APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from a health care liability action following the death of Ashley Denson
from a cardiac event she suffered after being treated and released from Methodist Medical
Center. Ms. Denson was unmarried and had two minor children at the time of her death.
The statutorily-required pre-suit notice listed Ms. Denson’s mother, Bobbie J. Denson, as
the claimant authorizing notice. The minor children were not identified anywhere in the
notice. The subsequent complaint was filed by “ASHLEY DENSON, Deceased, by and
through her Next Friend and Mother BOBBIE JO DENSON, and BOBBIE JO DENSON,
Individually.” The body of the complaint lists, for the first time, Ashley Denson’s children,
and states that Bobbie Denson “brings this action individually, and on behalf of Plaintiff,
decedent’s surviving minor children … as Grandmother and Legal Guardian.” The
defendants filed motions to dismiss, challenging Bobbie Denson’s standing to bring the
action and contending that the pre-suit notice failed to comply with the requirements of the
Tennessee Health Care Liability Act.1

I agree with the majority’s secondary conclusion that Grandmother held standing to
file suit on behalf of the minor children. I write separately to address the majority’s
dispositive holding that failure to identify the minor children in the pre-suit notice defeats
this cause of action, thereby precluding their claim for health care liability for judicial
review on its merits.

This is a divorce case. Husband appeals the trial court’s valuation and division of marital property and its award of attorney’s fees as alimony in solido to Wife. We affirm the trial court’s valuation and division of marital property. We vacate the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to wife as alimony in solido based on the lack of findings in the trial court’s order. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. The case is remanded for findings on the issue of whether an award of attorney’s fees is appropriate under the factors prescribed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-121 and, if so, whether the amount of attorney’s fees is reasonable.

Petitioner, Paul Jerome Johnson, Jr., appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition,
arguing that the post-conviction court erred by dismissing his claim of alleged bias by the
trial court and in finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial.
Following our review of the entire record, oral arguments, and the briefs of the parties, we
affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises from a post-divorce petition for contempt. Because we conclude that the trial court’s order failed to resolve all the issues before the court, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

A Decatur County Jury found Dustin Len Lovelace, Defendant, guilty of facilitation of
aggravated robbery. Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support the
conviction. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the
judgment.

The Petitioner, William Heath, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of
his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for especially aggravated
robbery, aggravated assault,1 and reckless endangerment, for which he is serving an
effective forty-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred
in “failing to view the cumulative effect of [his] claims as a constructive denial of the right
to counsel.” We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

A Madison County jury convicted the Appellant, Nicolas Wayna Johnson, of possession
of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver (counts one and two), possession of a firearm
with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony (counts three and
four), theft of property up to $1,000 (count five), and possession of unlawful drug
paraphernalia (count six). Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged counts
one and two and imposed a concurrent sentence of two years. The trial court also merged
counts three and four and imposed a sentence of three years to be served in the Tennessee
Department of Correction. By operation of law, the trial court ordered the concurrent two year
term for counts one and two to be served consecutively to the three-year term in counts
three and four. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1324(a), (e)(1), (g)(1). For counts five and
six, the trial court imposed a concurrent term of eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be
served concurrently with all other counts, for an effective sentence of five years in
confinement. The sole issue for our review is whether the trial court abused its discretion
in denying alternative sentencing. Because the Appellant was eligible for probation on the
theft and drug-related offenses, we remand for resentencing.

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights. Step-grandparents Joe K. and Lois K. (“Petitioners”) filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Vernetta G. (“Mother”) to her minor children, Skylith F., Zelda F., and Celeste G. (“the Children”). After a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to support, abandonment by failure to visit, and persistent conditions. Mother appeals. Mother argues, among other things, that she was thwarted by Petitioners from visiting the Children more often than she did. We find by clear and convincing evidence, as did the Trial Court, that Petitioners proved three grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights. We find further by clear and convincing evidence, as did the Trial Court, that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We affirm.

I concur in the majority’s thoughtful and well-reasoned opinion, but I write separately to reflect a variance of view with the majority’s determination as to the appropriate four-month statutory time period for assessing the ground for termination for abandonment by failure to support. In assessing abandonment, the General Assembly has directed Tennessee courts to consider “a period of four (4) consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of a proceeding, pleading, petition, or any amended petition to terminate the parental rights . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) (West July 1, 2021 to May 8, 2022). The majority concludes that the correct four-month period to examine for the ground of abandonment by failure to support in this case is the four months prior to the granting of the motion to amend, running from July 18, 2021, to November 17, 2021, rather than the four months prior to the time the amended petition was filed on September 24, 2021. I do not necessarily disagree with the majority on this point. Where I respectfully diverge is that I do not think it is necessary to decide between these two time periods in this case and would reserve doing so for a more appropriate case.

The Appellant, Taylor Jenkins Littrell, appeals the Carroll County Circuit Court’s order
revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his four-year sentence
in confinement. The Appellant alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by: (1)
admitting a blood alcohol report in violation of his confrontation rights; and (2) ordering
him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. Finding no reversible error, we
affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Marco Luciano Cianfarani, was convicted by a Rutherford County Circuit Court jury of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; three counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony; reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony; and possession of a weapon by a person with a prior felony conviction, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-502(a)(2) (2018) (subsequently amended) (aggravated rape), 39-13-102(a)(1)(A) (2018) (subsequently amended) (aggravated assault), 39-13-103(a) (2018) (subsequently amended) (reckless endangerment), 39-17-1307(b)(1)(A) (2018) (subsequently amended) (weapon possession by a convicted felon). The Defendant was sentenced to serve an effective twenty-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated rape and aggravated assault convictions, (2) the trial court erred in permitting the testimony from a witness of whom the defense received late notice, (3) the trial court erred in allowing evidence of the Defendant’s prior assault of the victim, and (4) the trial court erred in instructing the jurors to continue deliberating after being notified that one juror disagreed with the other eleven. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Donald H. Runions, appeals the Lewis County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his multiple convictions for violation of the Child Protection Act, rape of a child, and aggravated sexual battery. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his claims alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective by (1) failing to lodge an objection or move for a continuance due to the Petitioner’s absence from certain pretrial evidentiary hearings; (2) failing to present a sound trial strategy based upon adequate preparation; and (3) failing to allow the Petitioner to testify on his own behalf at trial. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal is the latest development in a protracted custody and visitation dispute between
Loring Justice and Kim Nelson. After the Juvenile Court for Roane County (“the Juvenile
Court”) entered a judgment awarding Ms. Nelson custody and severely restricting Mr.
Justice’s parenting time, Mr. Justice filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Knox County
(“the Trial Court”). He alleged various claims against Ms. Nelson and the lawyers and law
firms that represented her in the Juvenile Court. Ms. Nelson and her attorneys filed motions
for sanctions, alleging that Mr. Justice’s complaint violated Tennessee Rule of Civil
Procedure 11. Months later, Mr. Justice filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. After
entering an order of dismissal, the Trial Court granted Ms. Nelson and her attorneys their
Rule 11 motions and ordered Mr. Justice to pay their attorney’s fees and expenses. Mr.
Justice has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the Trial Court’s judgment
in all respects.

The appellant applied for a special exception permit allowing it to operate a liquor store in
a location designated as a C-2 Convenience Commercial Zone. The appellee, City Council
for the City of Chattanooga, denied the application based upon a councilmember’s
statements that “the City is turning that area around to meet some different purposes.” The
appellant sought review from the Chancery Court for Hamilton County, which upheld the
decision of City Council. Following careful review, we reverse.

A plaintiff filed suit alleging that the defendant’s negligence caused her to sustain personal injuries in an automobile accident. The plaintiff filed the complaint within one year of the accident, but she failed to have process issued within one year from the filing of the complaint. Thus, the defendant sought summary judgment based on a statute of limitations defense. In response, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant should be estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense because the parties had agreed that issuance of process was unnecessary. The trial court rejected the plaintiff’s estoppel argument and granted summary judgment to the defendant. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

A Grundy County jury convicted the Petitioner, Hershel Wayne Grimes, of first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison. This court affirmed his conviction on appeal. State v. Grimes, No. M2000-01531-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 1670188, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 8, 2007), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 13, 2007). The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, which he later amended, that alleged that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that the State had suppressed exculpatory evidence. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his petition because: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for not calling as witnesses Steven Groves, Tracy Marie Pressley, Billy Ray Griffith, and Billy Eugene Caldwell; and (2) the State failed to disclose exculpatory information in the form of a letter written by Special Agent Larry Davis to U.S. District Judge Sparks. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Andy F. Nunez, of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and attempted especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to life plus five years. The Petitioner appealed, challenging the trial court’s decision to quash subpoenas for information on plea agreements, and this court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions. State v. Nunez, No. M2019-00473-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 4734916, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 14, 2020), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 13, 2021). The Petitioner timely filed a post-conviction petition, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme
Court of Tennessee, filed by the plaintiff, Michael Halliburton, seeking to recuse the trial
judge in this case. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Mr. Halliburton,
and finding no error, we affirm.

A Shelby County jury found Defendant, Billy Ray Turner, guilty of first degree murder, conspiracy to commit first degree murder, and attempted first degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to an effective term of life in prison plus forty-one years. On appeal, Defendant contends: (1) the trial court improperly prevented Defendant from impeaching a witness when it excluded a conversation between the witness and the victim’s ex-wife; (2) the trial court improperly allowed the State to ask a witness leading questions; (3) the trial court erred by allowing a speaking objection by the State; (4) Shelby County was not the proper venue for the attempted first degree murder case; and (5) the evidence was insufficient to sustain Defendant’s convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Willie Brown, of rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to serve twenty-seven years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction. He also asserts that (1) the trial court erred in admitting text messages that were not properly authenticated; (2) the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), when it failed to disclose records related to an investigation of the victim’s mother; and (3) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. On our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Cody Lee Wilson, appeals his Robertson County Circuit Court jury convictions of sexual battery, rape, and two counts of incest, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Shelby County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Zion Robinson, for rape of a child, a
Class A felony. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Petitioner entered an open guilty
plea to the substantially reduced offense of sexual battery, a Class E felony. Following a
sentencing hearing, the trial court denied Defendant’s requests for judicial diversion and
probation and sentenced Defendant to serve two years incarcerated. Additionally, the trial
court ordered Defendant to register with the Sex Offender Registry. Defendant appeals,
arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in denying judicial diversion. We conclude
that Defendant has waived appellate review of his sentence by failing to prepare an
adequate record and we therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court. We remand this
case, however, for the entry of a corrected judgment form reflecting the indicted offense of
rape of a child.

The father of two children learned that the mother eventually planned to relocate to Florida. The father opposed the relocation and applied for a temporary restraining order to disallow the mother from leaving the state. He further requested modification of the permanent parenting plan entered at the time of the divorce (a default judgment). In response, the mother filed a counter-petition requesting permission to relocate out-of-state. The paternal grandparents filed a petition to intervene in the action to establish visitation. The court conducted a best interest analysis to determine whether it was in the children’s best interest to relocate with the mother. Concluding that it was in the children’s best interest to relocate, the court entered a modified parenting plan, which provided a period of co-parenting time for the father to be supervised by the grandparents and set forth a parenting schedule reflective of the distance between the parties upon the mother’s relocation. The father and the grandparents appealed. We affirm the judgment allowing the relocation. The trial court’s order regarding the grandparents’ visitation petition, however, is unclear. Accordingly, we vacate the modified parenting plan and remand this matter for specific findings under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-307 and for a ruling whether the visitation by the grandparents will be separate from or derivative of the father’s time.

This appeal involves a motion filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02, seeking to set aside the attorney's fee provision contained within a final divorce decree. The trial court denied the motion without hearing evidence from the parties or stating the basis for its decision.  Because we are unable to adequately review the matter due to the trial court's lack of findings of fact and conclusions of law and the lack of evidence in the appellate record, we vacate the trial court's order and remand for further proceedings.