APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Appellant, Mark L. Ward, was convicted by a Knox County jury of aggravated
kidnapping, attempted aggravated burglary, and two counts of aggravated rape, for which
he received an effective sentence of sixty-eight years in confinement. The sole issue
presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the Appellant’s
convictions. Upon our review, we affirm.

This case arises from a dispute between a property owner and his homeowners’ association. The property owner, Pratik Pandharipande, purchased a home in a vacation community on a Tennessee lake, intending to use it as a short-term rental. At the time of the purchase, the property was subject to covenants requiring that the home be used for “residential and no other purposes.” The covenants were amended several years later to allow leases with minimum lease terms of thirty days. Pandharipande contends that neither the original covenants nor the amendments prohibit him from leasing his property for short terms of two to twenty-eight days. His homeowners’ association disagrees on both scores. We agree with Pandharipande that the original covenants requiring residential use of the property do not bar his short-term rentals, but we agree with the homeowners’ association that the amendments do. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the homeowners’ association based on both the original covenants and the amendments. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We affirm the Court of Appeals in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Petitioner, Micah Joshua Ford, alias Joseph Tolbert, III, appeals the denial of his postconviction
petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received
the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. He also argues that he is
entitled to a new trial under the doctrine of cumulative error. Following our review of the
entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction
court.

The defendant, Cedric D. Marshall, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s order revoking his community corrections sentence and resentencing him to an effective sentence of seven years’ incarceration for his guilty-pleaded convictions of evading arrest, burglary, and theft of property. Because the defendant’s notice of appeal is untimely, we dismiss the appeal.

The plaintiffs filed this breach of contract action against their homeowners association for failure to rectify alleged violations of the neighborhood restrictions. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment establishing that the issues complained of were actual violations of the restrictions. The trial court dismissed the action in favor of the homeowners association and the plaintiffs’ neighbors who joined as interested parties. We affirm.

The Defendant, Lorie Ann Gerbis, was convicted following a bench trial of two counts of aggravated assault. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions. Specifically, she contends that the State’s evidence was inadequate to establish her identity as the perpetrator beyond a reasonable doubt. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Gregory L. Nelson, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his eight-year sentence for unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by fully revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Pettioner, Victercika Gilchrease, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of
her petition for post-conviction relief from her guilty plea convictions for second degree
murder and two counts of aggravated assault, for which she is serving an agreed, effective
twenty-one-year sentence. On appeal, she contends that the post-conviction court erred in
denying relief on her ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We affirm the judgment of
the post-conviction court.

In this accelerated interlocutory appeal, Appellant seeks to appeal from the denial of three separate motions to recuse the trial judge. As to the first motion, we affirm the trial court’s denial of that motion on the basis of Appellant’s failure to comply with Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee. As the second and third recusal motion, we dismiss this appeal, as no effective order denying those motions has yet been entered by the trial court.

Michael Notaro, Defendant, pled guilty to three counts of sexual exploitation of a minor
with an agreed-upon sentence of 10 years for each conviction, to be served consecutively
for a total effective sentence of 30 years at 100% in exchange for the State agreeing not to
seek further prosecution for any other offenses under investigation. Defendant did not seek
a direct appeal of his sentence. Instead, Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Rule 36.1 of
the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure in which he argued that his sentence was
illegal. The trial court dismissed the motion for failure to state a colorable claim.
Defendant appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this breach of implied warranty of good workmanship and materials case, the trial court awarded Appellee $77,494.36 in damages. Although the parties agree that the proper measure of damages is the cost to repair the defects, the parties dispute the method of repair and its cost. In determining Appellee’s damages, the trial court relied on testimony from Appellee’s expert contractor. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s order. The parties’ respective requests for appellate attorney’s fees are denied.

This appeal arises from a petition filed by a beneficiary of a trust seeking an accounting and removal of the trustee. The trustee asserted the affirmative defense that the beneficiary violated the no-contest clause in the settlor’s trust. The trustee served the beneficiary with requests for admissions, to which the beneficiary responded with objections to the majority of the requests. After the trial court granted his motion for the requests for admissions to be admitted, the trustee filed a motion for partial summary judgment based on the no-contest clauses in the trust and will of the settlor. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the beneficiary’s petition with prejudice. The beneficiary appealed. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Alain Benitez, appeals the Smith County Criminal Court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing for his two convictions of first degree felony murder. Upon review, we conclude that we must dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

In 2019, a Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Victor Wise, of two counts of
aggravated robbery, one count of attempted aggravated robbery, and two counts of
aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced him to forty-four years of incarceration. The
Petitioner appealed his convictions to this court, and we affirmed the convictions but
concluded that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. This court modified
the Petitioner’s total effective sentence to twelve years. State v. Wise, No. W2018-01343-
CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 4492910, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2019), no perm. app.
filed. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that
he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court denied
after a hearing. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This appeal arises from a health care liability action filed in circuit court by a conservator
on behalf of a ward. After a three-week jury trial resulted in a mistrial, the conservator
took a nonsuit. The conservator refiled the complaint against only one defendant hospital,
asserting that it was vicariously liable for the actions of a doctor based on a theory of
apparent agency. The defendant hospital moved for summary judgment on the basis that
the conservator had entered into a consent agreement agreeing not to sue the doctor in the
refiled suit if the doctor agreed to withdraw his motion for discretionary costs. According
to the defendant hospital, this agreement releasing the alleged agent from liability
extinguished the conservator’s right to pursue a vicarious liability claim against the
principal. In response, the conservator took the position that the consent agreement was
not binding because it was never approved by the probate court that appointed her. The
circuit court granted summary judgment to the defendant hospital, finding that the order
appointing the conservator authorized her to dispose of property, execute instruments, enter
into contracts, pursue legal causes of action, and manage money, thereby authorizing her
to enter into the consent agreement. The circuit court found nothing in the order of
appointment, the relevant statutes, or caselaw that would impose a mandatory requirement
for approval of the settlement by the probate court. Because the conservator had released
the alleged agent from liability, the circuit court found that the conservator could not pursue
vicarious liability claims against the defendant hospital. The conservator filed a motion to
alter or amend, asking the circuit court to consider an “Advisory Opinion” of the probate
court on the matter. The circuit court denied the motion, explaining that it respectfully
disagreed with the Advisory Opinion of the probate court. The conservator appeals. We
affirm and remand for further proceedings.

Defendant, Christopher A. Williams, while on parole under a sentence from the Sullivan
County Criminal Court, was convicted in federal court for conspiracy to distribute and
possess with intent to distribute 28 grams or more of cocaine base. The State filed a
detainer based on Defendant's violation of parole. Defendant filed a pro se "Motion to
Terminate Parole as Unsatisfactorily Completed/Alternatively Revoke Parole and Impose
Sentence in Absentia to Run Concurrent with Federal Supervise Release," which the trial
court denied, finding that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers ("IAD") "does not apply
to probation violations." Defendant filed a pro se motion to reconsider, asserting that he
was denied a due process hearing on his parole revocation. The trial court denied the
motion, and Defendant appeals. We dismiss Defendant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

This is an appeal from an order denying a motion for relief under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the order as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

Courts in both Florida and Ohio denied petitions to terminate Father’s parental rights in favor of the Prospective Adoptive Parents.  While Florida courts were still exercising jurisdiction over the transition of the child from his Prospective Adoptive Parents to his Mother and Father, the Prospective Adoptive Parents sought for the third time to have a court terminate Father’s parental rights, asserting willful failure to support in Tennessee.  The juvenile court dismissed the petition, finding that Father’s failure to support was not willful because the failure to support was tied to the Prospective Adoptive Parents’ representations that they would no longer pursue custody, to Father’s financial outlays related to preparing his home for a transition of custody, and to the complex, multi-jurisdictional nature of the litigation, in which Florida courts were expressly exercising jurisdiction for many months after the filing of the Tennessee petition and during the entirety of the period of non-payment.  The Prospective Adoptive Parents appeal, asserting that the ground for termination was established by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the child’s best interest, and that the court erred in assessing fees for the guardian ad litem.  We affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

I concur in the result reached by the Court and in its analysis in all but one respect.  In considering whether the father of Preston H., Christopher W. (“Father”), established an affirmative defense to the claim that he abandoned his child by failure to support, the Court reasons that it is unnecessary to determine “whether willfulness [of Father’s failure to support] presents a question of law, fact, or a mixed question of fact and law.”  In my view, the outcome of the appeal depends on that determination.

Petitioner, Kimberly Miller, appeals as of right from the Maury County Circuit Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief, wherein she challenged her convictions for first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder, for which she received a life sentence.  On appeal, Petitioner asserts that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel’s failure to permit Petitioner “to make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary decision on whether to assert—or not assert—the statute of limitations for all lesser[-]included offenses of first degree murder and first degree felony murder” and counsel’s failure to file a motion to dismiss, “along with alternative requests for mandatory or permissive jury instructions, related to the violation of [Petitioner’s] Due Process rights under the federal and state constitutions” based upon a lengthy, pre-indictment delay.  Following a thorough review, we affirm. 

The defendant, James Tyler Fucci, appeals the denial of his request for judicial diversion of the six-year sentence imposed for his Montgomery County Criminal Court guiltypleaded conviction of aggravated assault. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. We remand for entry of a judgment on Count 2 reflecting that the charge was dismissed in accordance with the plea agreement.

This case involves an accident between a motor vehicle and a school bus that occurred on
Highway 11E on a foggy December morning in Jefferson County, Tennessee. The
automobile was traveling eastbound on Highway 11E when it struck the bus, which was
stopped across the two eastbound lanes of Highway 11E positioned to make a left turn onto
the westbound lanes. The driver of the car, Jacob Cook, sustained serious injuries as a
result of the impact. Mr. Cook, together with his grandfather, Rickey Macari, who owned
the vehicle, brought an action in tort seeking damages against Jefferson County, the
Jefferson County Board of Education, and the driver of the school bus, Harold Moody. In
their complaint, Mr. Cook and Mr. Macari alleged that Mr. Moody's negligence in stopping
the school bus across the eastbound lanes was the proximate cause of Mr. Cook's injuries.
The defendants filed a counterclaim alleging that Mr. Cook's negligence, and not Mr.
Moody's, was the proximate cause of the accident because Mr. Cook had been speeding
when the accident occurred. During a bench trial, the defendants' expert witness, an
accident reconstructionist, opined that Mr. Cook had been speeding at the time of the
accident but that Mr. Cook's car would have collided with the stopped school bus even had
he been following the speed limit. At the conclusion of the bench trial, the trial court found
that Mr. Cook was indeed speeding at the time of the accident, but that Mr. Moody should
not have attempted to turn left across the eastbound lanes given the traffic and weather
conditions. Accordingly, the trial court determined that Mr. Moody's actions were the
proximate cause of Mr. Cook's injuries and allocated 80% of the fault for the accident to
Mr. Moody, with 20% of the fault assigned to Mr. Cook. The defendants timely appealed.
Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court's judgment with one modification:
we direct the trial court to dismiss Jefferson County as a defendant because the Jefferson
County Board of Education, as the owner of the school bus, is undisputedly the proper
defendant in this action.

This appeal arises from a health care liability action following the death of Ashley Denson
from a cardiac event she suffered after being treated and released from Methodist Medical
Center. Ms. Denson was unmarried and had two minor children at the time of her death.
The statutorily-required pre-suit notice listed Ms. Denson’s mother, Bobbie J. Denson, as
the claimant authorizing notice. The minor children were not identified anywhere in the
notice. The subsequent complaint was filed by “ASHLEY DENSON, Deceased, by and
through her Next Friend and Mother BOBBIE JO DENSON, and BOBBIE JO DENSON,
Individually.” The body of the complaint lists, for the first time, Ashley Denson’s children,
and states that Bobbie Denson “brings this action individually, and on behalf of Plaintiff,
decedent’s surviving minor children … as Grandmother and Legal Guardian.” The
defendants filed motions to dismiss, challenging Bobbie Denson’s standing to bring the
action and contending that the pre-suit notice failed to comply with the requirements of the
Tennessee Health Care Liability Act.1

I agree with the majority’s secondary conclusion that Grandmother held standing to
file suit on behalf of the minor children. I write separately to address the majority’s
dispositive holding that failure to identify the minor children in the pre-suit notice defeats
this cause of action, thereby precluding their claim for health care liability for judicial
review on its merits.

A Madison County jury convicted the Appellant, Markettus L. Patrick, of aggravated
assault by strangulation or attempted strangulation, a Class C felony, see Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 39-13-102(a)(1)(A)(iv), for which he received a sentence of five years to be served on
supervised probation following service of 150 days in confinement. The sole issue
presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction.
Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.