APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, William Swafford, was convicted by a Hamblen County jury of especially
aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and rape, for which he received an effective
sentence of fifty-five years’ imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is
insufficient to support his conviction of especially aggravated kidnapping and that the trial
court erred by admitting the preliminary hearing testimony of the Defendant’s late wife.
After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A husband appeals the trial court’s final judgment of divorce with respect to two issues.  Because the husband failed to comply with the applicable briefing rules, we have concluded that he waived his first issue.  We find no support for the husband’s second issue.  Having determined that the husband’s appeal is frivolous, we affirm the trial court’s decision and remand to the trial court for the assessment of damages.

Petitioner, Tracy L. Harris, pleaded guilty in Carroll County Circuit Court to first degree murder and aggravated rape and was sentenced to an effective sentence of life without parole. After unsuccessful challenges to his convictions and sentences in Tennessee and federal courts, Petitioner filed a pro se petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 (“The Act”), Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-301, et. seq., requesting DNA analysis on several items and samples taken from the crime scene. After the State responded in opposition, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition without a hearing and found that Petitioner had not met the statutory requirements of the Act. On appeal, Petitioner challenges the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition. We conclude that the post-conviction court did not err in dismissing the petition, and we affirm.

The juvenile court terminated a mother’s parental rights to two of her children. The mother appealed and challenges the court’s determination that clear and convincing evidence established grounds for termination and that termination of her rights was in the children’s best interests. We find no error and affirm.

A patient brought a health care liability action against his psychiatrist and the psychiatrist’s employer, alleging the psychiatrist engaged in improper sexualized conduct that caused him psychological injury.  The patient secured an expert witness in support of his suit, but the expert withdrew following the expert’s deposition.  The patient obtained a new expert witness.  However, relying on the cancellation rule, the trial court determined a conflict existed between the second expert’s affidavit and deposition testimony relating to the issue of damages.  The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants and also granted the defendants’ request for an award of discretionary costs.  The patient appeals.  We affirm.

Following a jury trial, a Cheatham County jury convicted Defendant, Jared A. Smith, of three counts of Rape of a Child, four counts of Aggravated Sexual Battery, and three counts of Incest, for which he received a total effective sentence of seventy-eight years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred by limiting his cross-examination of a police witness; (2) the State’s election of offenses was “vague, ambiguous and unsupported by the evidence,” in violation of his right to a unanimous jury verdict; and (3) the trial court erred by declining to instruct the jury on generic evidence.  Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm. 

Petitioner, Rico Eugene Mallard, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition seeking post-conviction relief from his 1999 especially aggravated robbery conviction, for which he was sentenced to twenty-two years’ incarceration to be served consecutively to his life sentence for first degree murder. The post-conviction court found that State v. Booker, 656 S.W.3d 49 (Tenn. 2022), did not establish a new constitutional right applicable to Petitioner’s case, and therefore, the statute of limitations was not tolled, and the petition was time-barred. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Williamson County jury convicted the Defendant, Thor Lucas Coleman, of attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault by strangulation, aggravated assault by violating a restraining order, possessing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and unlawful possession of a weapon. The trial court sentenced him to a forty-five-year effective sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court improperly admitted evidence of his prior acts of domestic violence against the victim; and (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for attempted first degree murder. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The trial court terminated a mother’s parental rights to six children based on abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and severe abuse. The trial court further concluded that terminating the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Mother appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling.

Defendant, Roger Trino Spencer, Jr., was indicted by the McNairy County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated robbery accomplished with a deadly weapon and two counts of aggravated assault by displaying a deadly weapon. Defendant was convicted as charged by a jury and sentenced by the trial court as a Range II offender to an effective eighteen years’ confinement. The trial court also imposed an effective $15,000 fine and ordered Defendant to pay $971 in restitution. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that the State failed to provide sufficient proof of his identity as the perpetrator of the offenses; the State’s improper comments during opening statement and closing argument entitle him to plain error relief; the trial court erred by failing to consider a validated risk and needs assessment in imposing his sentence; and the trial court erred by failing to consider his ability to pay in imposing fines and ordering restitution. Having reviewed the briefs and arguments of the parties and the record on appeal, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A decedent’s stepchildren filed a complaint contesting ownership of a portion of his twenty-acre property. They asserted theories of adverse possession, express oral trust, and breach of contract. The trial court dismissed the complaint. Because we conclude that the allegations of an express oral trust and breach of contract are sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss, we reverse in part.

Katherine Malone died in an accident in Idaho. Her ex-husband, Patrick Malone, was named guardian of their child, Beatrice Rose Malone (“Rosie”). A trust (“the Tennessee Trust”) was established in Davidson County, Tennessee, for all funds due to Rosie. Katherine Malone’s parents, James William Rose and Jennie Adams Rose (“the Roses”) were the personal representatives of her estate and “Limited Trust Protectors,” of the Tennessee Trust. Mr. Malone, as Rosie’s guardian, filed a wrongful death lawsuit in Idaho and recovered a settlement. The settlement funds were placed in a trust Mr. Malone established in Missouri with Blue Ridge Bank and Trust. The Roses filed this action to transfer the funds to the Tennessee Trust and to find Mr. Malone in civil contempt. The Probate Court agreed with the Roses, finding Mr. Malone in civil contempt and ordering that the funds be transferred to the Tennessee Trust. Mr. Malone and Blue Ridge Bank and Trust appealed. We affirm.

For disobedience of or resistance to a court order to constitute contempt, four elements must be satisfied.  Konvalinka v. Chattanooga–Hamilton Cty. Hosp. Auth., 249 S.W.3d 346, 354 (Tenn. 2008); see Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-102(3) (2024) (defining the scope of a court’s contempt power).  This case turns on the second of the four: whether “the order alleged to have been violated . . . [was] clear, specific, and unambiguous.”  Konvalinka, 249 S.W.3d at 354.  Because the order here was not sufficiently specific to support the finding of contempt, I would reverse.

Defendant, Desmond Lanier Hatchett, was convicted by a Knox County jury of evading
arrest with risk of death or injury, driving while his license was revoked, reckless driving,
violation of the financial responsibility law, and violation of the window tint law. The trial
court imposed an effective sentence of six years’ incarceration. Defendant appeals, arguing
that the trial court erred in imposing a six-year sentence for evading arrest with risk of
death or injury. Upon review of the entire record, briefs and oral arguments of the parties,
and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

In this negligence action, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding that the plaintiff, who is legally blind, had failed to present evidence that her fall from a street curb and resultant injury were caused by the defendant’s alleged negligence in failing to make a courtesy stop at the location the plaintiff had requested for exiting a city bus. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This is an appeal from a class certification. Because the trial court failed to clearly define the class being certified, we are unable to proceed to review the trial court’s decision. Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s certification order and remand for further proceedings as may be necessary.

The Petitioner, Ricky Hunt, pleaded guilty to two counts of second-degree murder and one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery in exchange for an effective thirty-year sentence. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, along with two amended petitions. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the post-conviction petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his petition because: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to explain the corroboration requirement regarding accomplice testimony and for failing to help him file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea; and (2) his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because trial counsel failed to advise him that his sentence was required to be served at 100%. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Timothy Dion Wells, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court
jury of second degree murder, for which he is serving a twenty-two-year sentence as a
Range I offender. See T.C.A. § 39-13-210(a)(1) (2018). On appeal, he contends that: (1)
the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred in various
evidentiary rulings, (3) he is entitled to a new trial based upon the cumulative effect of
multiple trial errors, and (4) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial
court.

After three days of a Dickson County jury trial, the Defendant, Mendy Powell Neal, who was charged with the first degree premeditated and felony murder of her husband and the aggravated arson of their home, entered a North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970), best interest plea to voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, in exchange for the dismissal of the felony murder and aggravated arson counts of the presentment and an agreed range of three to four years, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of the sentence. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion, determined that she was not a suitable candidate for probation or other alternative sentencing, and sentenced her as a Range I, standard offender to four years at 30% in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Following the denial of what the Defendant styled as a “Motion for New Trial,” which the trial court treated as a Rule 35 motion for a reduction in sentence, the Defendant filed an untimely appeal to this court in which she argues that the trial court erred in both the length and manner of service of the sentence. Based on our review, we conclude that the interest of justice does not warrant that the timely notice of appeal requirement be waived for the Defendant’s attempt to appeal the trial court’s original sentencing determinations. We further conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion by declining to reduce or modify the sentence pursuant to Rule 35 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Parents filed competing petitions to modify a parenting plan.  The parents agreed there had been a material change in circumstances warranting a modification.  But they disagreed over the residential custody schedule and decision-making provisions. After a hearing, the trial court modified the schedule and granted joint decision-making.  Because neither decision was an abuse of discretion, we affirm. 

The defendant, Calvin Dwight Butler, pled guilty to sexual exploitation of a minor. As a
condition of his plea, the defendant agreed to a sentence of six years with the manner of
service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court
ordered the defendant to serve his six-year sentence incarcerated with the Tennessee
Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in
sentencing the defendant to a term of confinement. Upon our review of the record and the
parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

In this contract dispute, the trial court dismissed the petitioners’ claims of fraudulent inducement and misrepresentation predicated on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court also awarded attorney’s fees to the defendant. The petitioners have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Shortly after the City of Memphis (“the City”) made public announcements regarding untested sexual assault kits, three women filed a class action complaint alleging that the announcements caused them severe emotional distress. More than a year after the announcements, the plaintiffs amended the complaint to add a new plaintiff. The three original plaintiffs’ claims were either voluntarily dismissed or dismissed by the trial court based upon the statute of limitations. The City sought summary judgment against the only remaining plaintiff on the ground that her claims were time-barred. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment, and this Court granted the City’s petition for an interlocutory appeal. Concluding that the applicable statute of limitations barred the new plaintiff’s claims, we reverse the trial court’s decision and remand.

Ms. Ward hired Kedalo Construction LLC (“Kedalo”) to renovate her store. She claimed that the work was not completed or was not done properly. After Kedalo attempted to remedy the situation, Ms. Ward was still not satisfied. Kedalo then said she was not their problem anymore. Ms. Ward created a website and Facebook page criticizing the company.  Kedalo sued for defamation. Ms. Ward responded with a petition to dismiss pursuant to the Tennessee Public Participation Act. After many filings and a deposition, the trial court dismissed the petition. Ms. Ward appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.