APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This case involves the 2009 termination of a city police officer's employment on grounds of unfitness for duty due to post-traumatic stress disorder suffered as a result of the officer's active military service while on leave from his employment. Following an administrative hearing in November 2009, the city council originally upheld the police chief''s termination of the officer's employment. The officer commenced this action in state court by filing a petition for writ of certiorari with the trial court. Upon hearing, the trial court found, inter alia, that the city council had incorrectly applied a statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 38-8-106, which had been overruled by an agreed consent order previously entered into between the United States and the State of Tennessee. See United States v. Tennessee, Civil Action No. 1:98-1357. The trial court therefore reversed the city council's decision and ordered the officer's reinstatement with back pay. The city appealed to this Court. In a 2012 decision, this Court affirmed the trial court's finding regarding the incorrect application of Tennessee Code Annotated § 38-8-106 and remanded the case, directing the trial court to instruct the city council regarding the appropriate legal standard. See Hoback v. City of Chattanooga, No. E2011-00484-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 2974762 at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 20, 2012). Following remand, the city council conducted a second hearing and again voted to uphold the prior termination of the officer's employment.

The Defendant-Appellant, Micah Cates, was convicted by a Carter County jury of vehicular homicide by intoxication. Prior to trial, the Defendant moved the trial court to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless blood draw. The trial court denied the motion and the case proceeded to trial where the State introduced evidence of the Defendant's blood alcohol content. Following the Defendant's conviction, the trial court imposed the minimum sentence of eight years with a release eligibility of 30 percent. The trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered that the Defendant serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his warrantless blood draw, and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing the Defendant. Upon our review, we conclude that no exception to the warrant requirement justified the warrantless blood draw in this case. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's denial of the Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from the blood draw and vacate his conviction.

The Defendant, Dennis Allen Rayfield, was convicted of first degree murder by a Wayne County Circuit Court jury. See T.C.A. § 39-13-202 (2014). He was sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, (2) the trial court erred in allowing the State to call a witness for the sole purpose of impeaching him, (3) the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the alternate jurors at the close of the proof, and (4) the trial court erred in permitting the sequestered jurors to have their cell phones in their possession during the trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Alvin Stewart, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court merged the domestic assault conviction into the aggravated assault conviction and sentenced the defendant to twenty years at 100% for the aggravated rape conviction and to six years at 30% for the aggravated assault conviction, to be served concurrently. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case involves an agreement among most of the heirs of Vida Mae McCartt (Decedent) regarding the distribution of the assets of her estate. After Decedent’s will was admitted to probate, five of her grandchildren filed an action to contest its validity. Following mediation, the grandchildren and Decedent’s three living children entered into a settlement agreement, which the trial court approved and incorporated into an agreed order distributing the assets of the estate. Thereafter, Sara Shannon Armes, the daughter of Decedent’s deceased son, J.D. McCartt, Sr., brought this action alleging that she was entitled to a share of the estate under the terms of the agreed order. Armes, who was not a party to the settlement agreement, also alleged that her siblings perpetrated a fraud by representing to the court that J.D. McCartt, Sr. had only three children and heirs at law when he actually had four, including Armes. The trial court granted the defendants’ Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

Petitioner, Craig O. Majors, appeals after the Johnson County Criminal Court dismissed his pro se petition for habeas corpus relief without a hearing. After a review of the record and authorities, we affirm the dismissal of the petition because Petitioner failed to show that his convictions were void or that his sentence had expired.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Joe Jackson, of aggravated assault and reckless endangerment. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of fourteen years. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction of aggravated assault. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The plaintiff, Jodi Lynn Jenkins (“Wife”), filed this divorce action against the defendant, Steven Louis Jenkins (“Husband”), on March 20, 2014. Prior to trial, the parties reached an agreement regarding certain issues, including an equitable division of their marital property, a permanent parenting plan, and child support. The trial court conducted a hearing on September 10, 2014, regarding the remaining issues of alimony and attorney's fees. Following the hearing, the trial court entered an order awarding Wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $3,500 per month until Husband's child support obligation terminated and $4,500 per month thereafter. The court also awarded Wife $5,000 in attorney's fees.1 Husband timely appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court's judgment. We remand this action to the trial court for a determination regarding the issue of a reasonable award of attorney's fees to Wife incurred in defending this appeal.

The Petitioner, Christopher Hubbard, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court‘s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault and resulting effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole as a repeat violent offender. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to call a favorable witness to testify, that the trial court erred by ruling that the charges of especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault did not violate double jeopardy principles, and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial and appellate counsel failed to raise the double jeopardy issue. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties‘ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this parental termination case, A.J.S.P. (Mother) appeals the termination of her rights to her minor son, E.T.P. (the Child). After the Child was placed in state custody and adjudicated dependent and neglected, custody was awarded to a non-relative. Subsequently, physical custody was returned to the Department of Children’s Services (DCS). At that time, both parents were incarcerated. As to Mother, DCS filed a petition to terminate her rights to the child based on her wanton disregard for the Child’s welfare. After a trial, the court granted the petition based on its findings, said to be made by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) grounds for termination exist and (2) termination is in the best interest of the Child. On appeal, Mother challenges only the court’s best interest determination. We affirm.

This interlocutory appeal involves a health care liability action. The plaintiffs, Margie Hunt and husband, Rickey Hunt, claim that Mrs. Hunt suffered injuries proximately caused by the conduct of the defendants with respect to two surgeries. Prior to filing their complaint, the plaintiffs gave timely written notice of their claim to potential defendants. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c) (Supp. 2013). Each of the three defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. Their separate motions were predicated on their assertion that the plaintiffs' pre-suit notice failed to comply with the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121, part of the Tennessee's Health Care Liability Act. Specifically, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs failed to provide a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization with their pre-suit notice. They also contend that the plaintiffs failed to attach to the complaint the medical authorization and also the pre-suit notice served upon the defendants. The defendant Dr. Nitin J. Rangnekar also relies upon the ground of insufficiency of service of process. The trial court denied each defendant's motion. On the defendants' further motions, the court granted them permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. R. App. P. 9. We likewise granted the defendants permission to file a Rule 9 appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendants, Jeremy Sims and Sherry Brookshire, appeal their Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of kidnapping and aggravated robbery. Defendant Sims claims that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for severance, the trial court erred by admitting certain witness testimony, the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction of aggravated robbery, the trial court erred by giving certain instructions to and communicating ex parte with the jury, the trial court erred by denying his post-trial motion for a mistrial and severance of defendants on the basis of Defendant Brookshire's incompetence to stand trial, and the cumulative effect of these errors prevented him from receiving a fair trial. Defendant Brookshire also challenges the trial court's denial of the motion to sever, the admission of certain evidence, the sufficiency of the evidence pertaining to the conviction of aggravated robbery, the trial court's instructions to the jury, and the trial court's finding that she was competent to stand trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Appellant, Maurice Montonio Dotson, Jr., pled guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, possession of a firearm during a dangerous felony, possession of drug paraphernalia, and theft of property valued under five hundred dollars. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of eleven years. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sentence imposed for possession of a firearm during a dangerous felony conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, John Brandon Gold, pleaded guilty to violating the sex offender registry, a Class E felony.  The trial court sentenced the Defendant, a Range II persistent offender, to five years plus ninety days, to be served at 45%.  The trial court denied the Defendant an alternative sentence.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that his sentence is excessive.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Taurys Hall, filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Shelby County Criminal Court. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as untimely, and the Petitioner challenges this ruling on appeal. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I respectfully concur in results only. I do so because the majority opinion, in the section discussing Defendant Sims’ severance issue, fails to address the admissibility of Defendant Sims’ unredacted statement pursuant to the “rule of completeness.” Tenn. R. Evid. 106. As noted in the majority opinion, the trial court considered the rule of completeness in its decision to admit the evidence. The majority opinion, in my view, implies that Defendant Sims’ unredacted statement was inadmissible under any circumstances in this particular case.

Petitioner, Robert E. Boling, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in concluding that he failed to prove that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel. Based upon a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, the decision of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Plaintiff/Appellant appeals the trial court's dismissal of his complaint on the ground that it was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Specifically, Appellant argues that a prior dismissal on the basis of the expiration of the statute of limitations was not an adjudication on the merits. Because dismissals on statute of limitations grounds generally operate as adjudications on the merits, we affirm.

Plaintiff filed a health care liability action against defendant doctor but did not file the certificate of good faith required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-122. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss; the motion was granted by the trial court. Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her complaint. Finding no error, we affirm. 

A Williamson County jury convicted the Defendant, Lecarvis Marquis Miller, of reckless aggravated assault and simple assault.  The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant to serve ten years as a Range III, persistent offender.  On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it failed to give the jury a supplemental unanimity instruction.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Robert George Russell, Jr., a Knoxville Fire Department captain, brought this action challenging the decision of Fire Chief Stan Sharp to promote others to the position of assistant fire chief. In 2013, Chief Sharp selected three fire officers to fill vacancies in the position of assistant chief. Russell filed an employment grievance with the Civil Service Merit Board (the CSMB or the Board), alleging that, in making his selections, Chief Sharp violated the applicable rules and regulations when he used, among other things, a mathematical formula that had not been approved by the Board. Russell also asserted that Chief Sharp violated the rules by not considering his ranking, according to the eligibility roster listing of the candidates eligible for promotion. The Board's administrative hearing officer denied the grievance, and the trial court affirmed. We hold that Chief Sharp did not violate the Board's rules and regulations and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in exercising his discretion to make promotions. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

In 2009, James Goins & Carpenter, P.C. (JGC) leased office space from 817 Partnership (817). JGC later decided to expand its law practice. It leased additional space in the same building from 817. Thereafter, a bank that had occupied the ground floor of the building moved out. Beginning in February 2011, Stuart F. James, an attorney with JGC, began raising concerns about security in the building. Over the course of the next few months, Mr. James repeatedly emailed 817's representatives about security, the heating and air conditioning system, JGC's financial problems, the need for a rent reduction, and a host of other issues. These emails eventually stopped; but in March 2013, Mr. James responded to a notice from 817 that JGC had missed rent payments. At that point, JGC's security issues resurfaced in a series of emails Mr. James sent from March to May of 2013. Ultimately, Mr. James informed 817 that JGC was dissolving and would be vacating the premises well before its lease expired. As a result, 817 filed a detainer action in general sessions court against JGC and Mr. James (collectively the Defendants). The general sessions court granted 817 a judgment. The Defendants filed a “motion to reconsider,” which was denied.

Petitioner, Malik Jones, entered guilty pleas in three separate cases, resulting in a total effective sentence of thirty-one years. Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief on the basis of an involuntary guilty plea and ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Because Petitioner has failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that he received ineffective assistance of counsel or that his plea was involuntary, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an appeal from the denial of Appellant’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion to set aside a settlement reached by Appellee, the decedent’s mother, in the underlying wrongful death lawsuit. Appellant brought the Rule 60.02 motion on behalf of her minor child, who was born out of wedlock. The decedent had executed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity of the minor child in Mississippi; Appellant argued that the acknowledgment was entitled to full faith and credit in Tennessee such that the child would be the rightful plaintiff in the wrongful death lawsuit. Appellee filed a challenge to paternity, arguing that the decedent was incarcerated at the time of the child’s conception. The Circuit Court stayed all proceedings and transferred the question of paternity to the Probate Court, which had no authority to enroll the foreign acknowledgment of paternity under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. Furthermore, because the child’s paternity was challenged, there was a question as to whether the mere filing of the VAP in a Tennessee Court, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 24-7-113(b)(3), was sufficient to establish paternity for purposes of the Wrongful Death Statute. If there is a challenge to the VAP, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 24-7-113(e) requires the trial court to first find that there is a substantial likelihood that fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact existed in the execution of the VAP. If the court so finds, then, under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 24-7-113(e)(2), DNA testing is required to establish paternity. Alternatively, the trial court could find that there is not a substantial likelihood of fraud, duress, or material mistake, deny the challenge to the VAP, and enroll the VAP as conclusive proof of paternity. Here, the trial court made no finding concerning fraud, duress, or material mistake under Section 24-7-113(e). Despite the fact that the court never resolved the paternity question, it, nonetheless, denied Appellant’s Rule 60.02 motion and granted attorney’s fees to the defendant in the underlying wrongful death action and to the Appellee/mother for Appellant’s alleged violation of the order staying all proceedings in the Circuit Court. We conclude that the Rule 60.02 motion was not ripe for adjudication until such time as the trial court conclusively established the child’s paternity under either Tennessee Code Annotated Section 24-7-113 or 24-7-112. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order denying Rule 60.02 relief and remand the case for further proceedings, including, but not limited to, entry of an order that complies with Section 24-7-113(e). We reverse the award of attorney’s fees and the order staying proceedings in the Circuit Court.

The employee sustained a work-related lower back injury, which required surgery. Her treating physician assigned an 8% permanent impairment rating, and referred her to a pain management specialist. The employee’s lawyer arranged for an independent medical evaluation with a neurologist, who assigned the employee 23% permanent impairment for her back injury and 2% permanent impairment for the sleep interruption she experienced as a result of ongoing back pain. Because the impairment ratings differed, the employee was seen by a physician in the Tennessee Medical Impairment Rating Registry (“MIR”), as established by statute. The MIR physician, an orthopedic surgeon, assigned the employee a 9% permanent impairment. The depositions of the evaluating physician and the MIR physician were introduced at trial, as well as the medical records of the treating physician, the employee’s testimony, and that of several lay witnesses. The trial court refused to allow the employer to call a vocational expert to testify, because the employer had failed to disclose the identity of this witness at an earlier time. At the conclusion of the proof, the trial court found that, regardless of the permanent impairment rating applied, the employee is unable to work and is therefore entitled to permanent and total disability benefits. Alternatively, the trial court found that the employee had introduced clear and convincing evidence to rebut the statutory presumption of accuracy that applies to the MIR physician’s impairment rating and adopted the 23% permanent impairment rating of the evaluating physician, even though his assignment of 2% permanent impairment for the employee’s sleep interruption was inconsistent with The AMA Guides to Permanent Impairment, 6th Edition (“AMA Guides”). The employer appealed. The appeal was referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We conclude that: (1) the trial court did not err by excluding the employer’s vocational expert; (2) the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding of permanent and total disability; and (3) the trial court erred by concluding that the employee rebutted by clear and convincing evidence the statutory presumption of accuracy that applies to the MIR physician’s impairment rating. Accordingly, we reverse and modify the judgment of the trial court, and considering the MIR physician’s impairment rating and the lay testimony concerning the employee’s limitations, award the employee 45% permanent partial disability benefits.