APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Mario Ramirez Rodriguez, appeals from the Wayne County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus relief. On appeal, the Petitioner claims his allegations regarding the age of the victim, his incorrect release eligibility noted on the judgment form for Count 2, and the failure of the trial court to impose the required statutory fines, could be proven upon an evidentiary hearing and should not have been deemed merely clerical errors. We conclude that there is no reversible error in the judgment of the habeas corpus court and affirm.
 

In 2007, the employee suffered a work-related back injury, for which he filed a workers’ compensation claim. After conservative treatment failed to provide relief, the employee obtained an unauthorized fusion surgery. The parties settled the workers’ compensation action in 2009. The settlement provided for “future medical benefits relating to the back injury” of 2007, while precluding future benefits for unauthorized care. In 2011, the employee sought authorization for a second surgerybyan authorized surgeon. The employer refused. The trial court ordered the employer to payfor the second surgery, and the employer has appealed. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the employer has appealed an order that is not final and that this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Thus, this appeal is dismissed.
 

The Defendant, Ray Neil Thompson, entered an “open” plea to two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of evading arrest. The trial court determined that the Defendant was a Range III, persistent offender and imposed sentences of twenty-three years at 100% for each of the aggravated robbery convictions and a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the evading arrest conviction. The trial court further ordered that those sentences were to be served concurrently with one another but consecutively to a prior twenty-seven-year sentence at 100% for aggravated robbery. On appeal, the Defendant argues that trial court erred by ordering 100% release eligibility for his aggravated robbery convictions pursuant to the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501(k)(2) and in imposing consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

The Defendant, Terrance Megel Jordan, was found guilty by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; rape, a Class B felony; aggravated statutory rape, a Class D felony; and evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-502 (2010) (aggravated rape), 39-13-503 (2010) (rape), 39-13-506 (2010) (amended 2012) (aggravated statutory rape), 39-16-603 (2010) (evading arrest). The rape and aggravated statutory rape convictions were merged with the aggravated rape conviction, although the trial court later vacated the aggravated statutory rape count. For aggravated rape, he was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to thirty-five years, to be served at 100%. For evading arrest, he was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days. The sentences were imposed concurrrently. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions of aggravated rape and rape; (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the victim’s statements to a social worker; and (3) the assistant district attorney committed prosecutorial misconduct during the opening statement. We affirm the Defendant’s convictions, but we vacate the rape and aggravated rape judgments and remand the case for entry of a single judgment reflecting the merger of these convictions

The Petitioner, Marcus Pearson, challenges the trial court’s dismissal of his post-conviction petition as barred by the one-year statute of limitations. He contends, and the State concedes, (1) that the date the trial court used to determine the timeliness of the petition was incorrect and (2) that an evidentiary hearing is necessary. We agree. Accordingly, the trial court’s dismissal of the post-conviction petition is reversed, and the case is remanded for the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing.
 

The defendant, Thomas G. McConnell, appeals a certified question of law from the Williamson County Circuit Court, where he pleaded guilty to driving under the influence of an intoxicant (“DUI”). The reserved certified question challenges on constitutional grounds a police officer’s basis for stopping his vehicle. The State concedes that the stop of the defendant’s vehicle violated his constitutional protection from unreasonable seizure and advocates reversal of the defendant’s conviction. Because we agree with the parties that the stop of the defendant’s vehicle was not supported by reasonable suspicion, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the charge against the defendant.
 

I have carefully considered Judge Stafford’s energetic dissent in this case, and find that I cannot agree. I submit this separate concurrence to explain my position.
 

Titus Miller (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for possession of marijuana and evading arrest. In his petition, he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that his counsel at trial was ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The pro se petitioner, Louis Tyrone Robinson, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that the “suppressed” transcript of his trial sentencing hearing constitutes newly discovered evidence of his innocence. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The petitioner, Adrian Deangelo Todd, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his second degree murder conviction. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the post-conviction court abused its discretion in denying his request for a continuance of the post-conviction hearing and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Appellant, Somer M. Bullard, was convicted of six counts of aggravated robbery representing two alternate theories of three separate offenses. The trial court merged the two convictions for each offense and sentenced appellant to concurrent sentences of eleven years for each of the three convictions, to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant raises the following issues in this direct appeal: (1) whether the trial court violated her right to a speedy trial; and (2) whether the trial court erred in sentencing her to an eleven-year effective sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Mother, who spent greater time with the parties’ minor child, notified Father via certified letter of her intent to relocate out of state. Thirty-three days later, Father filed a petition in opposition to the move. The trial court allowed Father to oppose relocation, despite his failure to formally oppose the move within thirty days, noting that Mother had learned of Father’s opposition within the thirty-day period and that she had not relocated until “well after” Father filed his petition.

In this statutory construction case, we conclude that Tennessee’s parental relocation statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-108, mandates that a parent wishing to oppose relocation file a petition in opposition within thirty days of receipt of notice of the proposed relocation. If no written petition in opposition is timely filed, the parent proposing to relocate with the child shall be permitted to do so, notwithstanding the absence of harm or prejudice to the relocating parent due to the untimely petition. Because Father failed to file a written petition in opposition to Mother’s proposed relocation within thirty days of receipt of her certified letter, we find the trial court erred in conducting any further analysis pursuant to section 36-6-108. The decision of the trial court is reversed, and Mother is permitted to relocate to Omaha, Nebraska, with the minor child. Father’s request for appellate attorney fees is denied, and all remaining issues are deemed pretermitted.

This appeal arises from a boundary line dispute. Appellees and Appellants both provided expert testimony and surveys from their respective surveyors. The trial court concluded that Appellees’ surveyor’s line was correct, and was not in conflict with the historic deeds. Accordingly, the court set the common boundary line between the parties’s properties in compliance with Appellees’ survey. In addition to the competing surveys, the court based its decision, in part, upon Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-2-109, which creates a presumption of ownership in a party who has paid taxes on property for more than twenty years. Based upon tax records, the court determined that Appellees had paid the property taxes on the disputed property for the relevant statutory period. Appellants appeal. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s determinations. Affirmed and remanded.

Based on the application of Rule 6.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure to the facts of this case, I must respectfully dissent from the majority. While the majority concludes that Father’s petition is barred by his failure to timely file his petition in opposition to the relocation, I would instead remand to the trial court for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law on the issue of whether Father’s delay in filing his petition was the result of excusable neglect.

This case is the consolidated appeal of two defendants, Franscisco I. Bustamonte and Scott Carroll, Jr., who were convicted for the initiation of a process intended to result in methamphetamine, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant Carroll as a Career Offender to thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court sentenced Defendant Bustamonte as a Range I, standard offender to eleven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant Carroll contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence found during the search of the residence. Additionally, both Defendants assert that: (1) the trial court erred when it allowed the State to amend the indictment to change the date of the offense; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction; (3) the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the charges of manufacture of methamphetamine, promotion of methamphetamine, and unlawful drug paraphernalia; (4) the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence the State’s inventory list of the ingredients found during a search of the residence and photographs taken during the search; and (5) the trial court erred when it sentenced them. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude there exists no error in the judgments of the trial court. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s judgments.
 

The appellant, James Hayes, pled guilty in the White County Criminal Court to driving under the influence (DUI) and reserved a certified question of law concerning whether the police had reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle. Upon review, we conclude that the appellant failed to properly certify his question of law. Therefore, we are compelled to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Petitioner, James Paul Kinard, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for three counts of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual battery and resulting effective sentence of seventy-five years in confinement to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Davidson County grand jury indicted appellant, Marie Delaluz Urbano-Uriostegui, for one count of aggravated child abuse and one count of aggravated child neglect, both Class A felonies. A jury found appellant guilty of aggravated child abuse and not guilty of aggravated child neglect. The trial court sentenced appellant to serve sixteen years at 100% in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, appellant raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that appellant caused the victim’s injuries; (2) whether the prosecutor’s comments during closing arguments constituted reversible error; (3) whether the trial court erred by improperly admitting an expert in child maltreatment; (4) whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to obtain a medical expert to testify on appellant’s behalf; and (5) whether newly discovered evidence justifies a new trial. Discerning no error in the proceedings, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves an appeal by a mother of the termination of her parental rights to her daughter. We conclude that the grounds for termination have been established by clear and convincing evidence. Further, there is clear and convincing evidence in the record that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is a termination of parental rights case in which the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services sought to terminate the parental rights of Robert E. and Susan E. to James C. E. The trial court terminated Robert E.’s parental rights, finding that he had abandoned James C. E. and that termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of James C. E. Robert E. appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Defendant, Antonious Jamal Brown, challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his jury conviction for first degree murder. Specifically, he contends that there was insufficient evidence presented to prove that he shot the victim and that he did so with premeditation. After reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves a dispute over property allegedly owned by a partnership. The plaintiff and defendant lived together for about six years but never married. It is undisputed that they formed a partnership during that time for the purpose of buying and selling real estate. The parties bought, renovated, and sold numerous properties, and after they separated, they equally split the remaining profits from the property sales. However, they could not agree as to who owned the house where the parties were currently living and various items of personal property acquired during their relationship. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that all of the disputed property was partnership property and that each party held a one-half undivided interest in the property. Accordingly, the court declared that the parties owned the disputed real property as tenants in common, and it awarded the plaintiff a judgment for one-half of the value of certain personal property. The court also awarded attorney’s fees to the plaintiff. The court further concluded that the defendant had fraudulently conveyed partnership property to her father, a co-defendant, and the court set aside the sale and held that the defendant was responsible for repaying to her father the amount he paid for the fraudulently conveyed property. The defendants appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the cause for further proceedings.

The appellant, Sampson Joseph McCoy, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to aggravated assault and received an eight-year sentence. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court was to determine the manner of service of the sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the appellant serve his entire sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for alternative sentencing. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 2003, a Putnam County jury convicted the Petitioner, Earl Vantrease, Jr., of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to serve sixteen years, at 35%. In 2006, the Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, contending that his judgment was void. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, and this Court originally affirmed. Earl Vantrease, Jr. v. Wayne Brandon, Warden, No. M2006-02414-CCA-R3-HC, 2007 WL 2917783, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Oct. 9, 2007), petition rehearing granted, Dec. 14, 2007. The Petitioner filed a motion for a rehearing, provided additional documentation, and this Court reversed itself and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition. Id. at *6. After an evidentiary hearing, the habeas corpus court again dismissed the Petitioner’s petition for habeas corpus relief. The Petitioner did not appeal, but, instead, he filed a second petition for habeas corpus relief. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the Petitioner’s second petition for habeas corpus relief. On appeal, the Petitioner contends the habeas corpus court erred when it dismissed his second petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of the Petitioner’s application for writ of habeas corpus.

On March 18, 1998, a concrete truck collided with a shuttle bus used to transport passengers between the Memphis International Airport and a nearby rental car facility. A passenger, who suffered a severe brain injury as a result of the collision, and his wife brought suit against the owner of the bus, the manufacturer of the bus, the manufacturer of the bus windows, and the franchisor of the rental car business. They based their claims in negligence and products liability, contending that the bus was unsafe because it was not equipped with passenger seatbelts, because it had side windows made of tempered glass rather than laminated glass, and because it provided perimeter seating instead of forward-facing rows. The trial court granted summary judgment to the window manufacturer and partial summary judgments as to the products liability claims against the bus owner and franchisor, but otherwise denied the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, which asserted that the plaintiffs’ claims were preempted by federal motor vehicle safety standards. Following trial, the jury found that the plaintiffs had sustained damages in the amount of $8,543,630, but assessed 100% of the fault to the corporate owner of the concrete truck, which had reached a settlement with the plaintiffs prior to trial. On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that they were entitled to a new trial, citing twelve grounds for review. As a threshold issue, however, the defendants continued to argue federal preemption of the claims. The Court of Appeals held that Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards 205 and 208, 49 C.F.R. §§ 571.205, .208 (1995), preempted the claims based on the lack of passenger seatbelts and the material used in the window glass, and further ruled that the trial court had erred by failing to grant a directed verdict on the perimeter-seating claim because the evidence was insufficient to establish causation. We granted the plaintiffs permission to appeal and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of the intervening decision by the United States Supreme Court in Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131 (2011). On remand, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its prior judgment, concluding that the ruling in Williamson did not affect its previous analysis. The plaintiffs were again granted permission to appeal. Because the seatbelt and window-glass claims are not preempted by federal law and the evidence sufficiently demonstrates causation in fact as to the perimeter seating claim, the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the plaintiffs’ claims of error during the course of the trial.