APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A jury convicted the defendant of three counts of facilitation of first degree murder and one count of facilitation of aggravated robbery. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and the sentence. On appeal to this Court, the defendant contends, inter alia, that the admission into evidence of an autopsy report through the testimony of a medical examiner who did not perform the autopsy violated his right to confront the witnesses against him under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. The defendant also argues that the warrantless search of his home by officers who entered the home after the first responding officer constituted an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution, so the trial court should have suppressed the evidence seized in that search. We hold that, under the circumstances of this case, the autopsy report is not testimonial under Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012), so its admission into evidence did not violate the Defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. We further hold that, where the responding officer’s initial entry into the home was justified by exigent circumstances, the subsequent entry into the home by other officers constituted a mere continuation of the initial officer’s lawful entry into the home. Consequently, the trial court did not err by denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence that was in plain view and within the scope of the exigent circumstances search. Finally, we hold that the admission into evidence of items that were not in plain view, even if erroneous, constituted harmless error. Accordingly, we affirm. 

This case presents a question regarding insurance coverage under liability and umbrella policies issued by plaintiff Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company to Jerry Dale Robertson and Sherry Ann Robertson. In July 2012, the Robertsons‘ house sitter and close family friend, Shaun Dunlap, used Dale Robertson‘s 2011 Ford Ranger pickup truck (the insured vehicle), on a personal errand to pick up a friend. On the return trip, the insured vehicle crossed the center line of the road, causing a head-on collision that killed three members of the Dembla family. Tennessee Farmers brought this declaratory judgment action seeking a judicial finding of no coverage under the policies because Dunlap was operating the insured vehicle without the permission of the insured. Defendant Kanika Dembla, the lone survivor in the Demblas‘ car, who had brought an underlying tort action against Dunlap, answered and argued that although Dunlap had no express permission to drive the insured vehicle, he had implied permission under the circumstances. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment to Tennessee Farmers, finding that Dunlap did not have implied permission to drive the insured vehicle while housesitting. We affirm.

The Board of Professional Responsibility (“Board”) initiated disciplinary proceedings against attorney Robert Lee Vogel based upon two unrelated complaints of professional misconduct. A hearing panel (“Panel”) determined that Mr. Vogel had violated the Rules of Professional Conduct (“RPC”) and entered a judgment suspending Mr. Vogel from the practice of law. The Panel subsequently clarified the sanction in an “Agreed Order Amending the Hearing Panel’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law” (“Agreed Order”). The Agreed Order provided that Mr. Vogel would be suspended from the practice of law for one year, with all but thirty days of the suspension to be served on probation. Mr. Vogel’s probation would be conditioned upon his compliance with the terms of his Tennessee Lawyer’s Assistance Program (“TLAP”) agreement, completion of his treatment and counseling program, and weekly attendance at two twelve-step meetings. The Board petitioned this Court for an order enforcing the Panel’s judgment and the Agreed Order. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 8.4, we determined that the punishment imposed by the Panel appeared inadequate and proposed that it be increased. Mr. Vogel subsequently requested oral argument, which we granted. The issue before the Court is whether the punishment imposed by the Panel is in uniformity with prior disciplinary decisions in this state and appropriate under the circumstances of this case. Upon a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we hold that it is not. Accordingly, we modify the Panel’s judgment to impose a one-year suspension from the practice of law, with the entire suspension to be served on active suspension.

Plaintiffs purchased a home from two of the Defendants; one defendant was the contractor whose construction company built the home and the other was his wife, who had marketed the home for sale. Before and after the closing, Plaintiffs identified several defects which they desired to have corrected; some defects were remedied while others were not. Plaintiffs brought suit and, following trial, the court awarded judgment for $2,000 in favor of Plaintiffs against the construction company for breach of contract and judgment for $40,184 against the estate of the contractor and the construction company for breach of warranty; the court held that the contractor’s wife was not liable for either judgment in her individual capacity. Plaintiffs appeal, asserting that contractor’s wife was liable as partner or joint venturer with the other Defendants for breach of contract and implied warranty of workmanship and that the court erred in its award of damages and in failing to award prejudgment interest. We modify and affirm the judgment.

The defendant, Mario Thomas, appeals the sentences imposed for his guilty pleas to the offenses of aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, employing a firearm in the commission of a dangerous felony, and possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony involving the use or attempted use of violence. The defendant's sole allegation of error is that the trial court should not have ordered his convictions for aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery to run consecutively. After a thorough review of the record, we discern no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Andra Taylor, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2012 convictions for aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and two counts of reckless endangerment involving a deadly weapon, for which he is serving an effective fourteen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying him relief due to the ineffective assistance of counsel in the conviction proceedings. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Dwayne Williams, pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual battery and was sentenced to eight years in confinement. Petitioner filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief, and following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, petitioner argues that: (1) his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered; (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to file a motion to suppress and failed to investigate a potential plea offer; and (3) he was denied a full and fair hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims against his first counsel. After our review of the parties' briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a premises liability case. Appellant had rented property from Appellees for approximately one year when Appellant was injured as a result of a fall when the railing along the stairs of the premises allegedly collapsed. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees based upon its conclusion that Appellees had negated the essential element of Appellant's claim that, in order for Appellees to have been negligent in the accident, any defect in the stairs or supporting structure must have existed at the time of the execution of the lease. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

Appellant, Louis Orlando Harmon, stands convicted of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000; possession of tools used to interfere with anti-theft security devices; and driving while his license was suspended.  He was sentenced to six years for the theft of property offense, to a consecutive term of eleven months, twenty-nine days for the possession of tools offense, and to a concurrent term of six months for the driving offense.  On appeal, he argues that the trial court committed plain error by allowing an Academy Sports and Outdoors loss prevention officer to testify about the identification of appellant and his vehicle by other employees of the store.  Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The State of Tennessee (“the State”) appeals the decision of the Tennessee Claims Commission (“the Claims Commission”) awarding Brett Patterson (“Patterson”) $439.10 for arts-and-crafts supplies that Patterson was required either to mail out of the prison or donate pursuant to a policy of the Turney Center Industrial Complex (“Turney Center”) where Patterson is an inmate. We find and hold that the Claims Commission does not have jurisdiction over intentional torts, and as no negligence was alleged or shown, the Claims Commission lacked jurisdiction over this case. We, therefore, vacate the decision of the Claims Commission and dismiss this case.

This case involves the trial court's award of litigation costs, inclusive of attorney's fees, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-12-119(c) (Supp. 2015), upon granting the defendant's Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the defendant in the amount of $10,000, the statutory maximum, against the plaintiff and her surety. The plaintiff appeals the portion of the ruling holding the surety liable for the $10,000 judgment of litigation costs in the event the principal fails to satisfy the judgment. Having determined that the surety's cost bond explicitly referred to “costs” as defined in Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-12-120 (2009), rather than as defined in subsection -119(c), we reverse the trial court's judgment as to the surety. We affirm the trial court's judgment against the principal and remand for enforcement of that judgment.

Appellant, Danny Blankenship Bonding Company, appeals the judgment of the Henderson County Circuit Court forfeiting a $3,000 bail bond in the case of criminal defendant Edward Hunt. On appeal, appellant argues that he was entitled to relief pursuant to Tennessee Code sections 40-11-139(c) and 40-11-203(a). Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

The appellant, Katarina R. Long, pled guilty in the Dickson County Circuit Court to theft of property valued $10,000 or more but less than $60,000 and was granted judicial diversion with the requirement that she complete three years of probation and pay $20,000 restitution.  On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the amount of restitution when it was clear that she did not have the ability to pay it.  Because we lack jurisdiction to consider her appeal, we must dismiss it.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant-bank to halt foreclosure proceedings. When the bank did not answer the complaint, the plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment. The trial court denied the motion for default judgment and, sua sponte, dismissed the complaint. We affirm the denial of plaintiff‟s motion for default judgment but vacate the dismissal of his complaint.

This appeal results from a divorce proceeding between Christopher Eric Tidwell (“Father”) and Alicia Ann Tidwell (“Mother”). On appeal, Father challenges the trial court’s determination of Mother’s income for child support purposes, the trial court’s award of rehabilitative alimony to Mother, and the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Mother. Having reviewed the record transmitted to us, we affirm the trial court’s determination of Mother’s income, vacate a portion of the awarded rehabilitative alimony, and modify the award of attorney’s fees.

This appeal involves an allegedly unsafe building in the City of Jackson. After a hearing, the City of Jackson’s environmental court ordered the property owner to demolish the building. The property owner appealed to circuit court. After another hearing, the circuit court declared the property a public nuisance and also ordered it demolished. The property owner appeals. He argues that the City of Jackson failed to follow the correct procedures under the city code, and therefore, he should not be required to demolish the structure. Discerning no merit in this assertion, we affirm.

An employee sustained a compensable injury to her shoulder. She was able to return to work in a transitional modified job and settled her claim within the one and one-half times impairment cap. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(d)(1)(A). Her employer offered her a permanent job with accommodations for her medical restrictions. The employee did not accept the position and was terminated. She sought reconsideration of her settlement. The trial court found that the employer had acted reasonably and that the employee had a meaningful return to work. The trial court, therefore, declined to award additional benefits. The employee has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment.

The Defendant, Stacey Green, appeals from his convictions for aggravated robbery, burglary, aggravated assault, and three counts of facilitation of aggravated robbery.  The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence relating to a victim’s pretrial identification of the Defendant in a photographic lineup and that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions.  Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

Post-divorce, a guardian was appointed for two minor children while their mother received treatment for substance abuse. The guardian, the half-brother of the minors, sought child support from both parents. The guardian alleges, inter alia, the trial court abused its discretion by adjusting for tax deductions before calculating the mother's gross income for child support due and by allowing her credit for support in kind and purchases of necessities. We affirm the trial court's findings.

The plaintiff filed the instant action regarding injuries he allegedly received while in the custody of the Robertson County Detention Center. The trial court dismissed the action sua sponte based on multiple grounds, including untimeliness pursuant to the applicable statute of limitations. The plaintiff filed a motion seeking alteration of the order of dismissal. The trial court denied the request by a handwritten notation supplied on the face of the motion. The plaintiff appealed. Having determined that there is no valid, final order in this matter, we conclude that the appeal must be dismissed due to this Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

In this health care liability action, the plaintiffs disagree with a number of the trial court’s rulings upon which it based its decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The trial court excluded the plaintiffs’ life care planner due to their failure to provide a complete disclosure of the life care planner’s opinions in a timely manner. The trial court ruled that the plaintiffs’ sole standard of care expert, a neurosurgeon, was not competent to testify as to the standard of care of the defendant nurse practitioner. Furthermore, the trial court precluded the plaintiffs’ standard of care expert from testifying at all due to the plaintiffs’ repeated failure to comply with the court’s orders regarding discovery. We find no abuse of discretion with respect to the trial court’s decisions and affirm the judgment.  

This is a termination of parental rights case. The Department of Children's Services (DCS) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of A.C.P. (Mother) with respect to her three minor children, ages twenty-two months to six years at the time of trial. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence of grounds. The court found the same quantum of evidence supporting the conclusion that termination of Mother‟s rights is in the children's best interest. Mother appeals. As modified, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Appellant, Phillip Serpas, entered guilty pleas to two counts of unlawfully obtaining a prescription for controlled substances by fraud, Class D felonies, and one count of conspiracy to obtain or attempt to obtain a controlled substance by fraud, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of two years each for the Class D felonies and one year for the Class E felony. The trial court held a hearing on the issue of alternative sentencing and ordered appellant to serve his effective two-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant appeals the denial of alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The former administrator of an assisted living facility appeals the summary dismissal of his claim for retaliatory discharge under the Tennessee Public Protection Act (“TPPA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304, and common law. Plaintiff contends he was fired in retaliation for initiating an internal investigation and submitting an internal report to his supervisors concerning an incident that arose when the son of an elderly resident observed an old bandage stuck to the bottom of his mother’s foot, which was revealed when her sock was removed in order to check the dressing for a wound on her ankle. Defendants contend Plaintiff’s claims are legally deficient because there was no neglect or illegal activity to report, and that Plaintiff grossly overreacted after being informed that an old bandage was found on the ball of a resident’s foot in a sock when the resident’s wound, which was on her ankle, was properly dressed and bandaged. Defendants also rely on the fact that Plaintiff did not file a qualifying internal or external report of neglect until after he was fired. The trial court summarily dismissed the TPPA claim stating “leaving a bandage in a sock, where a patient’s wound is in fact otherwise sufficiently bandaged, is not illegal activity as defined by the statute. Leaving the bandage in the sock is not ‘abuse and neglect’ as defined in the statute.” The court dismissed the common law whistleblower claim because Plaintiff did not show that Defendants engaged “in illegal conduct or in any way . . . posed a threat to an important public policy of the State when all that was done was to leave an old bandage in a patient’s sock.” Plaintiff appeals the summary dismissal of his claims under the TPPA and common law. We affirm.

Defendant, Daetrus Pilate, appeals his convictions for rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, sexual battery by an authority figure, and incest and also appeals his effective sentence of forty-nine years. Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred by permitting the State to present evidence that violated the rules of discovery; (2) the trial court erred by admitting a prior consistent statement of the victim; (3) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of Defendant's arrest and giving a jury instruction on flight; (4) cumulative error requires reversal of the convictions; (5) there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions; and (6) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.