APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from a divorce involving a challenge to the validity of the marriage. Marvin Dewayne Echols (“Husband”) filed suit for divorce against his wife Elke Monika Echols (“Wife”) in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (“the Trial Court”). Husband later alleged that his marriage to Wife was void. Husband and Wife had married shortly after a German court had pronounced Wife divorced, and Husband’s position is that Wife’s divorce was not yet legally binding under German law when they married in Kentucky. The Trial Court, among other things, found the marriage valid and granted the parties a divorce. Husband raises several issues on appeal, chief among them the issue of the validity of the marriage in the first place. We hold that Husband failed to prove that his marriage to Wife was invalid. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in its entirety.      

The plaintiffs filed this action to recover damages they incurred when, during construction, their home was completely destroyed by fire. The plaintiffs sued the project's general contractor as well as various subcontractors employed by the general contractor. The complaint included allegations of negligence, based in part on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and breach of contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants. The plaintiffs have appealed. We affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the general contractor regarding claims based upon the general contractor's own negligence and res ipsa loquitur, but we reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment regarding the negligence of the flooring subcontractors. We also reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the general contractor regarding the plaintiffs' breach of contract claim. Finally, we remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The employee fell from a roof in the course of his employment and sustained fractures of his left leg. The injury required three surgical procedures, including a fusion of his injured ankle, which resulted in the shortening of one leg. He asserted that his altered gait from the leg injury has caused disability to his lower back and that the permanency of his injuries has resulted in severe clinical depression. When the employee and the employer were unable to resolve the issue of workers' compensation benefits, the employee filed suit. At the conclusion of the proof, the trial court found that the leg injury extended to the body as a whole and, further, that the employee, who had been unable to return to work, was entitled to an award of benefits in excess of six times the anatomical impairment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-242 (2008 & Supp. 2013). The employer appealed, contending that the trial court erred by assigning disability to the body as a whole and by awarding a 90% vocational disability, which is in excess of six times the anatomical disability of 12%. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Kenneth A. Adams, appeals as of right from the Tipton County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing his petition on the grounds that it was untimely filed. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This case involves the 2009 termination of a city police officer's employment on grounds of unfitness for duty due to post-traumatic stress disorder suffered as a result of the officer's active military service while on leave from his employment. Following an administrative hearing in November 2009, the city council originally upheld the police chief''s termination of the officer's employment. The officer commenced this action in state court by filing a petition for writ of certiorari with the trial court. Upon hearing, the trial court found, inter alia, that the city council had incorrectly applied a statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 38-8-106, which had been overruled by an agreed consent order previously entered into between the United States and the State of Tennessee. See United States v. Tennessee, Civil Action No. 1:98-1357. The trial court therefore reversed the city council's decision and ordered the officer's reinstatement with back pay. The city appealed to this Court. In a 2012 decision, this Court affirmed the trial court's finding regarding the incorrect application of Tennessee Code Annotated § 38-8-106 and remanded the case, directing the trial court to instruct the city council regarding the appropriate legal standard. See Hoback v. City of Chattanooga, No. E2011-00484-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 2974762 at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 20, 2012). Following remand, the city council conducted a second hearing and again voted to uphold the prior termination of the officer's employment.

The Defendant-Appellant, Micah Cates, was convicted by a Carter County jury of vehicular homicide by intoxication. Prior to trial, the Defendant moved the trial court to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless blood draw. The trial court denied the motion and the case proceeded to trial where the State introduced evidence of the Defendant's blood alcohol content. Following the Defendant's conviction, the trial court imposed the minimum sentence of eight years with a release eligibility of 30 percent. The trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered that the Defendant serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his warrantless blood draw, and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing the Defendant. Upon our review, we conclude that no exception to the warrant requirement justified the warrantless blood draw in this case. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's denial of the Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from the blood draw and vacate his conviction.

The Defendant, Dennis Allen Rayfield, was convicted of first degree murder by a Wayne County Circuit Court jury. See T.C.A. § 39-13-202 (2014). He was sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, (2) the trial court erred in allowing the State to call a witness for the sole purpose of impeaching him, (3) the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the alternate jurors at the close of the proof, and (4) the trial court erred in permitting the sequestered jurors to have their cell phones in their possession during the trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Raymond Lee Swett, Jr., appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for relief, arguing he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief.

An employee sustained various injuries in a motor vehicle accident. Her employer denied the claim for workers‘ compensation benefits, contending that because the employee was driving to her home from work, the injury was not compensable. The trial court awarded benefits, including permanent total disability, based upon its finding that at the time of the accident the employee was returning to her office after an employment-related client visit. The employer has appealed, raising several issues which primarily relate to whether the evidence presented was sufficient to support the trial court‘s findings. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers‘ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This interlocutory appeal arises from a health care liability action and concerns the question of proper venue. Plaintiff filed her original lawsuit in Shelby County against the Appellants, a pathology group located in Shelby County. Appellants answered the complaint and raised, as an affirmative defense, the comparative negligence of Appellees, plaintiff's primary care physician and his employer, who are residents of Sumner County. Plaintiff then moved, under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 20-1-119, for leave to amend her complaint to add the Sumner County residents to the lawsuit. Leave was granted, and plaintiff filed an amended complaint under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.01. Appellees answered the complaint and averred that venue was improper in Shelby County under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 20-4-101(b). Appellees asked for dismissal of the lawsuit; however, rather than dismissing the lawsuit, the Shelby County court transferred the case to Sumner County. Appellants appeal. We affirm and remand.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant, Ryan Scott Haraway, pleaded guilty to four counts of aggravated burglary, one count of forgery, one count of theft of property, two counts of burglary of a motor vehicle, and three counts of assault. The total effective sentence was seven years with the trial court to determine the manner of service of the sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it denied him an alternative sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This is a dispute over a narrow strip of real property adjacent to the boundary line of tracts of land owned by plaintiffs Wayne Holtsclaw and Willie Holtsclaw and defendants Darrell Johnson and Brenda Johnson. The Holtsclaws brought this action seeking ejectment and a declaration that they owned the disputed property. The Johnsons asserted, among other things, that they were entitled to the property because of their many years of adverse possession. The Holtsclaws responded by arguing that Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-110 (2000 & Supp. 2015) bars the Johnsons' adverse possession claim because, for more than twenty years, the Johnsons had not paid property taxes on the disputed property. The Johnsons responded that the Supreme Court's opinion in Cumulus Broadcasting, Inc. v. Shim, 226 S.W.3d 366, 381 (Tenn. 2007), which held that § 28-2-110 is not applicable “when the tracts are contiguous, a relatively small area is at issue, and the adjacent owners making claims of ownership have paid their respective real estate taxes,” applied in this case. The trial court ruled that the Johnsons established ownership by adverse possession and that the “Cumulus exception” applies. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Marquette Houston, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2005 conviction for second degree murder and his twenty-five-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying him relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Davidson County judge convicted the Defendant, Steven Darrell Little, of one count of indecent exposure and sentenced him to six months of probation and ordered a $500 fine. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After review, we conclude that there is no error, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Cody Cofer, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Circuit Court for Cumberland County. He was convicted of two counts of felony murder and one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery, for which he received consecutive life sentences and a concurrent twelve-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at both the trial and appellate levels. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Owner of real property conveyed, by quitclaim deed, an interest to herself and her son as joint tenants, with the right of survivorship. Owner then conveyed her interest to her grandson by quitclaim deed a year later. In the deed to her grandson, Owner expressly referenced the earlier deed to her son, the grandson’s father. After Owner died, the son filed a declaratory judgment in which he asked the court to rule that he owns the property in fee simple. The son filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The grandson appealed the trial court’s judgment. We affirm. Owner transferred her right of survivorship to her grandson; but this right would come into play only if her son predeceased her. Because Owner died first, the son exercised his right of survivorship and became the sole owner in fee of the property.
 

Defendant, John Frank Mullins, pled guilty to theft of property valued over $1000 and was sentenced to eight years on Community Corrections. After a hearing, the trial court found that Defendant violated the terms of his Community Corrections sentence, revoked the Community Corrections sentence, and ordered Defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in incarceration. On appeal, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Laquint Deco Holder, pleaded guilty to sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine in a drug-free zone, and the trial court entered the agreed sentence of six years to be served at 100%. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered. After a hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that his counsel was ineffective and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After review, we conclude that the post-conviction court did not err when it dismissed the Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief. We therefore affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Maurice Montonio Dotson, Jr., pled guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, possession of a firearm during a dangerous felony, possession of drug paraphernalia, and theft of property valued under five hundred dollars. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of eleven years. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sentence imposed for possession of a firearm during a dangerous felony conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, John Brandon Gold, pleaded guilty to violating the sex offender registry, a Class E felony.  The trial court sentenced the Defendant, a Range II persistent offender, to five years plus ninety days, to be served at 45%.  The trial court denied the Defendant an alternative sentence.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that his sentence is excessive.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Taurys Hall, filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Shelby County Criminal Court. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as untimely, and the Petitioner challenges this ruling on appeal. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I respectfully concur in results only. I do so because the majority opinion, in the section discussing Defendant Sims’ severance issue, fails to address the admissibility of Defendant Sims’ unredacted statement pursuant to the “rule of completeness.” Tenn. R. Evid. 106. As noted in the majority opinion, the trial court considered the rule of completeness in its decision to admit the evidence. The majority opinion, in my view, implies that Defendant Sims’ unredacted statement was inadmissible under any circumstances in this particular case.

The defendant, Alvin Stewart, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court merged the domestic assault conviction into the aggravated assault conviction and sentenced the defendant to twenty years at 100% for the aggravated rape conviction and to six years at 30% for the aggravated assault conviction, to be served concurrently. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case involves an agreement among most of the heirs of Vida Mae McCartt (Decedent) regarding the distribution of the assets of her estate. After Decedent’s will was admitted to probate, five of her grandchildren filed an action to contest its validity. Following mediation, the grandchildren and Decedent’s three living children entered into a settlement agreement, which the trial court approved and incorporated into an agreed order distributing the assets of the estate. Thereafter, Sara Shannon Armes, the daughter of Decedent’s deceased son, J.D. McCartt, Sr., brought this action alleging that she was entitled to a share of the estate under the terms of the agreed order. Armes, who was not a party to the settlement agreement, also alleged that her siblings perpetrated a fraud by representing to the court that J.D. McCartt, Sr. had only three children and heirs at law when he actually had four, including Armes. The trial court granted the defendants’ Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.