APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The trial court dismissed Husband’s post-judgment motion based on its conclusion that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. We reverse.

After a lengthy trial, the trial court determined that the decedent was more than 50% at fault for the collision that resulted in his death. The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings and we therefore affirm.

The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution. We affirm.

This appeal concerns the circuit court’s dismissal of an appeal from the general sessions court. We dismiss the appeal for failure to comply with Rule 29 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.

In this appeal as of right, the State contends that the trial court erred by setting aside the jury verdicts of attempted second degree murder and entering judgments of acquittal for those counts based upon the doctrine of transferred intent. Also in this appeal, the defendant challenges his convictions of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and attempted first degree murder on grounds that the evidence was insufficient to support those convictions. Because the trial court erred by setting aside the jury verdicts of attempted second degree murder, the judgments effecting those verdicts and the 12-year sentences are reinstated. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed in all other respects.

In this divorce proceeding, Mother and Father entered into a Marital Dissolution Agreement and Permanent Parenting Plan, which were incorporated into the final decree of divorce; the parties shared equal parenting time with their two children and neither party was obligated to pay child support. Mother subsequently filed a petition to set support, as well as a motion for relief from the final decree, both of which sought to have the court set support in accordance with the child support guidelines. The court denied the petition and the motion on the grounds that the parties had agreed in the parenting plan that child support would not be paid and that a significant variance did not exist. Finding that relief to Mother is appropriate under the circumstances, we reverse the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

Appellant, Billy Wayne Vestal, entered a guilty plea to aggravated assault without a recommended sentence. Following the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to serve five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). Appellant challenges the sentence as being excessive. Upon our review, we discern no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Randy Clayton Norman, appeals the Maury County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of second degree murder and resulting fifteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves a judgment by the trial court that dismissed two motions filed by Mother. The first was the Motion to Alter or Amend the trial court’s decision denying the Petition to Set Support. That petition was denied on the basis that no significant variance existed. The second was Mother’s motion for relief pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. That motion was directed to the original decree of divorce and, more specifically, to the original child support established in the parenting plan.

Appellant, Sarah Lynn Hannon, pleaded guilty to possession with intent to sell or deliver 0.5 grams or more of cocaine in exchange for a sentence of ten years and dismissal of all remaining charges. Per the terms of the plea agreement, the parties left determination of the manner of service of her sentence to the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that appellant serve her ten-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. It is from this judgment that appellant now appeals. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The mother and stepfather of two children filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the children’s father on the ground of abandonment. The trial court terminated father’s rights on the grounds that he willfully failed to visit the children and paid only token support for the children in the four months preceding the filing of the petition. After a careful review of the record and the applicable law, we reverse the trial court, finding there is not clear and convincing proof that father’s lack of visitation was willful. We further hold that father’s payment of $697.76 in child support during the relevant time period was not mere “token support.”

The Defendant-Appellant, Franklin D. Moore, was convicted by a Madison County jury of driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense, and sentenced to two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. Upon our review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is a grandparent visitation case. The trial court awarded visitation to paternal grandparents on the basis of a finding of severe emotional harm to the child if visitation was not granted. The child’s mother and adoptive father appeal. We affirm the trial court’s ruling with regard to the evidentiary and procedural issues, but reverse as to the finding of a likelihood of severe emotional harm. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Grandparents Johnny F. and Sharon E. F. (“the Petitioners”) filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Shawn L. F. (“Father”) and Shauna L. F. (“Mother”) to the minor child Johnny K. F. (“the Child”). After trial, the Trial Court entered an order finding and holding, inter alia, that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Father’s and Mother’s parental rights under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102 (1)(A)(iv) with respect to Father and Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1- 102 (b)(23) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(3) with respect to Mother, and that termination was in the best interests of the Child. Father and Mother appeal to this Court. We reverse, in part, and vacate, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for a new trial.

The termination of Father’s parental rights was based upon his alleged abandonment of the Child because he had engaged in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the Child’s welfare. The majority held that the trial court improperly relied upon this ground of abandonment because the termination petition merely alleged abandonment for failure to visit and to submit child support. I respectfully disagree.

Mother challenges the decision of the trial court terminating her parental rights to her daughter, Aspyn S.J. We find clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s determination that Mother abandoned her child by willfully failing to provide support and that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child.

County board of education filed a declaratory judgment action seeking declaration that the high school principal’s decisions to re-assign certain extracurricular sponsorships were not subject to arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement between the board of education and the education association. The trial court entered judgment in the board of education’s favor and the education association appealed. We affirm.

This is a premises liability case in which Plaintiffs alleged that a shower bench in Hotel collapsed, causing Husband to fall and sustain injuries. Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant, claiming negligence. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that he did not install the bench and did not have actual or constructive notice of the independent contractor’s negligent installation of the bench. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. Plaintiffs appeal. We reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

On August 21, 2012, Petitioner, Eric Chamber, filed a pro se petition in the Shelby County Criminal Court, seeking post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of first degree murder and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping. He was convicted of these offenses in a jury trial, and the convictions were affirmed on appeal. State v. Eric Chambers [sic], No. 02C01-9811-CR-00346, 2000 WL 279645 (Tenn. Crim. App. March 6, 2000). Mandate from this court was issued May 25, 2000. Petitioner asserts that his petition is not barred by the one year statute of limitations because decisions by the United States Supreme Court in March 2012 established “a constitutional right that was not recognized as existing at the time of trial.” The trial court summarily dismissed the petition because it was filed beyond the one year statute of limitations imposed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-102(a). Petitioner has appealed, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Jordan Mansfield Looper, pleaded guilty to attempted second degree murder, with the length and manner of service of his sentence to be determined by the trial court. The trial court sentenced him to serve twelve years in confinement. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in its sentencing by using an inapplicable enhancement factor and denying an alternative sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted, the Petitioner, Glenard Thorne, of two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, two counts of facilitation of aggravated rape, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and the trial court sentenced him to a fifty-two year effective sentence. This Court affirmed the judgments and sentence on appeal. State v. Lance Sandifer, et. al, No. M2008-02849-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 5343202, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Dec. 21, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 26, 2010). The Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the post-conviction court did not err when it dismissed the petition. The post-conviction court’s judgment is, therefore, affirmed.

Petitioner, Shannon V. Jones, was convicted by a Lauderdale County jury of one count of facilitation of delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance weighing less than .5 grams and delivery of a counterfeit controlled substance. As a result, he was sentenced as a career offender to twelve years for the facilitation conviction and six years for the delivery of the counterfeit controlled substance conviction. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. Petitioner appealed his convictions. See State v. Shannon Jones, No. W2009-01706-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 3619537, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Sept. 17, 2010), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Feb. 16, 2011). His convictions were affirmed on appeal. Id. Subsequently, Petitioner sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court because Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the record preponderates against the post-conviction court’s findings. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

This is a forfeiture case. Appellant was convicted of a Class B felony for sexual exploitation of children pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 39-17-1003. Appellant tendered his home computer to a repair shop. Upon examination of the hard drive, the technician discovered unlawful images and notified local law enforcement. A search warrant was subsequently executed for Appellant’s home, where parts of the computer in question were discovered. After Appellant’s arrest, a forfeiture warrant was executed and, after his mortgage indebtedness was satisfied, proceeds from the sale of Appellant’s real property were forfeited to the State pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 39-17- 1008. Appellant appeals the forfeiture of these proceeds. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

The defendant, Gai D. Kuot, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of premeditated first degree murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. The court merged the murder convictions and sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment. The court imposed a concurrent sixteen-year sentence on the especially aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial; (2) the trial court erred in admitting, over his objection, hearsay statements of Sammy Sabino; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This litigation arose out of a family dispute regarding the ownership of a farm of approximately 300 acres. In 1985, Mr. and Mrs. Arlie Overton, who will be referred to collectively as “the parents,” conveyed their interest in the property to their five adult children. The complaint in this case alleges that, at the time of the conveyance, the parents and the children agreed that the children would transfer the property back to the parents upon their request. In 1986, three of the children conveyed their interest in the property to the other two children. In 1999, Novella Overton (“ Mother”) asked the two defendant daughters to transfer the property back. The daughters refused. The parents and the three grantors of the 1986 deed brought suit against the two daughters and a son-in-law, alleging breach of the oral agreement to reconvey. At the close of the plaintiffs’ proof during a jury trial, the court granted the defendants’ motion for a directed verdict as to all claims. We hold that there was material evidence before the jury supporting the claim that there was an oral agreement to transfer the property back to the parents. We further hold that the trial court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that the 1986 conveyance in some way terminated the oral agreement and extinguished the parents’ claim. Accordingly, we vacate the directed verdict as to the claim of Anthony Overton, Executor of the Estate of Mother. As to the directed verdict with respect to the claims of the plaintiffs Shairon Fay Howard, Derita Kay McCulloch, and Arlie Dennis Overton, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. This case is remanded for further proceedings as to the complaint of the Executor of Mother’s estate.