APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a contract interpretation case involving the proper apportionment of proceeds from the sale of several properties owned by the parties as tenants in common. When Husband and Wife divorced in 2005, a marital dissolution agreement was incorporated into their Final Decree of Divorce. In pertinent part, the agreement required the parties to sell six properties and split the proceeds therefrom. The agreement listed each of the properties with a dollar amount beside it. The agreement provided that Wife could be compelled to accept an offer for a particular property so long as her share of the proceeds equaled the dollar amount listed with that property in the agreement. The sum of the amounts listed with the properties at issue was $565,800. Real estate values declined substantially after the agreement was entered, and the properties were finally sold together for $322,287.71 in 2012. Following the sale Husband filed a motion seeking an equal division of the sale proceeds. Wife answered, insisting that the agreement entitled her to $565,800 and that she was therefore entitled to all of the sale proceeds, less Husband’s expenses related to the properties. During a bench trial, the court found the agreement ambiguous and therefore considered parol evidence to determine the intent of the parties. Based on its findings, the trial court determined that the parties intended to split the sale proceeds equally. Additionally, the trial court concluded that the agreement entitled Husband to reimbursement for one-half of his expenses on the properties, which the parties stipulated to be $156,270.48. In its final accounting, the trial court awarded $234,834.09 to Husband and $87,453.62 to Wife. We affirm.

In this post-conviction appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because trial counsel was deficient in failing to file a written motion requesting jury instructions on lesser-included offenses and that this failure resulted in prejudice because it precluded appellate review of the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on any lesser-included offenses. After a review of the record and the applicable authorities, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court with respect to trial counsel’s failure to file a written motion requesting an instruction on lesser-included offenses of especially aggravated kidnapping. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.

I concur with the majority opinion except for one issue. I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the failure to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of aggravated kidnapping constitutes reversible error in this post-conviction case. Such a failure to charge a lesser-included offense is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when no reasonable jury would have convicted the petitioner of the lesser-included offense. State v. Banks, 271 S.W.3d 90, 126 (Tenn. 2008).

The Defendant, Danny Adams, was convicted by a jury of simple assault. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for that conviction, including an argument therein of inconsistent verdicts. We have thoroughly reviewed the record on appeal, and although the evidence is sufficient, we must reverse the Defendant’s conviction because an incorrect mental state was included in the jury charge. Moreover, we cannot deem the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This is the second appeal of this case, involving the application of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 31-1-105 to set aside certain transfers by decedent to his long-term companion, which transfers were allegedly made with intent to deny his surviving spouse of her share of his estate. From the totality of the circumstances, and applying the factors outlined by this Court in Finley v. Finley, 726 S.W.2d 923 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986), we conclude that the evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s award of $8,500.00 in insurance proceeds to the surviving spouse for decedent’s funeral costs, but that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s award of a $28,000.00 bank account to the surviving spouse. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

The Defendant, Jessica Root, appeals the trial court’s nine-year sentence to her open plea of guilt to vehicular homicide by intoxication, contending (1) that the trial court failed to consider applicable mitigating factors and a sentencing practices report; (2) that she should have received the minimum sentence; and (3) that the trial court improperly denied all forms of alternative sentencing. Upon consideration of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves the classification and division of Husband’s $66,000.00 personal injury settlement in a divorce proceeding. The trial court classified the settlement as marital property, it deducted $13,400.00 for what it found to be “legitimate expense[s] of the marriage” paid by Husband, and it awarded Wife one-half of the balance, or $26,300.00. We reverse the trial court’s award to Wife.

Kathy Austin, Vickie Shipley, and Sherry Foshie (“Plaintiffs”) sued their brothers, Jacob Wilds, Jr. and James Wilds (“Defendants”), seeking to have certain deeds from their mother set aside due to alleged undue influence and/or duress. After a bench trial, the Chancery Court for Greene County (“Trial Court”) entered its order rendering judgment in favor of Defendants after finding and holding, inter alia, that Plaintiffs had failed to prove the existence of a confidential relationship necessary to show that the subject deeds were procured through undue influence. Plaintiffs appeal. We find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s findings, and we affirm.

The only issue in this appeal is whether two property owners in a subdivision are entitled to an award of attorney fees for prevailing in a third-party action brought against them by the homeowners association to enforce restrictive covenants. The association argued that the property owners were not entitled to attorney fees because they did not prevail on every issue that came up during litigation, because the attorney fee provision in the restrictive covenants could be read to mean that no such award could be made if additional damages were not also awarded, and because they did not personally pay their own attorney fees. The trial court agreed with those arguments and denied the motion for attorney fees. We reverse the trial court and remand the case for a determination of the amount of the attorney fee award.

Keenan D. Singletary (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to facilitation of aggravated robbery. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to five years’ incarceration and ordered the Defendant to pay $174 in restitution. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the length and manner of service of his sentence. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court determined that no material and substantial change in circumstance had occurred and denied Father’s petition to modify the parties’ parenting plan. We affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Steven R. Bryson, was convicted by a Hardin County jury of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-504 (2011). The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to eight years and six months in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Bryson argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; and (3) the trial court committed plain error in its jury instructions. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellee, Jerry R. Shouse, was indicted by the Maury County Grand Jury with one count of driving under the influence and one count of violation of the open container law. Prior to trial, Appellee filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the basis that the warrantless seizure was arbitrary and oppressive. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to suppress by written order. The State filed a notice of appeal on the same day that the order of nolle prosequi was entered. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine based on the recent decision of State v. Moats, 403 S.W.3d 170 (Tenn. 2013), the trial court properly granted the motion to suppress where the actions of the officer were not authorized under any exception to the warrant requirement. Consequently, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Devin Jay Davis, was convicted by a Chester County jury of criminally negligent homicide and aggravated child abuse and neglect, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty years. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated child abuse and neglect, the jury’s verdicts in count one and count two are fatally inconsistent, and his convictions violate double jeopardy. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Stevie Dickson, was indicted by the Montgomery County Grand Jury for first degree murder, attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault. Petitioner entered a best interest plea to second degree murder and attempted second degree murder. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty years. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the record supports the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

The Petitioner, Jason Osmond Hines, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of relief for his conviction of second-degree murder. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to properly impeach the State’s witnesses and adequately present a theory of self-defense. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This post-divorce case concerns parental relocation. Father sought to relocate to Arizona, citing family ties and increased career opportunities. The parties agreed that Father spent substantially more time with the child than Mother; however, Mother objected to the relocation, arguing that the move had no reasonable purpose. The trial court agreed with Mother and entered a parenting plan naming Mother primary residential parent. Because the trial court made no best interest finding regarding either the proposed relocation, or the parenting plan, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. Vacated and Remanded.

The defendant, Armard Reeves, was convicted of one count of unlawful and knowing possession with intent to deliver three hundred pounds (300 lbs) (136,050 grams) or more of a controlled substance, to wit: marijuana. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to the maximum sentence of twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The defendant was arrested as a part of a larger investigation that Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”) were conducting into narcotics distribution. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury as to the lesser-included offense of facilitation; (2) the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly possessed the amount of marijuana in question; (3) the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury that the defendant must knowingly possess certain amounts of marijuana; (4) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (5) the trial court erred when it failed to grant the defendant’s motion to suppress; and (6) the trial court improperly sentenced the defendant to the maximum sentence for a Range I offender. After a thorough review of the record we conclude that facilitation was properly omitted as a jury instruction, that the “knowing” mens rea requirement does not apply to the amount of marijuana, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress, and that the defendant was properly sentenced to the maximum term of incarceration.

Petitioner, Aso Hassan Nejad, was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit first degree murder and sentenced by the trial court to 25 years’ incarceration. This court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence on appeal. State v. Aso Hassan Nejad a.k.a. Diako Nejad and Ako Hassan Nejad, No. M2009-00481-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 3562015 (Tenn. Crim. App., Sept. 14, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn., Feb. 17, 2011). Petitioner now appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, David Lynn Smith, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and is currently serving a sentence of twenty-four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that the denial of his petition was error because he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to adequately prepare the petitioner to testify at trial; and (2) failing to investigate and interview an alibi witness. The petitioner further argues that the post-conviction court committed reversible error by refusing to exclude trial counsel from the post-conviction proceedings pursuant to Rule 615 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. Following review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the petitioner was not denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel, and no Rule 615 violation was established. Therefore, we conclude that the petition was properly denied and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Travei Pryor, of eleven counts of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; four counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; four counts of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and one count of possessing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, Class C felonies; and one count of criminal impersonation, a Class B misdemeanor. After a sentencing hearing, he received an effective twelve-year sentence. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for employing/possessing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury as provided by State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012). Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury pursuant to White constitutes reversible error. Therefore, the appellant’s eleven convictions for aggravated kidnapping must be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for a new trial as to those offenses. The appellant’s remaining convictions are affirmed. However, upon remand, the trial court is to merge the appellant’s aggravated robbery convictions in counts 7 and 8 and counts 9 and 10 and enter single judgments of conviction for those offenses.

A surgical pathology group filed this action in chancery court, claiming that the Med violated its own rules and acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to award the petitioner with a contract after a lengthy request for proposals process. The petition stated that the chancery court had subject matter jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to the statutes governing petitions for certiorari. The trial court granted the Med’s motion to dismiss for numerous reasons, including lack of jurisdiction. We find that the petition was not subject to dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and we reverse the trial court’s finding to the contrary. However, due to the petitioner’s failure to appeal the trial court’s alternative grounds for dismissal, we find it unnecessary to consider the issues raised on appeal, and we otherwise affirm the order of dismissal.

After reviewing the records and law as it currently stands, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s reasoned opinion with regard to its State v. White determinations. I would affirm the convictions as they were entered, although merging those counts which were alternatively charged. In all other regards, I join in the majority’s opinion.

A Perry County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Cordell Remont Vaughn, charging him with first degree murder. After Defendant’s first trial, this court reversed a jury’s verdict that found Defendant guilty of first degree murder. State v. Vaughn, 279 S.W.3d 584, 586-87 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008). Pursuant to a second jury trial, Defendant was again found guilty of first degree murder. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion for new trial. The State filed a Rule 10 application for an extraordinary appeal with this court, which was granted. On appeal, this court reversed the trial court’s granting of a new trial. State v. Vaughn, No. M2011-00067-CCA-R10-CD, 2012 WL 1484191 (Tenn. Crim. App. April 25, 2012) perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2012). On May 31, 2013, the trial court entered judgment and sentenced Defendant again to life in prison without the possibility of parole. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) the evidence was not sufficient to support his first degree murder conviction; (2) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the toxicology report; and (3) whether his right to be free from double jeopardy was violated. After a review of the record, we affirm Defendant’s conviction of first degree murder; we reverse the sentence of life without possibility of parole and remand this case to the trial court for entry of a judgment of conviction of first degree murder with a sentence of life imprisonment.

Defendant, Gary Hawkins, was convicted of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child neglect and aggravated child neglect following a jury trial. Defendant received a life sentence for the murder conviction and a concurrent sentence of 22 years as a violent offender for the aggravated child neglect conviction. In this direct appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by allowing evidence of a prior conviction for child abuse into evidence. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.