APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant, Arnes’a Hart, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of felony murder, one count of aggravated child neglect, and one count of child neglect after the death of her infant son. In exchange for pleas of guilty to criminally negligent homicide and child neglect, Appellant received sentences of six years and one year, respectively. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. The charge of aggravated child neglect was dismissed. The plea agreement specified that the trial court would determine the manner of service of the sentence after a hearing. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing, ordering Appellant to serve her sentence in confinement in order to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense and due to Appellant’s lack of truthfulness at the sentencing hearing. Appellant appeals the denial of alternative sentencing. After a review of the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude the record indicates that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying an alternative sentence where the proof showed that there was a need for deterrence of similar crimes, and Appellant was untruthful at the sentencing hearing. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The question presented by this appeal is which parent should be named the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child. The trial court named Appellee Mother primary residential parent. Appellant Father appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

This is a termination of parental rights case in which Custodial Parents sought termination of Mother’s parental rights to the Child. The trial court granted the termination petition, finding that Mother willfully failed to support and visit the Child and that termination was in the best interest of the Child. Mother appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Defendant, Olivia Kathleen Epps, pleaded guilty to first offense driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-1-401 (2010). She was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eleven months and twenty-nine days, all suspended but forty-eight hours. The Defendant’s plea agreement reserved a certified question of law regarding the legality of the traffic stop that led to her arrest. We affirm the judgment of the trial court./p>

The Petitioner, Cleo Henderson, appeals the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The mother of two minor children appeals the order placing her children and a stepdaughter in the custody of the Department of Children’s Services and limiting her to supervised visitation following a determination that the mother’s husband severely sexually abused another child in the home and the determination that the children were dependent and neglected. We affirm.
 

The Petitioner, Michael Thacker, appeals the Circuit Court of Hardeman County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal by a mother from the juvenile court’s judgment finding her in civil contempt for failure to pay child support and incarcerating her until she paid $400 toward the arrearage to purge the contempt. Finding the evidence inadequate to support a finding that the mother had the ability to pay child support when it was due or that she had the ability to pay $400 at the time of the hearing in order to purge the sentence, we reverse.

The petitioner, James Richard Lening, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2008 Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, felony vandalism, and aggravated criminal trespass, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Lillian (“the Child”) is the offspring of H.A.S. (“Father”) and H.D.S. (“Mother”). The parties were never married to each other. They entered into two mediated agreements regarding Father’s co-parenting time with the Child. The agreements were never presented to or approved by a court. The parties followed the agreements for a time but conflicts developed and Father filed a petition seeking review and modification of the agreements. He asserted that there had been a material change in circumstances and that he should be awarded primary custody of the Child. Following a bench trial, the court found and approved the mediated agreements as being in the Child’s best interest. The court further determined that there had been no change in circumstances warranting a change in custody; but the court did find and hold that Father’s co-parenting time should be revised. Father appeals. We affirm.

Matthew V. and Carlene V. (“the Foster Parents”) filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Lewis S. (“Father”), father to the minor twin children Maria B. S. and Anna J. S. (“the Children”). After a trial, the Trial Court terminated Father’s parental rights to the Children after finding that grounds for termination pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113 (g)(1), (g)(3), and (g)(9) had been proven by clear and convincing evidence, and that clear and convincing evidence had been shown that it was in the Children’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. We affirm as modified.

Leslie Dwight Coffey (“Husband”) filed this action for divorce against his spouse, Paula Sue Coffey (“Wife”). During the course of the proceedings, Husband was held in contempt on no less than four separate occasions. The contempt findings were sometimes related to some aspect of his refusal to pay child support. He was also found guilty of contemptuous conduct related to other matters. Each time, his sentence was suspended. Eventually, the suspended time amounted to a total of 50 days in jail. After over ten years of litigation, Wife filed two separate petitions asking that Husband show cause why he should not be held in criminal contempt. On the second petition, the court found Husband in criminal contempt, revoked the suspensions of the previously-imposed sentences and imposed a five day sentence for the new contempt. The court also awarded Wife $10,000 in attorney’s fees in a separate order entered the morning after Wife’s counsel filed an affidavit claiming over $20,000 in fees and expenses. Husband appeals. We affirm that part of the judgment holding Husband in criminal contempt and ordering him to serve a total of 55 days, which figure includes the previously-suspended sentences. We vacate that part of the judgment awarding Wife $10,000 in attorney’s fees and remand for a hearing to allow Husband an opportunity to challenge the fees and expenses claimed by Wife’s counsel.

The defendant was convicted of possessing more than 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant to fourteen years as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress cocaine that was seized by police after they searched his person. We conclude that the defendant waived this argument by failing to include it in his motion for new trial. The defendant also claims that the State violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), by using two of its peremptory strikes to remove two African American potential jurors. We conclude that these potential jurors were removed for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. Finally, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by allowing a felony drug conviction that was more than ten years old into evidence after the defendant denied that he sold drugs on the stand. We agree, but we conclude that the error was harmless. We affirm the judgments of the trial court accordingly.

Dale Keith Larkin (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder and one count of insurance fraud. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment for the murder conviction and to a concurrent term of eight years for the fraud conviction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues: (1) the trial court erred in refusing to sequester the jury; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the Defendant’s expert witness to testify for the State; (3) the trial court erred in admitting autopsy photographs and some of the victim’s bones into evidence (4) the trial court improperly limited the Defendant’s right to cross-examine a State’s witness; (5) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing argument; (6) the evidence is not sufficient to support his convictions; (7) the trial court failed to discharge its duty as thirteenth juror; and (8) the cumulative effect of these errors violated the Defendant’s rights to a fair trial. Upon our thorough review of the record, we have determined that (1) the trial court failed to satisfy its mandatory duty to act as thirteenth juror; (2) the trial court committed reversible error in allowing the Defendant’s expert witness to testify for the State; (3) the State failed to adduce sufficient proof to support the Defendant’s conviction of first degree premeditated murder; and (4) the State failed to adduce sufficient proof to support the Defendant’s conviction of insurance fraud. Therefore, we must reverse the Defendant’s convictions and remand this matter for a new trial on the charge of second degree murder and any appropriate lesser included offenses. The charge of insurance fraud is dismissed.

This is an appeal from an order of dismissal entered on January 23, 2013. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal.
 

Petitioner, Clarence Nesbit, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree murder and sentenced to death. He sought post-conviction relief, and the post-conviction court vacated the death sentence and granted a new sentencing hearing, which the State has not appealed. The post-conviction court denied Petitioner relief from his first degree murder conviction. On appeal, Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying his claim that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of the trial. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Marcie Lynn Pursell, was found guilty by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of three counts of aggravated child abuse, Class A felonies. See T.C.A. § 39-15-402 (2006) (amended 2009, 2011, 2012). She was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to three concurrent terms of fifteen years’ confinement. On appeal, she contends that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions and that the trial court erred by not allowing her to present evidence that she consented to a polygraph examination. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves an employee’s claim of retaliation for engaging in protected activity. The plaintiff employee filed a lawsuit against his employer, the defendant university, asserting several claims of employment discrimination under state and federal statutes. Subsequently, in a second lawsuit against the university, the plaintiff employee asserted that he suffered adverse job actions after he filed his charge of discrimination with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the first discrimination lawsuit. The alleged adverse job actions included making the employee perform tasks that resulted in physical injuries. The lawsuits were consolidated and, after an eight-day jury trial, the jury awarded the employee $3 million in compensatory damages on the retaliation claim only. The defendant university appeals. We hold that, to prove a claim of retaliation for engaging in protected activity, the plaintiff was required to present material evidence to the jury that the decisionmaker, his supervisor at the university, was aware of the plaintiff’s protected activity when she took the adverse job actions against the plaintiff. The plaintiff employee presented no material evidence at trial of such knowledge by his supervisor at the relevant time. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for entry of an order dismissing the plaintiff employee’s complaint.
 

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the numerous deficiencies in counsel’s performance failed to prejudice the Petitioner cumulatively in his right to a fair proceeding and failed to call into question the reliability of the jury’s verdict. I agree with the majority’s conclusions regarding counsel’s deficiencies except its conclusion that counsel were not deficient in their pretrial investigation and trial preparation. The majority concludes that because the trial began one year and seven months after the Petitioner was indicted, counsel “would not have had time or resources to conduct the investigation performed by post-conviction counsel after the trial.” Although the majority is correct in noting the length of time it took for all the relevant witnesses to be found and presented at the post-conviction hearing, I simply cannot agree that counsel did not have adequate time to investigate and prepare for the trial.

This appeal concerns whether Tennessee courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over an Indonesian cigarette manufacturer whose cigarettes were sold in Tennessee through the marketing efforts of a Florida entrepreneur who purchased the cigarettes from an independent foreign distributor. From 2000 to 2002, over eleven million of the Indonesian manufacturer’s cigarettes were sold in Tennessee. After the manufacturer withdrew its cigarettes from the United States market, the State of Tennessee filed suit against the manufacturer in the Chancery Court for Davidson County,alleging that the manufacturer had failed to pay into the Tobacco Manufacturers’ Escrow Fund as required by Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-31-101 to -103 (2001 & Supp. 2012). The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the trial court dismissed the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction over the Indonesian manufacturer. The Court of Appeals reversed, granted the State’s motion for summary judgment, and remanded the case to the trial court to determine the applicable fines. State ex rel. Cooper v. NV Sumatra Tobacco Trading Co., No. M2010-01955-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 2571851 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 2011). We find that, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Tennessee courts lack personal jurisdiction over the Indonesian manufacturer. We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(2).

This appeal concerns Mother’s reservation of a life estate in property she conveyed to Son pursuant to a warranty deed. After the initial conveyance in 1983, Son resided on the property for years before renting the property to others. Mother prohibited the use of the property by certain tenants, who complied with her demand to vacate. In 2008, Mother objected to the current tenant’s occupation and filed suit to enforce her right to possession of the property. The trial court dismissed the suit, finding that the claim was barred by a ten-year statute of limitations. Mother appeals. We reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The petitioner, Philander Butler, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of error coram nobis which challenged his 1989 and 1990 guilty pleas to sale of a controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell, and attempted possession of a controlled substance with the intent to sell. The trial court dismissed the petition on grounds: (1) that it was filed outside the applicable statute of limitation; and (2) that the petition failed to state a cognizable claim. On appeal, he contends that the dismissal was erroneous. The petitioner also contends that the court erred in summarily dismissing his “Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment Pursuant to Rule 59.04 and Motion to Set Aside Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60.02(2)-(3).” Following review of the record we discern no error and affirm the dismissal of the petition and motion.

In November of 1998, a number of American tobacco manufacturers and a majority of the states and territories of the United States, including Tennessee, reached a settlement in litigation over tobacco-related healthcare costs. The terms of the settlement permit the tobacco manufacturers that were involved in the litigation to withhold a portion of their liability under the settlement terms based upon loss of market share in a participating state, unless the state enacts a “qualifying statute” requiring manufacturers not party to the litigation to either participate in the settlement or pay an amount into a designated escrow fund based upon annual cigarette sales. The underlying purpose of requiring non-participating manufacturers to either join in the settlement or pay into the escrow fund is to assure “a level playing field” for all manufacturers selling cigarettes in the participating states and territories. In consequence, Tennessee adopted a qualifying statute, the Tennessee Tobacco Manufacturers’ Escrow Fund Act of 1999 (“Escrow Fund Act”), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-31-101 to -103 (2001 & Supp. 2012), which requires “[a]ny tobacco product manufacturer selling cigarettes to consumers within the state of Tennessee” after May 26, 1999, to either become a party to the existing settlement agreement or make specified payments into a “qualified escrow fund.” Id. § 47-31-103(a).
 

Following a jury trial, Petitioner, Damien Clark, was convicted of second degree murder. This court affirmed the judgment of conviction in State v. Damien Clark, W2007-00651-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 890886 (Tenn. Crim. App. April 1, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 17, 2009). Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the petition was dismissed. Petitioner appeals, asserting that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Jim George Conaser, contends (1) that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for harassment and (2) that the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing was improper. After a review of the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s harassment conviction and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the sentence from that conviction to run consecutively to a prior, unserved sentence.