APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Jaron Harris, of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, four counts of first degree felony murder, one count of second degree murder, one count of attempted second degree murder, two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and two counts of aggravated assault. The trial court merged several of the convictions, dismissed one count of aggravated assault, and then sentenced the Defendant to serve a total effective sentence of life plus fourteen years. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; and (2) the trial court erred when it allowed crossexamination of the Defendant about statements he made to other inmates about escaping from the courtroom. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Plaintiffs contend that the sales tax law unconstitutionally discriminates against satellite television providers. The law taxes the entire subscription fee billed to satellite customers while the first $15 of the subscription fee billed to cable customers is exempt. On cross motions for summary judgment,the trial court found the sales tax law violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The Commissioner of Revenue appeals. Because we find that satellite providers and cable providers are not similarly situated for purposes of the Commerce Clause, we reverse.
 

The Petitioner, Keesha Washington, appeals the Williamson County Circuit Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her 2010 conviction for aggravated arson and her eighteen-year sentence.  She contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying her relief because she received the ineffective assistance of counsel.  We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this post-divorce case, Father filed a petition to modify the permanent parenting plan to make him the primary residential parent and to hold Mother in contempt for failure to abide by the joint decision-making provision of the plan.  The trial court found a material change of circumstances existed warranting a change in the primary residential parent and held Mother in contempt, awarding Father $675.00 in attorney’s fees as a sanction. Mother appeals. We find no error in the trial court’s decision to change the primary residential parent;however,we vacate the trial court’s finding of contempt because Father’s petition did not comply with the mandates of Tenn. R. Crim. P. 42(b).

The defendant, Reginald Perry Davis Lashley, appeals the revocation of his probationary sentence.  The defendant pled guilty to two counts of criminal attempt to deliver a controlled substance, to wit ecstasy, and received an effective six-year sentence, which was suspended to supervised probation following service of one year in incarceration.  Subsequently, a violation warrant was issued alleging that the defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation by being arrested for DUI, using intoxicants to excess, failing to report the new arrest, and failing to verify payment of costs and fines.  Following a hearing, the trial court found the defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation and ordered that the balance of the sentence be served in incarceration.  On appeal, the defendant contends that the decision to revoke was not supported by sufficient evidence.  Following review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the defendant’s probation.  As such, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Holder of an automobile liabilityinsurancepolicybrought suit to recover for injuries sustained after being struck by a driver in a rental vehicle. The policy holder also sought coverage under the uninsured motorist coverage provision of his policy. Insurance carrier filed answer denying coverage and moved for summary judgment, contending that the policyholder was not entitled to coverage because the vehicle involved in the incident was owned by a rental car agency and, consequently, his damages did not arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of an uninsured motor vehicle as required by the policy. The trial court held that the rental car agency was a self-insurer under Tennessee law and, consequently, the vehicle was not an “uninsured motor vehicle,”and granted the carrier’s motion. Policyholder appeals; finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

This is a healthcare liability action. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion for a qualified protective order pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121(f)(1), but set-forth several conditions, including: 1) a court reporter must be present at the ex parte interviews with Plaintiff’s treating healthcare providers and record all questions and answers; 2) all answers during the interviews must be under oath; 3) the interview transcripts shall be filed under seal and with permission of the trial court, and after showing of good cause, Plaintiff may access the transcripts for the purpose of determining whether a violation of privacy under HIPAA occurred during the interviews; and 4) Defendants should not attempt to elicit or discuss protected health information which is not relevant to the issues in this lawsuit. The order also provided “[t]his does not restrict the Defendants or their attorneys from discussing non-substantive matters unrelated to the patient’s protected health information.” The trial court denied Defendants’ joint motion for interlocutory appeal of the order and Defendants filed an application for extraordinary appeal pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We granted the appeal for the sole purpose of determining whether, under section 29-26-121(f), the trial court erred by adding the four conditions noted above to its order. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings.

The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion to recuse and granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

This is the second appeal in this action involving a dispute over setoff claims related to a bankruptcy proceeding. The action commenced when the original plaintiff, Delwin L. Huggins, filed a complaint against the defendants, R. Ellsworth McKee and Alternative Fuels, LLC (“AF”), in December 2007. In July 2009, Mr. Huggins filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. In that proceeding, John P. Konvalinka purchased Mr. Huggins‟s interest in this action and was subsequently joined as a substitute plaintiff. Following consideration of the defendants‟ motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court dismissed Mr. Konvalinka‟s claims. Upon appeal, this Court affirmed the dismissal as to Mr. Konvalinka‟s claims against Mr. McKee but reversed as to the claims against AF. Upon remand, the trial court dismissed Mr. Konvalinka‟s claims against AF as moot. Having determined that the trial court failed to explain its conclusion that no relief would be possible, we vacate the judgment.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the petitioner, Alphonzo Chalmers, of first degree murder, and the trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that newly discovered mental health records entitled him to a new trial. The coram nobis court summarily denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

This is an appeal by Williamson County Bail Bondsman, Amir Karshenas of American Bonding Company, of the trial court’s denial of his motion to recuse the judge from hearing matters related to his authority to conduct business as a bail bondsman.  Following our review, we affirm the denial of the motion to recuse.

This is a legal malpractice case that was dismissed on grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee law firm. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion to continue the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, and also struck Appellant’s filings in opposition to the motion for summary judgment as untimely. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

The Petitioner, Don Sanders, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief seeking relief from his conviction of first degree premeditated murder and resulting life sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by ruling that his petition was untimely and by refusing to toll the one-year statute of limitations for his mental incompetence. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition.

This post-divorce dispute concerns a divorce decree that required husband to pay one-half of his retirement benefits to wife as alimony in solido. Fourteen years after the divorce, Husband returned to the trial court to terminate the payments on the ground that by the terms of the divorce decree, husband had been substantially overpaying wife. The trial court denied husband’s petition on the alternative grounds of res judicata, and a finding that the divorce decree obligated husband to pay wife one-half of the entire value of the retirement plan. We reverse the trial court’s determination that res judicata bars husband’s petition, but affirm as to the trial court’s interpretation of the divorce decree. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.

Petitioner, Willie Moore, pleaded guilty to eleven counts of identity theft, Class D felonies, and received the agreed-upon sentence of eleven years on each count to be served concurrently with each other as a persistent offender at forty-five percent release eligibility. He filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief on the basis that his guilty pleas were not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. The post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Rubalddi Espinoza Yoc, was convicted by a jury of one count of possession with intent to sell 0.5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance and one count of delivery of 0.5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance.  The trial court merged the two counts and sentenced Defendant to nine years’ incarceration as a Range I, standard offender, with all but one year suspended on probation.  On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.  Based upon our review of the record and legal authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 1996, a Montgomery County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Courtney B. Matthews, of four counts of first degree felony murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery.  The jury sentenced the defendant to a term of life in prison without the possibility of parole for each first degree murder conviction, and the trial court sentenced the defendant to a term of 25 years in prison for the especially aggravated robbery.  The court ordered that all sentences be served consecutively.  On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) that he was denied due process in the delay of the preparation of his trial transcript and of the hearing on the motion for new trial; (2) that the trial court erred in not reopening the hearing on the motion for new trial; (3) that the trial court erred by permitting cameras in the courtroom during the trial; (4) that the cameras “invaded” the deliberations of the jury; (5) that the trial court should have changed venue due to the influence of pretrial publicity; (6) that the trial court erred by admitting photographs of the victims; (7) that the trial court erred by admitting DNA evidence; (8) that the trial court erred by certifying a state witness as an expert in DNA analysis; (9) that the trial court erred by admitting the testimony of the medical examiner; (10) that the trial court erred by permitting the medical examiner to utilize demonstrative aids during his testimony; (11) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions under a theory of criminal responsibility for the conduct of another; (12) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions under a theory of direct liability; (13) that the trial court violated his due process rights by “forcing” the state to proceed on inconsistent theories at his trial and the trial of his codefendant; (14) that the trial court erred by interrupting jury deliberations to provide an instruction on criminal responsibility for conduct of another; (15) that the convictions for especially aggravated robbery and felony murder violate double jeopardy principles; (16) that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that the murders were heinous, atrocious, or cruel; (17) that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on certain non-statutory mitigating factors; and (18) that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentencing.  Upon hearing oral arguments and reviewing the briefs of the parties, the extensive record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Sumner County jury convicted the Petitioner, William A. Osborne, of three counts of facilitation of aggravated burglary, one count of facilitation of theft of property valued more than $500, one count of theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000, and one count of theft of property valued between $500 and $1,000.  The trial court sentenced him as a career offender and ordered the Petitioner to serve an effective sentence of thirty-six years.  The Petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court.  State v. William A. Osborne, No. M2010-02412-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 1243243, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Apr. 5, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 17, 2012).  The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective on multiple grounds.  The post-conviction court dismissed the petition after a hearing.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant-Appellant, Calvin Douglas, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of three counts of aggravated assault and one count of reckless endangerment with a dangerous weapon. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of 20 years‟ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for aggravated assault and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Marques Johnson, entered into a plea agreement in two separate cases.  In the first case, Petitioner pled guilty totwo counts of burglary of a motor vehicle and one count of theft of property valued over $500 and was sentenced to an effective sentence of six years.  In the second case, Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of burglary of a motor vehicle and one count of theft of property valued over $1,000 and was sentenced to an effective sentence of twelve years.  The trial court held a sentencing hearing and determined that the sentences should run consecutively, for a total effective sentence of eighteen years.  This Court affirmed that decision on direct appeal.  State v. Marques Sanchez Johnson, No. M2012-00169-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 5188136 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 22, 2013).  Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that he did not enter his plea knowingly and voluntarily.  Petitioner claimed that his trial counsel never informed him of his right to testify at the sentencing hearing or to make a statement of allocution.  After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, finding that Petitioner had not proven his claim by clear and convincing evidence.  After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court. 

Rickey Bell (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, rape, and two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to a total effective sentence of forty-nine years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion for a bill of particulars and in allowing proof of certain prior bad acts. The Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for rape of a child and rape. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a bill of particulars and in allowing the admission of proof of prior bad acts. We also conclude that there was sufficient evidence supporting the convictions for rape of a child and rape. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Jeffrey Scott Tucker, was convicted after a jury trial of assault, a Class A misdemeanor; assault of a law enforcement officer, a Class A misdemeanor; domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor; and resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor.  The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for the domestic assault conviction, contending that the testimony did not establish that the victim was in fear.  The simple assault conviction, which the parties agreed would merge with the domestic assault conviction, was dismissed by the trial court after the jury returned a verdict.  The defendant asserts that allowing the jury to consider the simple assault charge was error that affected his other convictions.  We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdicts. We further conclude that the jury properly considered the simple assault charge. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Joseph Sanford McNair, Jr., was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of possession with the intent to sell more than 0.5 grams of cocaine in a drug-free zone, a Class B felony, possession with the intent to deliver more than 0.5 grams of cocaine in a drug-free zone, a Class B felony, and possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(a)(4) (2010) (amended 2012, 2014) (possession with intent to sell and to deliver), 39-17-432 (2014) (drug-free school zone), 39-17-418 (2010) (amended 2014) (possession of marijuana). The trial court merged the possession with the intent to deliver cocaine conviction with the possession with the intent to sell cocaine conviction and sentenced the Defendant to twelve years’ confinement. The court ordered concurrent service of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the marijuana possession conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for possession with the intent to sell more than 0.5 grams of cocaine and (2) the court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Joshua Bishop, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

In this action to collect on a promissory note, the trial court granted summary judgment to the bank. Appellants appeal the trial court’s decisions regarding whether the bank was properly doing business in the State of Tennessee and whether the Appellants’ two contract-based counter-claims fail as a matter of law. Discerning no error regarding the trial court’s finding that the bank was properly doing business in the State, we affirm the trial court’s ruling in that regard. We also affirm the trial court’s finding that the bank was entitled to summary judgment on the contract-based counterclaims.