APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Karen Stoner (“the Executrix”), in her capacity as the Executrix of the Estate of Irma M. Collins, brought suit against Brittany C. Amburn seeking to divest ownership of certain real property out of Amburn and into her name in her representative capacity. The suit was grounded in the Executrix’s claim that the subject property was fraudulently conveyed to Amburn by the latter’s stepfather, Larry C. Collins (“the Judgment Debtor”), a judgment debtor of the Estate. The Executrix alleged that the transfer was made for the purpose of shielding the property from execution on her judgment. At the conclusion of the proof in a jury trial, the court held that no reasonable minds could reach a conclusion other than that the conveyance was fraudulent in nature. The court directed a verdict in favor of the Executrix. The court vested all right, title and interest to the property in the Executrix. Amburn appeals. We affirm.

The Petitioner, William Fisher, appeals from the Hickman County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. He contends that his sentence has expired. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This Court issues a show cause order on July 19, 2012, directing the pro se incarcerated appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The appellant is seeking a review of the decision on a claim pending on the small claims docket of the Tennessee Claims Commission. "No appeal may be taken from a commissioner's decision regarding claims appearing on the small claims docket." Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-403(a)(2).

The Petitioner, Francisco Miquel Jose,appeals from the Putnam County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that his 2004 guilty plea to misdemeanor theft of property was not knowingly made because he was not advised of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea, that the statute of limitations should be tolled because Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), announced a new rule of constitutional law that did not exist at the time of his plea, and that due process requires tolling of the statute of limitations due to the circumstances surrounding his guiltyplea. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A management employee working for Ford Motor Company was to become an employee of Ford’s wholly owned subsidiary when the subsidiary was made an independent company. The manager wanted to remain employed by Ford and sought to transfer back to an hourly position before the spinoff took effect. The manager’s supervisor promised the manager his benefits and pay would not change as an employee of the subsidiary and that he could return to an hourly position with Ford after the spinoff until such time that the subsidiary was purchased by a third party. The subsidiary was purchased by a third party five years later, but Ford did not permit the employee to transfer back to Ford at that point. After the employee asked to transfer back to Ford, Ford offered its hourly employees a special retirement plan whereby they were offered lifetime health and pension benefits. The employee would have been eligible to participate in this plan if he had been allowed to transfer back to Ford. The employee filed suit against Ford, claiming promissory estoppel and seeking damages based on the amount he would have received under the special retirement plan. A jury found Ford liable for promissory estoppel and awarded the employee damages. Ford appealed, arguing (1) the employee’s claim was preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act and (2) the employee failed to prove all the elements of promissory estoppel. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
 

This is an appeal from a final order of dismissal in the Circuit Court, entered on April 11, 2012. The appellant did not filed a notice of appeal until August 9, 2012. This Court issued a show cause order directing appellant to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The appellant has responded to the show cause order by motion which does not show good cause why the appeal should not be dismissed.

The Petitioner, Calvin D. Norris, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2007 conviction for possession with intent to sell one-half gram or less of cocaine and his ten-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his guilty plea was unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent because he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A plastic surgeon entered into a five year lease on office space, and defaulted on the lease after the first month. The landlord’s attorney filed separate lawsuits in general sessions court for breach of the lease contracts against the lessee, who had personally guaranteed the lease, and against the lessee’s personal corporation. The landlord obtained duplicate judgments for unpaid rent as well as for attorney fees. The general sessions judge informed the landlord that he was only entitled to collect one judgment. The lessee appealed to the circuit court, but paid the general sessions judgment in full while the circuit court action was still pending. The landlord’s attorney then filed a “partial satisfaction of judgment” and another complaint for attorney fees in general sessions court, followed by another complaint in circuit court, alleging that additional rents had accrued while the litigation continued. The lessee responded by filing a complaint for abuse of process against the landlord’s attorney, alleging that the attorney filed meritless complaints in order to drive up the fees he could collect. The landlord’s attorney filed a motion for summary  judgment on the ground that the statute of limitations for abuse of process had passed, and that in any case no abuse of process could be shown. The trial court granted the motion. We affirm.

The appellant, Devarick D. Nicks, pled guilty in the Montgomery County Circuit Court to two counts of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court was to determine the length and manner of service of the sentences. After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received an effective eight-year sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). The appellant contends on appeal that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his sentences in confinement. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights. She asserts the trial court
erred in holding that she engaged in conduct exhibiting a wanton disregard for the welfare
of the children prior to her incarceration and that termination was in the children’s best
interest. We have determined there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support
the trial court’s finding that Mother abandoned her children as proscribed by Tenn. Code
Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) and that terminating her parental rights is in the children’s best
interest. We affirm.

Defendant, Larry Wade, was indicted by the Hamilton County Grand Jury for premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. Following a pretrial hearing on Defendant’s motion to suppress, which the trial court took under advisement, Defendant entered a guilty plea to second degree murder on the same day as the suppression hearing. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court denied after two separate hearings. On appeal, Defendant asserts that the trial court’s failure to rule on his motion to suppress prior to accepting his guilty plea violated his due process rights, and consequently, Defendant’s guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered, and Defendant asserts that it was a manifest injustice to deny Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this negligence case, the jury returned a verdict in the amount of the plaintiff’s medical
evaluation and treatment immediately following the accident as well as pain and suffering.
We find material evidence to support the verdict and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the
trial court.

In 2003, Carol Ann Graybeal (“the Client”) filed this action against her former attorney and lover, Howell H. Sherrod, Jr. (“the Lawyer”), after he refused to give her an accounting regarding an investment she had made through him. In response to her demand for an accounting, he had accused her of stealing and damaging property, the value of which allegedly exceeded the value of her investment. In the answer later filed to her suit, he demanded a setoff; his answer was joined with a counterclaim seeking relief with respect to the stolen and damaged goods. Six years later, the case came on for trial. The court entered its first judgment on April 23, 2010 (“the April 2010 judgment”). The court found in favor of each of the parties regarding various of their respective claims, with the result that the Lawyer received a net judgment of $10,760.13, before interest. The Client filed a motion to alter or amend the April 2010 judgment. The court entered a second, almost identical, judgment on September 15, 2010 (“the September 2010 judgment”), in which it denied the Client’s motion. The Lawyer later filed a motion for discretionary costs as well as a motion to alter or amend the September 2010 judgment. In March 2011, the Client filed a motion for relief from the September 2010 judgment. In an order entered August 5, 2011 (“the August 2011 judgment”) and designated as “final,” the court granted the motion for discretionary costs in part, denied the Lawyer’s motion to alter or amend, and granted the Client’s motion for relief with respect to the calculation of prejudgment interest and the taxing of costs. The Lawyer appeals from the August 2011 judgment. The Client attempts to raise several issues of her own. We conclude that the merits of one of the earlier judgments – the September 2010 judgment – are not before us because what the Lawyer has labeled as a “motion to alter or amend” that judgment is not, despite its label, one of the motions recognized by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.01 as having the effect of “extending the time for taking steps in the regular appellate process.” We find no reversible error in the August 2011 judgment. Accordingly, we affirm that judgment.

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights upon finding that four grounds for termination had been established – the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the provisions of the permanency plan, abandonment by willful failure to visit and support, and failure to establish parentage, and that termination of Father’s rights was in the child’s best interest. We have determined that three grounds for termination were established by the requisite proof and that termination of his rights is in the child’s best interest. Therefore, we affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights.

The Defendant-Appellant, Richard Hanke, Sr., entered a plea of guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to robbery (count one), aggravated burglary (count two), aggravated assault (count three), and two counts of kidnapping (counts four and five), all Class C felonies. He additionally pleaded guilty to retaliation for past action (count six) and possession of a weapon with intent to employ in offense (count seven), both Class E felonies. The trial court imposed a term of six years’ confinement for the robbery, aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and each kidnapping. It further imposed a sentence of two years for possession of a weapon with intent to employ in offense and retaliation for past action. The trial court ordered the concurrent term of six years’ confinement in counts one, two, and four to be served consecutively to the concurrent term of six years’ confinement imposed in counts three, five, and seven. Count six was ordered to be served consecutively to all other counts, for an effective sentence of fourteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred in ordering partially consecutive sentencing. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

On March 6, 2008, the Defendant-Appellant, Christopher Seth Haley, was indicted in case number 199-2008 for violating the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender’s Act (MVHOA), evading arrest, possession of a Schedule II controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and conviction of two or more prior offenses of simple possession or casual exchange of a controlled substance thatcould be used to enhance his punishment for the third offense of simple possession of a controlled substance pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-418(e). On June 6, 2008, Haley was indicted in case number 4502008 for possession of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II drug with the intent to sell or deliver. On March 30, 2009, he entered guiltypleas in case number 199-2008 to the offenses of violating the MVHOA and evading arrest, Class E felonies, and in case number 450-2008 to the offense of possession of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II drug with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony, and the State entered a nolle prosequi for the remaining charges in case number 199-2008. On June 10, 2010, Haley was indicted in case number 439-2010 for felony escape and two counts of felony failure to appear. On September 30, 2010, Haley entered a guilty plea in case number 439-2010 to one count of failure to appear, a Class E felony, and the State entered a nolle prosequi for the remaining counts in that case number. On December 10, 2010, the trial court sentenced Haley as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent sentences of two years for violating the MVHOA conviction, two years for the evading arrest conviction, and ten years for the possession of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II drug with the intent to sell or deliver conviction. The court also sentenced Haley as a Range II, multiple offender to a consecutive sentence of four years for the felony failure to appear conviction, for an effective sentence of fourteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Haley contends that the trial court erred in failing to consider any mitigating factors before imposing his sentence and erred in denying him an alternative sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Klein Adlei Rawlins, appeals the Sumner County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse. He was sentenced to consecutive sentences of life with the possibility of parole and twenty years. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred: (1) by concluding that he received the effective assistance of counsel; and (2) by denying his request for funds to assist post-conviction counsel in investigation of the post-conviction petition. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the denial of relief.

A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Mark Takashi, of aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect, Class A felonies. The trial court merged the convictions, and the appellant received a twenty-five-year sentence to be served at 100%. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing him to represent himself at trial and that his sentence is excessive. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The sellers of real estate brought this action against the successful bidder at a real estate auction after the bidder failed to close because she was unable to obtain a loan sufficient to purchase the property. The sellers later auctioned the property for a substantially lower price. It is undisputed that the buyer breached the contract by not closing and that the sellers are entitled to recover certain special damages; the buyer challenges the trial court’s award of $55,300 for the seller’s general damages for their loss of the benefit of the bargain. We have determined the trial court’s decision is not supported by competent evidence in the record and that the sellers failed to prove the fair market value of the property on the date of the breach was less than the contract price. Therefore, we reverse the award of $55,300 for the loss of the benefit of the bargain. We, however, affirm the award of special damages, specifically the expense of conducting a second auction and sale, property taxes paid between the date of the breach and the second sale, and prejudgment interest, which shall be calculated based upon the judgment as modified.

The Petitioner, Cortino Harris, appeals as of right from the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to investigate and call at trial several eyewitnesses to the crime. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Marc A. Crowder, was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of aggravated assault and aggravated robbery and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective term of nine years in the Department of Correction. He raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether he was denied his constitutional right to a jury of his peers by the lack of a fair cross-representation of the community among the venire members; and (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Christopher Wheeler, entered open guilty pleas to twenty counts of sexual exploitation of a minor and one count of aggravated statutory rape. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve sixteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court’s sentence is excessive and contrary to law and that concurrent sentencing on all counts would have been appropriate. Following our review, we conclude that the trial court did consider the purposes and principles of the sentencing act, that the evidence in the record does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the length of the Defendant’s sentence. Thus, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

This appeal concerns post-divorce motions to set aside a marital dissolution agreement. The parties were divorced based on a mediated marital dissolution agreement. Shortly after the final decree was entered, the appellant wife filed post-divorce motions to set aside the marital dissolution agreement. The original trial judge first recused herself as to certain issues in the proceedings, and then later recused herself as to the entire case, so the post-divorce matters were ultimately heard by a special judge. All told, the appellant wife filed over 83 post-divorce pleadings, most involving efforts to set aside the parties’ marital dissolution agreement. Eventually, the trial court denied the wife’s motions to set aside and awarded the appellee husband over $61,000 in fees as sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The wife now appeals. We affirm.

Husband and Wife were married for eight years when Husband filed for divorce. Husband had purchased 63 acres of real property before marrying Wife and split the property into two parcels. When dividing the property between the parties, the trial court determined the house and ten acres was Husband’s separate property, but the appreciation on that parcel was marital property pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B). The trial court determined the remaining 53 acres was Husband’s separate property and that Wife had no interest in that parcel. Wife appealed, claiming both parcels transmuted into marital property during the marriage. In the alternative, Wife argued that the increase in value of the other 53 acres was marital property due to work she performed on a guesthouse located on the 53-acre parcel. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellee corrections officer’s employment with the Shelby County Sheriff’s Office was terminated for appearing in a video in which he stated that he had been a gang member. The Civil Service Merit Board affirmed the termination. The officer filed a petition for judicial review in the Shelby County Chancery Court, arguing that there was not substantial and material evidence to sustain his termination and that the termination violated his First Amendment rights. The trial court ruled that the Civil Service Merit Board’s decision was not supported by substantial and material evidence. We reverse the trial court’s ruling that the Board’s decision was not supported by substantial and material evidence, but vacate and remand to the Civil Service Merit Board for consideration of Appellee’s First Amendment argument.