APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, LeSergio Wilson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel.  After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The petitioner, Rivera L. Peoples, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing thathe received the ineffective assistance of counsel.  After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Athanasios Diakos Edmonston, appeals his Williamson County Circuit Court jury convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and assault, contending that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress the statements he made to law enforcement officers and that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support his convictions.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Thomas Andrew Bell, appeals the six-year sentence imposed for his Knox County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of possession with intent to sell more than one-half ounce of marijuana within 1,000 feet of a public park, possession of drug paraphernalia, simple possession, and possession with intent to sell cocaine, claiming that the trial court erred by ordering a fully incarcerative sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Ledarren Hawkins, appeals the post-conviction court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. On appeal, he argues that due process grounds warrant a tolling of the statute of limitations. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises from a dispute over an easement for a private airstrip. The original owner of the land sub-divided it into six tracts, with the plan of selling them to buyers interested in purchasing property with access to the airstrip. Three of the tracts were sold to Appellant and one was purchased by Appellee. After unsuccessful efforts to sell portions of their land holdings, the original owner and Appellant executed and recorded a purported abandonment of the easement. Upon discovering that the purchasers of the final two tracts sold by the original owner were building fences across the airstrip, Appellee brought suit seeking to assert his easement rights, among other claims. The trial court found that an express and, in the alternative, implied easement for the airstrip had been created. However, because the purchasers of the two tracts had been informed that the easement was abandoned, the court terminated the easement where it crossed those two tracts. In addition, the trial court found that the original owner and Appellant had committed the tort of libel of title in executing and recording an abandonment of easement without joining Appellee as a party to the agreement. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, William Thomas Umfleet, appeals his Hardin County Circuit Court jury conviction of first degree premeditated murder, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves an incumbent candidate's attempt to challenge the election for the office of Sheriff of Monroe County based upon the ineligibility of the other candidate. The incumbent candidate sought to claim the office or void the election. The trial court voided the election following a bench trial. This appeal followed. We affirm.

The trial court awarded death benefits based on the statutory maximum benefit of the State’s average weekly wage, rather than basing the maximum on the decedent’s weekly wages. It also awarded lump sum benefits to some of the decedent’s dependents. The employer has appealed. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for entry of an order consistent with this opinion.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Angel Manuel Rivera, of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and three counts of aggravated assault. After merging the murder convictions, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of life plus five years. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his convictions, the trial court’s denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal, the trial court’s permitting witness testimony about the appellant’s character, and the trial court’s failure to allow counsel to withdraw prior to trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Donald Edward Daniel, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court bench conviction of violating an order of protection pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-113, contending that the trial court’s interpretation of the order of protection was overly broad and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Forrest David Agostinho, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his 2012 convictions of 14 counts of aggravated sexual battery, five counts of Class B felony sexual exploitation of a minor, and one count of Class D felony sexual exploitation of a minor.  In this appeal, the petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court denied him a full and fair hearing on his post-conviction petition and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial.  Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Petitioner, Mindy Dodd, appeals the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s denial of her petition to reopen her petition for post-conviction relief, seeking DNA analysis of evidence pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Kevin Ladell Grandberry, appeals from his convictions for burglary, theft over $10,000, vandalism over $1,000, and felon in possession of a handgun. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the Defendant to be shackled during trial and that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Darryl L. Weems, pleaded guilty to attempt to obtain a controlled substance by fraud, forgery, and identity theft, in exchange for an effective six-year sentence with the trial court to determine the manner of service. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his request for alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The primary issue in this appeal is whether a teacher who was hurt on the job after being terminated but while she was still working under a temporary extension of her contract, can claim that she did not get a meaningful return to work after she reached maximum medical improvement. The trial court held that the statutory cap of one and one-half her medical impairment rating did apply because the employee had a meaningful return to work. This appeal has been referred to the Special Worker’s Compensation Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We reverse the trial court’s determination that the one and one-half times the medical impairment rating applies and adopt the court’s alternative finding that the employee sustained a fifty percent permanent partial disability. We affirm the lower court’s judgment in all other respects.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s grant of a motion for partial summary judgment as a result of the defendant’s failure to file a proper response. The defendant appeals. We reverse.  

This case stems from a proceeding in which the parental rights of the parents of a two year old child were terminated due to severe physical abuse of the child and upon the court’s finding that termination would be in the child’s best interest. Mother appeals the holding that termination of her rights was in the best interest and the court’s admission of the testimony of one witness. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

Doyle E. Dukes (“Doyle E.”) filed a petition for letters testamentary in the Chancery Court for Union County seeking to have the Last Will and Testament (“the Will”) of Doyle I. Dukes (“Deceased”) admitted to probate. Melbia Cooke (“Melbia”), Mary Lou Anderson (“Mary Lou”), and Ruth Jerline Hickey filed a complaint to contest the Will. The case was transferred from the Chancery Court for Union County to the Circuit Court for Union County (“the Trial Court”). After a bench trial, the Trial Court entered its order on September 19, 2014 finding and holding, inter alia, that a confidential relationship existed between Deceased and Doyle E., that the Will was invalid as the product of undue influence, and that Deceased died intestate. Doyle E. appeals to this Court raising issues regarding whether the Trial Court erred in finding a confidential relationship and whether the Trial Court erred in finding undue influence. We find and hold that the evidence in the record on appeal does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s findings, and we affirm.

The Petitioner, James Davis, Jr., appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends that, due to his mental condition at that time, he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not entered voluntarily. The Petitioner also contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel’s failure to request a mental evaluation. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

This is an action by homeowners against the insurance company that provided their homeowners’ insurance coverage. At issue is whether the insurer violated Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-130(b) (2006) by failing to make available coverage for insurable sinkhole losses and whether the physical damage to the home was caused by “sinkhole activity.”
When the insurer denied coverage, Plaintiffs commenced this action alleging, inter alia, that the insurer breached the policy and acted in bad faith when it refused to pay their claim. Plaintiffs also sought to hold the insurer liable for violating Tenn. Code Ann. § 56 7 130(b) because the insurer did not notify Plaintiffs that sinkhole coverage was an available option. At the time of the occurrence, the statute stated: “Every insurer offering homeowner property insurance in this state shall make available coverage for insurable sinkhole losses on any dwelling, including contents of personal property contained in the dwelling, to the extent provided in the policy to which the sinkhole coverage attaches.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-130(b) (emphasis added). It is undisputed that the insurer did not notify Plaintiffs that sinkhole coverage was available. The insurer filed a motion for summary judgment contending that Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-130 did not require it to notify Plaintiffs that sinkhole coverage was an available option. The insurer also denied the factual assertion that sinkhole activity caused the loss and asserted that it was not liable because, if sinkhole activity caused the damage, the policy contained an exclusion for such an occurrence. Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that they were entitled to a judgment that the insurer had violated Tenn. Code Ann. § 56 7 130 and that their insurance policy did not exclude coverage for the damage to their home. The trial court granted Plaintiffs’ motion with respect to Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-130, concluding it was undisputed that the insurer “did nothing to make the Plaintiffs aware of the sinkhole endorsement and, therefore, did not meet the requirements of [Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-130].” The trial court denied summary judgment on all remaining issues concluding that material facts were disputed concerning the cause of the damage to Plaintiffs’ home. On appeal, we reverse the grant of summary judgment to Plaintiffs based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-130 and remand with instructions to grant summary judgment to the insurer on that issue because the statutory language, “make available,” does not require insurers to give notice that sinkhole coverage is available. We affirm the trial court’s denial of summary judgment concerning whether the loss at issue is excluded from coverage because, as the trial court correctly found, material facts are in dispute.
 

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. After finding that William DeMorato ("Employee") suffered a bilateral carpal tunnel injury in the course and scope of his employment with Trans Carriers, Inc. ("Employer"), the trial court awarded permanent partial disability benefits of 15% to each arm and temporary total disability benefits of $104,948.02. After Employer filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, however, the trial court concluded that Employee was not entitled to temporary total disability benefits. Employee argues that the trial court erred in finding that he was not entitled to temporary total disability benefits. Employer argues that the trial court erred in finding that Employee suffered a compensable injury. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

The Petitioner, Gregory Hill, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his jury convictions for two counts of aggravated assault and resulting sixteen-year sentence. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel in the following ways: (1) because trial counsel advised him to reject a favorable guilty plea with a six-year sentence and for which he could apply for probation, opining to the Petitioner that there was a strong chance of acquittal if he proceeded to trial; (2) because trial counsel advised him against testifying on his own behalf, and his decision to do so, based upon that advice, severely limited the evidence put forth to the jury supporting his claim of self-defense; and (3) because, following the trial court's ruling excluding the Petitioner's brother's testimony about a similar act of violence by one of the victims, trial counsel failed to make an offer of proof of said testimony. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this capital case, the jury convicted the Defendant, Rickey Alvis Bell, Jr., of two alternative counts of first degree felony murder, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, and one count of aggravated sexual battery. The jury sentenced the Defendant to death for the first degree murder based on four aggravating circumstances. On direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the Defendant’s convictions. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the record did not support two of the aggravating circumstances but nonetheless affirmed the death sentence. We now address the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion to strike the death notice on the ground that he is intellectually disabled; (2) whether Tennessee’s statute prohibiting the execution of intellectually disabled persons is unconstitutional; (3) whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s two motions for mistrial; (4) whether the trial court erred by refusing to allow the Defendant to adduce evidence that the victim’s husband was having an extramarital affair at the time the victim was murdered; (5) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions; and (6) our mandatory review of the Defendant’s death sentence. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions and death sentence.

I concur with the majority’s holdings as to the trial court’s denial of Mr. Bell’s motion to strike the death notice based on intellectual disability; the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203 that prohibits the execution of any intellectually disabled person; and the trial court’s denial of Mr. Bell’s motions for mistrial. I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred by refusing to allow Mr. Bell to introduce evidence that Rick Harris, the victim’s husband, was having an affair with his ex-wife at the time the victim was murdered. However, I disagree that the error was harmless. In my view, the State failed to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that this error did not affect the outcome of the trial. Because Mr. Bell was deprived of his constitutional right to present a defense and the State failed to show that the error did not affect the verdict, Mr. Bell is entitled to a new trial. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that Mr. Bell is not entitled to a new trial and would pretermit the remaining issues.