APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an action for breach of contract to purchase real property. The trial court found that a valid contract existed between the parties and that Buyer breached the contract. The trial court found that Seller failed to prove general damages, however, where Seller failed to prove the fair market value of the real property at the time of breach. The trial court further found that Buyer was entitled to a credit against special damages proven by Seller, and that Seller was not entitled to attorney’s fees as the prevailing party where the provision for attorney’s fees had been crossed out on the standard form contract. Seller appeals and Buyer cross-appeals. We affirm.

The Defendant, Misty Lynn Nanney, pled guilty to one count of theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000, a Class E felony; one count of forgery, a Class E felony; one count of possession with intent to sell less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony; two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; and one count of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-103, -14-105(a)(2), -14-114, -16-503, -17-417(c)(2)(A), -17-425(a). Following a sentencing hearing, the Defendant received an effective eight-year sentence to be served in confinement. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying her request for probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jermaine R. Carpenter, filed for post-conviction relief from his conviction of simple possession of cocaine and two convictions of the sale of .5 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school zone, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Mershaun William Scott, was convicted in a bench trial by the Davidson County Criminal Court of simple possession of marijuana and received a thirty-day sentence, suspended to unsupervised probation, and a $250 suspended fine. See T.C.A. § 39-17-418 (2010). The Petitioner contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Branch Banking and Trust Company (“BB&T”) provided financing for a construction project and recorded a deed of trust. The excavation contractor, Charles Blalock & Sons, Inc., started work on the project and had done substantial work when Marshall & Ilsley Bank (“M&I Bank”) made a loan and recorded its trust deed. BB&T was paid off out of the proceeds of the loan from M&I Bank. Blalock was also paid current with the proceeds from the M&I Bank loan. BB&T released its trust deed. The developer later defaulted, and Blalock filed this action to enforce its statutory lien. M&I Bank’s assignee, Cay Partners, LLC, filed a counterclaim asserting that it should be entitled to the priority position of BB&T. Blalock and Cay filed competing motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted Blalock’s motion. Cay appeals. We affirm.

The Defendant, Memory Gayle Hall, entered open pleas of guilty to driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), speeding, and failing to provide evidence of financial responsibility. At sentencing, the trial court ordered her to serve forty days on consecutive weekends in the county jail, followed by probation for the balance of the eleven months and twenty-nine day sentence. She challenges the trial court’s denial of full probation, contending that she was a favorable candidate. After reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal from the grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee Shelby County. Appellants, former employees of the Shelby County Department of Homeland Security, filed suit against Appellee for retaliatory discharge under both the Tennessee Public Protection Act, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 50-1-304, and the Tennessee Public Employee Political Freedom Act, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 8-50-603. The trial court determined that Appellants had failed to meet their burden to show that the termination of their employment was causally connected to any whistleblowing activity and granted judgment in favor of Appellee. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal concerns an inmate’s petition for a writ of certiorari. The petitioner inmate was convicted of disciplinary offenses, which were affirmed by the Tennessee Department of Corrections. The inmate filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, seeking judicial review of the convictions. The trial court found that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the inmate’s petition because it did not include a recitation that it was his first application for the writ. We reverse and remand the cause for further consideration in light of Talley v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, 358 S.W.3d 185 (Tenn. 2011).

This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on two minor children, Holly B.C. (DOB: December 22, 2005) and Kylie M.C. (DOB: December 6, 2006) (collectively “the Children”). Defendants, Angela C. (“Mother”) and Chad C. (“Father”), are the biological parents of the Children. The Children were taken into custody in September 2007, after the defendants left them with a church nursery worker for two weeks and did not return during that period. The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate parental rights on September 25, 2008, and a hearing was held on the petition in September 2009. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement. The court later decided to hold the petition in abeyance to give the defendants an opportunity to make more progress with respect to their permanency plans. In July 1 2010, the defendants’ visitation with the Children was suspended due to alleged danger to the Children. A final hearing was held in September 2011. At that time, the Children had been in state custody for approximately four years. The trial court terminated the defendants’ parental rights. The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that both parents had failed to substantially comply with the permanency plan, that the conditions leading to removal still persisted, and that termination was in the Children’s best interest. Defendants appeal. We affirm.

This appeal involves jurisdiction over a divorce case. The parties lived in Maryland throughout their 19-year marriage. In 2007 or 2008, the husband left the marital home in Maryland. Several months later, he moved to Tennessee. About one year after he moved to Tennessee, the husband filed this complaint for divorce in the trial court below. The wife filed an answer and a counterclaim for divorce. The trial court conducted the first day of trial in the matter, and the case was continued. Before the trial resumed, the trial court sua sponte entered an order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction,jurisdiction over the wife and apparently also lack of subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. The husband now appeals. We reverse the trial court’s decision and remand for further proceedings.

Sonya Wyche (“the Putative Daughter”) was named as one of the heirs of James Sheperd Smith, deceased (“the Deceased”), in the petition for letters of administration filed by James B. Smith and Jacqueline Smith Gunn (collectively “the Adminstrators”). The Administrators filed a “Motion to Determine Identity of Heirs” approximately 13 months after the Deceased died. The court held that the Putative Daughter’s claim as a child born out of wedlock was not perfected in a timely fashion. The court also held that the Putative Daughter did not carry her burden of proving that the Administrators, by naming her as an heir in the petition, acted with intent to trick her into not filing a timely claim. The Putative Daughter appeals. We affirm.

Carlos Burris (“the Defendant”) appeals his convictions in two separate trials for attempting to obtain a controlled substance by fraud and driving on a suspended license, fourth offense. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to six years for the attempting to obtain a controlled substance by fraud conviction and to eleven months, twenty-nine days for the driving on a suspended license conviction. The trial court also ordered that the two sentences run consecutively. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence presented at both trials was insufficient to support his convictions. Additionally, the Defendant contends that his sentence for the first conviction was excessive and that the trial court erred by running the two sentences consecutively. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions and sentences.

The Petitioner, Kenneth Gregory Allen, appeals from the Marshall County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court erred in failing to acknowledge his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and dismissing his petition based solely on finding that the issues raised therein were previously determined. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing with regard to the Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Jarvis Q. Williams (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief from his convictions of seven counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and four counts of aggravated robbery, alleging ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel and denial of a public trial. After a hearing, the post-conviction court granted relief in the form of a reduced sentence but otherwise denied relief. This appeal followed. Upon our thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Plaintiff appeals a jury verdict awarding her damages in the amount of approximately $5,000 in her action for damages against her uninsured motorist insurance carrier. We affirm.

In this modification of custody case, Mother appeals only the trial court’s failure to make a specific finding that modification is in the child’s best interest. Concluding that the trial court failed to make the necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law, we vacate the order of the trial court naming Father primary residential parent and remand to the trial court for the entry of an order with appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Following a bench trial, the Defendant, Deborah Davis, was convicted of one count of driving under the influence (DUI), first offense, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-401. The Defendant was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days with forty-eight hours to be served in confinement and the remainder to be served on unsupervised probation. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress all evidence gathered by the police pursuant to an accident investigation because such evidence was protected by the accident report privilege of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-114(b); and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction. Following our review, we conclude that these issues are without merit and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Father’s individual retirement accounts (“IRAs”) were garnished to satisfy an award of attorney’s fees, and he filed a motion to quash the garnishment, claiming that the accounts were exempt from garnishment under Tennessee law. In a previous appeal, this Court concluded that the IRAs were exempt property, and we reversed the trial court’s order dismissing Father’s motion to quash the garnishment. On remand, the trial court vacated its previous order but again dismissed Father’s motion to quash. We reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to grant Father’s motion to quash and to dissolve the writ of garnishment.

A Williamson County Grand Jury indicted appellant, Robert Allen Zaloba, for eight counts of rape of a child, one count of rape, and one count of aggravated sexual battery. The first five counts of rape of a child (counts 1-5) pertained to one victim, and the remaining three counts of rape of a child, one count of rape, and one count of aggravated sexual battery involved a second victim. The trial court severed counts six through ten for trial. The jury returned verdicts of guilty on all counts, for which the trial court sentenced appellant to serve an effective forty-eight-year sentence. Appellant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court properly admitted a reference that appellant had engaged in sexual relations with another individual; (2) whether the trial court properly denied appellant’s request to admit the victim’s prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence; (3) whether the trial court properly denied appellant’s request for a jury instruction that it could consider the victim’s prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence; (4) whether the trial court properly instructed the jury that "recklessly" was a proper mens rea for rape of a child; (5) whether the trial court properly instructed the jury by using the disjunctive "or" to connect the requisite mental states; (6) whether the trial court erred in rejecting appellant’s mitigation proof at sentencing; (7) whether the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences; (8) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain appellant’s convictions; and (9) whether the circumstantial nature of the case rendered any errors by the trial court not harmless. Discerning no reversible error in the proceedings, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After a trial by jury, the defendant was convicted of one count of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. She was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to two years, with credit for time served and the balance to be served on probation as an alternative sentence. The defendant now appeals, claiming that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction and that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress evidence seized by police during a search of her property, both before and after the issuance of a search warrant. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a breach of contract case.  Appellant Homeowner contracted with Appellee for the installation of a “smart home” system. After myriad problems arose, Appellant fired Appellee, who filed the instant lawsuit to collect the unpaid balance for equipment and installation. The trial court determined that the primary purpose of the parties’ agreement was the sale of goods and applied Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The court granted judgment in favor of Appellee, but allowed certain offsets for items rejected by Appellant. Appellant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in applying the UCC, and in its calculation of damages. Appellant also appeals the trial court’s determination that the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act does not apply. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Andrea Nichole Bean, pled guilty to the sale and the delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the two convictions and imposed a sentence of sixteen years as a Range II, multiple offender to be served in the Department of Correction ("DOC"). In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her an alternative sentence. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Nathaniel Shelbourne (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of intentional or knowing aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to a term of eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to his prior sentence. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant claims that (1) the trial court erred in admitting photographs of the victim’s injuries; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor reckless endangerment; (3) the evidence is not sufficient to support his conviction; and (4) his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we have determined that the Defendant is not entitled to relief on any of these issues. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Homeowner and Contractor filed competing suits against one another in the general sessions court. Homeowner was awarded $1,500.00 against Contractor; Contractor’s suit against Homeowner was dismissed. Contractor then appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court dismissed all actions filed by both parties, finding that the construction contracts required arbitration of disputes. Homeowner appeals and we affirm.

The petitioner, Matthew Jackson, was convicted of four counts of aggravated robbery pursuant to a plea agreement and was sentenced to an effective ten years of incarceration. The petitioner filed a prior application for the writ of error coram nobis, the denial of which was affirmed on appeal. The petitioner brings this subsequent petition for the writ of error coram nobis, asserting various grounds for relief. The trial court denied the writ, noting that the claim was time-barred and that the petitioner failed to allege facts which would negate the knowing and voluntary nature of his pleas. After a review of the record, we affirm.