APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Thaddeus Johnson, was convicted of first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. For these crimes, he received a life sentence and a consecutive twenty-five year sentence. Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. The post-conviction court denied relief, finding that Petitioner failed to prove his claims by clear and convincing evidence. In this appeal, Petitioner challenges the dismissal of his petition and also alleges ineffective assistance at the post-conviction hearing. After reviewing the parties’ briefs, the record, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Plaintiff in suit to recover damages for injuries allegedly suffered in the course of his arrest appeals the grant of the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim filed on behalf of the City and Police Chief and the grant of summary judgment to the police officers who participated in his arrest. In responding to the motions, plaintiff acknowledged that the claims against City, Police Chief and two of the officers should be dismissed; we affirm the dismissal of those claims and parties. The order granting summary judgment to the remaining officer does not state the legal ground therefor or make findings of fact relative thereto; consequently, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings. We reverse the denial of plaintiff’s motion to amend to substitute one of the officers for the defendant named John Doe.

A funeral director sustained injuries to his shoulder and back while assisting with carrying a casket. His injury was accepted as compensable. Within a few days, he submitted a letter of resignation to his employer. After recovering from his injuries, he filed this action seeking permanent disability benefits. He also sought reconsideration of a previous settlement pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d). His employer asserted that the employee was not entitled to reconsideration of the earlier settlement and that any award for his later injury was subject to the one and one-half times impairment cap because of his voluntary resignation. The trial court found that the employee did not voluntarily resign, granted the petition for reconsideration, and awarded benefits for the second injury in excess of the cap. The employer appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This litigation is a dispute between the boards of education of the cities of Athens and Etowah (“the City School Boards”) on the one hand and McMinn County (“the County”) over the distribution of tax revenues among the various school systems within the county. Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-3-315(a) (2013) mandates that “[a]ll school funds for current operation and maintenance purposes collected by any county . . . shall be apportioned by the county trustee” among the local education agencies in the county based upon average daily school attendance. Over the years spanning from 1996 to 2011, the County apportioned funds in the account designated “general purpose school fund” to the City School Boards, but did not apportion funds from the County’s “educational capital projects fund.” The County argues that funds appropriated for and spent on school capital projects are not “school funds for current operation and maintenance purposes” under the language of the statute. The trial court agreed and granted the County summary judgment. It dismissed the complaint of the City School Boards. We affirm.

At an earlier time, in 2011, Betty Graham had filed a lawsuit arising out of a failed real estate transaction against (1) her real estate agent, Ginny Hall; (2) Crye-Leike Realty Corporation; (3) S&J Southeast Investments, LLC, the potential buyer of her condominium with whom she had unsuccessfully negotiated a contract; and (4) attorney Ellie Hill, her trial court appointed guardian ad litem. The trial court granted the defendants’ Rule 12.02(6) motions to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Graham appealed, but later voluntarily dismissed her appeal. Following her dismissal, our mandate, see Tenn. R. App. P. 42, 43, was issued on January 4, 2013. On April 26, 2013, Graham, acting pro se, “refiled” a lawsuit that is functionally identical to her first complaint. In her second suit, she relied upon the saving statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105(a) (2000). The trial court dismissed her second complaint on the ground of res judicata. We affirm that dismissal. Furthermore, we conclude that Graham’s suit is frivolous. Hence, this case is remanded to the trial court for a determination of the defendants’ reasonable fees and expenses associated with this appeal.

Appellant, James D. Wooden, appeals the trial court’s summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, as permitted by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, for lack of jurisdiction because the sentences have already expired. Although the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the motion, we determine Appellant has failed to state a colorable claim entitling him to relief and, therefore, affirm the denial of the motion.

This is a breach of contract and promissory estoppel action in which Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant for failure to fulfill an oral modification of leases for several pieces of earthmoving equipment. Defendant denied wrongdoing and filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, in part, and dismissed the promissory estoppel claim. The case proceeded to a jury trial on the breach of contract claim, but the jury failed to render a verdict. The court declared a mistrial, and Defendant filed a renewed motion for a directed verdict. The court granted the motion and dismissed the case. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case brought by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services. The trial court terminated the parental rights of both parents on the grounds of severe child abuse and wanton disregard for the welfare of the child. Parents appeal. There is clear and convincing evidence to support the grounds of wanton disregard with respect to both parents and severe child abuse with regard to the father. However, we do not find that there is clear and convincing evidence to support the ground of severe child abuse with regard to the mother. There is clear and convincing evidence that termination of both parents’ rights is in the child’s best interest. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand.

Appellant, John Talley, appeals the trial court’s summary denial of his motion to correct illegal sentences, imposed over twenty-eight years ago, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The trial court found it lacked jurisdiction because the sentences have already expired and because the trial court could not determine that the “sentence[s] are illegal.” We determine, because of the broadness of Rule 36.1, the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the motion and that Appellant stated a colorable claim, as currently defined. Accordingly, the judgment of the Criminal Court is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

An employee injured his left shoulder in 2005. He returned to work for his employer and settled his workers’ compensation claim. In 2011, he had recurrent symptoms in the shoulder. Eventually, hemade a claimfor benefits, alleging thathehad sustained a new injury. His employer contended that his symptoms were caused by the earlier injury and that he was entitled only to medical care under the previous settlement.  The trial court found that the employee had sustained a new injury and awarded permanent partialand temporary total disability benefits. Theemployerhas appealed. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal has been referred to the SpecialWorkers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report offindings of fact and conclusions of law.  We affirm the judgment.

I concur in results only, and I write separately in order to express my disagreement with the statement in the lead opinion by Judge Easter that if the sentences have been fully served, “the controversy is moot.” I respectfully submit that this conclusion is erroneous.

Petitioner, Misty Jane Brunelle, was convicted of three counts of aggravated child abuse in relation to broken bones sustained by her infant daughter. Her convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal. State v. Misty Brunelle, E2006-00467-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 2026616 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 13, 2007), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 22, 2007) (“Brunelle I”). Petitioner then filed a post-conviction petition, which was denied. This Court affirmed the denial of the post-conviction petition on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, but reversed the lower court’s determination that no newly discovered evidence existed. Misty Jane Brunelle v. State, No. E2010-00662-CCA-R3-PC, 2011 WL 2436545 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 16, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 18, 2011) (“Brunelle II”). Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, claiming that newly discovered evidence existed which may have resulted in a different outcome had it been presented at trial. After a hearing, the coram nobis court denied the petition. Based upon a thorough review of the law, record, and arguments in this case, we hold that the coram nobis court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the coram nobis court.

Defendant, Coty Shane Smith, pled guilty to one count of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence by improperly applying an enhancement factor and imposing a sentence that is disproportionate to the sentence received by one of the co-defendants in his case and to sentences received in other second degree murder convictions throughout the state. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Vincent Sims, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, in which he claimed he is intellectually disabled and, therefore, ineligible for the death penalty. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in denying his petition for writ of error coram nobis and his stand-alone claim under the intellectual disability provisions in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Jerome Wall, pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery and robbery. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, which the trial court summarily dismissed because appellant’s sentences had expired. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his motion because an illegal sentence may be challenged at any time pursuant to Rule 36.1 and that on remand, his case should be assigned to a different trial judge because the trial judge was not impartial as to the Rule 36.1 motion. The State concedes to appellant’s Rule 36.1 argument and states in its brief that this case should be reversed and remanded to the trial court. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This case involves the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.  The  trial court found multiple statutory grounds for the termination of Mother’s and Father’s  rights.  The court also found termination of the parents’ rights to be in the children’s best interest.  The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred in finding that Mother  and  Father  abandoned their  children  by willfully failing  to  support them. Because the parents appealed fewer than all of the multiple grounds relied upon by the trial  court for  termination,  the trial court’s decision  as  to the  other  grounds  is final.   Because a finding of only one statutory ground is necessary for termination, we affirm  the decision of the trial court.

Pro se Petitioner, Dexter Frank Johnson, appeals the summary dismissal of his third motion seeking to reopen his post-conviction proceedings and/or the denial of a writ of coram nobis by the Criminal Court of Hamilton County. He further claims that the post-1 conviction court erred by failing to appoint counsel to assist him with his petition because he is illiterate. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This case involves post-divorce litigation over child support and residential parenting time. In connection with a petition for a decrease in child support, the parties found themselves in a discovery dispute, which resulted in the trial court awarding Mother $10,000 in attorney’s fees.  Later, as a result of his move out of state, Father filed a motion to modify the parties’ permanent parenting plan. When Father decided not to pursue his motion to modify, Mother filed an emergencymotion for relief to set holiday parenting time. The court ordered that the parenting plan remain in effect for the holiday period and required Father to personally pick up and return the children for visitation. Father appeals the award of attorney’s fees to Mother stemming from the discovery dispute and the order requiring him to personally pick up and return his children when exercising holiday parenting time. We affirm the trial court’s order awarding attorney’s fees to Mother. Because we find the issue to be moot, we dismiss Father’s appeal regarding holiday parenting time.

Defendants appeal a jury award in favor of Plaintiff. Finding material evidence to support the verdict, we affirm.

Appellant, Lester Arnold Clouse, was convicted of aggravated assault, a Class C felony; simple assault, a Class A misdemeanor; and resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor.  After merger of the resisting arrest conviction with the aggravated assault conviction, the trial court sentenced him to fifteen years and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively.  Appealing from his convictions and sentences, appellant argues that: (1) the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress; (2) the trial court failed to approve the verdicts as thirteenth juror; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his assault convictions; and (4) the trial court erred in sentencing him to fifteen years in confinement consecutive to other outstanding sentences.  Following our review, we affirm the convictions.  However, we reverse appellant’s sentences and remand this cause for a new sentencing hearing.

The Defendant, Jason Lee Fisher, was convicted by a Marshall County Circuit Court jury of felony escape, a Class E felony.  See T.C.A. § 39-16-605(a) (2014).  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to six years’ confinement at 60% service to be served consecutively to a previous sentence.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a personal injury case. Appellant slipped and fell in a puddle of water while on Appellee’s premises. Appellant’s attorney filed her complaint one day after the statute of limitations had run on her claim. Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Appellant’s suit was time-barred. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee. Appellant appeals, arguing that the discovery rule tolled the statute of limitations because all of appellant’s injuries could not be discovered on the same date as the fall. Alternatively, Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it did not grant an enlargement of the statute of limitations under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 6.02. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

The petitioner, Joseph Howard Green, Jr., was originally charged with second degree murder, and he ultimately pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony.  He received a six-year sentence to be served consecutively to another sentence.  In this appeal, the petitioner contends that: (1) his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made because he was mentally ill and unmedicated at the time of his plea and because he was not made aware of the consequences of the guilty plea; and (2) that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment denying relief of the post-conviction court. 

This workers’ compensation appeal involves the application of the recently enacted pain management provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(j) (2014). An employee who sustained a work-related injury in 2007 settled his workers’ compensation claim with his employer in 2010. The settlement enabled the employee to continue receiving pain management treatment from a physician in Lebanon, Tennessee. The employee moved to Vonore, Tennessee in late 2012. Because his pain-management physician was now 162 miles away, the employee requested his former employer to provide a new panel of pain management physicians closer to his new residence. The employer declined, citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(j)(2)(A) that exempts pain-management physicians who live within 175 miles of the employee from the general statutory “community” residence requirement. The employee filed a motion in the Circuit Court for Rutherford County to compel the employer to provide a new doctor. The trial court held that the new 175-mile rule did not apply to the employee’s claim and ordered the employer to provide a new panel of pain management physicians. The employer has appealed to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 51. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Demarcus Keyon Cole, was convicted by a Madison County jury of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and was sentenced by the trial court to consecutive terms of life and twenty years, to be served consecutively to a six-year sentence for a previous conviction. The sole issue the defendant raises on appeal is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.