APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Jonathon C. Hood, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, he contends that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief from the imposition of ongoing punishment in the form of fines. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

This appeal arises from a divorce action. The husband appeals the trial court’s division of marital property and debt and the award of compensatory and punitive damages to the wife for injuries she allegedly sustained at the hands of the husband. We affirm.

In the parties’ divorce, the trial court denied Wife’s request for spousal support and her request for reimbursement for medical expenses incurred. We affirm.

This case involves Employee’s right to unemployment compensation benefits. The Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development denied Employee’s claim for unemployment compensation benefits after finding that she voluntarily quit her job based on her belief that she would soon be terminated. Employee appealed that finding in the trial court, where she also contended that she was denied her due process rights of notice and representation during the agency proceedings. The trial court upheld the denial of benefits, finding substantial and material evidence that Employee voluntarily quit her job, and finding that Employee was not denied due process during the agency proceedings. We affirm.

Appellant, Jonathan Ray Chapman, was convicted of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years in confinement. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by: (1) admitting his videotaped confession into evidence and (2) failing to admit a statement made by his girlfriend into evidence. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The defendant, Courtney Knowles, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of rape of a child, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Petitioner, Cedric Earl Johnson, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition. On October 11, 2010, judgments of conviction were entered against Petitioner pursuant to his negotiated guilty pleas to attempted first degree murder, aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated burglary. Petitioner received an effective sentence of twenty-five years of incarceration. On February 1, 2013, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. On February 27, 2013, the trial court entered an order dismissing the petition with prejudice because it was filed outside the one-year applicable statute of limitations. On April 11, 2013, Petitioner filed his notice of appeal. In its brief, the State moves this court to dismiss the appeal because the notice of appeal was filed almost two weeks late. See Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a) (a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days of entry of the judgment appealed from). We decline to dismiss the appeal and waive the timely filing of the notice of appeal. However, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee.

Land owner applied to the Sumner County Board of Zoning Appeals for a conditional use permit to operate a quarry with accessory asphalt and concrete plants and rock crushing facilities. After a public hearing, the Board denied the application. The land owner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the Board’s decision; the trial court affirmed the Board’s denial. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

A Shelby County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Shana Schafer, for driving while under the influence of an intoxicant (“DUI”) and DUI with a blood alcohol content (“BAC”) of greater than .08 percent. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress the results of the blood alcohol test based upon a violation of State v. Sensing, 843 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1992). The trial court granted the Defendant’s motion to suppress, and the State filed for an interlocutory appeal. The trial court granted the State’s application, and, on appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred when it granted the Defendant’s motion to suppress. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the Defendant’s motion to suppress. As such, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Defendant, Malcolm W. Bennett, was charged by indictment with Class C felony aggravated assault. In a negotiated plea agreement, he entered a “best interest” guilty plea to the amended charge of Class D felony reckless aggravated assault of the victim, a ten-year-old boy. The parties also agreed that Defendant would be sentenced as a Range II multiple offender, with the length and manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve eight years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal Defendant argues that his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of the Criminal Appeals of Tennessee.

This is an appeal from an administrative decision permanently revoking a real estate broker’s license. The Chancery Court reversed the decision of the administrative panel, finding that the decision was not based on substantial and material evidence, that the procedure utilized violated both statutory and constitutional principles, and that the administrative panel demonstrated “evident partiality.” We reverse the decision of the Chancery Court and reinstate the decision of the administrative panel. Reversed and remanded.

The petitioner, Ronnie Woodall, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of rape of a child. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial, that the State failed to disclose favorable evidence, and that the post-conviction court erred by failing to address each of the issues raised in the petition for post-conviction relief. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on D’Vante P., the minor child (“Child”) of Ashley C. (“Mother”) and Sylvester P. (“Father”). The Child was taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) on October 27, 2010, following investigation of lack of supervision in the home. On October 10, 2012, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents. The proceeding to terminate Father’s parental rights subsequently became a separate action, and Father is not a party to this appeal. Following a bench trial conducted on July 15, 2013, the trial court granted the petition as to Mother upon the court’s finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) Mother had failed to substantially comply with the permanency plans and (2) the conditions causing the removal of the Child into protective custody persisted. The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Mother has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The trial court dismissed this tort action as barred by the statute of limitations upon determining that Plaintiffs had failed to comply with Rule 4.03(1) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure where they failed to return alias summonses until 235 days after they were issued. We reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Jose Antonio Henriquez, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated sexual battery, Class B felonies; attempted aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony; solicitation of a minor, a Class C felony; and sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-504 (2010) (aggravated sexual battery), 39-12-101 (2010) (criminal attempt), 39-13-528 (2006) (amended 2013) (solicitation of a minor), 39-13-529 (2006) (amended 2011, 2012, 2013) (sexual exploitation of a minor). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent terms of eleven years as a violent offender for each of the aggravated sexual battery convictions and five years as a Range I, standard offender for each of the attempted aggravated sexual battery, solicitation of a minor, and sexual exploitation of a minor convictions. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) his right to a speedy trial was violated and (2) a fatal variance exists between the solicitation of a minor charge and the trial proof. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a grandparent visitation case. The grandparents filed a petition seeking to have a parenting plan established which designated them as primary caregivers or, in the alternative, provided them with “regular custodial time” with respect to a grandson who previously lived at their home. The juvenile court judge held that the Grandparents did not prove that the mother opposed visitation, and dismissed the petition. Concluding thatthe evidence does not preponderate against the court’s finding that the mother did not oppose visitation, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. We conclude from the record that clear and convincing evidence does not support the trial court’s finding of willful abandonment and, accordingly, reverse.

The plaintiff, Margaret Renee Wright, has appealed from the dismissal of her action for damages arising out of an automobile accident. Upon review of the record, this court determined that neither Ms. Wright’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59 motion nor her notice of appeal were timely filed. We thus ordered Ms. Wright to show cause why her appeal should not be dismissed. Ms. Wright’s trial counsel has filed a response asserting that both Ms. Wright’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59 motion and her notice of appeal were in fact timely filed. 2 It appears fromMs. Wright’s response that certain documents were omitted from the record. Nevertheless, we still conclude that Ms. Wright’s Tenn. R. Civ. P.59 motion was untimely and thus dismiss the appeal.

The order appealed is not a final judgment and therefore, this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Marvin Davis, of rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years at 100%. On appeal, the defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in admitting the videotaped forensic interview of the victim; and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Gary Allen Jordan, appeals the denial of his petitions for post-conviction relief from his guilty plea convictions for possession of marijuana with intent to sell, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, felony evading arrest, and two counts of aggravated assault. He argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After review, we affirm the denial of the petitions.

The trial court granted a divorce to a husband and wife after a marriage of nineteen years. The court named the husband as the primary residential parent of the parties’ children, divided the marital property between the parties, and awarded the wife transitional alimony of $3,000 per month for five years. The husband argues on appeal that the trial court erred in including his separate property in the marital estate subject to division. The wife argues that the alimony award was insufficient in light of the length of the parties’ marriage and the disparity in income between them, and that the court erred in failing to award her attorney’s fees. We agree that husband’s separate property should not be included in the marital estate, but that the division of property is still equitable. We hold that the wife is entitled to alimony in futuro. We also find that she should be awarded one-half of the attorney’s fees she incurred at trial.

The principal issue is whether an association that governs and coordinates interscholastic athletic competition of substantially all public and private secondary schools in Tennessee is the functional equivalent of a government agency for purposes of the Tennessee Public Records Act. Two reporters and their newspaper filed this action pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505 to obtain records from the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association regarding the enforcement of its bylaws on member schools. The chancery court held that the association was the functional equivalent of a government agency; therefore, it was subject to the Tennessee Public Records Act, codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503 et seq. The court also ordered it to produce the records at issue, subject to the redaction of students’ names. We affirm.

The petitioner, David Allen Brimmer, appeals as of right from the Johnson County Criminal Court’s order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief challenging the validity of his 1999 aggravated kidnapping conviction and resulting sentence of 60 years as a violent offender. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the order of the trial court.

This is the second extraordinary interlocutory appeal in this divorce case and custody dispute. In the first appeal, this Court held that the father did not automatically waive the psychologist-client privilege as to his mental health records by seeking custody or by defending against the mother’s claims that he was mentally unfit. While the first appeal was pending, the mother filed a motion asking the trial court to require the father to undergo a second mental health evaluation pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 35; the trial court granted the motion. The Rule 35 evaluating psychologist concluded that the father did not pose a danger to his children. Dissatisfied with this conclusion, the mother again asked the trial court to compel the father to produce all of the mental health records from his treating psychologists. After this Court rendered its decision in the first appeal, the trial court granted the mother’s request and again ordered the father to produce all of the mental health records from his treating psychologists. The trial court reasoned that the father waived the psychologist-client privilege as to all of his mental health records by allowing the evaluating psychologists to speak to his treating psychologists, by providing mental health records to the evaluating psychologists, and by testifying that he had a history of depression and had undergone treatment for it. It also ordered the father to produce all of his mental health records because the mother needed them to prepare her case. The father filed a request for a second extraordinary appeal, which this Court granted. We vacate the trial court’s order as inconsistent with this Court’s holding in the first appeal; we hold that there was at most a limited waiver of the psychologist-client privilege, only as to the privileged mental health information that the father voluntarily disclosed to the two evaluating psychologists involved in this case. As for mental health records not subject to a limited waiver of the privilege, we hold that the standard for the trial court to compel disclosure of the records is not met in this case. We remand the case for factual findings on any privileged mental health records the father voluntarily disclosed and other proceedings consistent with this opinion.