APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Tennessee Department of Revenue issued a tax assessment against a horse-drawn carriage company pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-6-212(a)(2). The carriage company filed a complaint in the chancery court challenging the tax assessment on two grounds: (1) that its carriage rides did not constitute a place of amusement under the statute and (2) that its equal protection rights had been violated because no other carriage companies had been assessed the tax. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The court granted the Tennessee Department of Revenue’s motion for summary judgment and denied the carriage company’s motion for summary judgment. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the chancery court’s decision.

In this appeal, a defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it granted the plaintiff’s motion to voluntarily dismiss its complaint while the defendant’s motion to dismiss and for attorneys’ fees was pending.  We hold that a pending motion to dismiss does not preclude the plaintiff from voluntarily dismissing its case pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01.  Likewise, the defendant’s request for attorneys’ fees did not create a “vested right” preventing the plaintiff from voluntarily dismissing its case.  The ruling of the trial court is affirmed.

This appeal stems from a lawsuit over a void marriage. Larry Inman (“Plaintiff”) sued
Cindy Craven Inman (“Defendant”) for divorce in the Circuit Court for Shelby County
(“the Circuit Court”). However, it emerged during the lawsuit that Defendant never
divorced her previous spouse. The Circuit Court entered an agreed final order holding that
the parties’ marriage was void and dismissing the complaint. Plaintiff later sued Defendant
in the Chancery Court for Shelby County (“the Trial Court”) asserting various causes of
action stemming from his being misled into believing he was married. Defendant filed a
motion to dismiss, which the Trial Court granted on res judicata grounds. Plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff could have asserted his claims in the previous divorce lawsuit, but he did not.
Thus, the doctrine of res judicata bars Plaintiff’s claims. We affirm.

The economic loss doctrine generally precludes a contracting party who suffers only
economic losses from recovering damages in tort. In Tennessee, the application of this
doctrine is limited to products liability cases. In this appeal, we consider whether the
economic loss doctrine should be expanded to apply outside the products liability context.
A jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages to a drywall subcontractor in a suit
against a general contractor under theories of breach of contract and tort. The Court of
Appeals applied the economic loss doctrine to preclude the recovery of damages in tort in
a suit between sophisticated commercial entities. The intermediate court, in part, affirmed
the award of compensatory damages for breach of contract, dismissed the tort claim, and
reversed the award for punitive damages. We hold the economic loss doctrine only applies
in products liability cases and should not be extended to other claims.

In this post-divorce case, Father appeals the trial court’s grant of sole decision-making authority over the Children’s non-emergency health care and religious decisions to Mother. Mother requests attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. Because there is no evidence to support an award of sole decision-making authority over religious decisions, we reverse the trial court’s order awarding Mother same. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed, and Mother’s request for appellate attorney’s fees is denied.

In this appeal, we address whether a Tennessee resident may sue an Alabama corporation in a Tennessee court for alleged breach of contract and breach of warranty pertaining to its construction of a custom lake house in Alabama. Tennessee resident Roger Baskin hired Pierce & Allred Construction, an Alabama corporation with its principal place of business in Alabama, to build a house on a parcel of land in Alabama. Mr. Baskin supplied the architectural plans and some of the materials, all sourced from Tennessee, and the parties communicated throughout the project from their respective states. However, all of Pierce & Allred Construction’s activities on the project occurred in Alabama. Mr. Baskin ultimately became dissatisfied with the quality and expense of the construction work, and he filed suit in the Davidson County Chancery Court. Pierce & Allred Construction moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that the corporation lacked the “minimum contacts” with Tennessee that due process protections require. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The trial court granted the motion, finding that the events relevant to the claims occurred in Alabama and that the corporation’s contacts with Tennessee were minor and attenuated. The Court of Appeals reversed, looking to recent decisions from this Court, see Crouch Ry. Consulting, LLC v. LS Energy Fabrication, LLC, 610 S.W.3d 460 (Tenn. 2020), and the United States Supreme Court, see Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021) (explaining that the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction requires that a plaintiff’s claim arise out of or relate to the defendant’s forum contacts). We granted permission to appeal. Based on our review, we have determined that Pierce & Allred Construction’s contacts with Tennessee were not such that the corporation reasonably should have anticipated being haled into a Tennessee court to answer this suit. In making this determination, we conclude that certain contacts with Tennessee did not reflect that the corporation purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business activities in Tennessee, while certain other contacts were not sufficiently related to Mr. Baskin’s claims to support the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction. Thus, we hold that Mr. Baskin failed to establish a prima facie case of the minimum contacts necessary for a Tennessee court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over the Alabama corporation. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court dismissing Mr. Baskin’s complaint.

During the pendency of a divorce, Wife was convicted of one count of criminal contempt. Wife filed a notice of appeal subsequent to this conviction. Before Wife’s initial appeal was heard, the trial court entered its order granting the parties a divorce. Wife filed another notice of appeal challenging the outcome of the divorce. We consolidated the respective appeals, and now, upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in both the contempt and divorce proceedings.

Because the notice of appeal was untimely, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the appeal. Appeal dismissed.

This is an appeal from a final order entered on February 10, 2023. The Notice of Appeal
was not filed with the Appellate Court Clerk until March 14, 2023, more than thirty days
from the date of entry of the order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because
the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This appeal arises from a dispute over the estate of Mrs. Willie Seeber. Mrs. Seeber left a purported Last Will and Testament executed in 2021,which the personal representative named therein has offered to the Probate Court for Loudon County for solemn form probate. However, various family members and friends of Mrs. Seeber seek to challenge this will and allege Mrs. Seeber lacked testamentary capacity and was unduly influenced to execute the will. The contestants rely upon earlier testamentary documents to establish standing to bring a will contest. The proponent appeals an order of the probate court holding the contestants have standing to bring a will contest. We hold the probate court did not err in its various findings and affirm the judgment of the probate court. This case is remanded for further proceedings.

The defendant, Mario Deshon Murray, pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm after being convicted of a felony involving violence, and the trial court imposed a sentence of fifteen years’ incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his request for alternative sentencing, in misapplying mitigating factors, and in imposing consecutive sentences. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Tyrell Webb, pleaded guilty to rape, and the trial court imposed a sentence
of eight years’ incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the
defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his request for probation and in restricting
cross-examination of the victim. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable
law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, we remand the case for entry of
judgments reflecting the dismissal of counts two and three.

A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, William Michael Bowers, of vehicular homicide by intoxication, a Class B felony, and driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor. The Defendant appeals, contending that (1) the trial court violated his right to confrontation by allowing a witness to testify via video rather than in person; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I must respectfully disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority in holding
the Appellant properly preserved the issue of whether the trial court violated his right to
confrontation by allowing a witness to testify via Zoom rather than in person. I believe the
Appellant has waived the confrontation clause issue for failure to specify at trial whether
he was objecting based on the federal constitution,1 the state constitution,2 or both. Given
the lack of a properly developed record, I would have concluded that the issue was not
entitled to plenary review and declined review for plain error. Accordingly, I dissent.

In this breach of contract dispute between an engineering consulting firm and a real estate development company, we review the trial court’s holding that the real estate development company breached the contract between the parties as well as the court’s award of attorneys’ fees to the engineering consulting firm. We affirm the court’s decision in all respects. Because the parties’ agreement states that the prevailing party in litigation arising from or related to the contract shall be entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs, we remand the case to the trial court with instructions for the trial court to award the engineering firm its reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this appeal.

The Defendant, Timothy Michael Crabtree, was convicted in the Henry County Circuit
Court of aggravated assault and was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years
in confinement. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his
conviction because the evidence fails to show the victim suffered serious bodily injury and
that his sentence is excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Cedric Konard Mitchell, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his ten-year
sentence for two counts of domestic assault and one count of aggravated assault in case
numbers 14908 and 15052. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by fully revoking
his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his ten-year sentence in
confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Tracey Lynn Carter, was convicted by a Lincoln County jury of attempted aggravated assault, resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, and public intoxication. He received an effective sentence of eight years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Appellant alleges that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for attempted aggravated assault; (2) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication; and (3) the trial court erred in denying a sentence of split confinement. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Plaintiffs sued for injuries and damages allegedly resulting from an automobile accident.
The trial court dismissed one of two defendants based on the statute of limitations.
Although the complaint was filed within one year of the accident, the original summons
went unserved, and plaintiffs did not obtain issuance of new process until over a year after
the issuance of the previous process. On appeal, plaintiffs contend that, because the
automobile accident resulted in a criminal prosecution, the time period for issuance of new
process under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 3 was extended. We affirm.

Former client sued his former attorney for legal malpractice and fraud. The trial court initially dismissed all claims, but was reversed on appeal as to the fraud claims. The trial court then held a bench trial and found in favor of the defendant attorney. In a second appeal, this Court affirmed the dismissal of all fraud claims except a fraud claim related to the hourly rate charged under the parties’ written contract. That claim was remanded to the trial court for purposes of consideration of the factors outlined in in Alexander v. Inman, 974 S.W.2d 689 (Tenn. 1998). On remand, the trial judge denied the plaintiff’s efforts to disqualify him from the case and to enlarge the scope of the trial. A bench trial was eventually held, despite the plaintiff’s multiple efforts to postpone. After a late motion to continue was denied, the plaintiff did not attend trial. Following the bench trial, the trial court once again ruled in favor of the defendant attorney, resulting in the dismissal of all claims against him. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

A Shelby County jury found the Defendant, Mr. Raghu Singh, guilty of two counts of
driving under the influence and one count of reckless driving. The trial court sentenced
the Defendant to an effective sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days, after service of
ten days in confinement. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is legally
insufficient to sustain his convictions for driving under the influence. He also asserts that
the trial court erred (1) in finding that the State had established a proper chain of custody
for his blood sample; and (2) by denying a motion to suppress statements he made at the
scene. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Mother filed a petition alleging civil and criminal contempt against the father of her child
due to unpaid child support. After several continuances, including based on Mother’s
request for an in-person hearing, the juvenile court heard the matter remotely via ZOOM.
At the start of the hearing, the trial court denied Mother’s request for a continuance for an
in-person hearing. The trial court also ruled that it had the authority to choose whether
Mother would prosecute her action as civil contempt or criminal contempt. The trial court
ruled that Mother’s petition would be treated solely as a civil contempt matter, but then
refused to punish Father for his past willful failure to pay child support because he had
made a purge payment. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further
proceedings.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final
appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

A Cheatham County jury convicted the Defendant, Charles D. Perry, of two counts of rape
of a child, and the trial court entered an agreed effective sentence of fifteen years of
incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the prosecution was time-barred
because it was commenced outside the statute of limitations; (2) his verdict was not
unanimous; (3) the trial court deprived his right to present a defense by limiting expert
testimony; (4) the trial court erred when it admitted character evidence in violation of
Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); (5) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his
convictions; and (6) the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors entitles him to a new
trial. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This appeal arises from a divorce. After trial, the trial court entered a final decree of
divorce with an attached Permanent Parenting Plan regarding the parties’ minor child. The
determination of child support was left blank. A supplemental order purported to
“bifurcate” the issue of child support and transfer the case from the Roane County IV-D
office to the Anderson County IV-D office. The father appeals. Since the issue of child
support was never resolved or adjudicated, there is no final, appealable judgment. The
appeal is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.