APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Jason Lee Biles, appeals as of right from his jury conviction for delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class C felony, and the trial court’s subsequent sentence of ten years. The Defendant contends that the evidence submitted to the jury was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court’s ten-year sentence was excessive and inconsistent with the Sentencing Act. After reviewing the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction and that the trial court’s ten-year sentence is neither excessive nor inconsistent with the Sentencing Act. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mother of two children appeals an order terminating her parental rights. Both children were taken into Department of Children’s Services custody after they tested positive for cocaine. The trial court found several grounds for termination and determined that termination is in the children’s best interests. Mother contends the trial court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence that termination of her rights is in the best interest of the children. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Appellant, Otis B. Owens, pled guilty to arson and vandalism of property valued at over $60,000. As per the guilty plea the length and manner of service of sentence was to be determined by the trial court after a hearing. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of eight years. Appellant appeals, arguing that the trial court improperly denied an alternative sentence and that the trial court improperly applied enhancement factors in determining the length of the sentence. After a review of the record, we determine that the trial court properly sentenced Appellant to an effective eight-year sentence, and, in order to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense, did not abuse its discretion in denying an alternative sentence. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.
 

On April 23, 2012, the petitioner, Ronald L. Taylor, filed pro se a petition for post-conviction relief challenging his 2005 conviction of aggravated assault. The post- onviction court summarily dismissed the petition based, in part, upon the bar of the statute of limitations. The State has moved this court pursuant to this court’s rule 20 to summarily affirm the postconviction court’s order of dismissal. Because the record evinces no basis for tolling the statute of limitations and because the petition was untimely and barred by the statute, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the post-conviction court’s order.

This appeal arises from the denial of Plaintiff/Appellant’s claim for unemployment compensation benefits. We affirm.

This is a divorce case in which the husband challenges the award of alimony. After the divorce trial, the trial court awarded the wife transitional alimony and alimony in futuro. It also awarded the wife a monetary amount per month for her share of the husband’s military pension benefits. The husband filed a motion to alter or amend arguing inter alia that the military would not make direct payments to the wife from his military benefits because the marriage did not overlap the husband’s active-duty military service for the requisite number of years. Based on the husband’s argument, the trial court modified the alimony award by deleting the requirement that the husband divide his military pension benefits with the wife, but increasing the husband’s in futuro alimony obligation by an equal amount. The husband now appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Malcolm H. Jones, appeals from his dual jury convictions for aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and the trial court’s subsequent sentence, after merging the two convictions, to serve nine years in the Department of Correction (DOC). He contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for, that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a continuance, and that the trial court’s sentence of nine years was excessive because the trial court misapplied an enhancement factor, and the remaining two enhancement factors are not sufficient to support a one-year enhancement beyond the minimum in the range. Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Gregory Lance, was convicted of two counts of first degree murder, especially aggravated burglary, and arson. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Gregory Lance, No. M2001-02507-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 1960270, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Apr. 28, 2003), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Oct. 27, 2003). Petitioner sought post-conviction relief. The denial of his petition was affirmed by this Court on appeal. Gregory Paul Lance v. State, No. M2005-01765-CCA-R3-PC, 2006 WL 2380619 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Aug. 16, 2006), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 18, 2006). In March of 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis. It was dismissed as untimely. After a review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the untimely petition for coram nobis relief as Petitioner made no allegations that would toll the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the judgment of the coram nobis court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Michael W. Smith, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Kyrie T. Adams, appeals as of right from the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to file a motion to suppress his statement to the police prior to the Petitioner entering a guilty plea. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Carolyn Nadine Killian, appeals her conviction for driving under the influence (DUI), first offense, and her sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days with ten days to be served in confinement and the remainder of the sentence to be served on probation. On appeal, she argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction and (2) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence by failing to consider the purposes and principles of the sentencing act. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment, but we remand the case for entry of a percentage of service for the DUI conviction.

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, Jackie Ewing, of theft of property valued over $1,000.00. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Martin Lewis Privette, appeals the Sumner County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2011 conviction for incest and his four-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court applied an impermissible legal standard in determining whether he received the effective assistance of counsel when entering his guilty plea. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Antoinette Horton, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to a term of eighteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, she contends that the court erred in denying her petition because she was denied her right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, she contends that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to present a witness who would have established that the gunshot fired by the petitioner could not have killed the victim; and (2) failing to adequately advise the petitioner with regard to the State’s plea offers. The petitioner also asserts that the post-conviction court’s denial of her request for funding for a ballistics expert violated her Due Process rights. Following review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Defendant, Joseph Anthony Gonzales, appeals from the trial court’s partial revocation of his probation and order that he serve one of his two eight-year sentences, imposed pursuant to his guilty pleas to dual counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter, in the Department of Correction (DOC). He contends that the evidence relied upon by the trial court was insufficient to support the revocation and requests that this court reinstate his probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. The case is remanded to reflect the proper award of jail credits on the judgment form.

The Defendant, Willie Howard Mull, pled guilty to aggravated assault, felony reckless endangerment, and unlawfully carrying a weapon. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of four years, to be served on probation. A warrant was issued alleging the Defendant had violated his probation. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Jose Juan Frierson, entered a "best interest" plea, on January 7, 1999, to criminal attempt to commit aggravated rape and was ordered to serve an eight-year split-confinement sentence. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief on December 30, 2009, alleging that he was entitled to the tolling of the one-year statute of limitations period for post-conviction petitions due to his mental incompetence. The Petitioner further alleged that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because the trial court failed to ensure that he was aware that the sentence included a requirement of lifetime supervision. After hearings on the petition, the post-conviction court entered an order denying post-conviction relief. The Petitioner filed, at the same time, both an appeal to this Court and a motion for new trial. Thereafter, the post-conviction court issued a subsequent order granting post-conviction relief. Upon our review of the record, we conclude that the subsequent order granting post-conviction relief is void because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the second order. As to the first order denying post-conviction relief, we affirm the judgement of the post-conviction court.

A Lauderdale County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Greg Patterson, of felony reckless endangerment, and the trial court sentenced him to eighteen months to be served in community corrections. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we agree that the evidence is insufficient. Therefore, the conviction is reversed, and the original charge is dismissed.

The defendant, Noura Jackson, was convicted of second degree murder for the death of her mother, Jennifer Jackson, and sentenced to twenty years and nine months in the Department of Correction. On appeal, she argues that the trial court erred in the following rulings: (1) concluding that her conversation at the scene with a family friend, who is an attorney, was not subject to the attorney-client privilege; (2) concluding that the searches of the residence she shared with the victim and of a vehicle parked in the driveway were lawful; (3) allowing testimony of lay witnesses as to her use of “drugs”; (4) allowing testimony of her having sexual relations at a time after the murder, as to her eviction from an apartment after the murder, and as to her hospitalization at Lakeside Hospital after the murder; (5) allowing the victim’s brother and sisters to testify as to arguments between the defendant and the victim prior to the murder; and (6) allowing certain photographs of the crime scene and the victim’s body. Additionally, the defendant argues that she is entitled to a new trial because of (7) prosecutorial conduct consisting of references to the post-arrest silence of the defendant; suppression of the third statement of a State’s witness; loudly beginning its opening statement by saying, “Give me the f*cking money”; using a misleading PowerPoint presentation during its closing argument; commenting on her right to remain silent; references to the Deity during closing arguments; commenting in closing argument on the length of the trial; treating as established facts which were not proven at trial; making personal attacks during closing statements upon her; and making additional improper statements during closing argument. Further, the defendant argues on appeal that (8) the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction for second degree murder and that (9) the court erred in imposing more than a minimum sentence. We have carefully reviewed the record and conclude that the arguments of the defendant are without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is the second appeal of this case in which Cadlerock, LLC attempted to domesticate a foreign judgment that it had purportedly received by assignment. The judgment had been entered against Sheila R. Weber. The trial court refused to enroll the judgment and dismissed the case because Cadlerock, LLC was merely an assignee of the judgment. Cadlerock, LLC appealed, and this court directed the trial court to enroll the judgment. On remand, the trial court enrolled the judgment as directed. Sheila R. Weber appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

I concur in the results reached in the lead opinion by Judge Glenn. Indeed, I join in the lead opinion on all but one issue. I write separately to address the issue of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. As the lead opinion points out, the opening sentence of the State’s rebuttal argument was as follows: “Just tell us where you were. That’s all we’re asking, Noura.” The defense contends that the remark constitutes an improper comment on the defendant’s choice not to testify at trial. The State claims that the remark was merely a reference to the testimony during trial given by Cindy Eidson, the defendant’s aunt.

Appellant appeals from an order dismissing his claims for monetary damages against the State of Tennessee, the Tennessee Department of Human Services, and the Assistant Commissioner of the Child Support Services Division of the Tennessee Department of Human Services. Having determined that sovereign immunity bars the lawsuit, we affirm.

An employee appeals the trial court’s decision to void a final administrative order by the Department of Labor awarding the employee attorney fees with respect to the employee’s actions to enforce a workers’ compensation settlement. We have determined that the applicable request for assistance process does not constitute a contested case under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act and that the trial court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear this matter. We reverse the decision of the trial court.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Defendant, Anthony Dewight Washington, appeals from his conviction by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of possession with intent to sell or deliver more than one-half gram of cocaine in a drug-free zone, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417(a)(4), (c)(1) (2010) (amended 2012) (possession of cocaine), 39-17-432 (2010) (increased penalty for a drug offense committed in a drug-free zone). The Defendant was sentenced to serve thirty years as a Range III, persistent offender. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in sentencing him. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.