APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Devarick D. Nicks, pled guilty in the Montgomery County Circuit Court to two counts of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court was to determine the length and manner of service of the sentences. After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received an effective eight-year sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). The appellant contends on appeal that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his sentences in confinement. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights. She asserts the trial court
erred in holding that she engaged in conduct exhibiting a wanton disregard for the welfare
of the children prior to her incarceration and that termination was in the children’s best
interest. We have determined there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support
the trial court’s finding that Mother abandoned her children as proscribed by Tenn. Code
Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) and that terminating her parental rights is in the children’s best
interest. We affirm.

Defendant, Larry Wade, was indicted by the Hamilton County Grand Jury for premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. Following a pretrial hearing on Defendant’s motion to suppress, which the trial court took under advisement, Defendant entered a guilty plea to second degree murder on the same day as the suppression hearing. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court denied after two separate hearings. On appeal, Defendant asserts that the trial court’s failure to rule on his motion to suppress prior to accepting his guilty plea violated his due process rights, and consequently, Defendant’s guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered, and Defendant asserts that it was a manifest injustice to deny Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jason Clinard, appeals the Hickman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner, who was convicted of first degree murder, contends that his conviction was illegal because he was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole, which he states contravenes statute. Upon a review of the record in this case, we conclude that the habeas corpus court properly denied the petition for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.
 

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the post-conviction court erred in failing to allow the Petitioner to amend his petition during the evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner sought to amend his petition to allege another ground for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the amendment would have raised the issue of trial counsel’s failure to assert the trial court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial in the Petitioner’s motion for new trial or on direct appeal. The motion for a mistrial related to the admission of impermissible character evidence regarding prior, uncharged bad acts during the prosecutor’s opening statement.

The petitioner, Ricardo Rodriguez, brings a post-conviction challenge to his 2004 guilty plea for sale of a controlled substance based on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010), in which the Court concluded that trial counsel’s failure to advise a defendant that his guilty plea would result in deportation amounted to deficient representation. In this case, the post-conviction petition was not filed within the one-year limitations period specified by the Tennessee Post-Conviction Procedure Act, and it was dismissed by the post-conviction court based on the statute of limitations at Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-30-102(a). The petitioner contends that Padilla should be retroactively applied and that his claim falls into an exception to the statute of limitations for new constitutional rules with retrospective application. See T.C.A. § 40-30-102(b)(1) (2006). Alternatively, the petitioner claims that due process tolls the statute of limitations or that the rule is an old rule with retroactive application. The petitioner also challenges the knowing and voluntary nature of his plea and brings a habeas corpus challenge based on his incomplete knowledge of English. We conclude that, because Padilla does not warrant retroactive application and because due process does not require the statute of limitations to be tolled, the petition was time-barred. We further conclude that the post-conviction court properly denied relief on the petitioner’s remaining claims and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
 

In 2003, Carol Ann Graybeal (“the Client”) filed this action against her former attorney and lover, Howell H. Sherrod, Jr. (“the Lawyer”), after he refused to give her an accounting regarding an investment she had made through him. In response to her demand for an accounting, he had accused her of stealing and damaging property, the value of which allegedly exceeded the value of her investment. In the answer later filed to her suit, he demanded a setoff; his answer was joined with a counterclaim seeking relief with respect to the stolen and damaged goods. Six years later, the case came on for trial. The court entered its first judgment on April 23, 2010 (“the April 2010 judgment”). The court found in favor of each of the parties regarding various of their respective claims, with the result that the Lawyer received a net judgment of $10,760.13, before interest. The Client filed a motion to alter or amend the April 2010 judgment. The court entered a second, almost identical, judgment on September 15, 2010 (“the September 2010 judgment”), in which it denied the Client’s motion. The Lawyer later filed a motion for discretionary costs as well as a motion to alter or amend the September 2010 judgment. In March 2011, the Client filed a motion for relief from the September 2010 judgment. In an order entered August 5, 2011 (“the August 2011 judgment”) and designated as “final,” the court granted the motion for discretionary costs in part, denied the Lawyer’s motion to alter or amend, and granted the Client’s motion for relief with respect to the calculation of prejudgment interest and the taxing of costs. The Lawyer appeals from the August 2011 judgment. The Client attempts to raise several issues of her own. We conclude that the merits of one of the earlier judgments – the September 2010 judgment – are not before us because what the Lawyer has labeled as a “motion to alter or amend” that judgment is not, despite its label, one of the motions recognized by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.01 as having the effect of “extending the time for taking steps in the regular appellate process.” We find no reversible error in the August 2011 judgment. Accordingly, we affirm that judgment.

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights upon finding that four grounds for termination had been established – the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the provisions of the permanency plan, abandonment by willful failure to visit and support, and failure to establish parentage, and that termination of Father’s rights was in the child’s best interest. We have determined that three grounds for termination were established by the requisite proof and that termination of his rights is in the child’s best interest. Therefore, we affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights.

The Defendant-Appellant, Richard Hanke, Sr., entered a plea of guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to robbery (count one), aggravated burglary (count two), aggravated assault (count three), and two counts of kidnapping (counts four and five), all Class C felonies. He additionally pleaded guilty to retaliation for past action (count six) and possession of a weapon with intent to employ in offense (count seven), both Class E felonies. The trial court imposed a term of six years’ confinement for the robbery, aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and each kidnapping. It further imposed a sentence of two years for possession of a weapon with intent to employ in offense and retaliation for past action. The trial court ordered the concurrent term of six years’ confinement in counts one, two, and four to be served consecutively to the concurrent term of six years’ confinement imposed in counts three, five, and seven. Count six was ordered to be served consecutively to all other counts, for an effective sentence of fourteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred in ordering partially consecutive sentencing. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

On March 6, 2008, the Defendant-Appellant, Christopher Seth Haley, was indicted in case number 199-2008 for violating the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender’s Act (MVHOA), evading arrest, possession of a Schedule II controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and conviction of two or more prior offenses of simple possession or casual exchange of a controlled substance thatcould be used to enhance his punishment for the third offense of simple possession of a controlled substance pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-418(e). On June 6, 2008, Haley was indicted in case number 4502008 for possession of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II drug with the intent to sell or deliver. On March 30, 2009, he entered guiltypleas in case number 199-2008 to the offenses of violating the MVHOA and evading arrest, Class E felonies, and in case number 450-2008 to the offense of possession of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II drug with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony, and the State entered a nolle prosequi for the remaining charges in case number 199-2008. On June 10, 2010, Haley was indicted in case number 439-2010 for felony escape and two counts of felony failure to appear. On September 30, 2010, Haley entered a guilty plea in case number 439-2010 to one count of failure to appear, a Class E felony, and the State entered a nolle prosequi for the remaining counts in that case number. On December 10, 2010, the trial court sentenced Haley as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent sentences of two years for violating the MVHOA conviction, two years for the evading arrest conviction, and ten years for the possession of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II drug with the intent to sell or deliver conviction. The court also sentenced Haley as a Range II, multiple offender to a consecutive sentence of four years for the felony failure to appear conviction, for an effective sentence of fourteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Haley contends that the trial court erred in failing to consider any mitigating factors before imposing his sentence and erred in denying him an alternative sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Klein Adlei Rawlins, appeals the Sumner County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse. He was sentenced to consecutive sentences of life with the possibility of parole and twenty years. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred: (1) by concluding that he received the effective assistance of counsel; and (2) by denying his request for funds to assist post-conviction counsel in investigation of the post-conviction petition. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the denial of relief.

A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Mark Takashi, of aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect, Class A felonies. The trial court merged the convictions, and the appellant received a twenty-five-year sentence to be served at 100%. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing him to represent himself at trial and that his sentence is excessive. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The sellers of real estate brought this action against the successful bidder at a real estate auction after the bidder failed to close because she was unable to obtain a loan sufficient to purchase the property. The sellers later auctioned the property for a substantially lower price. It is undisputed that the buyer breached the contract by not closing and that the sellers are entitled to recover certain special damages; the buyer challenges the trial court’s award of $55,300 for the seller’s general damages for their loss of the benefit of the bargain. We have determined the trial court’s decision is not supported by competent evidence in the record and that the sellers failed to prove the fair market value of the property on the date of the breach was less than the contract price. Therefore, we reverse the award of $55,300 for the loss of the benefit of the bargain. We, however, affirm the award of special damages, specifically the expense of conducting a second auction and sale, property taxes paid between the date of the breach and the second sale, and prejudgment interest, which shall be calculated based upon the judgment as modified.

The Petitioner, Cortino Harris, appeals as of right from the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to investigate and call at trial several eyewitnesses to the crime. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Marc A. Crowder, was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of aggravated assault and aggravated robbery and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective term of nine years in the Department of Correction. He raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether he was denied his constitutional right to a jury of his peers by the lack of a fair cross-representation of the community among the venire members; and (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Christopher Wheeler, entered open guilty pleas to twenty counts of sexual exploitation of a minor and one count of aggravated statutory rape. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve sixteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court’s sentence is excessive and contrary to law and that concurrent sentencing on all counts would have been appropriate. Following our review, we conclude that the trial court did consider the purposes and principles of the sentencing act, that the evidence in the record does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the length of the Defendant’s sentence. Thus, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

This appeal concerns post-divorce motions to set aside a marital dissolution agreement. The parties were divorced based on a mediated marital dissolution agreement. Shortly after the final decree was entered, the appellant wife filed post-divorce motions to set aside the marital dissolution agreement. The original trial judge first recused herself as to certain issues in the proceedings, and then later recused herself as to the entire case, so the post-divorce matters were ultimately heard by a special judge. All told, the appellant wife filed over 83 post-divorce pleadings, most involving efforts to set aside the parties’ marital dissolution agreement. Eventually, the trial court denied the wife’s motions to set aside and awarded the appellee husband over $61,000 in fees as sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The wife now appeals. We affirm.

Husband and Wife were married for eight years when Husband filed for divorce. Husband had purchased 63 acres of real property before marrying Wife and split the property into two parcels. When dividing the property between the parties, the trial court determined the house and ten acres was Husband’s separate property, but the appreciation on that parcel was marital property pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B). The trial court determined the remaining 53 acres was Husband’s separate property and that Wife had no interest in that parcel. Wife appealed, claiming both parcels transmuted into marital property during the marriage. In the alternative, Wife argued that the increase in value of the other 53 acres was marital property due to work she performed on a guesthouse located on the 53-acre parcel. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellee corrections officer’s employment with the Shelby County Sheriff’s Office was terminated for appearing in a video in which he stated that he had been a gang member. The Civil Service Merit Board affirmed the termination. The officer filed a petition for judicial review in the Shelby County Chancery Court, arguing that there was not substantial and material evidence to sustain his termination and that the termination violated his First Amendment rights. The trial court ruled that the Civil Service Merit Board’s decision was not supported by substantial and material evidence. We reverse the trial court’s ruling that the Board’s decision was not supported by substantial and material evidence, but vacate and remand to the Civil Service Merit Board for consideration of Appellee’s First Amendment argument.

The Petitioner, Carlos C. Beasley, pro se, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his 1998 especially aggravated robbery conviction and resulting twenty-four-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying him habeas corpus relief. He argues that his conviction and sentence are void because the indictment was defective. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Putnam County jury convicted the Defendant, Gerald Eugene White, of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver and simple possession of oxycodone. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to an effective sentence of thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals, arguing that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it allowed testimony in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); (3) the State made an improper closing argument; and (4) the trial court improperly sentenced the Defendant as a career offender. After a thorough review of the record and relevant law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The case involves a lease-purchase agreement. The plaintiff is a truck driver. The co-defendants are two affiliated companies – a truckload hauling company and a leasing company. The plaintiff truck driver worked for the hauling company. The truck driver entered into a lease-purchase agreement with the leasing company to purchase the truck he drove in his work for the hauling company. His lease payments on the truck were made via weekly payroll deductions; the hauling company deducted the amount of the lease payments from the truck driver’s payroll and transferred those amounts to the leasing company on his behalf. If the driver earned less than the amount of the lease payment, the hauling company paid the lease payment anyway and the deficiency became a debt that the truck driver owed to the hauling company. At the end of the lease, the lease-purchase agreement required the truck driver to pay the residual value of the truck. He was allowed to pay this over the course of one year, also through weekly payroll deductions. After the final residual payment was made, the leasing company refused to give title of the truck to the plaintiff truck driver because he still owed money to the affiliated hauling company. The defendant leasing company then repossessed the truck and sold it. The plaintiff truck driver filed this lawsuit against both defendant companies, alleging breach of contract, conversion, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court granted summary judgment to the truck driver on his breach-of-contract claim, and it conducted a bench trial on the breach-of- contract damages and the remaining claims. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court held in favor of the plaintiff on all of his claims and awarded both compensatory and punitive damages. The defendants now appeal. We affirm the award of compensatory damages and reverse the award of punitive damages.

Father’s parental rights to his son were terminated on the ground that Father is confined in a correctional facility for more than ten years as a result of a criminal act and that the child was under the age of eight at the time of Father’s sentencing. Father contends that the trial court should have considered the possibility of his receiving parole in determining whether grounds for termination of his rights were present and whether termination was in the child’s best interest. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court.

This appeal involves the scope of the procedural due process rights of a public high school student facing discipline for an infraction of school rules of conduct. After injuring a younger student with his automobile on school property, the student was cited for an infraction of the student conduct rule proscribing reckless endangerment. The principal’s decision to suspend the student for ten days was upheld by a hearing board and a designee of the director of schools, and the school board declined to review the matter. Thereafter, the student and his family filed a petition for common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking judicial review of the disciplinary decision. Following a hearing during which the trial court  permitted the student and his family to present evidence regarding allegedly arbitrary, capricious, and illegal conduct by school officials that was not reflected in the record of the disciplinary proceedings, the trial court found that the school officials had violated the student’s procedural due process rights because one official had performed both prosecutorial and decision-making functions and because this official was biased against the student. The trial court also determined that the evidence did not support the conclusion that the student’s conduct amounted to reckless endangerment. Accordingly, the trial court directed the school system to expunge the student’s record and awarded the student and his family $371,845.25 in attorneys’ fees and $25,626.27 in costs. The Board of Education appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgments. Heyne v. Metropolitan Nashville Bd. of Pub. Educ., No. M2010-00237-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 1744239 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 6, 2011). We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

The Defendant, Nickalos Boyce, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.