.
 

A Campbell County jury convicted the Defendant, Bert Durand Hatmaker, of one count of reckless endangerment, one count of assault, and one count of leaving the scene of an accident. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent sentences of two years for the reckless endangerment conviction, eleven months and twenty-nine days for the assault conviction, and thirty days for the leaving the scene of an accident conviction, with sixty days to be served in jail and the remainder to be served on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for reckless endangerment. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The issue presented in this divorce case is which parent should be designated as the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor children. The trial court named the Appellee/Mother primary residential parent, and Appellant/Father appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal arises out of a wrongful death action involving numerous defendants. We dismiss the appeal as to two defendants for failure to file a timely notice of appeal. We dismiss the appeal as to the remaining defendants for lack of a final judgment.
 

The Petitioner, Joseph A. Hale, appeals the Morgan County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 2007 conviction for second degree murder and resulting seventeen-year sentence. He contends that his sentence is void because the trial court improperly sentenced him pursuant to the 2005 Sentencing Amendments when the offense date was 2004. The State has moved this court to affirm the trial court’s denial of relief by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion for a memorandum opinion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The plaintiff, a public official, sued the defendants for libel and false light invasion of privacy. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment based on the truth of the statements. The plaintiff sought to complete discovery before the motion was heard. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion and plaintiff appealed. We affirm the grant of summary judgment as to the libel claims, but reverse the grant of summary judgment as to some of the false light claims.
 

An injured employee returned to work for his pre-injury employer. The employee was moved to a different area and worked fewer overtime hours because of his medical restrictions. The trial court held that the employee did not have a meaningful return to work pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) (2008) and awarded permanent partial disability benefits in excess of one and one-half times the anatomical impairment. The employer appealed. We hold that the employee had a meaningful return to work and that Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) limits the employee’s recovery to one and one-half times the anatomical impairment. We therefore modify the judgment of the trial court.

Buyer purchased used automobile and signed contract stating the vehicle was being sold “as is” and without any warranties. After the transaction was completed and Buyer complained to Seller that the power steering was not working properly, Seller agreed to credit Buyer’s account with the cost of repairing the power steering. Buyer was unwilling or unable to pay for the repair out of his own pocket, and Seller ultimately repossessed the vehicle. Buyer sued Seller for breach of contract and trial court awarded Buyer damages. Seller appealed and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Seller modified the parties’ original contract when it agreed to compensate Buyer for the cost of repairing the vehicle.
 

In this claim for workers’ compensation benefits, the trial court awarded permanent partial disability benefits to the employee for hearing loss. Her employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by admitting the testimony of the employee’s medical expert into evidence and by finding that her hearing loss was caused by her employment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiffs charged defendant with medical malpractice. The case was tried before a jury, resulting in a judgment for the defendant. An out-of-state medical doctor testified on behalf of the defendant, over the objection of plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have appealed to this Court, insisting that it was reversible error for the Trial Court to allow that expert to testify in violation of the "Locality Rule". On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

Defendant, Sherri A. Bogle, appeals from the trial court’s order revoking Defendant’s probation and requiring her to serve the sentence in incarceration. Defendant argues on appeal that her sentence had expired before the State initiated revocation proceedings. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Carter County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Wendi Nicole Garrison, of the second degree murder of the victim, Joshua Perry. The trial court imposed a sentence of sixteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction, that the trial court erred in denying her request to charge assisted suicide as a lesser-included offense of second degree murder, and that the trial court erred in denying her request for a jury instruction regarding assisted suicide as a defense to second degree murder. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves retrospective insurance premiums on a workers’ compensation insurance policy. The defendant trucking company operates in several states, including Texas and Tennessee. Tennessee requires employers to maintain worker’s compensation insurance for certain employees, but Texas does not. The defendant trucking company purchased workers’ compensation insurance for its Tennessee employees from the plaintiff insurance company. The trucking company employed over-the-road truck drivers who were Tennessee residents. The trucking company decided to classify its Tennessee-resident overthe-road drivers as Texas employees whose on-the-job injuries would not be covered by the Tennessee workers’ compensation insurance policy. Consequently, the trucking company did not pay insurance premiums to cover those employees. The plaintiff insurance company conducted a retrospective premium audit; in the audit, it determined that the Tennesseeresident over-the-road drivers presented a risk of loss to the insurance company. Consequently, the insurance company notified the trucking company that it owed retrospective premiums based on those drivers. The trucking company refused to pay, so the insurance company canceled the insurance policy and filed this lawsuit for the retrospective premiums. The trialcourtgranted summaryjudgmentin favorof the insurance company,and the trucking company now appeals. We affirm, finding under the undisputed facts that the Tennessee-resident over-the-road employees presented a risk of loss to the insurer under the workers’ compensation insurance policy during the relevant policy periods.