APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Gregory N. Brown, was charged in a two-count indictment with domestic aggravated assault and cruelty to animals. Defendant pled guilty to domestic aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and the cruelty to animals charge was dismissed. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve six years as a Range I standard offender in the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). Defendant appeals his sentence and argues that the trial court erred by imposing the maximum sentence within the applicable range. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.  

Rose A. Chapman and Alfred C. Chapman (“Plaintiffs”) sued Wellmont Holston Valley Medical Center (“the Hospital”) regarding a fall Ms. Chapman suffered while a patient at the Hospital. The Trial Court entered judgment upon the jury’s verdict finding and holding that the Hospital was not at fault. Plaintiffs appeal raising one issue regarding whether the Trial Court erred in granting the Hospital’s motion in limine to exclude testimony about an apology and offer to pay bills allegedly made by one of the Hospital’s nurses. We find this issue has been waived, and we affirm.

A woman who suffered a series of persistent infections after surgery filed a malpractice complaint against the defendant surgeon. Her complaint alleged that the infections were cause by a small metal object that the defendant had negligently left in her body during the surgery. The plaintiff attached to her complaint the statutorily required certificate of good faith, which certified that she had consulted with an expert, who provided a signed statement confirming that he believed, on the basis of the medical records, that there was a good faith basis to maintain the action. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122. After the object was discovered to be a surgical clip of a type that was designed to be retained by the patient’s body, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which the plaintiff did not oppose. The defendant surgeon subsequently filed a motion for sanctions against the plaintiff under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122 (d)(3), which gives the court the authority to punish violations related to the certificate of good faith. The trial court granted the motion, and awarded the defendant doctor over $22,000 in attorney fees. We reverse.

Petitioner, Julio Villasana, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide and one count of leaving the scene of an accident. Petitioner entered guilty pleas to one count of aggravated vehicular homicide, a Class A felony, and one count of leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death, a Class E felony. Following a sentencing hearing, Petitioner was sentenced by the trial court to the maximum sentence of 25 years for aggravated vehicular homicide and two years for leaving the scene of an accident. His sentences were ordered to run concurrently. This court affirmed Petitioner’s sentence on direct appeal. In his post-conviction petition, Petitioner asserted that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that his pleas were involuntarily and unknowingly entered. The post-conviction court denied relief following a hearing. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves the transfer of a state prisoner’s action based on improper venue. The prisoner was housed in a correctional facility located in Hardeman County, Tennessee. The correctional facility is operated by a private entity. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-21-803,the Circuit Court of Davidson County transferred this action to Hardeman County, where the correctional facility is located. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves a prisoner who was sentenced to death in 1991. Nineteen years later, he filed a petition in the Criminal Court for Shelby County seeking to reopen his post-conviction proceeding on the ground that he possessed new scientific evidence of his actual innocence. His evidence consisted of a newly-obtained I.Q. test score purportedly showing that he could not be executed by virtue of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203 (2010) because he was intellectually disabled. The trial court declined to hold a hearing and denied the prisoner’s petition. The trial court determined, as a matter of the law, that the prisoner’s newly-obtained I.Q. test score was not new scientific evidence of his actual innocence of the offenses to which he earlier pleaded guilty. The prisoner filed an application for permission to appeal the denial of his petition to reopen in the Court of Criminal Appeals. In addition to asserting that the newly-obtained I.Q. test score was new scientific evidence of his actual innocence, the prisoner asserted that this Court’s decision in Coleman v. State, 341 S.W.3d 221 (Tenn. 2011), announced a new constitutional right and, therefore, provided another basis for reopening his petition for post-conviction relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals entered an order on June 29, 2011, affirming the trial court’s denial of the petition to reopen because the I.Q. test score did not amount to scientific evidence of actual innocence for the purpose of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117(a)(2) (2006) and because Coleman v. State did not announce a new rule of constitutional law under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117(a)(1). We granted the prisoner’s application for permission to appeal to address whether the phrase “actually innocent of the offense” in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117(a)(2) encompasses ineligibility for the death penalty in addition to actual innocence of the underlying crime and whether our holding in Coleman v. State established a new constitutional right to be applied retroactively under Tenn. Code Ann.§ 40-30-117(a)(1). We hold that the Tennessee General Assembly, when it enacted Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117(a)(2), did not intend for the phrase “actually innocent of the offense” to include ineligibility for the death penalty because of intellectual disability. We also hold that Coleman v. State did not establish a new rule of constitutional law that must be applied retroactively under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30117(a)(1). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals denying the prisoner’s petition to reopen his post-conviction petition.
 

In Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790, 792 (Tenn. 2001), this Court held that “the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution prohibit the execution of [intellectually disabled] individuals because such executions violate evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society, are grossly disproportionate, and serve no valid penological purpose in any case.” The next year, the United States Supreme Court reached the same conclusion:
We are not persuaded that the execution of [intellectually disabled] criminals will measurably advance the deterrent or the retributive purpose of the death penalty. Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of our “evolving standards of decency,” we therefore conclude that such punishment is excessive and that the Constitution “places a substantive restriction on the State’s power to take the life” of a[n intellectually disabled] offender.
 

This appeal concerns a termination of parental rights. The appellees filed a petition for adoption and termination of parental rights with respect to the minor child at issue. The trial court, upon finding clear and convincing evidence of several grounds on which to base termination and concluding that termination was in the child’s best interest, revoked the biological father’s parental rights to the child. The father appeals. We affirm.

In this action plaintiff charged defendant had breached the contract between them and sought specific performance. The Trial Court held the contracts were ambiguous and construed them in accordance with the actions the parties took in regard to the contracts. The Trial Court ruled in favor of the defendant and dismissed the Complaint, but refused to award the prevailing party attorney's fees as was required in the parties' contract. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court's Judgment, but modify and remand, with instructions to the Trial Court to award the prevailing party her attorney's fees.

Defendant was convicted of first degree (premeditated) murder after a trial by jury. He was sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. The defendant also claims that the trial court erred by admitting three pieces of evidence: (1) an excerpt from a 911 call made by the victim several days before his death, in which the victim claimed to be "a little . . . concerned" about the defendant’s behavior; (2) testimony from one of the defendant’s friends to the effect that the friend did not believe that any affair had occurred between the defendant and the friend’s then-wife; and (3) testimony concerning various searches performed on the defendant’s computer involving the name "Missy." Finally, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by granting the State’s request for a special jury instruction concerning the destruction of evidence. After review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction and that the trial court did not err with respect to the evidentiary and jury instruction claims raised by the defendant. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Roane County jury convicted the Defendant, Roger A. Beu, Jr., of sexual battery by an authority figure. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to three years as a Range I, standard offender, at thirty percent, to serve thirty days in jail, with the balance on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for new trial based on the prosecutor’s improper comments to the jury during closing argument; (2) the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence the written statement of the victim; and (3) there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I respectfully concur in the results in this case. My departure relates to only one issue – the rationale for affirming the trial court’s admission into evidence a portion of a recording of the victim’s telephone call to the police in which the victim expressed his concern over the defendant’s behavior. Assuming that this evidence passes the hearsay barrier as evidence of the victim’s state of mind, I would have held that the victim’s state of mind as expressed in the recording was irrelevant to the issues on trial. I note that the recording itself does not express the date of the telephone call, but the prosecutor’s oral, in-court preface to the playing of the recording indicates to the trial court that the call was placed on June 5, 2008. Given the somewhat banal comment offered on the recording and the remoteness of nearly three weeks, I see no relevancy of the statement to the issues joined at trial. That said, I would have also held that the error was harmless.

The Defendant, Akeem T. Goodman, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery, Class A felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202, -403 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to consecutive Range I terms of twenty-two years at 100% service as a violent offender for an effective forty-four-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Lawrence Ralph, Jr., appeals as of right from the Warren County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his drug-related convictions and effective seventeen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends (1) that he received ineffective assistance from trial counsel; and (2) that he was denied access to legal materials that he needed to prepare to represent himself at trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Pamela J. Booker, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s order revoking her probation for her three convictions for violating a habitual traffic offender order and ordering her to serve her effective fifteen-year sentence. On appeal, she contends that the court erred in ordering her to serve the sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

James M. Watkins (“the Defendant”) appeals his jury convictions for burglary of a business, vandalism of property worth $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, and possession of burglary tools. He received an effective sentence of twelve years as a Range III, career offender. On appeal, he asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the contents found as a result of a stop and subsequent search of the Defendant and a bag in his possession. He also argues the following: that the trial court erred in overruling the Defendant’s objection to a jury instruction; that newly acquired evidence exists that would have affected the outcome of the trial; and that Officer Rogers’ testimony was perjury that prejudiced the Defendant. Lastly, the Defendant alleges that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions.

The defendant, Donnie Paul Boling, Jr., pled guilty to reckless endangerment, a Class E felony, and to driving under the influence, possession of less than one-half ounce of marijuana, and possession of Alprazolam, all Class A misdemeanors. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of one year. In this appeal, the defendant’s sole claim is that the trial court erred by denying him probation or an alternative sentence. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Walter Ray Carter, pro se, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his pleadings entitled “Motion of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel” and “Motion to Dismiss Indictment and/or Arrest Judgment” filed on July 18, 2011 in four separate cases. The motions sought relief from certain drug-related convictions entered in 1996 and in 2005. Following our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court was within its discretion to construe the pleadings as petitions for post-conviction relief which are now time barred pursuant to the statute of limitations. The summary dismissal is affirmed.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Petitioner, Scotty V. Nunn, appeals the Morgan County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 1994 convictions for fraudulent breach of trust and misapplication of contract payments and resulting sentence of fourteen years. The Petitioner contends that he is entitled to relief because of an improper extradition from the Commonwealth of Virginia. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Ngoc Dien Nguyen, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his sentences of probation. Defendant pled guilty to two counts of writing or passing worthless checks over $1,000. He received a sentence of two years for each count, as a Range I standard offender, to be served concurrently on probation. Subsequently, a probation violation warrant was filed, which alleged that Defendant had violated his probation by committing new offenses, failing to report the new offenses to his probation officer, failing to notify his probation officer that he was back in Tennessee after serving a parole violation in California, and failing to provide proof of payment of court costs and fines. Following the hearing the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his effective two-year sentence in confinement, with credit for time served. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee sought workers’ compensation benefits, alleging that he injured his back at work on September 30, 2008, and is now totally and permanently disabled. The employer denied that the employee sustained a compensable work-related injury, but alternativelyargued that the employee is not totallyand permanently disabled. The trial court concluded that the employee sustained a compensable work-related injury and awarded 80% permanent partial disability benefits. The employer has appealed, arguing that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the injury was compensable and that, even if the employee proved a compensable injury, the evidence preponderates against the award of 80% permanent partial disabilitybenefits. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Donald Keith Solomon, appeals as of right from the Bedford County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing his petition for being untimely filed. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Patrick Pope, appeals the Maury County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner is currently serving an effective eleven-year sentence for aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and aggravated robbery. On appeal, he contends that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to investigate possible alibi witnesses in preparing the case for trial. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

A Shelby County grand jury returned a seven-count indictment against petitioner, Mikel Hamrick. He entered guilty pleas to four of the counts, including aggravated 1 burglary, especially aggravated stalking, domestic assault, and theft of property less than $500, for which he received an effective four-year sentence. The remaining counts were dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, alleging that his mental instability rendered his guilty pleas involuntary and that the infirmity was compounded by trial counsel’s failure to adequately advise him of the consequences of pleading guilty. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.