APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves a contract for the construction of a hotel. The project owner refused to make the final payment owed to the general contractor, claiming that it was entitled to withhold $237,000 in liquidated damages because the project was not completed on time, in addition to deducting other “offsets” under the contract. The general contractor claimed that the owner was not entitled to liquidated damages for several reasons, including the fact that the owner had caused delays, and the fact that the owner had failed to make a timely claim for liquidated damages as required by the contract. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the owner on the issue of liquidated damages, allowing the owner to subtract $237,000 from the final payment it owed under the contract. The court also resolved several other issues between the parties. The trial court declared the owner to be the prevailing party in the litigation and awarded the owner its attorney’s fees. The general contractor appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part and remand for further proceedings.

Lawrence Key (“the Defendant”) appeals his jury convictions for two counts of aggravated robbery. In his appeal, he asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions.

We accepted this appeal to determine whether a lawyer’s potential violation of the ethical rule governing communications with a person represented by another lawyer constitutes criminal contempt pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-9-102(1), (2). Although a lawyer’s violation of an ethical rule may in some circumstances constitute criminal contempt, the evidence in this case is insufficient to support the “willful misbehavior” element of the offense of criminal contempt. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, and we vacate Mr. Beeler’s conviction.

The defendant, Jacque Michelle Lee, appeals the sentencing determination made by the Davidson County Criminal Court following the revocation of her alternative sentence. The defendant was sentenced to an effective ten-year sentence after she pled guilty to five counts of theft of property and one count of theft of services, and she was ordered to serve her sentence on community corrections. The defendant also agreed to participate in a drug court program. Within days of starting to serve her sentence, the defendant failed to attend two required program meetings. A violation warrant was issued. Following a hearing, the defendant’s alternative sentence was revoked, and the trial court ordered the defendant to serve the remainder of her sentence in confinement. On appeal, the defendant does not contest the trial court’s finding of a violation. Rather, she argues that the trial court erred by ordering her to serve her sentence in confinement rather than returning her to community corrections. After review, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

In its appeal, the State argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed a misdemeanor vandalism charge against the defendant, Carl E. Presley, and also in ruling that it could not charge the jury on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor vandalism on the two remaining felony vandalism charges, because the statute had run as to the misdemeanor.  After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the dismissal of the vandalism charge and, as to the issue regarding the lesser included offense of misdemeanor vandalism, deny the State’s Rule 10 appeal as improvidently granted.

The defendant, Terry Sanders, was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-417. He was sentenced, as a Range III persistent offender, to fifteen years for each count, to be run consecutively, for an effective sentence of thirty years. The defendant appeals his convictions, asserting that the trial court should have granted his motions for a mistrial based on testimony introduced at trial that the defendant was on community corrections and based on juror bias. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the defendant is not entitled to a new trial and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Betty L. Darden, appeals the Dickson County Circuit Court’s denial of her petition to waive court costs and fines. The petitioner pled nolo contendere to conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary and conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, both Class D felonies, and received an effective sentence of two years,which was suspended to probation. Her probation agreement required payment of court costs and fines on a monthly basis. The petitioner filed a “Petition to Remit Fines and Costs and Waive Probation Fees.” A hearing was held on the petition, after which the trial court waived probationary fees but ordered the petitioner to complete payment of her court costs and fines. Following review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion in the decision and affirm the denial.

The Petitioner, Paul David Childs, convicted of sexual battery, appeals from the summary dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition on the basis that the Petitioner failed to provide any factual grounds in support of his claims for relief. The State concedes that the post-conviction court acted in error. Following our review, we reverse the order of summary dismissal and remand this case to the post-conviction court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In this divorce case, the Trial Court awarded the wife her attorney's fees as alimony in solido. The husband appeals this issue arguing that the wife's property settlement was such that she should pay her attorney's fees out of the property settlement. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court.

This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to set aside an order of dismissal for failure to state a claim. Because the appellant did not file her notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal.
 

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Ronaldo Regala Puno, Jr., of attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the appellant to seventeen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for attempted first degree murder. Upon review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the appellant’s conviction, but we remand the case to the trial court for entry of a single judgment reflecting the merger of the convictions.

This appeal arises from two very unorthodox contracts by which Buyers purchased a retail convenience market, the equipment and inventory of the market, and the underlying real estate. Within four months of the purchase, Buyers commenced this action seeking rescission of the contracts on the basis of Sellers’ breach of contract, fraud, and misrepresentation. Sellers prevailed on all issues in the trial court and recovered the business and real estate. The trial court also ruled that Sellers were entitled to keep the $190,000 down payment on the real estate. On appeal, Buyers raise several issues, inter alia, they contend the trial court erred in finding they did not prove fraudulent inducement or intentional misrepresentation, that the court erred in finding that Buyers breached the contract, and that the trial court erred in awarding Sellers the $190,000 down payment as damages for Buyers’ breach of the contract when Sellers did not plead damages in their counter-complaint. We have determined the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that Sellers did not make intentional misrepresentations, and that, to the contrary, the preponderance of the evidence established that Sellers made intentional misrepresentations for which Buyers are entitled to a rescission of the contracts and return of their $190,000 down payment.

A Davidson County jury found appellant, Dwaniko Martez Sudberry, guilty of three counts of reckless aggravated assault, one count of attempted aggravated child neglect, and one count of reckless homicide stemming from the death of his infant daughter. The trial court merged the convictions of reckless aggravated assault with the conviction for reckless homicide and sentenced appellant to four years. The trial court sentenced appellant to twelve years for attempted aggravated child neglect and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively for an effective sixteen-year sentence. Appellant contests his convictions and sentences on the following grounds: (1) the convicting evidence was insufficient; (2) the combination of his convictions offends the principles of double jeopardy; (3) the trial court erred in failing to order the State to make an election on the offense of aggravated child neglect; (4) the trial court erred in admitting certain expert testimony; and (5) the trial court committed multiple errors in sentencing him. Following our careful review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we discern no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, David Earl Scott, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and aggravated assault, claiming that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, that his kidnapping convictions run afoul of the precedent set in State v. Anthony and its progeny, and that the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive. Because the evidence of serious bodily injury was insufficient, the defendant’s conviction of especially aggravated kidnapping is reversed and modified to a conviction of aggravated kidnapping, and the sentence is modified from 25 years to 12 years. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed in all other respects.

This is a child custody case. Appellant/Mother appeals the denial of her Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04 motion to vacate the order granting Father/Appellee’s petition for custody of the minor child and for enrollment of a foreign decree on custody. Mother received, at most, three days notice before the hearing on Father’s petition in violation of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 6.04. Because Mother did not receive adequate notice, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying Mother Rule 59 relief. Reversed and remanded.

I respectfully disagree with the conclusion by the majority that the evidence of serious bodily injury to the victim was insufficient to support the conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping. After considering the evidence of serious bodily injury in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it is my view that a rational trier of fact could have found that the victim suffered serious bodily injury at the hands of the Defendant, and therefore I would affirm the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction.

This is an appeal from an administrative decision on the termination of the employment of a municipal employee. The appellant employee was fired from her job with the appellee municipal health department for accessing patient medical records without authorization. The appellee civil service merit board of the municipality conducted an administrative hearing and upheld the termination of her employment. The employee filed a lawsuit in chancery court seeking judicial review of this decision. The trial court affirmed the decision of the civil service merit board and upheld the termination. The employee now appeals this decision, arguing that her due process rights were violated and that the decision of the civil service merit board was not supported by substantial and material evidence. We affirm.

This appeal involves in personam jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. The chancery court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12.02(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The court found that the defendant had not purposely availed itself of the privilege of doing business in Tennessee and did not have sufficient contacts with Tennessee to be subjected to jurisdiction in this state. The plaintiff, a corporation that claims its principal place of business is in Tennessee, appeals. We find that the circumstances do not support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant foreign corporation by a Tennessee court. Accordingly, we affirm.

Terrell Loverson (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of second degree murder, misdemeanor assault, and obstructing arrest. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant challenges (1) the trial court’s admission of a photograph of the victim; (2) the sufficiency of the evidence; and (3) his sentence. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we have determined that the Defendant is not entitled to relief on any of these issues. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Theodore Locklin, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and ordering his six-year sentence into execution. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to revoke his probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Christopher L. Williams, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. He claims that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition as time-barred. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Colby Terrell Black, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his original twelve-year sentence in the Department of Correction. He argues that the trial court violated his right to due process by making insufficient findings at the revocation hearing, and the State agrees. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of an appropriate written order that summarizes the evidence and clearly sets forth the reasons for the revocation of probation.

The Defendant, Lindsey Butler, appeals the Maury County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation for possession of cocaine with the intent to sell and two counts of possession of marijuana with the intent to sell, and ordering the remainder of his effective eight-year sentence into execution. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court (1) abused its discretion in revoking his probation and (2) failed to exercise “separate discretion” in determining his punishment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Salvatore Pisano, Jr., was convicted of four counts of aggravated sexual battery and sentenced to serve eight years in prison for each count, all counts to be served concurrently. The petitioner filed a timely post-conviction petition, which was dismissed by the post-conviction court without a hearing or the appointment of counsel. The petitioner then filed a motion to reopen his post-conviction petition; the motion was denied. The petitioner filed a notice of appeal. Because the petitioner has not complied with the statutory requirements surrounding appeal of an application to reopen a petition for post-conviction relief, we are without jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and the appeal is dismissed.

The Petitioner, Celso V. Melendez, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty pleas to two counts of facilitation to deliver over 300 grams of cocaine and resulting effective sentence of twenty-four years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his guilty pleas were based upon trial counsel’s assurance that he would be eligible for the boot camp program. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the Petitioner received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, the judgment of the post-conviction court is reversed, the judgments of conviction are vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.