APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Mother and Father appeal the trial court’s finding that termination is in the best interests of their three younger children. Because we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s findings that Mother and Father committed severe abuse against a child and that the children’s best interests are served by termination, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Gabriel Enriques Turcios, was convicted of first degree murder and was sentenced to serve life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Thereafter, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at his trial. More specifically, he alleged that his trial counsel (1) failed to timely and adequately raise an insanity defense; (2) failed to challenge the aggravating circumstance for sentencing under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(i)(5); and (3) failed to seek suppression of messages exchanged between the Petitioner and the victim. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appealed. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Brandon Bassett, Defendant, was indicted for and convicted of five counts of aggravated sexual battery. On appeal he argues that the State’s failure to elect an offense in Count 5 resulted in a jury verdict that was not unanimous and requires reversal. Defendant also argues the trial court abused its discretion in ordering consecutive sentencing by failing to place findings on the record to show that the overall length of the sentence comported with the purposes and principles of sentencing. Because we determine that the proof at trial necessitated an election on Count 5, we reverse the conviction in Count 5 and remand for a new trial. However, we determine the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to an effective sentence of thirty years. In all other respects, the judgments are affirmed. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion for recusal of the trial judge. After carefully reviewing the limited record provided by the parties, we affirm the decision of the trial court denying the motion.

This appeal arises out of a local planning commission’s approval of a development plan application. The Plaintiff sought to appeal the planning commission’s approval of the application to the local board of zoning appeals; however, a local zoning ordinance permitted the plan applicant to opt out of the appeal before the board of zoning appeals, which he did. The plaintiff then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the circuit court, challenging the planning commission’s approval of the application and the dismissal of his appeal by the board of zoning appeals. The plaintiff claimed that the opt-out provision violates his constitutional right; thus, by applying the opt-out provision, the board of zoning appeals acted illegally. The circuit court dismissed the petition, holding that the plaintiff impermissibly combined an original action with a petition for certiorari review. The circuit court also dismissed the plaintiff’s claim regarding the planning commission’s actions because the plaintiff did not sufficiently verify his petition. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right filed pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Due to numerous deficiencies in the petition, the appeal is hereby dismissed.

The Defendant, Nancy Abbie Tallent, was convicted by an Anderson County Circuit Court jury of two counts of third-offense driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (2024). The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be served at 75%. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the case, (2) no probable cause existed for her arrest, (3) the trial court erred by failing to strike the testimony of witnesses who offered allegedly perjured testimony, (4) a police officer committed willful misconduct because he “overcharged” her in order to obtain a higher bond and obtain leverage for a plea agreement, (5) the trial court erred by not suppressing the blood sample evidence based upon the use of an allegedly outdated consent form, (6) the police violated the Defendant’s HIPAA rights and violated State law by requesting her medical records and by fabricating the alcohol toxicology report used at trial, (7) the police violated State law by altering video evidence used at trial, (8) she was denied due process of law due to various defects in the conviction proceedings, (9) she was denied an additional blood sample for defense testing, (10) police officers perjured themselves and suborned perjury, (11) the chain of custody for the blood evidence was not established, and (12) the State unjustifiably made a plea offer after the jury returned the guilty verdict in order to avoid an allegedly meritorious appeal following “an abusive performance” during the trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Byron Pipkin, of first degree premeditated murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, possessing a firearm during a felony, and possessing a handgun as a convicted felon. The trial court imposed an effective life sentence plus sixty-eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his first degree premeditated murder conviction and the trial court erred when it admitted prejudicial information. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

In this post-divorce proceeding, Appellant initiated a contempt action against Appellee for failure to make two alimony payments, as required under the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”). After Appellee remitted payment, the sole issue to be tried was the amount of attorney’s fees Appellant expended enforcing the MDA. Appellant sought $14,289.50 in attorney’s fees and $396.36 in expenses. The trial court awarded her $2,500.00. Because the trial court made limited findings and failed to consider Rule 1.5(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct, we vacate its award of attorney’s fees. On remand, the trial court is instructed to reconsider Appellant’s attorney’s fee award in view of the Rule 1.5(a) factors and to make written findings consistent with these factors. Husband’s request for appellate attorney’s fees is denied.

An employee discharged in a reduction-in-force claimed her employer discriminated against her. The trial court determined that the employee was unable to establish a prima facie case of discrimination and granted summary judgment to the employer. We affirm.

Defendant, Corridirus Qualls, was convicted of one count of first degree premeditated murder; two counts of attempted second degree murder; one count of reckless endangerment by discharging a firearm into an occupied habitation; two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; two counts of aggravated assault; and one count of reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a total effective sentence of life plus eighteen years. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by imposing partial consecutive sentencing. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following an automobile accident allegedly involving a State of Tennessee employee, claimant sought damages against the State based on alleged injuries arising from the accident. The Division of Claims and Risk Management denied the claim, and claimant appealed to the Claims Commission. Because claimant’s appeal was not filed within the ninety-day statutory time limit, the Claims Commission dismissed it. Finding no error, we affirm.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right filed pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B by the defendant, Keith Dessinger, concerning his motion seeking recusal of the trial court judge. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Mr. Dessinger, we determine it to be fatally deficient. We therefore dismiss the appeal.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

In this accelerated interlocutory appeal, Father seeks to appeal the denial of his motion to recuse the trial court judge. Because we can find no evidence in the record of any bias that would require recusal, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion.

In this constitutional challenge involving a non-judicial foreclosure, the trial court determined that Tennessee Code Annotated § 35-5-106 is not unconstitutional as applied because the City of Chattanooga acted in a proprietary capacity when it conducted a non-judicial foreclosure of a deed of trust. Thus, only private conduct is at issue and constitutional rights are not implicated. We affirm.

The Defendant, Andrew Jackson, through counsel, has filed a motion for review of
the Hamblen County Criminal Court’s revocation of his pretrial bail. See Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-11-144; see also Tenn. R. App. P. 8. The Defendant asserts that the trial court
improperly revoked his pretrial bail, sua sponte, when the Defendant decided not to enter
a guilty plea at the plea submission hearing and, instead, asserted his right to a jury trial.
The Defendant argues that the trial court’s summary revocation of his pretrial bail—
without notice, a hearing, or requiring the State to establish by a preponderance of evidence
a statutory basis for revoking his pretrial bail—does not comport with due process. See
State v. Burgins, 464 S.W.3d 298, 306 (Tenn. 2015). The State has filed a response
conceding that the Defendant’s due process rights were denied when the trial court
summarily revoked his bail without holding a hearing. Upon full consideration, the
Defendant’s motion is GRANTED, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this court’s order.

The Defendant, Heather Jackson, through counsel, has filed a motion for review of
the Hamblen County Criminal Court’s revocation of her pretrial bail. See Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-11-144; see also Tenn. R. App. P. 8. The Defendant asserts that the trial court
improperly revoked her pretrial bail, sua sponte, when the Defendant decided not to enter
a guilty plea at the plea submission hearing and, instead, asserted her right to a jury trial.
The Defendant argues that the trial court’s summary revocation of her pretrial bail—
without notice, a hearing, or requiring the State to establish by a preponderance of evidence
a statutory basis for revoking her pretrial bail—does not comport with due process. See
State v. Burgins, 464 S.W.3d 298, 306 (Tenn. 2015). The court has determined that a
response from the State is not necessary in this matter.1 Upon full consideration, the
Defendant’s motion is GRANTED, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this court’s order.

This is a post-divorce civil contempt action stemming from a divorce that was finalized in 2014. At the hearing on the contempt petition in February 2024, the husband moved the trial court to dismiss the petition because the parties’ marital dissolution agreement was not in the record. The trial court granted this motion but later, upon motion by the wife, set aside the 2014 final decree pursuant to Rule 60.01. The trial court re-entered the final decree, nunc pro tunc, with the marital dissolution agreement attached. From this order, the husband timely appeals to this Court. We reverse.

In the Circuit Court for Washington County (“the Trial Court”), Gayla Henry filed a motion to vacate two 2019 judgments entered by the General Sessions Court for Washington County (“the General Sessions Court”) in favor of Jesse Street and Property Listing and Rental Agency (“Property Listing”) and to re-open a case dismissed by the Trial Court in 2020. She named Mr. Street; Property Listing; Robert Stacy, sole proprietor of Property Listing; and Kristi Shepard, a real estate agent employed by Property Listing (“Defendants”) as defendants in her motion. She alleged that the 2019 judgments had been procured through fraud by opposing counsel. The Trial Court denied the motion to vacate. Ms. Henry appeals. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm and grant Defendants’ request for attorney’s fees and costs on appeal.

A husband and wife disputed the value of the husband’s business for purposes of equitably dividing the marital estate in their divorce. The trial court adopted a value proposed by the wife’s expert. Because we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Henry T. Johnson, appeals from the Lake County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his second petition for writ of habeas corpus. Specifically, the Petitioner contends he raised cognizable claims for habeas corpus relief and asserts his judgment of conviction of first degree murder is void because (1) the trial court failed to pronounce judgment or sentence pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-20-101(a); (2) the original judgment was not signed by the trial judge; and (3) the trial judge was without jurisdiction to enter a corrected judgment because the original judgment had already become final. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights appeal. The trial court found that four statutory grounds existed to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the minor child and that termination of parental rights would be in the child’s best interest. Father has appealed. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

In 2020, a local board of education adopted changes to its student code of conduct requiring, among other things, that teachers participate in a student discipline policy and engage in social and emotional learning support. The local teachers’ association filed suit, arguing that the board of education was required to engage in collaborative conferencing with the teachers’ association before adopting the changes because they constituted “working conditions” under the Professional Educators Collaborative Conferencing Act of 2011, Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-5-608(a). The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the teachers’ association. We reverse.

This appeal concerns service of process. Vernon Lowe (“Plaintiff”) sued Elisha Harvey (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”) for personal injuries sustained in a car accident. Defendant lives out of state. Plaintiff attempted to serve Defendant via the Tennessee Secretary of State. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss asserting insufficient service of process. The attempted service on Defendant occurred during the Covid-19 pandemic, when the signature requirement for return receipt mail was suspended by the postal service. The signature space on the proof of delivery shows “E Harvey” handwritten with “MRC1C19” underneath. Plaintiff does not argue that this represents Defendant’s signature. Instead, Plaintiff argues that his service upon the Secretary of State was sufficient in itself. The Trial Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.