APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Plaintiffs sued the defendant national fraternity, among others, following an automobile accident with an apparent fraternity pledge. The trial court granted summary judgment to the national fraternity finding that it owed no duty of care to Plaintiffs, and it denied Plaintiffs’ motion to amend to allege the national fraternity’s vicarious liability based upon a principal/agent relationship between the national fraternity and the local fraternity chapter and/or between the national fraternity and local fraternity chapter members/prospective members. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the national fraternity as well as its denial of Plaintiffs’ motion to amend, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant-Appellant, Antoine Perrier, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for attempted second degree murder in count 1, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony in count 2, and aggravated assault in counts 3 through 8. He was subsequently convicted of the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter in count 1, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony in count 2, aggravated assault in counts 3 through 7, and the lesser included offense of assault in count 8. The trial court merged count three into count one before sentencing Perrier as a Range I, standard offender to four years in counts 1, five years in counts 4 through 7, and eleven months and twenty-nine days in count eight. The court also sentenced Perrier as a Range I, violent offender to a mandatory consecutive sentence of six years in count 2. See T.C.A. § 39-17-1324(e)(1), (h)(i) (2006). The court ordered counts 1 through 7 to be served consecutively to one another and ordered count 8 to be served concurrently with the other counts for an effective sentence of thirty years. On appeal, Perrier argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; (2) the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case solely for the purpose of correcting a clerical error on the judgment for count 4.

The Petitioner, Craig U. Quevedo, appeals as of right from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 2002, the Petitioner pled guilty to numerous counts of rape and incest, and pled nolo contendere to multiple counts of rape, rape of a child, and aggravated sexual battery, as well as one count of aggravated rape. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-502(a)(2), -13-503(a)(1), -13-504(a)(4), -13-522(a), -15-302(a)(1). Following a sentencing hearing, the Petitioner received an effective sentence of ninety-two years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends (1) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to file a motion to suppress a journal written by the Petitioner prior to the entry of his pleas; (2) that trial counsel was also ineffective in failing to file a motion to sever certain offenses prior to the entry of his pleas; and (3) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his sentencing hearing because trial counsel failed to object to the admission of his journal into evidence and failed to present sufficient mitigating evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court with respect to the Petitioner’s first two issues. However, the post-conviction court failed to make any findings of fact or conclusions of law with respect to the Petitioner’s issues regarding his sentencing hearing. As such, the case is remanded for the post-conviction court to enter an order stating its findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the sentencing hearing issues.

Employee of company providing services to an intellectually disabled adult appeals the finding that he committed abuse and neglect against the adult and the resulting placement of the provider’s name on the abuse registry maintained by the Tennessee Department of Health. Finding no error, we affirm.
 

This appeal involves the validity of a will executed in contravention of an earlier contract to make mutual wills. A husband and wife signed a contract to make mutual wills and then executed those wills. Soon after the husband’s death, the wife executed a new will that was inconsistent with her previous will. Following the wife’s death, her son of an earlier marriage sought to probate his mother’s last will in the Chancery Court for Knox County. In response, the children of the husband’s earlier marriage filed an action in the Chancery Court for Knox County asserting (1) that their stepmother’s last will had been procured by undue influence, (2) that this will was invalid because it breached the contract to prepare mutual wills, and (3) that the will prepared by their stepmother pursuant to the contract to make mutual wills should be admitted to probate. The wife’s son asserted that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate his stepfather’s children’s claims and that the contract to make mutual wills was void for lack of consideration. Following a hearing on the parties’ cross-motions for a summary judgment, the trial court determined (1) that the husband’s children had failed to prove that their stepmother’s will had been procured through undue influence, (2) that it had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claims asserted by the husband’s children, (3) that the contract to make mutual wills was supported by adequate consideration, and, (4) that the wife’s last will, therefore, was null and void. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. In re Estate of Brown, No. E2011-00179-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 4552281 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2011). We affirm.

The Defendant, Justin Ellis, was convicted by a Knox County jury of aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, aggravated assault, and aggravated robbery. The aggravated assault conviction was merged with the aggravated robbery conviction. The trial court imposed an effective nineteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the successor judge erroneously determined that he was qualified to act as thirteenth juror in this case. Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude that the successor trial judge could not act as the thirteenth juror and reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.

County election commission was denied use of city library for a polling place and initiated an action to have its rights under several election statutes declared. The trial court held that the statutes vested the election commission with the authority to designate polling places and that such authority must be exercised reasonably; the trial court also held that the city did not abuse its discretion in determining that the library was not a practicable location for use as a polling place on the dates requested and in failing to make the building available. We reverse, holding that the election commission has the sole responsibility to designate polling places and that the city, through the library board, was required to make the library available for use as a polling place.
 

I concur in the majority opinion but write separately to comment upon the specific question presented in this appeal and the effect of our decision on prior Tennessee case law.

I respectfully disagree with the conclusion by the majority that the successor trial judge abused his discretion by finding that witness credibility was not an overriding issue in this case, and approving the jury verdicts as thirteenth juror. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for new trial because witness credibility was “the sole issue at trial” and the original trial judge did not approve the verdict as the thirteenth juror before being replaced by a successor judge. The majority vacates the Defendant’s convictions, concluding that witness credibility was “an overriding issue and that a new trial is therefore required.”

While on routine patrol in the early hours of the morning, a police officer observed a pick-up truck parked in a shopping center lot. Because the truck’s headlights were turned on, the officer drove into the lot, stopped her patrol car directly behind the truck, and activated her blue lights. Although the officer had seen no indication of criminal activity or distress, she approached the truck, observed a beer can in a cup holder inside, and found the defendant in the driver’s seat with the keys in the ignition. When she determined that the defendant had been drinking, he was arrested and later convicted for his fourth offense of driving under the influence. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the defendant was seized without either probable cause or reasonable suspicion. While we acknowledge that the activation of blue lights will not always qualify as a seizure, the totality of the circumstances in this instance establishes that the officer seized the defendant absent probable cause or reasonable suspicion and was not otherwise acting in a community caretaking role. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed, the conviction is reversed, and the cause dismissed.

The Petitioner, Robert Guerrero, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that his indictment was so defective as to deprive the trial court of jurisdiction because it was not signed by the grand jury foreperson and was not endorsed “A True Bill.” He also alleges that the habeas corpus court erred by failing to appoint him counsel. Upon review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

The Petitioner, Jonathan Adams, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following his direct appeal, the Petitioner, with the assistance of counsel, filed an untimely petition for post-conviction relief challenging the performance of trial counsel. Although the issue of timeliness was raised by the parties, the post-conviction court addressed the petition on the merits and denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his petition was timely filed, alleging two alternative dates as supplying the requisite final action of this court for purposes of the post-conviction one-year statute of limitations: (1) the date the corrected judgments were filed in accordance with this court’s order on remand; or (2) the date this court’s mandate was filed. Having reviewed the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we hold that the final action of this court was the filing date of its opinion on direct appeal, and therefore, the post-conviction petition was filed outside of the applicable one-year limitations period. The appeal is dismissed.

This is a post-conviction appeal of the trial court’s order denying appellant relief from his jury convictions of felony murder (two counts); second degree murder (two counts); aggravated burglary; and reckless endangerment. The trial court, which heard the post-conviction petition, sentenced appellant to two consecutive life sentences plus thirteen years. We affirm the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief.

The Defendant, Edward William Crandall, challenges his conviction for aggravated rape of a child, a Class A felony, alleging (1) that the evidence supporting his conviction was insufficient to prove penetration of the victim and to identify him as the perpetrator and (2) that the trial court erred when denying his motion for judgment of acquittal at the end of the State’s case-in-chief because the State had failed to prove the victim’s age. After reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we discern no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court. The case is remanded to the Loudon County Criminal Court for correction of the judgments to reflect that service of Count 3 is consecutive to Count 1 and that service of Count 2 is concurrent to Count 1.

This is a medical malpractice case. The General Sessions Court granted the Defendants’ motions to dismiss based on Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the pre-suit notice and certificate of good faith requirements under the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act (“TMMA”). Plaintiff timely sought a de novo appeal to Circuit Court, paid $211.50 to the General Sessions Court clerk, and paid an additional cash bound in the amount of $250.00. On appeal in Circuit Court, the Defendants filed motions for summary judgment based on Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the TMMA. After raising the issue sua sponte, the Circuit Court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the appeal from the General Sessions Court because Plaintiff failed to file a surety bond as required under Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-5-103. Alternatively, the Circuit Court further concluded that, even if it had jurisdiction, the Defendants were entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff failed to comply with the TMMA. Plaintiff appeals. Although we conclude that the Circuit Court erred in dismissing the appeal from General Sessions Court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we affirm the Circuit Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.

This lawsuit concerns the extent to which a bookstore/café area and fitness center/gymnasium contained in a church family life center facility are exempt from property taxation under Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-5-212. The trial court upheld the determination of the State Board of Equalization and the Assessment Appeals Commission that the bookstore/café area was not exempt from taxation, and that the fitness center qualified for a 50 percent exemption under the statute. We affirm.
 

Tennessee prisoners whose convictions and sentences are upheld on appeal have one year to file a petition for post-conviction relief to challenge their convictions and sentences. This appeal involves the narrow circumstances in which fundamental fairness demands the tolling of this deadline. A prisoner filed his petition for post-conviction relief after the statutory deadline had passed because his former attorney provided him the wrong deadline date and failed to give the prisoner his legal files until after the actual deadline had passed. Following a hearing, the Criminal Court for Shelby County dismissed the petition as untimely. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Whitehead v. State, No. W2010-00784-CCA-R3-PC, 2011 WL 3912856 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 7, 2011). We granted the prisoner’s application for permission to appeal. We find that the facts of this case reflect that the prisoner was effectively abandoned by his appellate attorney after his petition for writ of certiorari was filed in the United States Supreme Court. This abandonment impeded the prisoner’s otherwise diligent efforts to file a timely post-conviction petition. Therefore, the statute of limitations should be tolled. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, and remand the prisoner’s case to the trial court so the prisoner may pursue his petition for post-conviction relief.
 

In this case, the majority concludes that the plaintiff’s payment of $211.50 to the General Sessions Court clerk and her posting of an additional $250.00 cash bond satisfied the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 27–5–103, and therefore, that the Circuit Court erred in sua sponte dismissing her appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The majority further concludes, however, that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants due to the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the certificate of good faith requirement. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the plaintiff satisfied the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-5-103 so as to properly perfect her appeal from the general sessions court to the circuit court. I would find that the requirements of section 27-5-103 were not satisfied because the fee paid and the bond posted were insufficient to secure all costs incurred throughout the appeal, and, therefore, that the circuit court never acquired subject matter jurisdiction in the cause. Although I would rely upon divergent grounds, however, I fully concur in the majority’s ultimate dismissal of the case.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that due process requires tolling of Mr. Whitehead’s post-conviction statute of limitations based on attorney abandonment.
 

This workers’ compensation appeal arises from a petition for post-judgment medical care. The trial court initially found that the employee had sustained a compensable injury to his neck and awarded benefits, including future medical care. Shortly after the entry of a final judgment, which designated a treating physician, a dispute arose over employee’s medical treatment and a proposed surgical procedure. The employee petitioned the trial court to directhis employer to payfor his medical treatment. The employer requested an independent medical evaluation. The surgery took place while the petition was pending. Several days later, the employee suffered a brain hemorrhage. The trial court ruled that the surgical procedure was reasonably related to the work injury, but the hemorrhage was not; thus, it directed the employer to pay for the former but not the latter. After additional proceedings, the trial court awarded attorneys’ fees to the employee, but not the full amount requested. The employer has appealed, contending that the fee award is excessive. The employee contends that the trial court erred byfinding that treatment of the hemorrhage was not related to his work injury and by not awarding the attorneys’ fees requested. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court declining to order the employer to provide treatment for the hemorrhage. Because the record is insufficient to allow for review, we vacate the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
 

Appellant, William Walker, was convicted by a Maury County Circuit Court jury of possession of cocaine over 0.5 grams with intent to sell, a Class B felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-417; 39-17-425. Appellant received a sentence of 12 years for possession of cocaine for sale and 11 months, 29 days for possession of drug paraphernalia, to be served concurrently. On appeal, appellant contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm appellant’s convictions and the court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Phillip Douglas Seals, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his two first degree murder convictions. On appeal, he argues that: (1) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) the postconviction court erred in denying his request for transcripts of the opening and closing statements so he could determine whether the original prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct. After review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

This appeal concerns a termination of parental rights. The trial court, upon finding clear and convincing evidence of two grounds on which to base termination and concluding that termination was in the children’s best interest, revoked the mother’s parental rights to three of her minor children. The mother appeals. We affirm.

The Appellant, Milburn L. Edwards, appeals the trial court's summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Anthony Dodson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that (1) the post-conviction court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a continuance for the purpose of having a witness testify at the post-conviction hearing, and (2) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to call the aforementioned witness to testify at trial for the purpose of impeaching the victim’s testimony. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.