APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The State appeals the trial court’s order granting the motion of the defendant, Mark David Bond, to suppress evidence seized during the search of his vehicle after a drug detection canine indicated the presence of narcotics during a sweep around the perimeter of the vehicle. The State challenges the trial court’s conclusion that the canine’s reaction was unreliable due to the canine’s inability to distinguish between the odor of illegal marijuana and the odor of legal hemp. After review, we reverse the trial court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress, reinstate the indictment against the defendant, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

I have the privilege to join the majority’s well-reasoned opinion in significant part.
The majority concludes that the evidence is sufficient to uphold the Defendant’s conviction
for DUI. I agree. The standard of review controls the analysis, and it requires us to view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to discard all countervailing evidence.
State v. Weems, 619 S.W.3d 208, 221 (Tenn. 2021). Using this standard, I agree that a
rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond
a reasonable doubt.

This appeal involves the disbursement of settlement proceeds proffered by an insurance company in resolution of a claim against it. The plaintiff is the surviving spouse of the decedent, who was killed when she was struck by a vehicle while riding her bicycle. The plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against the vehicle’s driver and the driver’s parents, all of whom were subsequently dismissed from the lawsuit following a settlement unrelated to this appeal. Within the same action, the plaintiff asserted a claim against his and the decedent’s insurer for negligent misrepresentation and negligent failure to procure insurance. The insurer had previously paid a pre-suit settlement to the plaintiff related to uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. In the complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the insurer had misrepresented additional coverage under an “umbrella policy,” leading the plaintiff and decedent to believe they were covered while failing to actually reinstate the umbrella policy when it had been temporarily cancelled months before the decedent’s death. The plaintiff and the insurer eventually reached a confidential settlement. To facilitate the release of claims by both the plaintiff and the decedent’s estate and upon the estate’s motion, the trial court entered an agreed order allowing the estate to intervene. The plaintiff then filed a motion to disburse the settlement proceeds to him, and the estate filed an intervening complaint and opposition to the plaintiff’s motion, asserting that the estate was entitled to one hundred percent of the settlement proceeds related to the umbrella policy claim. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order granting the plaintiff’s motion to disburse the settlement proceeds to him upon finding that the cause of action against the insurer had not vested in the decedent prior to her death. The court subsequently denied the estate’s motion to alter or amend the judgment. The estate has appealed. Determining that the cause of action against the insurer was based in tort, rather than wrongful death, and accrued to the decedent at the time of her fatal injuries, we conclude that the right to the resulting settlement proceeds belongs to the decedent’s estate. We therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for entry of an order granting disbursal of the settlement funds to the estate.

The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks
jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Appellant appeals the trial court’s judgment finding that she breached a contract and
ordering her to pay $3,343.10 in contractual damages. On appeal, Appellant has failed to
comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a) and Rule 6 of the Rules of the
Court of Appeals of Tennessee. Substantive review is also precluded by the lack of a
transcript or statement of the evidence as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate
Procedure 24. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.

This appeal concerns the enforcement of a restrictive covenant. A number of property owners (“Plaintiffs”) in the German Creek Cabin Site Subdivision sued fellow property owner Julia Cris Stevens (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Grainger County (“the Trial Court”) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs sought to prevent Defendant from completing a 400 square foot structure on her lot as it would constitute a second dwelling on the original lot in contravention of a restrictive covenant. The Trial Court ruled in Plaintiffs’ favor, ordering Defendant to remove the structure and granting permanent injunctive relief. Defendant appeals. She argues, among other things that it is inequitable to require her to remove the structure. She also contends that it is not a dwelling. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Purchaser of real property at a non-judicial foreclosure sale brought an unlawful detainer
action against the original homeowners when they refused to vacate the property after the
sale. The homeowners brought a separate action against their mortgage servicer and the
purchaser alleging, inter alia, wrongful foreclosure. The trial court dismissed the
homeowners’ complaint against the purchaser and granted the purchaser’s motion for
summary judgment with regard to the detainer action because there was no genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the purchaser was entitled to possession of the property.
Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a final order entered on November 23, 2022. The Notice of Appeal
was not filed with the Appellate Court Clerk until June 27, 2023, more than thirty days
from the date of entry of the order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because
the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Because “[t]here is absolutely no doubt that wrongful foreclosure can be raised as
an affirmative defense to an unlawful detainer action brought by the purchaser of property
in foreclosure[,]” Davis v. Williams, No. E2010-01139-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 335069, at
*3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2011), no appl. perm. appeal filed (citations omitted), I
respectfully dissent. The reasoning behind this defense is evident—to protect those who
are wrongfully foreclosed upon from losing their home. The Hances availed themselves
of the defense of wrongful foreclosure, just as Tennessee law provides. The Hances’
wrongful foreclosure lawsuit against Nationstar is still pending.1 While I cannot know the
future outcome of the wrongful foreclosure lawsuit, neither can the majority. Under the
majority’s holding, the decision in the wrongful foreclosure suit is immaterial. The Hances
could prevail in their wrongful foreclosure lawsuit against Nationstar and still be ejected
from their home by JCR leaving them with the hollow “victory” of attempting to collect
on a money judgment against Nationstar. Their home would be lost to them despite their
win. Such a result would be deeply unjust and contrary to longstanding Tennessee
precedent that wrongful foreclosure is a defense to a detainer action.

Appellant filed this action against his local election commission seeking to prevent a candidate from being placed on the ballot of the August 4, 2022 Robertson County election for circuit court clerk. We dismiss this appeal as moot.

This is a breach of contract action in which the plaintiff staffing agency alleged nonpayment
in accordance with the terms of its agreement with the defendant company. The
plaintiff sought recovery from the defendant company, its successor company, and
individuals involved in the sale of the defendant company to its successor. The trial court
awarded judgment in favor of the plaintiff. We affirm.

Defendant, Carl Paige, pleaded guilty to attempted second degree murder and agreed to an eight-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to a term of eight years to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his request to suspend his sentence to probation. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Deshaun Ward, appeals from the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s revocation of the probation that he had received for his negotiated plea to reckless vehicular homicide and two counts of vehicular assault. On appeal the Defendant contends that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel at his probation revocation hearing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiffs brought suit alleging breach of contract and the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing against the mortgage servicer of their loan. The mortgage servicer sought summary
judgment on two grounds: (1) an absence of privity and (2) its actions did not violate any
provision of the contract. The Plaintiffs conceded that the mortgage servicer’s actions did
not violate any specific term of the contract and indicated their suit exclusively relied on a
claim predicated upon breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the mortgage servicer. The trial court
acknowledged but declined to rule upon the mortgage servicer’s privity argument and
instead granted summary judgment based on its conclusion that a breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing cannot occur in the absence of a breach of a specific term of
the contract. The Plaintiffs appealed. We affirm the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment on the ground that there is no privity of contract between the Plaintiffs and the
mortgage servicer.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s denial of a petition for emergency custody and its
sua sponte entry of a joint mutual restraining order between the parents involved in a
custody dispute. We affirm.

This is a post-divorce dispute. Two primary issues are presented, whether the trial court
erred by (1) holding the mother in civil contempt for violating the Permanent Parenting
Plan and the Parental Rights Statute and (2) reversing the Shelby County Divorce Referee’s
ruling regarding the father’s child support obligations. For the reasons set forth below, we
reverse the findings of contempt as well as the ruling setting aside the Divorce Referee’s
ruling and remand with instructions to reinstate the Order Confirming the Divorce
Referee’s Ruling.

In this divorce action, Wife appeals the trial court’s classification and distribution of assets,
formation of a parenting plan, and calculation of Husband’s child support obligation. Wife
also appeals the denial of her petition for criminal contempt. As appellee, Husband raises
issues regarding the allocation of the parties’ equity in the marital property, the enrollment
of the child in private school, and the distribution between the parties of education expenses
for the child. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s decisions regarding the division of
the parties’ property after minor modification, vacate the trial court’s decisions regarding
child custody and child support, and remand the case to the trial court for further
proceedings. Wife is barred from appealing the denial of her criminal contempt petition
and we decline to award Wife her attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

The Chester County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Jerry Ray Mullins, for the first-degree
murder of the victim, Samantha Melendez. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of the
lesser-included offense of second degree murder. The trial court imposed a twenty-twoyear
sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues
that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction because he acted in self-defense
when he shot the victim twice in the head. Following our review of the entire record and
the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Elizabeth Christmas and John M. Kington were romantically involved for many years.
When the parties’ relationship ended, Dr. Kington reported to the Hamilton County
Sheriff’s Office (“the Sheriff’s Office”) the theft of several items of jewelry from his home.
At the conclusion of the Sheriff’s Office’s investigation, a grand jury indicted Ms.
Christmas for theft of property valued at more than $250,000. The State of Tennessee (“the
State”) later dismissed the charge of theft before the case proceeded to trial. Ms. Christmas
subsequently filed a complaint and an amended complaint against Dr. Kington in the
Hamilton County Circuit Court (“Trial Court”) alleging, inter alia, malicious prosecution
and abuse of process. Dr. Kington filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Trial
Court granted. Ms. Christmas appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the
judgment of the Trial Court.

The defendant, Benjamin Spencer Brown, appeals the trial court’s imposition of
consecutive sentences for his Hamilton County Criminal Court jury convictions of
criminally negligent homicide and reckless endangerment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Sean Longmire, of one count of first degree
murder and three counts of attempted first degree murder. On appeal, the Defendant asserts
that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review, we
affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Glenard Cortez Thorne, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis by the Davidson County Criminal Court, arguing the trial court erred in dismissing the petition because newly discovered evidence exists in his case. After our review, we conclude the petition is untimely and does not present a cognizable claim for coram nobis relief. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Defendant, James Stephen Carder, was indicted by the Marshall County Grand Jury for 36 counts of theft of property in amounts ranging from less than $1,000 to $60,000 and two counts of aggregate theft in an amount greater than $60,000 but less than $250,000. Five of the theft counts were dismissed after the close of the State’s proof, and a petit jury convicted Defendant of 24 theft counts and both aggregate theft counts. The trial court merged those individual theft convictions involving the same victim and also merged the two counts of aggregate theft, and the court sentenced Defendant as a Range II offender to an effective 20 years’ incarceration and ordered him to pay $134,990 in restitution. In this appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and that law enforcement improperly investigated the case and interfered with his contracts. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand this case to the trial court for entry of amended judgment forms to reflect the merger of the 24 individual theft convictions into count 37, the one aggregate theft conviction.

The pro se Defendant, Marquette Benson, aka Marquette Mukes, appeals the summary
denial of his September 6, 2022 Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to
correct an illegal sentence. Because it is clear that the Defendant’s September 6, 2022
filing is merely a request for the trial court to reconsider its denial of the Defendant’s first
Rule 36.1 motion, which was summarily denied on October 4, 2021 for failure to state a
colorable claim, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

This is an appeal from a divorce decree that was initially entered in 2017, but the divorce action was not finalized until 2022. In this appeal, Wife argues that the trial court should not have divorced the parties because there were no valid grounds for divorce. Because the parties executed a valid marital dissolution agreement agreeing to be divorced on the ground of irreconcilable differences, we affirm the trial court’s decision to declare the parties divorced. We modify the divorce decree, however, to provide that Wife is awarded the divorce on that ground, consistent with the parties’ agreement. We further award Husband his attorney’s fees as required under the marital dissolution agreement.