APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This case focuses on whether the trial court properly enforced and interpreted the parties’ prenuptial agreement when equitably dividing their assets incident to a divorce and whether the trial court properly set child support pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines. The plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce on May 30, 2012. The parties proceeded to trial in May 2013 on the issues of property division, child support, and attorney’s fees. An agreement was reached concerning a co-parenting schedule for their daughter. The court found that the parties’ prenuptial agreement was enforceable but that it did not require that the parties’ jointly owned marital residence be divided equally. The trial court did, however, divide the parties’ jointly owned personalty equally. In making findings with regard to the parties’ respective annual income amounts, the court set child support accordingly. The trial court also declined to award attorney’s fees to either party. Husband timely appealed. We vacate the trial court’s rulings regarding division of the real property, the award of child support, and attorney’s fees, and we remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

I cannot concur in the majority’s treatment of the marital residential property as joint property. The majority concludes that it was, in the language of the parties’ prenuptial agreement, “Co-Owned Property.” The trial court held that a finding of “Co-Owned Property” would be “inconsistent with the intent and conduct of the parties, not compelled by the pre-marital agreement.” The court went on to say that such a finding “would result in an unequivocally inequitable windfall.” Hence, in my judgment, the issue for us is whether the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings on this subject.

The petitioner, Charles Lane, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief challenging his Sevier County convictions of first degree murder and aggravated sexual battery. Petitioner seeks relief alleging he was not warned of his Miranda rights before giving a statement, and that he was suffering from mental deficiencies at the time of his guilty plea. Because the petition fails to present a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of the petition.

The petitioner, Frank Taylor, was convicted of one count of first degree felony murder, a Class A felony, and criminal attempt: especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. He appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when: (1) trial counsel failed to investigate and pursue as a defense the petitioner’s absence from his juvenile detention hearing, his lack of representation at the hearing, and the fact that he did not receive advice regarding the ability to appeal the detention order; (2) trial counsel failed to pursue the denial of a meaningful transfer hearing; and (3) trial counsel failed to challenge the probable cause of the petitioner’s arrest warrant. After a review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an appeal by Joseph C. from an order terminating his parental rights to his two minor children, Shainna S. C. and Jason L. C. Because the record does not support the trial court’s finding that the Department of Children’s Services (DCS) proved by clear and convincing evidence the only ground relied upon in support of the termination of the appellant’s parental rights to his children, we vacate the order and remand for further proceedings.

In this divorce action, Mother asserts that the trial court erred in designating Father as primary residential parent and in allocating sole decision-making authority to him, in the distribution of marital property, and in failing to seal her medical records at trial. We modify the distribution of marital property in part; in all other respects we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Unmarried parents of two children sought to modify a Permanent Parenting Plan. Mother also sought to collect a child support arrearage owed by Father. The trial court modified the residential parenting plan without conducting a best interest analysis. The trial court also declined to add statutory interest, as requested by Mother, to the child support arrearage owed by Father. Mother appealed certain aspects of the trial court’s judgment and sought attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand.

A Union County schoolteacher was twice interviewed by school administrators in an investigation of charges regarding the teacher’s alleged improper conduct. Both times, the teacher’s request to have a representative from the Union County Education Association (“the Association”) present with him for the investigatory interview was denied. After the investigation was complete, the teacher was not disciplined and no adverse action was taken against him. The Association brought this action alleging that the Union County Board of Education (“the Board”), acting through its agents, violated the Professional Educators Collaborative Conferencing Act of 2011 (“the Collaborative Conferencing Act”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-603 (2013), which provides that “[p]rofessional employees have the right to selforganization, to form, join or be assisted by organizations, to participate in collaborative conferencing . . . and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of other mutual aid and benefit. . . .” The Association sought a declaratory judgment that the Board’s refusal to allow the teacher to have a representative present was an unlawful act under Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-606. The trial court granted the Board summary judgment on the ground that the Association “had no injury in fact and therefore lacked standing to proceed with this action.” We hold that the rights provided to professional employees under section 603 of the Collaborative Conferencing Act include the right to have a representative of his/her organization present, upon the employee’s request, at an investigative interview where the employee reasonably believes the investigation may result in disciplinary action against him or her. We further hold that the Association has standing to pursue this action. Consequently, we vacate the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal arises from a challenge to an annexation ordinance. The City of Norris, Tennessee (“Norris”) passed two annexation ordinances on the same day. The second territory to be annexed was contiguous to the city only through bordering the territory annexed earlier that same day. Mark B. Garrett (“Garrett”), a property owner in the second annexed territory, sued Norris in the Chancery Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”) in a bid to stop the annexation of this second territory (“the Territory”). The Trial Court eventually voided the annexation of the Territory on the basis that the Territory was not contiguous to the city. Norris appeals. We hold, inter alia, that the annexation ordinance purporting to annex the Territory is void because at the time of the passage of the annexation ordinance, the first annexation was not yet operative and the Territory, therefore, was not contiguous to the city as required by law. We affirm the Trial Court.

This is an action brought against SunTrust Bank, executor of the estate of James Darrel Russo, Sr. (“decedent”). Decedent’s former wife, plaintiff Deborah Russo, alleged that Albert W. Secor, a SunTrust employee, who was  handling the estate’s affairs for the bank, promised her that SunTrust would continue to pay insurance premiums under a policy of health insurance insuring plaintiff. In July 2006, SunTrust paid one premium payment. Coverage under the policy lapsed after that due to non-payment of premium. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to SunTrust, holding that the bank “cannot be held liable as executor of the estate of [decedent] because the Plaintiff is not a beneficiary of that estate.” After Secor filed an affidavit attesting that he acted on behalf of SunTrust as the executor of the estate only, and not on behalf of the bank in any other capacity, the trial court granted SunTrust summary judgment as far as its individual responsibility is concerned. At issue is the correctness of the trial court’s second ruling. We hold that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the capacity in which Secor was acting when he made the alleged promise. Plaintiff presented no evidence suggesting that Secor acted in any capacity other than as a representative of SunTrust in its fiduciary capacity. Furthermore, any alleged promise by Secor to bind SunTrust individually to pay the insurance premiums is barred by the statute of frauds, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-2-101(a)(1) (2012). We affirm.

The appellant, Alex Hardin Huffstutter, entered a plea of nolo contendre to driving under the influence (DUI), reserving the following certified question of law concerning whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313 (2007) precludes judicial diversion for a charge of DUI.  The State contends that the question presented is not dispositive and, therefore, that this court is without jurisdiction to consider the appeal.  Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we agree with the State and conclude that the appeal should be dismissed.

Curtis Gordon, Jr. entered a plea of guilty to robbery.  He appeals the sentence imposed of fifteen years as a persistent offender, consecutive to a sentence for which he was on probation at the time of the robbery.   Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

C.R.H. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s order terminating her rights to two minor children. The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) removed the children from Mother’s care following allegations that she locked one child in a bedroom for three days without access to water, food, or a bathroom. The children entered protective custody and were adjudicated dependent and neglected. DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. After a bench trial, the court found (1) that multiple 1 grounds exist to terminate Mother’s rights and (2) that termination is in the children’s best interest, both findings said by the trial court to be made by clear and convincing evidence. Mother appeals. She challenges the trial court’s findings with respect to grounds, but does not contest the best-interest determination. We affirm.

Appellant, Curtis Taylor, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury in a multi-count indictment for first degree murder (Count 1), attempted first degree murder (Count 2), possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony (Count 3), and use of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony (Count 4). After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter in Count 1, and was convicted of the offenses as charged in Counts 2 through 4. According to the judgment forms, Appellant was sentenced to ten years in Count 1, fifteen years in Count 2, four years in Count 3, and ten years in Count 4, for a total effective sentence of thirty-five years. However, the transcript of the sentencing hearing reflects a sentence of two years in Count 3, but the same total effective sentence. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant presents the following issues for our review on appeal: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction for voluntary manslaughter; and (2) whether the trial court properly sentenced Appellant. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgments and sentences. However, because the judgment forms do not accurately reflect the sentence as imposed by the trial court during the sentencing hearing, the matter is remanded for entry of corrected judgments to reflect that Appellant was sentenced to two years in Count 3, possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony, and that the sentences in Counts 1, 2, and 4 are to run consecutively to each other but concurrently to the sentence in Count 3, for a total effective sentence of thirty-five years. Accordingly, the matter is affirmed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal involves water service by one utility district to a neighboring utility district. The plaintiff utility district provided water service to the defendant neighboring utility district for many years pursuant to a series of contracts. The last contract included a date certain on which the contract expired. Before the expiration date, the defendant neighboring utility district agreed to begin purchasing its water from a different provider upon expiration of the water service contract with the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit seeking, inter alia, to enjoin the defendant provider and the neighboring utility district from entering into a contract for water services. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant neighboring utility district and denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the defendants were permitted to contract for water services. It then dismissed all remaining claims against the defendants. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court in all respects.

In this divorce action, Wife appeals the trial court’s valuation of Husband’s ownership interest in three businesses, determination of Husband’s income, division of marital assets, duration of rehabilitative alimony awarded to her, amount of child support Husband was ordered to pay, and the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to her. We determine that the trial court accepted the calculation of a $134,085.00 promissory note as a liability for one business co-owned by Husband but failed to require value of the same amount as a note receivable for the business collecting payment on the debt, owned 50% by Husband. We therefore increase the trial court’s valuation of the business collecting payment on the debt by one-half the amount of the applicable note receivable, or $67,042.50. We also determine that the trial court erred by attributing to Husband the full liability for the third business, a limited liability company in which Husband owns a one-half interest. We accordingly reduce the allocation for that liability by one-half, or $45,689.50, increasing the total modification of the value of Husband’s net assets awarded by the trial court by the amount of $112,732.00. We award to Wife 48% of this increase, or $54,111.36, commensurate with what we determine to be the trial court’s equitable distribution of marital property, and we remand for a determination regarding the proper method of distribution for this additional award to Wife. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

The Petitioner, Joseph Pollard, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of postconviction relief. He was convicted of first degree murder, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and aggravated assault and received an effective sentence of life with the possibility of parole. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel due to trial counsel’s failure to qualify an expert witness or anticipate the trial court’s rejection of the witness’s qualifications. The Petitioner further claims that appellate counsel was ineffective due to his failure to include the same issue on direct appeal. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights contending the evidence is insufficient for this court to appropriately review the testimony in the trial court because a portion of the evidentiary record is set forth in a statement of the evidence. We have determined the record is sufficient for proper appellate review because the entirety of Mother’s testimony is set forth in a verbatim transcript of the evidence, in which Mother admits knowing she had a duty to support her child, that she had the capacity to provide support during the relevant period, and she failed to do so. Thus, the record contains sufficient evidence to establish the ground of abandonment by failing to support the child. The evidence also supports the trial court’s finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. We, therefore, affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights.

Pursuant to the terms of a negotiated plea agreement, Petitioner, Robert Lewis Webb, pled guilty to first-degree murder, aggravated rape, aggravated burglary, and aggravated robbery, and was sentenced to an effective life sentence without the possibility of parole. Petitioner subsequently filed an untimely pro se petition for post-conviction relief. He asserted, among other things, that the guilty plea was involuntary. Appointed counsel filed an amended petition, alleging that the statute of limitations should be tolled due to a new constitutional ruling, Petitioner’s mental incompetence, and misconduct on the part of Petitioner’s trial attorney. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner appealed. The State concedes that Petitioner is entitled to a hearing on whether the statute of limitations should be tolled. We determine that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing the petition without an evidentiary hearing to determine whether due process requires that the statute of limitations be tolled. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In this divorce action, Wife appeals the trial court’s valuation of Husband’s ownership interest in three businesses, determination of Husband’s income, division of marital assets, duration of rehabilitative alimony awarded to her, amount of child support Husband was ordered to pay, and the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to her. We determine that the trial court accepted the calculation of a $134,085.00 promissory note as a liability for one business co-owned by Husband but failed to require value of the same amount as a note receivable for the business collecting payment on the debt, owned 50% by Husband. We therefore increase the trial court’s valuation of the business collecting payment on the debt by one-half the amount of the applicable note receivable, or $67,042.50. We also determine that the trial court erred by attributing to Husband the full liability for the third business, a limited liability company in which Husband owns a one-half interest. We accordingly reduce the allocation for that liability by one-half, or $45,689.50, increasing the total modification of the value of Husband’s net assets awarded by the trial court by the amount of $112,732.00. We award to Wife 48% of this increase, or $54,111.36, commensurate with what we determine to be the trial court’s equitable distribution of marital property, and we remand for a determination regarding the proper method of distribution for this additional award to Wife. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

This is an appeal from a Restraining Order entered on May 20, 2014. The Notice of Appeal was not filed until June 20, 2014, thirty-one (31) days after the date of entry of the Restraining Order. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The Petitioner, Courtney Watkins, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court for Shelby County. He was convicted of especially aggravated robbery and sentenced to twenty-three years’ imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the post-conviction court erred in denying his motion for continuance. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Michael Williams, was convicted of rape in 2001 by a Shelby County jury. As a result, he was sentenced as a violent offender to serve thirty years in incarceration. Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Michael Williams, No. W2001-01925-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1349520 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, June 20, 2002). Appellant subsequently sought post-conviction relief. The petition for postconviction relief was denied. See Michael Williams v. State, No. W2005-01810-CCA-R3- PC, 2006 WL 3371404 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Nov. 20, 2006), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Mar. 19, 2007). Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in Hardeman County, alleging that the 2001 judgment is void because he was sentenced as a career offender. The habeas corpus court denied relief, dismissing the petition without a hearing after determining that Petitioner’s sentence had not expired. After a review of the record, we conclude that the habeas corpus court properly dismissed the petition for relief where Petitioner failed to show that the judgment was void or that his sentence had expired. For those reasons, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

Appellant, Rodregus Carter, was convicted by a Shelby County jury for aggravated burglary and theft of property valued over $1,000. The trial court sentenced Appellant as a Range III, Persistent Offender to thirteen years for the aggravated burglary conviction and twelve years for the theft of property conviction, to be served concurrently, for a total effective sentence of thirteen years. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant presents the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court improperly denied the motion to suppress his statement; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (3) whether the trial court improperly admitted the testimony of the victim with regard to her health condition; (4) whether the trial court improperly sentenced Appellant as a Range III, Persistent Offender; and (5) whether Appellant’s sentence was excessive. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that Appellant’s issues are without merit. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The petitioner, Travis Davison, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, asserting that his sentence was illegal in that he received a shorter term than that mandated by statute. The State agrees that the petitioner has made a colorable claim that his sentence is illegal and that the matter should be remanded. After review, we remand the case for the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1.