APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant, James Edward Church, Jr., pled guilty to eleven counts of theft of property valued at less than $500, three counts of burglary, one count of resisting arrest, four counts of auto burglary, and one count of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 in Bedford County. The trial court was to determine the manner and length of the sentences at a sentencing hearing. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of approximately twelve years and six months. Appellant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. After a review of the record and the evidence, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 51. An employee, who was rendered permanently and totally disabled following a compensable back injury, suffered severe depression after his employer informed him that his employment had been terminated. He filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking workers’ compensation benefits. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the employee’s depression was compensable and, therefore, that the employee was entitled to receive medical benefits for treatment. The employer asserts on this appeal that the trial court erred by admitting the testimony of the employee’s evaluating psychiatrist and that the award of benefits is inconsistent with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(15) (2008 & Supp. 2011). We affirm the judgment.
 

Petitioner, a police officer for the Memphis Airport Police Department (“MAPD”), was terminated by the Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority (“MSCAA”) for violating several of its policies and procedures. On appeal to this Court, Petitioner argues that MSCAA’s policies, and its application of those policies, violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Petitioner also argues that MSCAA violated his equal protection rights by applying its policies and procedures in a disparate fashion. After throughly reviewing the record, we find no basis for Petitioner’s claims. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Bureau of TennCare filed a petition to appoint an administrator of Omer Stidham’s estate in order to file a claim against the estate for medical assistance rendered. The court appointed an administrator, and the Bureau of TennCare filed its claim. The administrator found that the estate was insolvent but moved the court to determine whether real property held in a revocable trust could be used to satisfy the debts of the estate. The heirs objected, arguing that the claim was untimely and that the property could not be reached because it was held in a revocable trust. The court authorized the use of the property to satisfy the debts of the estate, finding that the claim was not untimely and that the revocable trust was subject to claims against the estate. The heirs appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Gary R. Bunton, appeals the Johnson County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he is being illegally restrained because his probation and community corrections sentences expired before revocation warrants were filed. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the habeas corpus court properly dismissed the petition.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 51. After the employee sustained a compensable back injury, he filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits in the Chancery Court for Macon County. During the bench trial, the trial court admitted, over the employer’s objection, testimony from a physician selected through the Medical Impairment Registry (“MIR”) stating that the employee’s impairment arose from a work-related injury. The trial court thereafter awarded the employee permanent disability benefits based on a 6% impairment. We affirm the judgment.
 

An employee of an agency of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) was discharged after she filed complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and a lawsuit against Metro alleging employment discrimination. The employee appealed her termination to the Metro Civil Service Commission and eventually settled the appeal, receiving backpay and other consideration in exchange for her agreement not to apply for or accept future employment with the agencythat discharged her. The employee subsequently filed a complaint against Metro alleging, among other things, retaliatory discharge in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). Metro filed a motion seeking summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, reasoning that the employee could not establish that her termination constituted an adverse employment action because she had accepted backpay and agreed not to be reinstated as part of the settlement of her Civil Service Commission appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We conclude that the employee’s acceptance of the settlement does not preclude her from establishing that her termination constituted an adverse employment action for purposes of her federal retaliatory discharge claims. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacate the judgment of the trial court granting Metro summary judgment, and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
 

Defendants, Marvin Christopher Long, Desmond Shelton Spann, and Dontillus Williams, were indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for possession with intent to deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school and for conspiracy of the same offense, both Class A felonies. Following a jury trial, all three defendants were convicted as charged. Defendant Long was sentenced by the trial court as a career offender to 60 years’ incarceration for each conviction with his sentences to be served concurrently; Defendant Spann was sentenced as a multiple offender to 25 years’ incarceration for each conviction with his sentences to be served concurrently; and Defendant Williams was sentenced as a persistent offender to 40 years’ incarceration with his sentences to be served concurrently. Defendants appeal and assert the following: 1) Defendant Long challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court’s classification of him as a career offender; 2) Defendant Spann challenges the trial court’s jury verdict form regarding the schedule of the controlled substance, challenges the trial court’s instructions as to lesser-included offenses, and argues the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury regarding the weight of the controlled substance; and 3) Defendant Williams challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence. After a careful review of the record before us, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

During a robbery, one of the defendants shot the victim in the leg. Although the bullet passed through the victim’s leg, the wound required minimal medical treatment and did not cause the victim to suffer a loss of consciousness, extreme pain, disfigurement, or impairment. The defendants were convicted of especially aggravated robbery and aggravated robbery. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions. We modify the convictions for especially aggravated robbery to convictions for aggravated robbery because the victim did not suffer a serious bodily injury as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-403 (2010) and remand to the trial court for resentencing.

The Defendant-Appellant, Kevin Anthony Graham, entered a guilty plea in the Hawkins County Criminal Court to the charged offense of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony, and requested that the trial court grant him judicial diversion or an alternative sentence. At that time, the State informed the court that the parties agreed Graham would be sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to a sentence of three years with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the court, in the event that the court denied judicial diversion. Graham was subsequently sentenced to three years’ incarceration. On appeal, Graham contends that the trial court erred in denying: (1) judicial diversion and (2) an alternative sentence. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying a sentence of split confinement. Although the trial court properly denied judicial diversion, full probation, and a community corrections sentence, we reverse the judgment and remand the case with instructions to the trial court to enter an order sentencing Graham to serve 90 days’ confinement in the Hawkins County Jail before serving the remainder of his three-year sentence on supervised probation.

I concur with the Court’s conclusions that all gunshot wounds do not necessarily cause bodily injury that involves a “substantial risk of death” for the purpose of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106(a)(34)(A) (2010). I also agree that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that the particular gunshot wound Mr. Westbrooks received involved a substantial risk of death. Accordingly, I join the Court’s decision to vacate Messrs. Farmer’s and Turner’s convictions for especially aggravated robbery and to remand for resentencing for aggravated robbery. I have chosen to write separately to highlight the important role that expert medical testimony must play in many cases in which the State must establish that the injury to the victim carried with it a substantial risk of death.

The Defendant, Nathaniel Kelly, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence and order of incarceration. The Defendant contends (1) that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his community corrections sentence and placing his original sentence into effect, instead of ordering a period of shock incarceration followed by release to community corrections, and (2) that the trial court did not issue a statement setting forth the evidence or factors it relied upon in making its determination to revoke his sentence. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s revocation of the Defendant’s community corrections sentence.

The defendant, a Pennsylvania corporation, challenges the trial court’s decision to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Based upon the defendant’s initiation of a contractualrelationship with a Tennessee manufacturerand itsentry into a contractproviding that Tennessee law would control, we affirm the trial court’s decision to exercise jurisdiction in this dispute arising out of the contract.
 

The Defendant, Jonathan Radford, pled guilty to two counts of facilitation of aggravated robbery. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Defendant, as a Range I offender, to two concurrent five-year sentences and ordered him to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days in confinement, with the remainder to be served on supervised probation. The Defendant’s probation officer filed a probation violation report, the second such report filed against the Defendant. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation for a second time and ordered that he serve the balance of his sentences in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it revoked his probation. After reviewing the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Defendant-Appellant, Demariceo Chalmers, appeals as of right his convictions for attempt to commit aggravated robbery and first degree murder committed during the perpetration of an attempted aggravated robbery. He received a sentence of five years for the attempt to commit aggravated robbery to be served concurrently with a sentence of life imprisonment for the felony murder. In this appeal, the sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction of felony murder. Specifically, Chalmers contends that the State failed to prove felony murder because he abandoned his intent to commit the underlying felony prior to shooting and killing the victim. After reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The father has appealed from an order entered on September 20, 2011, granting the mother’s motion to dismiss the father’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 motion but reserving several other matters for a final hearing. Because the order appealed does not resolve all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.
 

Petitioner, William A. Stafford, pled guilty to facilitation of aggravated kidnapping and was sentenced to nineteen years in incarceration. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus relief that was dismissed by the habeas corpus court. After a thorough review of the record and briefs on appeal, we conclude that Petitioner has not shown that his sentence was void or that his confinement was illegal. Therefore, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of his petition.

This appeal involves claims arising from a verbal exchange at a gas station. The plaintiff customer gave cash to a clerk employed at the defendant gas station to pay for gas. After a verbal exchange between the clerk and the customer, the customer left the gas station. The customer promptly filed this lawsuit, alleging a variety of tort claims, including defamation, false light in the public eye, and infliction of emotional distress. The complaint sought damages in excess of a billion – with a “b”– dollars. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant gas station. The customer appeals. We affirm.

Following the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss, the Defendant-Appellant, Jerell Reed, entered guilty pleas to tampering with evidence, a Class C felony, and simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor, and purported to reserve a certified question of law regarding whether his attempt to dispose of less than onehalf ounce of marijuana constituted the felony offense of tampering with evidence. Because Reed failed to properly reserve the certified question, we dismiss the appeal.

In this conversionaction,the trialcourtentered judgmentagainstthe defendantupon findings that she abused a confidential relationship, exerted undue influence, and improperly converted funds of her sister while she had dementia. The defendant appeals contending the action is time barred; she also contends the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence the deposition of her sister’s physician because she did not receive notice of the deposition. We have determined that the statute of limitations was tolled from the accrual of the claim of conversion until the death of the defendant’s sister due to the sister being of unsound mind and that the action was timely filed after her death. We also find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the deposition into evidence because the trial court afforded the defendant the opportunity to depose the physician but she failed to do so. Accordingly, we affirm.
 

Following an accident which claimed the life of their teenage son, the deceased’s parents filed claims for wrongful death and negligent infliction of emotional distress against the driver and owner of the car that struck their son. The parents also sought to recover from their own insurance company under the uninsured motorist provisions of their policy. The driverof the car settled, paying the deceased’s parents $25,000 for their wrongful death claim and $25,000 for their negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. The parents’ insurer paid them an additional $75,000 for the wrongful death claim but refused to pay any damages for their emotional injuries. The insurer contended that (1) emotional distress did not constitute “bodily injury” as defined in the policy, and (2) the “Each Person” limit in the policy had been met, here by exhausting any available coverage. The parents maintained that recovery for emotional harm was not precluded under the policy definition of “bodily injury” and that the “Each Person” limit had not been met. The trial court agreed with the parents and ruled in favor of coverage. The Court of Appeals reversed. We granted the parents’ application for permission to appeal to decide whether “bodily injury” as defined in the policy includes mental injuries standing alone. It does not. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
 

This appeal arises from a dependency and  neglect petition originally filed by the Department of Children’s Services in the Juvenile Court for Shelby County in May 2010. We dismiss the matter for lack of jurisdiction.

This is a premises liability case in which Karen Wright alleged that she slipped in a puddle of water and fell on the floor while exiting an Autozone store. She filed suit against Autozone Stores, Inc., claiming negligence. Autozone Stores, Inc. filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that Karen Wright could not prove that it caused the condition which led to her fall or that it had actual or constructive notice of the condition prior to her fall. Autozone Stores, Inc. also alleged that Karen Wright could not recover because she was 50 percent or more at fault for her injuries. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. Karen Wright appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.
 

In this interlocutory appeal, we must decide whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over a workers’ compensation case when the time stamp on the complaint is earlier than the “time noted” on the Benefit Review Conference Report, pursuant to Benefit Review Process Rule 0800-2-5-.09(2). Because a workers’ compensation action may not be filed under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(a)(2)(A) (2008) until exhaustion of the benefit review conference process, we hold that when subject matter jurisdiction over a workers’ compensation case depends upon the issuance of a Benefit Review Conference Report, the “time noted on the Report” is controlling. Moreover, we hold that the time stamp on the complaint,if unambiguous,maynotbe impeached with extrinsic evidence. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the employer’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismiss this action.
 

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights upon its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, of abandonment, persistence of conditions, and that termination is in the best interests of the children. We conclude that the trial court erred in finding persistence of conditions. However, we affirm the trial court’s finding of abandonment and that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children.