APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in
February of 2009 seeking to terminate the parental rights of Kimberly M. (“Mother”) to the
minor children, Zacharias T.M., Isaiah K.M., Ashley M.M., Chelsea M.M., Sierra C.M., and
Brittany N.M. (“the Children”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court terminated the parental
rights of Mother to the Children after finding that grounds for termination pursuant to Tenn.
Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and (g)(3) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii) had been
proven by clear and convincing evidence, and that clear and convincing evidence had been
shown that it was in the Children’s best interest for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated.
Mother appeals to this Court. We affirm.

Petitioner was convicted in 1998 of one count of first degree murder in Wilson County. He was sentenced to life in prison. Petitioner was unsuccessful on appeal. State v. Henry Dequan Rhodes, No. M1999-959-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 264327, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Mar. 10, 2000), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 30, 2000). On March 16, 2011, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in its dismissal of his petition. We conclude that the post-conviction court did not err because the decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), did not create a new constitutional right that was required to be retroactively applied; Petitioner did not provide adequate support for his argument that the statute of limitations had been tolled based upon the violation of a due process right; and Petitioner did not meet the requirements set out to present a writ of error coram nobis to the court. Therefore, we affirm the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of the petition.

This appeal arises from a dependency and neglect proceeding. The State of Tennessee, Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition against Lisa M. S. (“Mother”) seeking to adjudicate her minor child Wyatt S. (“the Child”), born in March of 1998, dependent and neglected. The petition was rooted in the Child’s disclosures that Mother had sexually abused him. The juvenile court found the Child dependent and neglected. Mother appealed to the Circuit Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”) for a de novo hearing. The Trial Court found the Child dependent and neglected by clear and convincing evidence. The Trial Court also specifically found severe child abuse in this case. Mother appeals to this Court. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in its entirety.

A Lawrence County jury convicted the Defendant, Curtis Dewayne Staggs, of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the first degree murder convictions and imposed a life sentence, and imposed a consecutive twelve-year sentence for the aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a new trial based upon a State witness recanting his testimony; (3) the trial court erred when it issued a material witness attachment; (4) the trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences; and (5) the trial court erred when it did not grant his motion for a new trial based upon the prior knowledge of the case by a juror. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we find that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the Defendant’s convictions and that the trial court committed no error. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Theodore Locklin, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and ordering his six-year sentence into execution. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to revoke his probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Kristopher Colbert, was indicted by the Montgomery County Grand Jury in April of 2011 for driving under the influence, driving under the influence per se, reckless endangerment, vehicular assault,and aggravated assault. Appellant pled guilty to two counts of vehicular assault in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts of the indictment. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to four years for each offense, to be served consecutively as a Range I, standard offender. Appellant filed a motion to reconsider and a motion to reduce sentence under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 and/or Tennessee code Annotated section 40-35-212(d). After a hearing, the trial court denied the motions. Appellant initiated this appeal to determine whether the trial court improperly denied the motion to reduce the sentence. After a review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Defendant, Jody Lee Lindsey, pled guilty to one count of violating the Habitual Motor Vehicle Offender (“HMVO”) law, one count of third offense driving on a revoked license, and one count of felony failure to appear. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court found the Defendant to be a Range III offender and merged the driving on a revoked license conviction with the HMVO conviction. It then sentenced the Defendant to five years for both the HMVO conviction and the felony failure to appear conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively based upon the Defendant’s extensive criminal history, for an effective sentence of ten years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences; (2) his convictions were based upon an unlawfully induced guilty plea; (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (4) the counsel representing him at the guilty plea hearing and sentencing hearing was ineffective. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Eric D. Wallace (“the Petitioner”), proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that (1) his indictment for attempted first degree murder is defective because it was amended improperly to include a factual basis for aggravated assault; (2) the judgment and sentence imposed for felony murder and attempted first degree murder are void; and (3) the felony murder conviction must be dismissed. The habeas corpus court summarily denied relief, and this appeal followed. We affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Jason Everett Nickell (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to three counts of misdemeanor stalking, with no agreement as to his sentences. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days at seventy-five percent on each count, to be served consecutively. On appeal, the Defendant argues that his sentence is excessive because the trial court did not consider two mitigating factors. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal from the dismissal of Appellant/juvenile’s appeal of the juvenile court’s determination of delinquency to the circuit court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 37-1-159. While the appeal was pending, Appellant ran away from the group home, where he had been ordered to live. Appellee Department of Children’s Services filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. The circuit court determined that the appeal should be dismissed based upon application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. The court further determined that Appellant had capacity, under the Rule of Sevens, to be held responsible for his actions. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322, a former Tennessee State Trooper appeals the chancery court’s judgment affirming the Tennessee Civil Service Commission’s decision to terminate his employment. The Commission affirmed the initial order of the Administrative Law Judge, who upheld the Tennessee Department of Safety’s decision to terminate the trooper’s employment for violations of its policies and procedures and for the good of the service pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-30-326. Discerning no error, we affirm.

An insurance company filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that mother and child were residents of the insured’s household, and therefore, that coverage for the death of the child was excluded bythe relevanthomeowner’s insurance policy. The chancery court found that mother and child were not residents of the insured’s household at the time of the child’s death, and we affirm.
 

Petitioner, Odell Shelton, seeks relief via a writ of error coram nobis from his plea agreement that resulted in a conviction of aggravated assault and a sentence of ten years. He claims that the trial court improperly sentenced him as a multiple (Range II) offender and erroneously relied upon a presentence report in denying his request for a suspended sentence. Petitioner asserts that the trial court’s reliance on the presentence report is “newly discovered evidence.” The coram nobis court summarily dismissed the petition. Discerning no basis for coram nobis relief, we affirm.

The trial court terminated the parental rights of Mother and Father based on abandonment for failure to support and failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and persistence of conditions. We reverse termination on the grounds of abandonment, and affirm termination of parental rights on the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan and persistence of conditions. We also affirm the trial court’s determination that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children.

The Defendant, Michael Eugene Rutherford, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and ordering his fiveyear sentence into execution. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to revoke his probation, (2) there is new evidence related to testimony relied upon by the trial court in revoking his probation, (3) the trial court erred by allowing the victim of the Defendant’s new theft charge to testify at the revocation hearing, and (4) the court erred by insufficiently weighing his good behavior. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a dispute between adjacent landowners over Defendants’ installation of a private water line within a right-of-way easement across the Plaintiffs’ property. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that Defendants’ private water line trespassed on Plaintiffs’ property. Further, the trial court ordered that the Defendants would be incarcerated if they did not remove the water line and return Plaintiffs’ property to its previous condition within thirty (30) days. Defendants appealed. We affirm in part and remand for further proceedings.

In this paternity case, Father appeals the Carroll County Juvenile Court’s rulings with regard to custody and parenting time with his minor child. The trial court’s ruling as to the paternity of the child is affirmed. However, because the trial court did not comply with Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we vacate the judgment of the trial court with regard to custody and the parenting schedule and remand for entry of an order with appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Plaintiff purchased family entertainment center businesses from defendants and it leased, from defendants, buildings in which the entertainment centers were operated. Plaintiff also purchased certain assets from defendants, but a dispute ultimately arose regarding certain assets’ inclusion within the sale. At the expiration of the building leases, defendants filed suit claiming that plaintiff had damaged their property, that plaintiff had improperly removed certain items from the buildings, and that it had failed to remove other items which it should have removed. Plaintiff filed an answer and counterclaim asserting ownership of the allegedly damaged, improperly removed, and non-removed property, and further claiming that defendants had reneged upon an agreement to sell it one of the buildings at issue. The trial court entered a brief order awarding defendants damages and dismissing plaintiff’s counterclaim. Plaintiff moved the trial court to alter or amend its judgment and for entry of a final order. The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion, finding there were no remaining issues in need of resolution. We find that the order appealed is not a final judgment, and therefore, that this Court lacks jurisdiction in this matter. Thus, we must dismiss this appeal and remand to the trial court for appropriate findings and entry of a final order.

This appeal involves an inmate’s petitions for writ of certiorari challenging the Board of Probation and Parole’s decisions to deny him parole on two separate occasions. The trial court dismissed the inmate’s claims related to one parole hearing but requiring further proceedings as to his claims related to the second parole hearing. Because the order appealed does not resolve all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

A City of Memphis firefighter who participated in the City’s employee assistance program was terminated after his second positive drug screen. The firefighter appealed his termination to the Civil Service Commission. He argued that his drug screen results were confidential under federal law and that he had not executed a consent form to authorize the disclosure of the results to the City. The Commission overruled the firefighter’s motion to exclude the test results and upheld his termination. The chancery court reversed, finding that the drug screen results were inadmissible because the City had failed to comply with federal law. We find substantial and material evidence to support the decision of the Commission, and therefore reverse the decision of the chancery court.

The Defendant, Richard Tipton, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense, a Class E felony; driving on a revoked license, third offense, a Class A misdemeanor; violation of the seatbelt law, a Class C misdemeanor; and failure to provide evidence of financial responsibility, a Class C misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-10- 401(a)(2), 55-50-504, 55-9-603(a)(1), and 55-12-139. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve one year and six months in the county jail. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) that the trial court failed to consider the eight-year span of time in which the Defendant committed no crimes when determining his sentence, showing a lack of consideration of other sentencing factors. Following our review, we remand this case to the trial court for correction of the judgments because the Defendant was sentenced to the county jail instead of the Department of Corrections (DOC), as required by statute. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I concur in the majority’s holding that the followup drug screen at issue was not a “[r]ecord[] of the identity, diagnosis, prognosis, or treatment” of Mr. Payton, and therefore was not covered by 42 U.S.C.A. § 290dd-2(a).

The defendant, James D. Ledford, II, appeals the Seqautchie County Circuit Court’s denial of his request for alternative sentencing. The defendant pled guilty to one count of vehicular homicide by reckless conduct, a Class C felony, and received a sentence of nine years, as a Range II offender, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. At the same time, the defendant also pled guilty to a violation of probation in a separate case with a sentence of two years, which the trial court revoked and ordered to be served concurrently with the homicide sentence. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying him an alternative sentence. Following review of the record, we affirm the sentence as imposed.

The defendant, Donald E. Fentress, appeals the sentencing decision of the Montgomery County Circuit Court. The defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and aggravated rape, a Class A felony. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that his sentence for rape is excessive under the facts and circumstances of his case. Specifically, he faults the trial court for failing to apply mitigating factor (8), that the defendant was suffering from a mental condition which significantly reduced his culpability for the offense. See T.C.A. § 40-35-113(8) (2010). Following review of the record before us, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

William J. Ferris, Sr. (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief from his jury convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.