APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, James Allen Ballew, was indicted by the White County Grand Jury for one count of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony, from White County Lumber Company.  On January 29, 2013, Defendant entered a guilty plea to theft of property valued at $500 or more but less than $1,000, a Class E felony.  Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Defendant received a two-year sentence to be served on probation and agreed to pay restitution, with the amount to be determined at a subsequent hearing.  A restitution hearing was conducted.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement and requested that the State provide the court with a revised pecuniary loss list, including items recovered by the victim.  All that is contained in the transcript from the subsequent hearing is a brief colloquy wherein the trial court said, “we’ve agreed that an order will be submitted on restitution?” and the prosecutor replied, “Yes, your honor.”  The appellate record does not contain a separate order for restitution.  However, an amended judgment was entered, which states that Defendant is ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $11,000 to White County Lumber.  The amended judgment is silent as to the time or manner of payment.  Defendant appeals, arguing that the amount of restitution was unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence and that the trial court did not consider Defendant’s ability to pay restitution.  The State argues that the record is inadequate to allow for appellate review, and therefore, the trial court’s order of restitution should be presumed correct.  We conclude that there is nothing in the record to indicate whether the trial court made a ruling as to the amount of restitution or if an agreement was reached.  Defendant’s ability to pay restitution was apparently not considered by the trial court, and the trial court failed to include the repayment terms on the judgment form.  It is problematic that there is no indication that Defendant’s counsel was present in open court when the trial judge and the prosecutor had their brief colloquy.  Restitution, when appropriate, is just as much an integral part of a sentence as the length of sentence and the manner of service of the sentence.  See T.C.A. § 40-35-104(c)(2).  Thus, there must be something more in the record setting forth restitution other than what is contained in this record.  Moreover, the amended judgment incorrectly states that Defendant was convicted of a Class D felony.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court as to restitution and remand this case for a new restitution hearing and entry of an amended judgment that reflects the amount of restitution and the manner of payment, as well as that Defendant’s conviction offense as a Class E felony.

The order appealed is not a final judgment, and therefore, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

A married couple entered into a business partnership prior to their marriage. This is a consolidated appeal from the parties’ divorce action and their partnership dissolution action. We affirm the trial court’s decision to adjudicate the partnership dissolution action and the divorce action separately, based on Wife’s failure to raise any argument on this issue in the trial court. With regard to the remaining issues, however, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

Betsy Stibler ("Plaintiff") sued The Country Club, Inc. ("Defendant") alleging, among other things, that Defendant had created a nuisance by planting trees on Defendant's real property adjacent to Plaintiff's real property. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing the Chancery Court for Hamblen County ("the Trial Court") granted Defendant summary judgment after finding and holding that Plaintiff could not prove that the trees planted by Defendant constituted a nuisance. Plaintiff appeals to this Court. We find and hold that there are no genuine disputed issues of material fact and that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and we affirm.

Appellant, Rico Vales, stands convicted of two counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies, and being a felon in possession of a handgun, a Class E felony. He received concurrent sentences of fifteen years for each aggravated assault conviction and six years for the handgun conviction. Appellant raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction of aggravated assault against one of the victims and (2) whether his right to a trial by an impartial jury was violated by pre-trial contact between a juror and one of his witnesses and the prior acquaintance of the juror and that witness. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Gary D. Scales, was indicted by the Davidson County grand jury for one count of robbery.  A jury found Defendant guilty of the charged offense, and the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve 15 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a Persistent offender.  Defendant appeals his conviction and asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.  Having carefully reviewed the record before us, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A subcontractor filed suit to enforce a mechanic’s lien. The subcontractor, which was also a remote contractor, was required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-11-145(a) to serve a notice of its claim of nonpayment on the owner of the project as well as on the “prime contractor in contractual privity with the remote contractor.” The subcontractor notified the owner, but it did not notify the prime contractor. The subcontractor asserted it was not required to notify the prime contractor because it had no contractual relationship with the prime contractor. The defendants moved to dismiss the subcontractor’s complaint due to its failure to comply with the statute and notify the proper parties. The trial court granted the motions and dismissed the subcontractor’s lien claims. The subcontractor appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. The subcontractor is required by statute to notify both the owner and the prime contractor of the project of nonpayment.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Appellants/Parents’ parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to provide suitable housing; (2) substantial non-compliance with the permanency plans; and (3) persistence of conditions. Because the grounds for termination of Appellants’ parental rights are met by clear and convincing evidence, and there is also clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the Children, we affirm and remand.

Defendant, Charlie E. Mullican, pled guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, to driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), second offense, and possession of a handgun while under the influence of intoxicants.  He properly reserved a certified question of law for appeal.  The question of the law is dispositive of the case.  After a thorough review we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The order appealed is not a final judgment and therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this matter. Consequently, this appeal is hereby dismissed.

Appellants Ronald Chery, Daryn W. Chery, and John K. St. Cloud were charged in a presentment with thirteen counts of aggravated burglary, thirteen counts of varying degrees of theft, and one count of conspiracy to commit theft of property valued at more than $60,000.  Appellants filed a motion to dismiss the presentment on the grounds that they had been previously charged with one count of aggravated burglary and evading arrest that were so closely related to the subsequent thirteen burglaries and thefts that joinder of the offenses was mandatory.  Following a hearing on the motion to dismiss, the trial court denied relief. Each appellant pleaded guilty to five counts of aggravated burglary, and the State dismissed all theft counts and the conspiracy count.  As part of the plea agreement, appellants reserved a certified question pertaining to the necessity of mandatory joinder of the subsequent thirteen burglaries with the first burglary and related offenses pursuant to Rule 8(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure.  Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

Petitioner, William Newson, pleaded guilty to driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) with an agreed sentence of eleven months twenty nine days, with forty-eight hours to serve and the remainder on probation. The sentence was to be served concurrently with a parole violation and a violation of an order of protection in unrelated cases. Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief alleging that trial counsel promised him that his DUI guilty plea would result in his release from jail after serving the forty-eight hours as described in the guilty plea agreement and that he would return to probation. Petitioner now appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that his guilty plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered due to the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Having reviewed the record before us, we affirm the judgment of trial court.

Appellant, Christopher Bell, pleaded guilty to especially aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and aggravated criminal trespass. The trial court sentenced appellant to an effective seventeen-year sentence. Appellant reserved a certified question of law arguing that the juvenile court did not properly conduct his transfer hearing from juvenile court to criminal court. Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we conclude that appellant’s transfer hearing was properly conducted and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In December 2009, the Petitioner, Maurice Edward Carter, pled guilty to one count of aggravated statutory rape and one count of criminal exposure to HIV and received an effective sentence of 20 years.  Pursuant to his plea agreement, the Petitioner reserved a certified question of law concerning the trial court’s denial of his motions to suppress evidence and his statement.  On direct appeal, this Court determined that the certified question was not dispositive of the Petitioner’s case and dismissed the appeal.  Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition but was denied relief.  The Petitioner now appeals, contending that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel’s failure to:  (1) properly preserve the certified question of law; (2) adequately explain to the Petitioner the possible outcomes of his direct appeal; and (3) address in the certified question of law the issue of the legality of the officer’s opening a locked box found in the Petitioner’s vehicle.  The Petitioner further contends that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary based upon trial counsel’s ineffectiveness and the trial court’s failure to ensure that the Petitioner understood the ramifications and possible outcomes of his appeal of a certified question of law.  Following review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this delayed direct appeal, the Defendant, Elmi Abdulahi Abdi, argues that the trial court erred when it admitted a redacted version of his video-recorded statement into evidence.  The Defendant contends that the trial court should have introduced the full video-recorded statement to allow the jury to consider his statement in context.  The record does not include the un-redacted video statement, a transcript of the audio of the un-redacted video statement, a transcript of a hearing on the Defendant’s motion in limine to exclude the redacted statement, or an order from the trial court ruling on the motion in limine.  Additionally, the Defendant did not make a contemporaneous objection when the redacted video was played to the jury and did not require the introduction of the un-redacted video pursuant to the rule of completeness, Tennessee Rule of Evidence 106.  We conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting the redacted video and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, William Scott Ross, pled guilty to one count of facilitation of a conspiracy to sell over seventy pounds of marijuana and one count of official misconduct.  Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received an effective three-year sentence in the local corrections facility, suspended to supervised probation.  After a hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion.  On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to grant judicial diversion.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case regarding S.C.M. and T.O.J.M. (collectively, the Children), the minor children of H.C. (Mother) and B.M. (Father). After both parents were arrested, the Children’s maternal grandparents, R.R. and T.R. (collectively, the Grandparents) obtained temporary, emergency custody. Nearly three years later, the Grandparents filed a petition seeking to (1) terminate both parents’ rights and (2) adopt the Children. Following a trial, the court terminated both parents’ rights. Father appeals. We affirm.

The Defendant, Micah Johnson, alias, was convicted by a Knox County jury of one count of premeditated murder, two counts of felony murder, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and one count of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the murder counts and the kidnapping counts into a single count for each, respectively. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole plus fifty years for all of these convictions. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for premeditated murder; (2) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury regarding substantial interference as mandated in State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012), thus, requiring reversal of his kidnapping convictions; (3) the trial court erred, in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b), by allowing introduction of the Defendant’s prison disciplinary records as rebuttal evidence to the neuropsychologist’s testimony about the Defendant’s psychological test results; (4) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to impeach the forensic psychiatrist defense expert with a twenty-two-year-old academic misdeed; (5) the trial court erred by failing to suppress the video recording of the crime scene and the photographs taken at the crime scene and during the victim’s autopsy all gruesomely depicting the victim’s body; (6) plain error occurred when the State elicited testimony from its rebuttal mental health expert that, if the Defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity, he was not committable to a mental health facility in her opinion; and (7) the imposition of consecutive sentencing was improper. Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court’s failing to instruct the jury properly pursuant to White constitutes reversible error. Therefore, the Defendant’s two convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping must be reversed and remanded to the trial court for a new trial as to those offenses only. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The defendant, Timothy Allen Johnson, was convicted of one count of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony.  He was sentenced as a persistent offender to a twelve-year sentence.  On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction.  After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

K.M.K. (Father) appeals the trial court’s judgment terminating his parental rights to his son, K.M.K., and his daughter, K.M.K. (collectively, the Children). The petitioner, Department of Children’s Services (DCS), removed the Children from their mother’s home after it found them living in unsafe and unsanitary conditions. They were placed in foster care and subsequently adjudicated dependent and neglected. Nine months later, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents. The trial court terminated 1 Father’s rights based upon findings of (1) abandonment, (2) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan, and (3) persistence of conditions. The trial court also determined that termination is in the best interest of the Children. Father appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified in this opinion. Those modifications do not affect the trial court’s decision to terminate Father’s parental rights, which ultimate decision we affirm.

An attorney, who was representing herself in her divorce action, appeals the trial court’s  finding  that  she  was  in  direct  contempt  of court.  She  insists  her  conduct  was  not  contemptuous and it did not disrupt the orderly progress of the hearing. She also challenges  the procedure bywhich the trial court conducted the summary contempt hearing, asserting it was erroneously held hours after the successful completion of the hearing in which she was  allegedly in contempt of court. She also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and  contends the trial court erred by basing its finding of contempt on extraneous evidence  instead of relying solely on knowledge the judge obtained through his own senses, his sight  and hearing. A trial court has the authority to punish direct contempt summarily but only in  exceptional circumstances when necessary to“act swiftly and firmly to prevent contumacious conduct from disrupting the orderly progress” of a court proceeding. Danielsv.Grimac,342 S.W.3d 511, 517 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010); State v. Turner, 914 S.W.2d 951, 956-57 (Tenn.  Crim. App. 1995); Robinson v. Air Draulics Eng’g Co., 377 S.W.2d 908, 911-12 (Tenn.  1964). The transcript of thehearingrevealsnoexceptionalcircumstances and no conduct that  obstructed the administration of justice. To the contrary, all issues at the hearing during  which  the  alleged  contemptuous  conduct  occurred  were  ruled  upon, and  the  hearing  concluded hours before the commencement of the summary contempt hearing. Based on  these facts, Plaintiff was entitled to a hearing upon proper notice pursuant to the procedures  of Tenn. R. Crim. P. 42(b). See Grimac, 342 S.W.3d at 517-18 (citing Turner,914S.W.2dat 959 n. 11). Therefore, the court erred by conducting a deferred summary contempt hearing.  Furthermore, the trial court found the attorney in contempt, “in willful misbehavior in her  official  transactions  by appearing  in  Court  intoxicated,” based  on  extrinsic  evidence,  urinalysis results, obtained after the hearing in question,not on conduct the court observed in the courtroom. Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure42(a),which governs the procedure by which a judge may summarily punish a person for criminal contempt,limits the evidence that may be considered to conduct the judge “saw or heard” in the courtroom. See Wilson v.  Wilson, No. 03A01-9104-CH-00126, 1992 WL 200971, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 21,  1992). Because the finding of intoxication was based on extrinsic evidence, the criminal  contempt judgment must be reversed. The record also reveals the extrinsic evidence, thetest results the court relied upon, was unreliable, for it was only designed to test the“presence”of  any alcohol for persons in recovery, not whether a person was “intoxicated.” Therefore, the  judgment of criminal contempt is reversed and the case is dismissed.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Jaron Harris, of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, four counts of first degree felony murder, one count of second degree murder, one count of attempted second degree murder, two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and two counts of aggravated assault. The trial court merged several of the convictions, dismissed one count of aggravated assault, and then sentenced the Defendant to serve a total effective sentence of life plus fourteen years. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; and (2) the trial court erred when it allowed crossexamination of the Defendant about statements he made to other inmates about escaping from the courtroom. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Plaintiffs contend that the sales tax law unconstitutionally discriminates against satellite television providers. The law taxes the entire subscription fee billed to satellite customers while the first $15 of the subscription fee billed to cable customers is exempt. On cross motions for summary judgment,the trial court found the sales tax law violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The Commissioner of Revenue appeals. Because we find that satellite providers and cable providers are not similarly situated for purposes of the Commerce Clause, we reverse.
 

The Petitioner, Keesha Washington, appeals the Williamson County Circuit Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her 2010 conviction for aggravated arson and her eighteen-year sentence.  She contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying her relief because she received the ineffective assistance of counsel.  We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.