APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Johnny Leon Hatcher, appeals the sentencing decision of the Humphreys County Circuit Court following the revocation of his probationary sentence. The defendant pled guilty to six counts of manufacturing, delivery, sale, or possession of methamphetamine and received an effective six-year sentence, one year to be served in confinement and the balance on community corrections. A violation report was filed and, following a hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant’s sentence and ordered the balance of the original sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant does not contest the trial court’s revocation but argues that the court erred in ordering him to serve the sentence in confinement. After review, we conclude no error occurred and affirm the decision of the trial court.

The plaintiff, a probationer, charged Washington County with negligent oversight and supervision, after she was sexually assaulted and raped by a private entity’s probation officer. The trial court ruled in favor of the county, and the plaintiff appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Martin J. McMurray, was convicted by a Sullivan County Circuit Court jury of driving a lawnmower while under the influence (“DUI”), a Class A misdemeanor; violation of an habitual traffic offender order (“HMVO”), a Class E felony; driving under the influence with a blood-alcohol concentration over .08% (“DUI per se”), a Class A misdemeanor; and DUI, sixth offense, a Class E felony. The trial court merged the DUI and DUI per se convictions into the DUI, sixth offense, conviction and sentenced the defendant to three years on that conviction. The trial court sentenced the defendant to three years for the HMVO conviction, to be served consecutively to the DUI, sixth offense, conviction for an effective sentence of six years in the Department of Correction as a Range II, multiple offender. The trial court further ordered that the sentences be served concurrently with a violation of probation in another case. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for DUI; (2) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and at the motion for new trial; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a continuance; (4) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence; and (5) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for recusal. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The pro se defendant, John S. Crandall, was convicted in a Wayne County bench trial of failure to have a valid driver’s license, failure to wear a safety belt, failure to stop at a stop sign, violation of the financial responsibility law, and driving with an expired registration. On appeal, he challenges the constitutionality of the Tennessee statutes requiring him to wear a safety belt, purchase automobile insurance, and obtain a Tennessee driver’s license when his driver’s license from his former state of residence was not expired. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a negligence claim under Tennessee’s Governmental Tort Liability Act. The decedent was involved in a serious vehicular accident. A witness called the defendant municipality’s 911 emergency communications center for help. The 911 responders went to the accident scene and transported the decedent to a local hospital, where he died. The decedent’s mother filed this lawsuit against the municipality, alleging that the 911 operator was negligent in failing to summon emergency personnel from a neighboring county, because those responders were closer to the scene of the accident and could have provided aid to the decedent sooner. The municipality filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing inter alia that it owed no duty to summon aid outside of its jurisdiction. The trial court granted the motion, and the plaintiff now appeals. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Jeffery C. Grissom, appeals as of right from the Warren County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from one of his two attorneys at trial and from appellate counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises from a petition for contempt related to an underlying divorce judgment. Philip Wayne Hamby (“Hamby”) and Myra Renee Wheeler (“Wheeler”) were divorced by decree of the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). As part of the terms of the divorce, Hamby was required to turn over to Wheeler a publishing company (“the Business”) the two then owned. Wheeler later filed a motion for contempt alleging that Hamby had failed to pay certain necessary taxes on the Business and should be responsible for that tax debt. Wheeler also alleged that, because of the resulting tax lien, the Business was encumbered and Hamby, therefore, owed alimony arrears pursuant to the Trial Court’s divorce judgment. The Trial Court held Hamby responsible for the IRS tax debt, and also ordered him to pay back alimony. Hamby appeals. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in its entirety.

The defendant, Ngoc Dien Nguyen, pled guilty to theft over $1,000 and attempted theft over $1,000 and was sentenced as a Range I offender to an effective term of six years in the Department of Correction. The court ordered that the six-year sentence be served consecutively to a Robertson County sentence and a California sentence and that the defendant pay $9,462 in restitution to the victim. On appeal, the defendant challenges the award of restitution. After review, we affirm the defendant’s convictions but remand for a new hearing as to restitution.

The Petitioner, Andre L. Mayfield, filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 in the Davidson County Criminal Court. The lower court treated this motion as a petition for writ of habeas corpus and summarily dismissed it. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends that his sentence is void because it is in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-20-111(b). Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

In 2007, pursuant to a plea agreement, the Knox County Criminal Court sentenced appellant, Christopher Lee Gibson, to an effective four-year sentence for aggravated assault and reckless endangerment. The trial court suspended the sentence and placed appellant on probation. The court subsequently issued a probation violation warrant alleging that appellant violated the terms of his probation by committing the new offense of possessing a handgun after having been convicted of a felony. Appellant pled guilty, without a recommended sentence, to committing the new offense and stipulated that he had violated the terms of his probation. Following a combined hearing to determine his sentence for the handgun charge and the outcome of his probation violation, the trial court revoked appellant’s probation and ordered that he serve the four-year sentence in confinement. The trial court also ordered appellant to serve a sentence of two years for unlawful possession of a handgun concurrently with his original four-year sentence. Appellant contests the trial court’s revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the original four-year sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A  Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Elmi Abdi, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range III offender to thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and his status as a Range III offender on direct appeal. State v. Elmi Abdi, No. M2009-01614CCA-R3-CD,2010 WL 2977892 (Tenn.Crim.App.,at Nashville,July29,2010),perm.app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2011). The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which was amended by appointed counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and during his sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition.

Petitioner, Thomas Edward Kotewa, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for DNA testing pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001, alleging that DNA testing of clothing he was wearing at the time of the murder to which he pleaded guilty and testing of the murder weapon would have supported his position of self-defense. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition. Perceiving no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Natayna Daemarie McCullough, was convicted by a Maury County jury of facilitation of attempted especially aggravated robbery, a Class C felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed the maximum six-year term and denied judicial diversion or any form of alternative sentencing. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) several evidentiary rulings, including an alleged Brady violation and limitations on two witnesses’ testimony; and (3) various sentencing determinations, including the imposition of the maximum sentence,and the denial of judicial diversion or any other form of alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This post-divorce proceeding involves modification of the primary residential parent designation and contempt. The final decree of divorce designated the mother as the child’s primary residential parent. Subsequently, the mother was found in criminal contempt for failure to adhere to the parenting plan; her sentence was suspended provided there were no violations of the trial court’s orders. A few months later, the mother was found to have further violated the trial court’s orders. Consequently, the trial court ordered the mother to serve a portion of the suspended jail sentence imposed in the prior contempt order. In addition, the trial court held that a substantial and material change in circumstances had occurred, and it modified the parties’ parenting plan to designate the father as the primary residential parent. The mother now appeals. We affirm.

The City of Memphis and two persons who had to cast provisional ballots in the August 2012 election because they lacked sufficient photographic identification filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to have the photographic identification requirement for voting declared unconstitutional, or to have the Memphis library photographic identification card declared sufficient identification for purposes of the voting law. The trial court found that the plaintiffs did not have standing, that the photographic identification requirement was constitutional and that the Memphis library photographic identification card was not acceptable under the law as sufficient identification for voting. The plaintiffs appealed. We find that the plaintiffs have standing, that the law is constitutional and that the Memphis library photographic identification card is acceptable under the law as sufficient proof of identification for voting.

Judgment and Order

On September 26, 2012, the State of Tennessee, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, section 2.02, appealed the trial court’s order denying its motion to have the trial judge recused or otherwise disqualified from presiding over the three cases at issue in this appeal. After initial review, this Court, pursuant to Rule 10B, section 2.04, stayed all further proceedings in these cases pending resolution of this appeal. Then, in accordance with the mandate of Rule 10B, section 2.06, that this Court act on an expedited basis, this Court, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, section 2.05, requested and received responses from the defendants on October 8, 2012. The issue presented is as follows: Whether a person of ordinary prudence in the trial court’s position, knowing all the facts known to the trial court, would find a reasonable basis for questioning the trial court’s impartiality in these three cases? After a thorough de novo review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying the State’s motion for recusal. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, the trial judge is recused, and the stay previously entered in these cases shall remain in effect until the Chief Justice of the Tennessee Supreme Court appoints a replacement trial judge, or pending further orders of this Court or the Tennessee Supreme Court.

Appellant, Carlos Radale Cornwell, appeals his conviction of second degree murder and resulting sentence of thirty-five years. Appellant cites the following errors: (1) the State failed to adequately preserve evidence; (2) the trial court erred in permitting the State’s medical expert to testify beyond the scope of her expertise; (3) the trial court improperly allowed two of the State’s witnesses to testify as experts; (4) the trial court erred in allowing improper testimony of certain lay witnesses; (5) the State improperly argued a theory in its closing argument that was not supported by the evidence; (6) the State failed to provide audio tapes of witness interviews in a timely fashion; (7) the trial court erred by allowing an officer to read aloud the affidavit of complaint supporting a domestic violence warrant taken by the victim against appellant; and (8) the trial court erred in sentencing appellant as a Range II offender and in determining the length of appellant’s sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm appellant’s conviction and sentence.

A Shelby County jury convicted appellant, Corey Noland, of false imprisonment, a Class A misdemeanor; domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor; bribery of a witness, a Class C felony; two counts of coercion of a witness, Class D felonies; and aggravated stalking, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of eighteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in applying sentence enhancement factors; and (3) the trial court erred in allowing the State to engage in “vindictive prosecution.” After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Pro se Petitioner, Eric Tolley, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief seeking analysis of certain evidence under the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 (“The Act”). The Petitioner originally entered guilty pleas to three counts of aggravated sexual battery and two counts of rape of child for which he received an effective sentence of twenty-one years and six months in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition without an evidentiary hearing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Randall Turner, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief seeking relief from several convictions in the Hamilton County Criminal Court. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee.

This is an involuntary commitment case, in which we are asked to review the trial court’s grant of Appellee/Hospital’s motion to dismiss. The trial court found that all of the claims asserted in Appellant/Patient’s complaint sounded in medical malpractice. Because Appellant failed to provide a certificate of good faith as required under the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-115, et seq. (“TMMA”), the trial court granted Appellee’s motion to dismiss. Appellant argues that not all of her stated claims sound in medical malpractice. We affirm the dismissal of Appellant’s claim asserting a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. However, we conclude that Appellant has stated a claim for medical battery, as well as a claim for negligence per se arising from alleged violations of the involuntary commitment statutes. Moreover, because Appellant’s negligence per se claims survive the motion to dismiss, she may also maintain the false imprisonment and invasion of privacy claims. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

This is a divorce appeal. The parties were married for two years and had one minor child. At the time of the divorce trial, both parties were unemployed. The trial court adopted the mother’s proposed parenting plan in its entirety, based on its review of the child support history. It awarded minimal alimony and calculated child support by imputing income to the father but not to the mother. The father appeals. We affirm the award of alimony, vacate the parenting plan and the award of child support, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury found the appellant, Abbas H. Nejat a.k.a. Abbas H. Nejad, guilty of retaliation for past action, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced the appellant to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction. The appellant also challenges the trial court’s ruling regarding the admissibility of evidence concerning the appellant’s membership in the Kurdish Pride Gang. Finally, the appellant challenges the sentence imposed by the trial court. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to two children. Mother’s rights were terminated on grounds of abandonment by failure to support the children within four months prior to her incarceration and wanton disregard for the children’s welfare, substantial noncompliance with permanency plans, and persistence of conditions. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.