APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal from a case arising in the Shelby County General Sessions Environmental Court. For the reasons stated herein, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review this appeal. Moreover, we are unable to transfer this appeal because it was not timely filed for the appropriate court that has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and it is, therefore, dismissed.

The State of Tennessee appealed the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s order granting the Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence recovered during the search of her car.  On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred because probable cause existed to search the Defendant’s car based on a police dog’s signal for the presence of narcotics.  We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for reinstatement of the charges.

I concur with the majority opinion’s conclusion based on the narrow issue raised by the parties and the existing law in Tennessee.  I write separately, however, to highlight how the legalization of hemp has fractured the foundation underlying the rule that a drug detection dog sniff is not a search subject to Fourth Amendment protections.  In my view, the cases before this court thus far miss the primary issue—whether a drug detection dog sniff that no longer discloses only contraband is itself a search that must be supported by probable cause.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights on four grounds. The Tennessee
Department of Children’s Services does not defend two of the four grounds, so we reverse
as to those grounds. We affirm the ground that Mother is unable to parent the children due
to her present mental condition. Because the trial court’s order does not contain sufficient
findings of fact, we vacate the trial court’s findings that the mother failed to manifest a
willingness and ability to parent and that termination is in the children’s best interests.

Father appeals the trial court’s finding of abandonment by wanton disregard as a ground for termination of his parental rights, as well as its finding that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

The Plaintiff brought a premises liability claim after falling off his own ladder while at the Defendant’s residence. The Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing he had no duty to warn and could avoid liability under principles of comparative fault. The Plaintiff countered that the Defendant was actually his employer and that the Defendant’s decision not to provide workers’ compensation insurance prevented the Defendant from being able to raise a comparative fault defense. Furthermore, the Plaintiff argued that the Defendant did have a duty to warn. The trial court granted the Defendant summary judgment finding no duty to warn and that even if a duty existed that Plaintiff’s claim failed as a matter of law based upon comparative fault principles. The Plaintiff appealed to this Court. We affirm.

The Defendant, Glen Edward Miller, pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery and two counts of kidnapping, and the trial court sentenced him to a twelve-year effective sentence, to be served on probation after one year of confinement. In response to the Defendant’s second proven probation violation, the trial court ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. On appeal from this judgment, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court improperly admitted hearsay evidence; (2) the evidence is insufficient to prove that he violated his probation; and (3) the trial court erred when it ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Nicole L. Lindholm, appeals the trial court’s imposition of an effective five-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction for her convictions for aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony, which followed the trial court’s revocation of her probationary sentence on judicial diversion. The Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence and erred by denying her request for probation. Based on our review, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.

Following a bench trial, the Maury County Circuit Court convicted the Defendant of patronizing prostitution from a minor, a Class B felony, in count one and solicitation of a minor to commit patronizing prostitution, a Class C felony, in count two. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eight and three years, respectively, and merged the convictions. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is sufficient to support only a conviction of patronizing prostitution from a law enforcement officer posing as a minor, a Class A misdemeanor, in count one and that the evidence is insufficient to support any conviction in count two. The State concedes that the Defendant committed a Class A misdemeanor in count one and, therefore, that both convictions must be modified to misdemeanors. We agree with the State; modify the judgment in count one to reflect a Class A misdemeanor conviction of patronizing prostitution from a law enforcement officer posing as a minor; modify the judgment in count two to reflect a Class B misdemeanor conviction of solicitation of a law enforcement officer posing as a minor to commit patronizing prostitution; and remand the case to the trial court for resentencing.

A Knox County jury convicted the Petitioner, Richard Williams, III, of several offenses, including attempted first degree murder. He later filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition after finding that it was untimely and that principles of due process did not toll the running of the statute of limitations. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court did not adequately consider the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on his ability to access the prison library and, therefore, to timely file his petition. We respectfully disagree and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Hawkins County jury convicted the Defendant, Christopher James Funk, Sr., of driving
under the influence of an intoxicant and possessing a firearm while under the influence of
alcohol. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent sentences of eleven months
and twenty-nine days after service of forty-eight hours in custody. On appeal, the
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying both his motion to suppress and his
subsequent motion for an interlocutory appeal. The State asserts that the Defendant waived
any issue regarding his motion to suppress by failing to file a motion for a new trial. It also
argues that the denial of an interlocutory appeal may not be challenged in a later direct
appeal. On our review, we agree with the State and respectfully affirm the trial court’s
judgments.

The Tennessee Claims Commission dismissed appellant’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal came on to be heard upon the record from the Circuit Court for Meigs
County, arguments of counsel, and briefs filed on behalf of the respective parties. Upon
consideration thereof, this Court is of the opinion that there is no reversible error in the
trial court’s judgment.

In this divorce action, the court limited Wife’s proof at trial as a sanction for her failure to respond to pre-trial discovery. After the trial, the court granted the parties an absolute divorce, equitably divided the marital estate, adopted a permanent parenting plan for their minor children, and declined to award Wife spousal support. Wife argues that the court erred in limiting her proof at trial, dividing the marital estate, and denying her request for spousal support. Discerning no abuse of discretion in these decisions, we affirm.

A father filed a petition to modify the existing parenting plan. The trial court found a material change in circumstances had occurred and it was in the child’s best interest to award custody to the father. Because the evidence does not preponderate against either finding, we affirm.

This case concerns the procedure used by the Tennessee State Board of Equalization when it determined the 2018 appraisal ratio for Shelby County. In 2017, Shelby County real property was reappraised. Accordingly, the Board of Equalization set the County’s 2017 appraisal ratio at 1.000. In 2018, the Board of Equalization used the 2017 reappraisal to set the Shelby County 2018 appraisal ratio at 1.000. Appellants—owners of commercial tangible personal property in Shelby County—challenged the Board’s methodology as violative of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 67-5-1605 and 67-5-1606 and unsupported by substantial and material evidence. Following review under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, the trial court determined that: (1) the Board did not violate Tennessee Code Annotated sections 67-5-1605 and 67-5-1606 when it set the County’s appraisal ratio at 1.000 in 2018; (2) the Board’s decision was supported by substantial and material evidence; and (3) the Board’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This lawsuit arises from a real property/boundary dispute between the plaintiff and the defendants. The trial court found that a prior circuit court condemnation judgment vesting title to the Knoxville Community Development Corporation “bars the claim of [the plaintiff] as an impermissible collateral attack upon the condemnation judgment.” Thus, the trial court ruled that the condemnation judgment barred the plaintiff’s adverse possession claim against the defendants. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The Appellant appeals his convictions of second degree murder and possession of a firearm
with a prior violent felony conviction, for which he received an effective sentence of fortyeight
years’ imprisonment. In this appeal, the Appellant argues that (1) the trial court erred
in denying the motion to suppress his confession; and (2) the evidence is insufficient to
establish his identity as the perpetrator of the offenses. After review, we affirm the trial
court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Deonta Baskin, was convicted of first degree murder and possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life without parole
pursuant to the repeat violent offender statute for his first degree murder conviction to be
served consecutively to thirty years’ confinement as a Range III, persistent offender for his
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon conviction. On appeal, the Defendant argues
that the trial court erred by imposing excessive sentences based on his prior convictions.
After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This post-divorce appeal concerns the trial court’s finding of contempt against the father for his failure to pay child support and the court’s calculation of his support arrearage owed. We affirm.

In this health care liability action, the trial court granted summary judgment to the appellee
surgeon based on the expiration of the statute of limitations and the appellant patient’s
failure to show evidence of causation and damages. On appeal, we conclude that (1) there
is a genuine dispute of material fact as to when the appellant’s cause of action accrued; (2)
the trial court did not specifically rule on the propriety of appellant’s pre-suit notice; and
(3) there are genuine disputes of material facts as to the causation and damages elements
of the appellant’s claim. Accordingly, we reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for
further proceedings.

The Defendant, Lance T. Sandifer, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. In his motion, the Defendant argued that his sentences were illegal because he was not granted a juvenile transfer hearing and that the criminal court, therefore, lacked subject matter jurisdiction over him. Following our review, we affirm.

This appeal concerns an order of dismissal entered by the Tennessee Claims Commission. Though Appellant raises a number of issues on appeal, this Court is unable to review any of the issues due to Appellant’s noncompliance with applicable appellate briefing requirements. Because all of Appellant’s issues on appeal have been waived due to his failure to comply with the appellate briefing requirements, we affirm the judgment of the Tennessee Claims Commission.

This case involves an election contest filed by the plaintiff based on the defendant’s residency eligibility for the office of Lenoir City Municipal Court Judge. Following a hearing, the trial court determined that the defendant had complied with article VI, section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution because the clause required, inter alia, that he be a resident within the judicial district, not necessarily within the city limits, to preside over the municipal court, which has concurrent jurisdiction with a general sessions court. The
plaintiff has appealed. Upon review, we determine that the language of article VI, section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution requiring a judge elected to an inferior court to have been a resident of the “district or circuit” to which he or she is assigned means, under these circumstances, that the Lenoir City Municipal Judge must have been a resident of Loudon County for at least one year prior to the judge’s election because the Lenoir City Municipal Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Loudon County General
Sessions Court. Accordingly, inasmuch as the defendant had been a resident of Loudon County for at least one year prior to the election, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s election contest. However, we modify the trial court’s judgment to state that the defendant complied with the residency requirement at issue because he had been a resident of Loudon County for at least one year rather than because he had been a resident of the Ninth Judicial District for the prescribed time period.