APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Because the circuit court orders from which the appellant has sought to appeal do not
constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This appeal involves a contract for the removal of a tree. The trial court granted a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant tree company. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.

Appellants, Amelia Vaughn and Gemelia Johnson appeal the March 3, 2023 order of the
Shelby County Probate Court. Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, this
Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). The appeal is
dismissed.

Petitioner, Willie Nathan Jones, appeals from the Putnam County Criminal Court’s denying his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his convictions of second degree murder and attempted second degree murder. Petitioner argues trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to contemporaneously object to the prosecutor’s closing argument and failing to object to the prosecutor’s use of the term “victim” when referring to a State’s witness. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court
Rule 10B § 2.02 from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. This appeal arises
from a civil action in which the plaintiff has brought claims of fraud and civil conspiracy
against his former counsel in a criminal case that resulted in a conviction and his counsel
in a pending post-conviction case. While this civil action was pending, the trial court
allowed the attorneys who were representing the plaintiff in the post-conviction case to
withdraw. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff filed a recusal motion, contending that the trial
judge should be recused because he showed bias in favor of the plaintiff’s post-conviction
attorneys when he granted their motions to withdraw without a hearing, during which the
plaintiff wished to share his grievances about the attorneys. The trial court denied the
plaintiff’s recusal motion, and this Rule 10B appeal followed. We have concluded that
neither the legal grounds nor the evidence that the plaintiff relies upon in his affidavit in
support of the recusal motion are sufficient to prompt a reasonable, disinterested person to
reasonably question the judge’s impartiality. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court
denying the motion for recusal is affirmed.

This is an appeal from a divorce in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (the “trial court”). Donna Booker (“Wife”) and Mike Booker (“Husband”) married for the first time in 1993 and divorced in 1998. They remarried shortly thereafter in February of 1999. The day of their second wedding, Husband and Wife executed a prenuptial agreement addressing Husband’s interest in his family’s steel erection business. Wife filed the current divorce action in the trial court in February of 2020, and a trial was held May 3 and 4, 2022, and July 6, 2022. The trial court ordered the parties divorced, divided the marital estate, and awarded Wife alimony in futuro. Finding that the prenuptial agreement was valid, the trial court determined that Husband’s interest in his family business was separate property. Wife appeals. Following thorough review, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand the case for further proceedings.

The plaintiff, John H. Packard, IV (“Plaintiff”) was struck by a vehicle driven by Jonathan
R. Bentley while Plaintiff attempted to walk across a roadway in Gatlinburg, Tennessee.
Plaintiff brought a suit arising in negligence against a number of parties, including the City
of Gatlinburg (“City”). As to City, Plaintiff alleged that it created an unreasonably
dangerous risk of harm to pedestrians attempting to use the crosswalk because it failed to
inspect and maintain LED lights it had previously installed on a nearby crosswalk sign.
The Circuit Court for Sevier County (“trial court”) granted summary judgment in favor of
City, finding that City negated an essential element of Plaintiff’s claim, that City was
entitled to immunity pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act
(“GTLA”), Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-101 et seq., and that City was also
immune pursuant to the public duty doctrine. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of
the trial court.

Defendant, Jimmy Dewayne Richards, was convicted by a Fentress County jury of burglary, theft of property, and vandalism. On appeal, the Defendant argues, among other things, that the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress. We cannot adequately review on the record before us whether the search was supported by probable cause or whether Defendant lacked standing to challenge the search. The trial court sua sponte raised the standing issue after all the proof was presented at the hearing and did not comply with its duties to judge the credibility of witnesses, to weigh the evidence, and to resolve factual issues in deciding the motion to suppress. We therefore remand this case for a new hearing on the motion to suppress in accordance with the instructions in this opinion.

This appeal concerns an inmate’s lawsuit over injuries he sustained from falling off a top
bunk bed in prison. Jody Higgins (“Plaintiff”) was an inmate at Silverdale Detention
Facility (“Silverdale”). CoreCivic, Inc. operated Silverdale through a contract with
Hamilton County. CoreCivic of Tennessee, LLC (the two CoreCivic entities together,
“CoreCivic”) employed security at Silverdale. Correct Care Solutions, LLC (“CCS”)
provided medical treatment to Silverdale inmates through a contract with CoreCivic.
Plaintiff sued CoreCivic, CCS, and Hamilton County (“Defendants,” collectively) in the
Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) asserting health care liability and
other claims. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment, which the Trial Court
granted based in part on a lack of expert proof. Plaintiff appeals. He argues among other
things that it is common knowledge that Plaintiff, who suffers from seizures, should have
been given a bottom bunk pass and anti-seizure medication. We hold, inter alia, that
Plaintiff failed to present competent, admissible expert proof in support of his health care
liability claim at the summary judgment stage, and that the issues of this case do not fall
under the common knowledge exception. Plaintiff’s other claims are barred by the statute
of limitations. We affirm.

Jason M. Peterson (“Plaintiff”) was the passenger in a vehicle driven by Jodi L. Carey
(“Defendant”) at the time of a motor vehicle accident. Plaintiff filed a personal injury
action against Defendant more than one year after the accident. Plaintiff argues that
Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-104(a)(2) extends the statute of limitations for his
action to two years because Defendant was cited for the violation of a traffic ordinance
contained in the Kingsport Municipal Code in relation to the accident. The Circuit Court
for Sullivan County (“trial court”) applied the one-year statute of limitations set forth in
section 28-3-104(a)(1) and granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant. Finding no
error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to support; abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; persistent conditions; and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children. The mother also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the children. We reverse the trial court’s finding on the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans because the initial permanency plan does not appear in the record, but we affirm the trial court in all other respects.

A mother appeals from the judgment holding her in criminal contempt of court, denying her motion to dissolve an ex parte no-contact order entered against her, and denying her motion to transfer the case to another county. Upon a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment. Due to the passage of time and the position taken by the parties and by the trial court when issuing its ruling, we remand for a new evidentiary hearing on the ex parte order suspending the mother’s contact with the children.

The Petitioner, Quintavious Montez Patton, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition.

The petitioner, Edward Dean, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing
the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel.
After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the
petition.

This is a State appeal, filed by the State Attorney General and Reporter, from the entry of
an order granting the petitioner’s, Courtney Anderson’s, motion to reopen his postconviction
and amending/reducing his original sentence of 162 years, 11 months, and 29
days to a time served sentence of 25 years. The State appealed, arguing the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to hear the petitioner’s motion as it was barred by the one-year statute
of limitations and the petitioner failed to prove the statute should be tolled. Additionally,
the State submits that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to amend the petitioner’s sentence
under the post-conviction statute and that the trial court’s actions amount to an improper
commutation of the petitioner’s sentence. The petitioner contends that the State waived
any challenge to the statute of limitations by failing to raise the issue below and that his
claim meets the requirements of the statute and allows for the tolling of the statute, and
therefore, the trial court properly granted the relief requested. Upon our thorough review
of the applicable law and the briefs and arguments of both parties, we conclude that the
instant petition is barred by the one-year statute of limitations and that the petitioner failed
to establish and the trial court failed to find a proper basis for tolling the statute.
Accordingly, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the petitioner’s motion and amend
the petitioner’s sentence. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the trial court, reinstate the
petitioner’s original sentence, and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Frederick Peat, of aggravated rape, for
which he received a sentence of twenty-five years in confinement. On appeal, the
defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his
conviction. The defendant also argues the trial court erred in preventing him from
impeaching the victim with evidence of the victim’s prior convictions and in imposing an
excessive sentence. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we
affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Juan De Paz Mondragon, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court
jury of two counts of second-degree murder, attempted second-degree murder, and
employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and the trial court
imposed an effective sentence of thirty-eight years’ incarceration. On appeal, the
defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for seconddegree
murder and attempted second-degree murder, and the trial court abused its
discretion in imposing consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the judgments of
the trial court. Furthermore, we remand to the trial court entry of corrected judgment forms
in counts one and two reflecting the merger of the defendant’s convictions for seconddegree
murder into a single conviction.

The defendant, Eric Dewayne Milton, appeals from the trial court’s revocation of his
community corrections sentence and order directing the defendant to serve the remainder
of his eight-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court
abused its discretion by failing to treat the defendant’s violation as a violation of probation
and impose a thirty-day sentence of confinement. After a thorough review of the record,
the applicable law, and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Chauncy Black, was found guilty by a Shelby County jury of reckless
endangerment of Kaleb Wakefield and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon of
Isabella Edwards for discharging a firearm into an occupied habitation. The trial court
imposed a six-and-a-half-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction of reckless endangerment with
a deadly weapon of Isabella Edwards. The defendant also argues the trial court erred in
failing to instruct the jury as to a presumption of reasonableness in the use of deadly force
within his residence. Following our review, we affirm the defendant’s convictions.

Defendant, Taylor Brent Farley, pleaded guilty to one count of attempted delivery of fentanyl, a Class C felony. Defendant sought judicial diversion, but the trial court denied diversion and imposed a six-year sentence on Community Corrections. On appeal, Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying judicial diversion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case arises from a dispute between a property owner and his homeowners’ association. The property owner, Pratik Pandharipande, purchased a home in a vacation community on a Tennessee lake, intending to use it as a short-term rental. At the time of the purchase, the property was subject to covenants requiring that the home be used for “residential and no other purposes.” The covenants were amended several years later to allow leases with minimum lease terms of thirty days. Pandharipande contends that neither the original covenants nor the amendments prohibit him from leasing his property for short terms of two to twenty-eight days. His homeowners’ association disagrees on both scores. We agree with Pandharipande that the original covenants requiring residential use of the property do not bar his short-term rentals, but we agree with the homeowners’ association that the amendments do. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the homeowners’ association based on both the original covenants and the amendments. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We affirm the Court of Appeals in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Petitioner, Micah Joshua Ford, alias Joseph Tolbert, III, appeals the denial of his postconviction
petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received
the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. He also argues that he is
entitled to a new trial under the doctrine of cumulative error. Following our review of the
entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction
court.

The defendant, Cedric D. Marshall, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s order revoking his community corrections sentence and resentencing him to an effective sentence of seven years’ incarceration for his guilty-pleaded convictions of evading arrest, burglary, and theft of property. Because the defendant’s notice of appeal is untimely, we dismiss the appeal.

The plaintiffs filed this breach of contract action against their homeowners association for failure to rectify alleged violations of the neighborhood restrictions. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment establishing that the issues complained of were actual violations of the restrictions. The trial court dismissed the action in favor of the homeowners association and the plaintiffs’ neighbors who joined as interested parties. We affirm.

The Defendant, Lorie Ann Gerbis, was convicted following a bench trial of two counts of aggravated assault. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions. Specifically, she contends that the State’s evidence was inadequate to establish her identity as the perpetrator beyond a reasonable doubt. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.