APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant-Appellant, Doris Sharphine Halliburton, was convicted by a Dyer County jury of aggravated assault, a Class D felony, and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to a term of three years, with Halliburton to serve one year in the Dyer County Jail before serving the remaining two years of her sentence on supervised probation. On appeal, Halliburton argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction and (2) her sentence was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

After pleading guilty to the indicted charges of conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, aggravated burglary, conspiracy to commit theft of property valued at $10,000 or more, and theft of property valued at less than $500, appellant, Colin D. Savage, was tried and convicted on the remaining charges of especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping. The trial court merged the convictions for conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary and conspiracy to commit theft of property valued at $10,000 or more and sentenced appellant to four years in confinement. The court pronounced a six-year sentence for the aggravated burglary conviction, twenty-four years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, twenty-four years for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for theft of property valued at less than $500. The trial court ordered that the sentences for especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping run consecutively to each other, with the remaining sentences running concurrently with them, resulting in an effective sentence of forty-eight years. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and claims the following errors: (1) the State’s evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court erred in declining to merge the convictions for especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping; and (3) the trial court erred in ordering the sentences to be served consecutively. After reviewing the record for sufficiency of the evidence, consecutive sentencing, and propriety of the trial court’s refusal to merge the convictions, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant-Appellant, Emmett Hartnest, Jr., was convicted by a Hardin County jury of driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with Hartnest to serve ten days in the Hardin County Jail before serving the balance of his sentence on supervised probation. On appeal, Hartnest argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and (2) his sentence was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right from the trial court’s denial of a motion for
recusal. Having reviewed the appellant’s petition for recusal appeal pursuant to the de novo
standard as required under Rule 10B, §2.06, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the
petitioner’s motion for recusal.

Defendant-Appellant, Jamel Marsh, was convicted by a Hamilton County jury of voluntary manslaughter and received a sentence of four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Marsh argues: (1) the trial court’s method of selecting and qualifying the jury violated Tennessee Code Annotated sections 22-2-308 and 22-2-313 and as well as Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); (2) the trial court erred in preventing defense counsel from cross-examining Rachel Hixson about whether she received preferential treatment in her unrelated criminal cases in exchange for her testimony against Marsh and erred in preventing defense counsel from making an offer of proof regarding this alleged preferential treatment, thereby violating Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); and (3) his sentence violated Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and his sentence was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment to show that the jury found Marsh guilty of voluntary manslaughter.

The Defendant-Appellant, Jonathan Lamont Jones, was indicted by a Dyer County grand jury of tampering with evidence, a Class E felony, and resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor. Jones was acquitted of tampering with evidence and convicted of resisting arrest. He was sentenced to six months probation after serving ninety days in confinement. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B
from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Having reviewed the appellant’s petition
for recusal appeal pursuant to the de novo standard as required under Rule 10B, § 2.06, we
affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the petitioner’s motion for recusal.

This appeal involves the termination of a father’s parental rights. The four children at issue were removed from the father’s home by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services due to neglect and abuse. After three years, the Department instituted termination proceedings. The juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights on grounds of abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and persistent conditions, but it declined to find abandonment by failure to support. The father appeals both the grounds for termination and the best interest finding. We reverse the trial court’s holding on abandonment by failure to support, affirm to the remainder, and so affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights.

In this parental termination case, the father was appointed counsel at the time the Court held a dependency hearing in the Juvenile Court and the Order appointing counsel in that proceeding also appointed the attorney for the subsequent termination of parental rights trial. When the Petition to terminate the father's parental rights trial was held, neither the father nor counsel appeared at trial and a Judgment was entered terminating the father's parental rights. On appeal, appellant argues that the statue and rule governing this proceeding required notification to the father's attorney. We vacate the Judgment of the Trial Court on the grounds that both the Court and the Department of Children's Services were charged with the knowledge that the appellee was appointed counsel and that the termination Petition's Judgment was prejudicial to the judicial process when the father's lawyer was not notified of the Petition or trial. We vacate and remand for a new trial.

This appeal concerns the termination of parental rights. The subject child is the eighth born to the appellant mother. The appellant mother failed a prenatal drug screen prior to the birth of the child at issue, so the appellee Tennessee Department of Children’s Services took the child into protective custody three days after birth. A permanency plan was adopted and the mother made efforts to comply with her permanency plan responsibilities. The Department filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights as to this child. The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights based on the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan and persistence of conditions. The mother now appeals only as to the grounds for termination. We reverse as to the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan but affirm as to the ground of persistent conditions. On that basis, we affirm the termination of parental rights.

This case involves a dispute over the ownership of a parcel of real property. Appellee church purchased the disputed property from the seller bank in 1974, but failed to record its deed. Through a clerical error, the seller bank sold the disputed property to Appellant real estate investor in 2008. Appellant promptly recorded his deed. After the investor demolished a portion of a wall constructed by the church on the disputed property, the church sued to quiet title and for damages. The trial court ruled that the deed to the investor was void as champertous because the church’s possession of the property was open and obvious at the time of conveyance. Thus the trial court ruled that the church was the true owner of the property. Although we affirm the decision of the trial court, we rely on grounds other than those found by the trial court.

A Madison County Circuit Court Jury found the appellant, Ameale Hudson, guilty of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion for a change of venue; (2) denying his motion to bar the State from referring to him by his nickname,“Pistol”; and (3) denying his motion to prohibit the admission of postmortem photographs of the victim. The appellant also contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This matter arose from a car accident between Traci Jones and Bernice Jones. At trial, the
jury found Bernice Jones 100% at fault and awarded Traci Jones a portion of her requested
relief. On appeal, Traci Jones argues that the trial court erred by reversing its pre-trial ruling
on a motion in limine, denying her motion for mistrial, and denying her motion for directed
verdict. We affirm the trial court’s decision.

A Gibson County grand jury indicted appellant, Christopher Alexander Jones, for first degree murder. The jury found appellant guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Specifically, he contends that the evidence did not show sufficient proof of premeditation and that his intoxication negated the required culpable mental state for this offense. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support appellant’s conviction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Memphis police officer was terminated after he was involved in a physical altercation with his girlfriend during which she sustained facial injuries. The Civil Service Commission upheld the termination, and the chancery court affirmed. In the initial appeal to this Court, we remanded for the Commission to make  findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Commission issued an amended decision with additional findings. Upon reviewing the amended decision, the chancery court  reversed the termination and reinstated the officer. The City appeals, arguing that the Commission’s decision was supported by substantial and material evidence. The officer presents numerous arguments in support of his assertion that reversal of the Commission was proper. We affirm the order of the chancery court in part, but we vacate the reinstatement of the officer and reinstate the Commission’s decision to uphold termination.

The Defendant, Matthew T. McGee, pleaded guilty to driving under the influence, first offense, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (2008). He was sentenced to an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days with forty-five days’ confinement and the remainder on probation. The Defendant’s plea agreement reserved two certified questions of law regarding the legality of the traffic stop. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is the second appeal in this case. In the first appeal we held that the parties did not have a contract for the sale of the property, and we remanded it back to the Trial Court to determine a reasonable fee in quantum meruit for the plaintiff as the facilitator of the sale. Upon remand, the Trial Court heard proof and held that plaintiff was entitled to a 6% commission on the sale price. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment as modified.

Plaintiff purchased a vent hood from defendant. The hood was paid for at the time of purchase and delivered, but was returned to defendant as being unworkable. Plaintiff brought this action for reimbursement of payment for the hood in Sessions Court. Sessions Court entered a Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appealed to the Circuit Court. The Circuit Judge entered Judgment for the plaintiff for $3,500 for the amount paid for the hood to defendant. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court's Judgment. 

Plaintiff in suit seeking to have court declare boundaries of fifteen acre tract of land appeals
the declaration of boundaries and award of the tract to Defendants, adjoining landowners.
Defendants appeal finding that Plaintiff adversely possessed a portion of the fifteen acre
tract. Finding no error, we affirm.

Jeffery D. Allen (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief, challenging his convictions for first degree felony murder, criminally negligent homicide, facilitation of attempted first degree murder, and attempted especially aggravated robbery. As his bases for relief, he alleged several grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that trial counsel (1) failed to call two witnesses to testify at trial, (2) failed to adequately cross-examine a witness, and (3) failed to move to sever the Petitioner’s offenses prior to trial. Upon a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Bethany Lorraine Kuykendall, pleaded guilty to theft of property valued at more than $1000 but less than $10,000, for which she was granted judicial diversion with the requirements that she complete two years of probation and pay $150 per month toward restitution. On appeal, she contends that the trial court abused its discretion in setting the restitution amount. Because we lack jurisdiction to consider her appeal, we dismiss it.

In January of 2011, Ezra Williams (“Plaintiff”) sued Stephen Leon Williams and Regions Bank . Plaintiff died in May of 2011. Regions Bank filed a Suggestion of Death. No motion for substitution of proper party was made within ninety days after Plaintiff’s death was suggested upon the record. In July of 2011, the attorney who had represented Plaintiff prior to Plaintiff’s death filed a Motion for Voluntary Dismissal. In October of 2011, Regions Bank filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The Trial Court granted the Motion for Voluntary Dismissal without prejudice. Regions Bank appeals to this Court. We hold that the Trial Court should have dismissed the case pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 25.01 for failure to timely move for substitution of proper party. We, therefore, vacate the Trial Court’s judgment and dismiss this case pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 25.01.

Petitioner, Bobby Lee Scales, Jr., filed a pro se etition for habeas corpus relief attacking two convictions of theft in Davidson County and one conviction of theft in Williamson County. The habeas corpus trial court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing, and Petitioner appeals. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus trial court.

This is the second time the attempt to recall Chattanooga’s mayor has been before this court. In the initial appeal, we concluded the trial court acted prematurely and without jurisdiction when it enjoined the election commission from placing the recall issue on the ballot, because the election commission, at that point in time, had not formally decided whether or not to certify the recall petition. After we vacated the void judgment of the trial court, the election commission certified the recall petition and the mayor again filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the petition process was flawed and to enjoin the placement of the recall issue on the ballot. The trial court found that the petition seeking the recall of the mayor is invalid and illegal because it does not comply with all the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-5-151. The leaders of the recall effort appeal. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Petitioner, Roger Brent Banks, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for six counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of solicitation of sexual exploitation of a minor. Petitioner pled guilty to three counts of aggravated sexual battery. The remaining counts were dismissed. As part of the plea agreement, Petitioner received an effective sentence of sixteen years at 100%, and was ordered to lifetime supervision after the service of the sentence. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief on the basis that his sentences were void and illegal. The petition was dismissed as untimely. Petitioner appeals. After a review of the record, we determine that the petition was properly dismissed as untimely as Petitioner failed to show any reason that the statute of limitations should be tolled. As a result, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.