APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Bedford County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Alfonzo Marquis Sutton, of conspiracy to sell and deliver .5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance, cocaine. The trial court sentenced him as a Range III persistent offender to thirteen years, forty-five percent of which he was to serve in confinement before being eligible for release. On appeal, the appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, that prosecutorial misconduct warranted a mistrial, and that his sentence is excessive. Upon review, we conclude that prosecutorial misconduct warrants a new trial.

Defendant, Bruce D. Mendenhall, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for first degree premeditated murder, and he was convicted as charged following a jury trial. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life in prison. Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence and submits the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred by refusing to suppress evidence obtained from Defendant’s person, his truck, and his tractor trailer as a result of Defendant’s initial encounter with police Sgt. Postiglione, which Defendant asserts was a seizure not supported by reasonable suspicion; (2) whether the trial court erred by refusing to suppress Defendant’s statements to police officers; (3) whether Defendant’s statements to a fellow inmate should have been suppressed; (4) whether the trial court erred by admitting evidence that Defendant solicited another person to kill three potential witnesses; (5) whether the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to exclude portions of Defendant’s phone calls recorded while Defendant was incarcerated; (6) whether the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to present testimony from a ballistics expert at trial; (7) whether the trial court erred by admitting into evidence items recovered from Defendant’s truck; (8) whether the trial court erred by admitting into evidence photographs of the victim’s body; (9) whether the evidence is sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction; and (10) whether the trial court erred by ordering Defendant’s sentence to run consecutively to a previously imposed sentence. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A jury convicted the defendant, Cynthia Denise Gray, of one count of the promotion of the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class D felony, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-433 (2010). The trial court sentenced her to serve three years and six months in prison as a Range I standard offender. The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the length of the sentence, as well as the trial court’s refusal to impose an alternative sentence. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient and that there was no error in sentencing. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Donald A. Rogers, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his original three-year sentence in the Department  of Correction. He argues that the trial court erred in ordering full confinement, rather than imposing split confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is the second appeal by the father of three minor children challenging the termination of his parental rights. Mother’s parental rights were terminated in 2009 and are not at issue. In the first appeal, this Court found the Department of Children’s Services failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite the children with the father and therefore reversed the termination of Father’sparental rights.In re Keisheal,N.E.,No.M2009-02527-COA-R3-PT, 2010 WL 2176104, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 28, 2010). Following the first appeal, a new petition was filed. After the second trial, the trial court found the petitioners established the ground listed in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(8)(B)(i) that: “[t]he parent . . . is incompetent to adequately provide for the further care and supervision of the child because the parent’s . . . mental condition is presently so impaired and is so likely to remain so that it is unlikely that the parent . . . will be able to assume the care and responsibility for the child in the near future. . . .” The trial court further found the Department of Children’s Services made reasonable efforts to reunite the children with the father, and that termination was in the children’s best interest. We affirm.

This appeal involves a tort suit filed after a workplace injury. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that it was a statutory employer within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Law, Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-113, and therefore, it was immune from the tort claim asserted on behalf of the injured worker. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Harry Coleman, of second degree murder, aggravated assault, and two counts of assault. After a sentencing hearing, he received an effective eighteen-year sentence. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions and that he is entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the appellant’s convictions and the trial court’s denial of the motion for new trial. However, the case is remanded to the trial court for correction of a clerical error on two of the judgments.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Jackson Martin, of attempted second degree murder and two counts of carjacking. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the carjacking convictions and sentenced him to an effective sentence of twenty-two years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred by commenting to the jury about his failure to present alibi witnesses; (2) the trial court erred by refusing to give the jury an alibi instruction; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

 A Shelby County grand jury indicted petitioner, Ronald Woods, for three counts of assault. Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of assault, and the State agreed to dismiss the two remaining counts. During the plea hearing, petitioner also pleaded guilty to several offenses in an unrelated case that was pending in the criminal court. He received an agreed-upon effective sentence of six years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days for both cases. Petitioner requested post-conviction relief, alleging: (1) that the State engaged in vindictive prosecution; (2) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) that his guilty plea was involuntary; and (4) that he was denied due process of law. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Mother petitioned for criminal contempt against Father due to his alleged failure to pay child support as required and she further sought reimbursement for one-half of the children’s optical and dental expenses. Father counter-petitioned for contempt against Mother. The trial court found Father in criminal contempt, but it declined to impose incarceration. However, the trial court denied Mother’s request for optical and dental reimbursement, finding Father was under no obligation to pay such. We affirm in part and we reverse in part.
 

Husband appeals the trial court’s award of alimony and partial attorney’s fees to Wife in this divorce action. Finding no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, we affirm.

In this divorce proceeding, Husband appeals the trial court’s determination that, pursuant to the unclean hands doctrine, he is not entitled to proceeds of property sold in a partition action. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Gary Adams, of four counts of aggravated rape. The trial court imposed four, consecutive sentences of twenty-five years for a total effective sentence of 100 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his convictions, the trial court’s refusal to merge the convictions, and the sentences imposed by the trial court. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Mother and Father were divorced, and Mother was named the primary residential parent of their three children. Mother remarried and decided to relocate to California. Father opposed the relocation and sought to be named the primary residential parent. By the time of hearing, relocation of only one child was at issue. Father introduced expert testimony that the relocation would pose a threat of specific and serious harm to the child that outweighed the threat of harm to the child from a change of custody, as set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. §36-6108(d)(1)(B). Relying on the expert’s testimony, the trial court denied Mother the opportunity to relocate with the child to California. Mother appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Shawn Blair, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his two convictions for simple possession of marijuana and resulting consecutive sentences of eleven-months, twenty-nine days. On appeal, the petitioner contends that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because he was not advised by trial counsel or the trial court about the immigration consequences of his pleas. Upon review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on three minor children (“the Children”). The defendants are Russell C. (“Father”) and Brandy C. (“Mother”). The Children were taken into custody by the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) in January 2008 because of repeated injuries sustained by the oldest child. DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents in April 2010, alleging numerous grounds for termination. Following a bench trial, the court granted the petition after finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father and Mother were in substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans and that the conditions leading to removal still persisted. However, the trial court found that severe child abuse was not proven. The court did find, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the Children’s best interest. Father and Mother appeal. We reverse in part and affirm in part. Termination of the parents’ parental rights is affirmed.

Petitioner, Demetrius Byrd, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from felony drug convictions in which he alleged that his guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. More specifically he contends that (1) trial counsel failed to properly investigate his case to determine that Petitioner’s co-defendant, Dominic Jones, pled guilty to the cocaine offense under a separate indictment and accepted full responsibility for the offense; and (2) trial counsel insisted that he plead guilty to avoid federal prosecution. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, and we accordingly affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Robert Nelson Buford, III, of facilitation of first degree felony murder and facilitation of attempted especially aggravated robbery. After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received an effective thirty-five-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court should have suppressed his statement to police because he invoked his right to remain silent; (3) his prior bad acts were inadmissible; (4) the trial court should have given the jury a requested instruction; and (5) his effective sentence is excessive. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court erred by admitting the appellant’s statement into evidence because the appellant invoked his right to remain silent but that the error was harmless. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure of their claims for conspiracy, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from an alleged wrongful foreclosure.We affirm the trial court in all respects.

A Warren County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Samuel Moore, of attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, and assault. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of thirty-one years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the State’s failure to provide him with a verbatim transcript of the suppression hearing, the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, and the sentences imposed. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this case regarding title insurance company’s duty to seller of real property, the trial court found no factual dispute regarding the escrow agent’s apparent agency and granted summary judgment to title insurance company against seller of real property. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a divorce. Harold Dean McDaniel (“Husband”) sued Kimberly Ruth McDaniel (“Wife”) for divorce in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). After a long and contentious legal battle, including an earlier appeal to this Court and subsequent remand for a new trial, the Trial Court entered its supplemental final decree of divorce. Wife appeals, raising a number of issues. We hold that the Trial Court did not adequately compute child support, and, therefore remand for its proper computation. We also modify the allocation of guardian ad litem fees. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court as modified, in part, and vacated, in part.

This is a declaratory judgment action wherein one insurance company, which provided general liability insurance coverage to the insured, asserts that another insurance company, which provided the same insured with automobile insurance coverage, had the primary duty to pay the cost of defending and to indemnify the insured in a third-party tort action filed pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-112. The plaintiff insurer asserts that the defendant insurer had the primary duty to provide and pay the cost of the defense in that action and to indemnify the insured pursuant to its automobile insurance policy because an additional insured was operating a “boom truck” owned by the insured that was listed under the defendant’s auto policy when the injury to the third-party plaintiff occurred.Both insurers filed motions for summary judgment.The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion and granted summary judgment to the defendant insurer holding that the plaintiff, not the defendant, is liable for providing and paying the cost of the defense and for indemnifying the insured in the third-party tort action. We affirm.

Robin M.G. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to her minor children, Daniel E.S. and Jacob A.G. (“the Children”). At separate times, the Children 1 were removed to the custody of the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) and were placed in foster care. DCS took custody of Daniel after he pleaded “true” to disorderly conduct and was adjudicated unruly. A year later, DCS petitioned the court to declare both Children dependent and neglected in Mother’s care and took Jacob into immediate protective custody. After the Children were adjudicated as being dependent and neglected, DCS implemented a permanency plan for each and worked with Mother for two years in a failed effort to reunify the family. DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. After a bench trial, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple grounds for terminating Mother’s rights exist and that termination is in the best interest of the Children. Mother appeals. We affirm.

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee alleged that he sustained compensable injuries to both shoulders. His employer conceded the compensability of the right shoulder injury, but denied the left shoulder claim. An examination was done by a physician through the Medical Impairment Registry(“MIR”) regarding the right shoulder claim. The trial court found that the presumption of correctness of the MIR impairment opinion had been overcome by clear and convincing evidence as to the right shoulder injury. The trial court also concluded that the left shoulder injury was compensable and awarded benefits accordingly. The trial court also denied employer’s claim that it was entitled to an offset pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-114(b) for benefits paid under its accident and sickness policy. We hold and find that the trial court erred by failing to apply the offset sought by the employer, and affirm the judgment in all other respects.