APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The trial court dismissed “petitions for medical support” of non-marital children filed by the Department of Human Services as inconsistent with the child support statutes and guidelines. We affirm.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B from the trial court’s denial of motions for recusal in two post- ivorce cases involving custody of the parties’ minor children. Having reviewed the appellant’s petition for recusal appeal pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court, we affirm the Trial Court.

Property owners’ permit to place a mobile home on their property was revoked by the county building commissioner on the grounds that the property on which the home was to be located did not meet the minimum lot size requirement in the zoning ordinance; on appeal to the Board of Zoning Appeals, the property owners were granted a variance. The County filed a petition in Chancery Court seeking certiorari review of the grant of the variance, naming the Board of Zoning Appeals and property owners as defendants. After a hearing, the trial dismissed the petition; the court denied the property owners’ request for attorney fees incurred in connection with the Board of Zoning Appeals and certiorari proceedings. We hold that the property owners are entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

A Shelby County Grand Jury indicted appellant, Kearn Weston, for robbery, a Class C felony. A jury convicted him as indicted, and the trial court sentenced him as a persistent offender to fourteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence on appeal. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Mooneyhans were brought into court by the county government and were forced to defend a decision by the county’s board of zoning appeals. After that decision was upheld in the trial court, the county once again forced the Mooneyhans into this court. They were required to spend money on an attorney in both courts to defend an action by the county government from attack by the county government. These egregious actions by the county were unauthorized.

Susan Michelle Barnett (“the Defendant”) was convicted after a jury trial of aggravated assault, two counts of misdemeanor assault, and unauthorized use of an automobile in Gibson County Circuit Court case no. 17702. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to an effective sentence of six years. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve her six-year sentence consecutively to a previous sentence. On the date of the sentencing hearing in case no. 17702, the Defendant also pleaded guilty to failure to appear in Gibson County Circuit Court case no. 18191 and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to one year, to be served consecutively to her six-year sentence. Thereafter, the Defendant attempted to appeal both cases. Having determined that we lack jurisdiction in case no. 17702, we dismiss that appeal. We also dismiss the appeal in case no. 18191 because the notice of appeal was untimely filed, and the Defendant is not entitled to appeal her guilty plea pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b) and Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b).

This is the second appeal in this divorce case. During the parties’ ten-year marriage, they had two children. The husband served in the military, stationed in several different places. Eventually the family moved to Tennessee, where the wife worked part-time and took care of the children while the husband was deployed. Just after the husband returned from his deployment, the wife filed a petition for divorce, and the husband filed a cross-petition. The parties reached an agreement on property issues, but no others. After a trial, the trial court entered a final decree, found the husband at fault for the demise of the marriage, and granted the wife a divorce. The final decree designated the wife as the children’s primary residential parent, awarded the wife rehabilitative alimony, and divided the marital estate in accordance with the parties’agreement. The husband filed the first appeal.The appellate court dismissed the first appeal for lack of a final order and remanded the case for resolution of several issues. After a post-remand hearing, the trial court entered an order mostly reaffirming its initial decision. However, in light of the wife’s post-remand admission of infidelity during the marriage, the trial court declared the parties to be divorced, rather than granting the wife a divorce. The husband again appeals, challenging the trial court’s failure to find the wife at fault for the demise of the marriage, its designation of the wife as the children’s primary residential parent, the award of rehabilitative alimony, the property division, and the award of attorney fees in favor of the wife. We modify the award of alimony, but otherwise affirm the decision of the trial court.

Edward Joseph Warwick, Sr. (“Husband”) sued his former spouse, Katherine Dodge Gribben Warwick (“Wife”); her attorney, David W. Noblit (“Counsel”); and Noblit’s law firm (collectively “Defendants”). Husband alleges that, since the time of the parties’ divorce, Wife and Counsel had conspired against him in an effort to destroy him and gain access to his separate funds. Husband claims the Defendants are guilty of fraud on the court, abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and a civil conspiracy, for which he seeks eight million dollars in compensatory and punitive damages. Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. Following a hearing, the trial court dismissed Husband’s complaint. The court stated “that the[] causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations or that the complaint failed to state a claim, or both.” Husband appeals. We affirm.

The Department of Revenue conducted an audit on plaintiff's partnership, and as a result franchise and excise taxes of $317,659.72 plus interest of $59,525.59 were assessed against plaintiff. Plaintiff brought an action contesting the assessments, and since the Commissioner had relied on Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1320-6-1-.20 to make the assessment, the plaintiff charged the Rule was inconsistent with the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-4-2006. The Trial Judge held the regulation was in conflict with the code section to the extent that the Rule attempted to restrict the deduction for charitable contributions made to only the book basis, rather than the fair market value, and the plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on that issue and an abatement in the assessment of $303,049. The Court also found that the plaintiff was in error in not including certain real property in calculating the net worth under the ruling of Crown Enterprises, Inc., v. Woods, and that the defendant was entitled to a judgment of additional tax in the amount of $14,610.72. Both parties appealed. On appeal, we reverse the Trial Court's Judgment regarding excise tax and we remand for a Judgment on the excise tax as assessed by the Commissioner. The Trial Court's Judgment regarding the franchise tax is affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, following a jury trial and sentenced as a Range III offender to fourteen years and six months incarceration. In this delayed appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by permitting him to be impeached with a hearsay statement contained in a police report. Following review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff, a retail business specializing in hair restoration and related services that leased “beauty equipment” from a third party lessor, filed this action against the manufacturer of the “beauty equipment” and the distributor of the products asserting claims for intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Plaintiff obtained a monetary judgment against the distributor, however, the trial court summarily dismissed all claims against the manufacturer. Plaintiff appeals the summary dismissal of its claims against the manufacturer. We affirm.

Following a jury trial,the Defendant, Maurice O.Byrd,was convicted of aggravated robbery, felony first degree murder, and premeditated first degree murder. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202,-402. The trial court merged the premeditated first degree murder conviction into the felony first degree murder conviction and sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment. The trial court also sentenced the Defendant to eight years for the aggravated robbery conviction and ordered the sentence to be served concurrently with the life sentence for the felony first degree murder conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a judgment in a certiorari review action where the trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner. The trial court found that a proposed construction project involving the petitioner’s property was not covered by the local zoning ordinance, and, therefore, the petitioner was not required to seek a variance from the local board of zoning appeals in order to obtain a building permit. The respondents appeal. We affirm.

Elizabeth C. Wright (“the Seller”) filed suit against Frederico A. Dixon, III (“the Buyer”) for breach of a contract to purchase real property. The contract allowed the Buyer to terminate in the event he was unable to obtain financing. Under the contract, termination was to be effective only if notice of same was “received.” The Buyer claims to have sent a notice of termination through his agent by fax to the Seller. The Seller claims that she did not receive it. The trial court found that the attempted termination was ineffective because it was not received. The Buyer appeals. We affirm.

An employee alleged that he sustained an injury to his back. His employer denied the claim.  The trial court found the injury to be compensable and awarded the employee 30% permanent partial disability benefits. The employer has appealed contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the injury is compensable. On appeal, the employee asserts that the award of benefits was inadequate. After review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Kenneth E. King was arrested for driving on a revoked license. He was put in a cell with several violent criminals. At his arraignment, the court ordered him released. The person charged with processing the release delayed his release by simply doing nothing. While awaiting his release, Mr. King was assaulted by one of his cellmates. He sustained serious injuries, including partial loss of vision in one eye. He filed this action against Anderson County (“the County”). After a bench trial, the court found the County 55% at fault and King 45% at fault for provoking the assault. It determined that the total damages were $170,000 reduced to $93,500 to account for King’s comparative fault. The County appeals. We affirm.

Martha Scent filed a declaratory judgment action against multiple defendants to establish her rights with respect to a deed of trust that granted her a lien on a tract of land. In addition, Scent sought to establish that “her” signature on a release of her deed of trust is a forgery. The trial court granted Scent partial summary judgment voiding and nullifying the release of her trust deed. The case proceeded to a bench trial with the focus on the priority of trust deeds as between Scent and the defendant Ellen W. Hood. Based upon the application of the doctrine of merger, the court ruled that Scent held the priority position. The court awarded judgment in her favor and Hood appeals. We affirm.

U.S. Bank, N.A. (“Bank”) had a mortgage on a residence which was insured against fire loss by Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (“Tennessee Farmers”). When the owner of the residence failed to pay the mortgage, the Bank commenced foreclosure proceedings. Thereafter, the owner filed for bankruptcy which stayed the foreclosure proceedings. After the residence was destroyed in a fire, the Bank filed a claim to recover the insurance proceeds. Tennessee Farmers refused to pay the claim. As a result, the Bank filed suit against Tennessee Farmers alleging breach of contract, bad faith refusal to pay an insurance claim, and unfair or deceptive practices under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”). The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the Bank, concluding that the Bank's failure to give Tennessee Farmers notice of the foreclosure proceedings did not invalidate the insurance coverage. On appeal to this Court, we reversed, finding that the Bank’s commencement of foreclosure proceedings amounted to an increase in hazard under the policy and the Bank’s failure to provide notice precluded coverage. After granting the Bank’s application for permission to appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of this Court, and held that commencement of foreclosure proceedings did not constitute an increase in hazard under the terms of the insurance policy or the applicable statutory provisions, and therefore, the Bank was not required to give notice to Tennessee Farmers. U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 277 S.W.3d 381 (Tenn. 2009). Subsequently, on remand from the Supreme Court, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of the Bank for the amount due on the mortgage plus accrued interest. The trial court further awarded the Bank attorney’s fees and costs based on its finding that Tennessee Farmers’ interpretation of the policy, that the Bank was required to provide them with notice of the commencement of foreclosure proceedings, amounted to bad faith and an unfair act or practice under the TCPA. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we reverse and remand.

Appellant, David Joseph Buckhanon, was convicted by a Maury County jury of facilitation of attempted first degree murder, facilitation of especially aggravated burglary, and facilitation of especially aggravated robbery. As a result, Appellant was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty three years. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant initiated this appeal. He challenges: (1) the trial court’s exclusion of testimony by a witness who heard the Appellant’s co-defendant state that he, rather than Appellant, was responsible for the shooting; (2) the trial court’s admission of Appellant’s alleged street name “Laylow”;
(3) the trial court’s admission of testimony from a detective that there was no evidence of a third participant in the shooting; (4) the insufficiency of the evidence; and (5) the application of enhancement factors to his sentence. After a review of the evidence, we determine: (1) the trial court properly excluded hearsay testimony; (2) the trial court properly admitted evidence of Appellant’s street name; (3) the trial court properly excluded evidence of Appellant’s claim of a second accomplice where there was no corroboration;(4)the evidence was sufficientto supportthe convictions;and(5)thetrialcourtproperlysentenced Appellant. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

A Davidson County jury convicted appellants, Alejandro Neave Vasquez and Nazario Araguz, of conspiracy to deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone and possession with intent to deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone. The trial court sentenced appellant Vasquez to an effective twenty-year sentence and sentenced appellant Araguz to an effective seventeen-year sentence. On appeal, both appellants argue that: (1) the trial court erred in denying their motions to suppress; (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence regarding money recovered by law enforcement; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions; and (4) the trial court erred in denying appellants’ requests for a special jury instruction and in granting the State’s request for a special jury instruction. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Derron S. Guy, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, wherein he challenged his 2010 Shelby County Criminal Court convictions of employing a firearm during a dangerous felony. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a dispute over a claim for rent reimbursements in a lease agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant, holding that the undisputed facts showed that a limitation of remedy provision in the lease relieved the defendant from any liability. We affirm the judgment of the court below.

This appeal arises from a dispute over setoff claims related to a bankruptcy proceeding. Delwin Huggins (“Huggins”) sued R. Ellsworth McKee (“McKee”) and Alternative Fuels, LLC (“AF”) (McKee and AF as “the Defendants,” collectively) in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). Huggins filed for bankruptcy. Konvalinka later purchased the claims asserted by Huggins in this lawsuit. The Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that, even if Konvalinka’s claim for damages was successful, McKee had an offset far in excess of these damages which rendered any further proceedings useless. The Trial Court agreed with the Defendants and dismissed the case. We affirm, in part, and, reverse, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court.

The defendant, Glen A. Forrest, was convicted of attempted cocaine delivery in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-417 (2010). The trial court ordered six months of his sentence to be served in prison and the remaining five years and six months to be served on probation. The trial court subsequently found the defendant to be in violation of the terms of his probation and revoked the probation, ordering the defendant to serve the original sentence. The defendant appeals the trial court’s determination that he violated the terms of his probation. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court has committed no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner challenges the decision of the Tennessee Department of Transportation denying his application for a billboard permit because his proposed location was within 1000 feet of another permit location. He contends the Department erroneously deviated from its regulation requiring permit applications for locations within 1000 feet of each other to be considered on a “first come first served” basis, insisting he submitted a “complete” application before the applicant who was granted a permit for the nearby location. The Chancery Court summarily dismissed the petition, finding it constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the Department’s decision to grant a permit to the other applicant. The court also found that the Department complied with its rules in issuing the permit to the other applicant and denying the petitioner’s application because petitioner’s location was less than 1000 feet away from the other applicant’s location. We affirm.