APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an action to recover amounts due under a promissory note. The trial court awarded the plaintiffs $50,000.00 in compensatory damages, attorney’s fees of one-third of that amount, and prejudgment interest on both the compensatory damages and attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s judgment that the individual defendants are individually liable on the obligation and that the ad damnum clause permitted the plaintiffs to recover $50,000.00 in compensatory damages, plus attorney’s fees and prejudgment interest. We vacate the attorney’s fees award and remand for a determination of the plaintiffs’ reasonable attorney’s fees. We reverse the award of prejudgment interest on the attorney’s fees award only. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

A taxpayer who rented hygienically-clean textiles to its customers challenged the revocation of three industrial machinery tax exemption certificates that it had previously been issued. An administrative judge determined that the taxpayer was not entitled to the exemption because the taxpayer’s operations did not constitute “manufacturing” as they were not necessary for processing tangible personal property. The taxpayer appealed to the Chancery Court for Davidson County. The chancery court reversed after concluding that the administrative decision was not supported by substantial and material evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm the chancery court’s decision.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. As the majority notes, an administrative judge determined that the taxpayer’s sanitizing operations in this case do not constitute “manufacturing” as they are not “processing” tangible personal property. The administrative judge reasoned that a taxpayer is required to show that its activity fundamentally changes or transforms the property from the state or form in which it originally existed. Applying that standard, the administrative judge found that the state or form of the linens has not been changed or altered by the cleaning, as they remain the same linens before and after.

Petitioner, Clint Earl Sims, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s order denying him post-conviction relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel when he pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated assault, three counts of domestic assault, three counts of vandalism less than $1,000, one count of false imprisonment, and one count of violating an order of protection. Petitioner also argues counsel’s ineffective assistance rendered his guilty plea unknowing and involuntary. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we conclude Petitioner’s appeal is untimely, the interest of justice does not favor waiver of the untimely notice, and therefore, this appeal is dismissed.

Employee Patrece Edwards-Bradford filed a petition for benefit determination seeking permanent disability benefits for an alleged back injury. The Court of Workers' Compensation Claims denied Employee's claim, finding that she had not rebutted the presumption of correctness afforded to the causation and impairment opinions of her authorized treating physicians, and was therefore not entitled to permanent disability benefits. Employee has appealed, and the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for consideration and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm.

In 2020, the Defendant, Riki Kale Moss, was indicted for violation of the implied consent law, driving under the influence (“DUI”) by impairment, and DUI, per se. The Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence resulting from the traffic stop of his vehicle. The trial court granted the Defendant’s motion, and the State filed a motion to reconsider on the grounds that law enforcement had probable cause to stop the Defendant’s vehicle. The trial court issued a revised order denying the motion to suppress, and a jury convicted the Defendant of DUI by impairment and DUI per se. The Defendant appeals the denial of his motion to suppress and also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Defendant, Christopher David Pace, entered a partially open plea in which the length of his
sentence was agreed upon. The trial court would determine the manner of service at a
separate sentencing hearing. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred because
it relied only upon a “Specific Data Report” in sentencing Defendant. Alternatively,
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Defendant’s request
for alternative sentencing. The State concedes that it was reversible error for the trial court
to sentence Defendant without a presentence report. We find that the trial court erred in
failing to consider the validated risk and needs assessment as required by Tennessee Code
Annotated section 40-35-210(b)(8). However, we conclude that the issue is waived. We
further conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s
request for alternative sentencing. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Plaintiff brought suit alleging the Defendants failed to obtain informed consent prior to conducting a medical procedure.  The Defendants responded with a consent form signed by the Plaintiff detailing the potential side effects of the procedure of which the Plaintiff asserted he had not been informed, and they moved for summary judgment.  The Plaintiff argued the consent form in the present case was inadequate to establish informed consent.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.  The Plaintiff appealed, challenging the validity of the signed consent form based on an alleged misrepresentation and his inability to read because of an eye condition, and arguing, therefore, that there is a material question of fact as to whether informed consent was obtained.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The March 9, 2023 order from which the appellant has appealed was not effectively
entered. Therefore, there is no final appealable judgment, and this Court lacks jurisdiction
to consider this appeal.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. The juvenile court
terminated parental rights on the grounds of failure to provide a suitable home, substantial
noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistence of conditions, and failure to manifest
an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility for his child. The
court also determined that termination was in the child’s best interest. We agree and affirm.

The Defendant, Jessie Lee Short, was convicted by a Hardin County Circuit Court jury of
two counts of false imprisonment, a Class A misdemeanor, and three counts of assault, a
Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-302(a) (2018) (subsequently amended) (false
imprisonment); 39-13-101(a)(2) (2018) (assault). The trial court imposed concurrent
sentences of eleven months, twenty-nine days in confinement at 75% service. On appeal,
the Defendant contends that he was deprived of his right to equal protection under the law
when the State exercised a peremptory challenge against a black prospective juror without
articulating a valid race-neutral reason. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A foster mother filed a petition to terminate parental rights and adopt a minor child. This appeal concerns the rights of a putative father who signed a Voluntary Acknowledgment of Paternity asserting that he was the biological father of the minor child. We have determined that the foster mother had standing to challenge the VAP, and we affirm the trial court’s decision disestablishing the putative father’s status as legal father.

Mother appeals the trial court’s order dismissing her petition for civil contempt and
awarding Father a money judgment and his attorney’s fees. Because the trial court failed
to conduct an evidentiary hearing, we conclude that there was no evidence before it from
which to make a ruling. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand
with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing on all issues in this case.

Tennessee’s Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 34-6-201 to -218, includes a provision for limited statutory immunity from civil liability, under certain conditions, for health care providers who rely in good faith on health care decisions made by an apparent agent on a principal’s behalf. Id. § -208. Tennessee’s Health Care Decisions Act, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 68-11-1801 to -1815, includes a similar provision for limited statutory immunity from civil liability, under certain conditions, for health care providers who comply in good faith with health care decisions made by an apparent agent on a principal’s behalf. Id. § -1810. The health care decision in this case is the execution of an arbitration agreement with admission to a nursing home. The agreement was signed by an agent under a durable power of attorney for health care executed several years earlier. After the resident’s death, his estate filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the nursing home on negligence theories. On appeal from the trial court’s denial of the defendant nursing home’s motion to compel arbitration, we hold that the nursing home does not meet the requirements for limited statutory immunity from civil liability under either the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act or the Health Care Decisions Act. Consequently, the trial court did not err in considering evidence on whether the principal had the requisite mental capacity to execute the durable power of attorney for health care. We overrule the holding on the immunity provision in the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 34-6-208, in Owens v. National Health Corporation, 263 S.W.3d 876, 889 n.4 (Tenn. 2007), to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion. We affirm the trial court, reverse the Court of Appeals, and remand to the Court of Appeals.

The plaintiff purchased a home at an auction. The home was sold “as is.” The plaintiff
sued the defendant marketing firm which had advertised the property for auction, alleging
that it had actual knowledge of mold issues but did not disclose them to bidders, and that
it misrepresented the acreage of the real property. The plaintiff’s claims for breach of
contract, fraudulent concealment, and reckless misrepresentation proceeded to a jury trial.
The defendant moved for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff’s proof, which the
court denied, but did not renew its motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the proof.
After the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant did not file a post-trial
motion seeking a new trial. On appeal, we conclude that the defendant waived its right to
contest the trial court’s denial of its motion for a directed verdict by failing to file a motion
asking for a new trial as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(e). We
further conclude that the defendant waived appellate review of whether the evidence was
sufficient to support the jury’s verdict on the fraudulent concealment, breach of contract,
and reckless misrepresentation claims by failing to renew its motion for a directed verdict
at the close of all proof in the jury trial. We grant the plaintiff’s request for reasonable
attorney fees pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-1-122.

A tenured teacher appealed his dismissal for insubordination, neglect of duty, and
unprofessional conduct. Among other things, he argued that the decision of the Board of
Education lacked evidentiary support. After a de novo review, the trial court affirmed the
Board’s decision. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial
court’s factual findings. And the record supports the teacher’s dismissal for
insubordination, neglect of duty, and unprofessional conduct. So we affirm.

Petitioner, Mark Anthony Clemmons, appeals as of right from the Wilson County Criminal
Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his guiltypleaded
convictions for possession with intent to sell not less than one-half ounce nor more
than ten pounds of marijuana; possession with intent to sell a Schedule III controlled
substance (dihydrocodeinone); and two counts of sale of not less than one-half ounce nor
more than ten pounds of marijuana, for which the trial court imposed an effective twentyseven-
year sentence. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance
of counsel based upon trial counsel’s failure to explain the consequences of entering an
open plea. Following our review, we affirm.

A plaintiff obtained a default judgment against a corporation. Ten months later, the plaintiff moved to pierce the corporate veil and enforce the judgment against an alleged alter ego of the corporation. The trial court denied the motion. Because the judgment was final and the alleged alter ego was never made a party to the action, we affirm.

In this case of first impression, the State appeals the trial court’s sentencing hearing order
that the Defendant’s two life sentences be served concurrently after he was determined to
be ineligible for the death penalty due to intellectual disability pursuant to Tennessee Code
Annotated section 39-13-203(g) (Supp. 2021) (subsequently amended). The State argues
that the consecutive alignment of the Defendant’s original sentences remained final and
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider manner of service. The Defendant
responds that the trial court had jurisdiction to sentence him, including determining the
manner of service of his sentences, and did not abuse its discretion in imposing concurrent
life sentences. After considering the arguments of the parties, the rules of statutory
construction, and other applicable legal authority, we conclude that the trial court properly
acted within its discretion in conducting a hearing to determine the manner of service of
the Defendant’s life sentences. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed

The Defendant, Sarah N. Eakes, pleaded guilty to one count of child neglect, and the trial court sentenced her to serve eighteen months in confinement and denied her request for both an alternative sentence and judicial diversion. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied her requests for an alternative sentence and judicial diversion, and she asks this court to enter an order granting both. The State concedes that the trial court failed to consider or weigh the relevant factors in its denial, but it asks this court to remand the case for a new sentencing hearing. After review, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and grant judicial diversion. The matter is remanded to the trial court for the imposition of the conditions, and term of judicial diversion, with the term not to exceed eighteen months.

This appeal involves judicial review of the denial of approval to expand a private
construction and demolition waste landfill. The board overseeing the metropolitan
government’s solid waste management plan denied the application for expansion, finding
that expansion of the landfill was inconsistent with the waste management plan. The
operator of the landfill filed a petition for review in the Chancery Court for Davidson
County, arguing that the board failed to act within ninety days of receiving the application,
followed an uncertified plan, and lacked substantial and material evidence to support the
denial. The chancery court affirmed the board’s denial, and the operator has appealed. We
have determined that the operator waived its arguments regarding the plan’s certification
status by failing to raise those arguments before the board. We affirm the trial court’s
decision in all other respects.

The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks
jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The Defendant, Demarcus Taiwan Russell, Jr., was convicted by a Greene County Criminal
Court jury of driving under the influence (“DUI”), simple possession of marijuana, driving
on a suspended license, and speeding. He was sentenced by the trial court to an effective
term of 11 months, 29 days, suspended to supervised probation after service of two days in
the county jail. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his DUI
conviction and argues that the State made an improper closing argument. Based on our
review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The State appeals the trial court’s order granting the motion of the defendant, Mark David Bond, to suppress evidence seized during the search of his vehicle after a drug detection canine indicated the presence of narcotics during a sweep around the perimeter of the vehicle. The State challenges the trial court’s conclusion that the canine’s reaction was unreliable due to the canine’s inability to distinguish between the odor of illegal marijuana and the odor of legal hemp. After review, we reverse the trial court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress, reinstate the indictment against the defendant, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.