APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Father appeals the parenting schedule that substantially restricts his parenting time. Without making any findings of fact, the trial court restricted Father’s parenting time to 48 hours per month, with no overnight visitation, until the child is three years old. Father contends the severe restrictions on his parenting time are not supported by the evidence. He further contends the trial court erred by severely limiting his parenting time without making any finding that he was guilty of conduct that affected his ability to parent pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-406(d). In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury, the trial court is required, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01, to find the facts specially, state separately its conclusions of law, and enter judgment accordingly. The underlying rationale for this mandate is that it facilitates appellate review by affording a clear understanding of the basis of the trial court’s decision; in the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law, this court is left to wonder on what basis the court reached its ultimate decision. In this case, the trial court did not identify the legal principles it applied or the factual basis for its decision; therefore, it failed to satisfy the Rule 52.01 mandate. Because the trial judge has retired and both parties wish to avoid the cost of a new trial, the parties have requested that we conduct a de novo review of the record, and we have determined that the transcript of the evidence is sufficient for this court to conduct a de novo review to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies. See Gooding v. Gooding, __ S.W.3d __, No. M2014-01595-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 1947239, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2015). We find Father’s inappropriate statements and conduct concerning the child’s genitals are directly adverse to the best interests of the child. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-406(d). We also find that the evidence preponderates in favor of a finding of neglect and substantial nonperformance of Father’s parenting responsibilities to such a degree as to be adverse to the best interest of the child. See id. Accordingly, we affirm the parenting plan that substantially restricts Father’s parenting time.

In 2010, Brian Le Hurst (“the Petitioner”) was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder in the death of Eddie Dean Evans and sentenced to life.  The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the Davidson County Criminal Court denied following a hearing.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct.  Specifically, he asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to:  (1) complete ballistics testing on the bullet recovered from the victim; (2) object to the prosecutor’s closing argument; (3) object to the admission into evidence of a phone call from the victim on the basis of the Confrontation Clause; (4) object to the admission of allegedly irrelevant information from the Petitioner’s computer; and (5) object to the testimony of two of the State’s witnesses.  Regarding his claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the Petitioner contends that the prosecutor made multiple arguments during closing argument that were not supported by the evidence.  Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

An employee developed carpal tunnel syndrome. Her employer provided medical treatment until the authorized treating physician opined the condition did not arise primarily from her work. The employer then denied the claim. At trial, the employee presented the testimony of an evaluating physician who opined her work was the primary cause of the condition. The trial court found the employee had successfully rebutted the opinion of the authorized treating physician, as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(12)(C)(ii). It further found the condition arose primarily from her employment, as required by section 50-6-102(12)(A)(ii) and awarded benefits. The employer appeals. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm.

Defendant, Jarquese Antonio Askew, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury in a three-count indictment with first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery.  Prior to trial, Defendant filed a “Motion to Recuse Prosecuting Attorney.”  Following a hearing, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion.  A jury convicted Defendant of the lesser-included offenses of facilitation of voluntary manslaughter in Count 1 and criminally negligent homicide in Count 2, and Defendant was convicted as charged in Count 3 of especially aggravated robbery.  The trial court merged Count 2 into Count 1 and sentenced Defendant to three years in Count 1 and 17 years in Count 3, to be served concurrently.  In this appeal as of right, Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion to disqualify the prosecutor, and Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence.  Having carefully reviewed the record before us and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Pursuant to his plea agreement, the Defendant-Appellant, Curtis Colston, entered a guilty plea to aggravated assault and received a sentence of six years, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court.  In this appeal, Colston argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for an alternative sentence.  Upon our review, we affirm the sentence and remand for entry of a corrected judgment.

The petitioner, Chancy Jones, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his second degree murder conviction, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition for post-conviction relief.

The petitioner, Randall K. Madison, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  Following merger of alternative offenses, the petitioner stands convicted of twelve counts of rape and one count of forgery.  For these convictions he received an effective sentence of thirty-five years in the Department of Correction.  On appeal, he contends that it was error to deny his petition for relief because he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel.  Following a thorough review of the record before us, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Kimberly Ann Phillips, appeals the trial court’s revocation of her probation and reinstatement of her effective eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction.  On appeal, the Defendant-Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion because no “substantial” violation of her probation had occurred.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that Employee suffered work-related injuries to both shoulders and awarded twenty percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. Employer argues that the trial court erred in finding that Employee suffered a work-related injury and contends that the award was excessive. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

The defendant, Ryan D. Buford, appeals his jury convictions for first degree (felony) murder, especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and tampering with evidence, a Class C felony.  The defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to police.  He also urges us to conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the testimony of a co-defendant was insufficiently corroborated. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress and that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions, and we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Dewayne Pickins (“the Defendant”) was indicted with one count each of aggravated assault, attempted aggravated assault, and violating an order of protection. Prior to trial, the State voluntarily dismissed the charge of violating an order of protection. At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, the trial court granted the Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to the aggravated assault charge. The jury convicted the Defendant of attempted aggravated assault. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for attempted aggravated assault and (2) the trial court erred in refusing to allow the Defendant to cross-examine the victim about her prior convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of conviction of the trial court.

This case represents the consolidated appeals from the dismissal of the petitioner’s coram nobis petition and post-conviction petition, both of which sought to overturn his 2011 conviction for theft of property valued at over $10,000 but less than $60,000.  The procedural history of these cases is complicated by the fact that both attorneys, one in the coram nobis court and one in the post-conviction court, filed “motions to reconsider” purporting to delay the trial court’s final disposition of each action.  We reiterate that motions to reconsider are not authorized by the Rules of Criminal Procedure.  Waiving the timely notice of appeal in the coram nobis action, we discern no error in the dismissal of the petition.  We reach the merits of the petitioner’s post-conviction case and affirm the denial of relief.

Defendant, Gerald Dewayne Triplett, appeals his conviction for one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) that the trial court erred in its evidentiary rulings with regard to hearsay statements and impeachment of a witness with a prior inconsistent statement; (2) that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (3) that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. Based upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Zacheriah L. Holden, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his right to due process was violated.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The pro se petitioner, Michael V. Morris, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that due process requires that the statute of limitations for filing his petition be tolled because Sutton v. Carpenter, 745 F. 3d 787 (6th Cir. 2014), which he interprets as establishing that he has the right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, was not released until after the time limit for filing the petition had expired.  Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition as time-barred pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Petitioner received an effective sentence of fifty years in the Department of Correction.  On direct appeal, this court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentence.  Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied following a hearing.  On appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, the Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel’s failure to hire a DNA expert to analyze the evidence against the Petitioner.  Following our review, we affirmed the judgment of the post-conviction court.  Thereafter, the Tennessee Supreme Court granted the Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal and remanded the matter to the post-conviction court for the entry of a supplemental order denying the petition.  The post-conviction court complied with the remand order and filed a supplemental order with this court.  Upon reconsideration of the Petitioner’s case, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Brian J. Dodson, was convicted of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and aggravated assault, and he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment.  Thereafter, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and that the trial court violated his due process rights by refusing to delay the trial until a hospital records custodian arrived at the courthouse to authenticate the medical records of a witness.  The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Blount County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Margaret Laverne Riddle, of one count of vehicular homicide. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the trial court's denial of her motions to suppress the results of a blood alcohol test, arguing that (1) the State did not have valid consent to obtain the sample and (2) her due process rights were violated by the destruction of the blood sample before she was indicted and could have the sample tested. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant filed a petition to modify alimony and child support. During the hearing on the petition, the trial court modified an award of separate property. Because the trial court issued a judgment outside of the relief requested by the parties, we reverse and vacate.     

The defendant, Alfonzo Rounsaville, appeals from his Hamilton County Criminal Court jury conviction of aggravated robbery, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his pretrial motion to suppress an out-of-court identification, that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial, that the trial court erred by providing a jury instruction on the offense of aggravated robbery in light of the evidence adduced at trial, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from post-divorce litigation between Dale Crafton Roberts (“Mother”) and James Frederick Roberts (“Father”). Primarily at issue is the validity of the trial court‟s adoption of a modified permanent parenting plan recommended by its divorce referee. For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the modified permanent parenting plan that was adopted and remand for further proceedings that are consistent with this Opinion.

The Petitioner, Christopher Farrow, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his motion. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Board of Professional Responsibility hearing panel determined that an attorney violated multiple rules of professional conduct and imposed a suspension to be served on probation subject to certain conditions. The trial court affirmed the hearing panel’s findings but modified the sanction by requiring the attorney to pay restitution, shortening the term of the suspension and probation, and eliminating and modifying other conditions of probation. Upon careful consideration, we affirm the trial court’s order of restitution, but otherwise reinstate the decision of the hearing panel.
 

The Defendant-Appellant, Victor Dyson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of two counts of aggravated assault and one count of theft of property valued at less than five hundred dollars. As a Range III, persistent offender, he was sentenced to fifteen years, eleven months and twenty-nine days in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant-Appellant argues: (1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of prior bad acts in violation of Tennessee Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b); (2) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the law of self-defense; (3) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant-Appellant's motion for new trial based on insufficient evidence; (4) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant-Appellant's motion for a mistrial after the prosecutor referred to the trial court's refusal to instruct on self-defense; and (5) the trial court committed cumulative errors which, taken together, denied the Defendant-Appellant his constitutional right to a fair trial. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case involves a will contest and alleged resulting trust. The plaintiff and her husband purchased two adjoining parcels of improved real property located in Strawberry Plains, Tennessee, in 1992. The plaintiff‘s husband died on February 23, 2004. On March 1, 2004, the plaintiff executed a quitclaim deed, conveying title to the property to her husband‘s uncle, ultimately the decedent in the instant action. On March 3, 2004, the decedent executed a last will and testament, bequeathing all of his property to the plaintiff. In April 2006, however, the decedent executed a subsequent last will and testament, making no mention of the plaintiff and bequeathing all of his property to a friend, whom he also named as executor of his estate. The decedent died in July 2012, and his 2006 will was admitted to probate. The plaintiff subsequently filed a will contest, alleging that a resulting trust was created shortly before her husband‘s death upon an agreement entered into between her husband and the decedent. According to the plaintiff, her husband sought to protect their real property from potential creditors by conveying title to the decedent with the understanding that the decedent would in turn bequeath the property to the plaintiff. The decedent‘s estate filed a motion for summary judgment. Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the estate. The plaintiff appeals. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.