APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, William T. Minton, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Sara Anne Neumann, was charged with one count of driving under the influence (“DUI”). The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence from the traffic stop, arguing that the arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion that she was committing a traffic violation to justify the stop. The trial court agreed and granted the motion to suppress. The State now appeals, arguing that the officer’s observation of the defendant and his radar gun constituted reasonable suspicion. Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we conclude that the evidence preponderates against the findings of the trial court. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Kevin Patton Benfield, was convicted by a Henderson County jury of one count of aggravated assault and received an effective sentence of six years' confinement. On appeal, the sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction. Upon our review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Ameale Hudson, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel‘s failure to include in his motion for new trial the issue of the trial court‘s denial of two of the Petitioner‘s pretrial motions, which resulted in the waiver of the issues on direct appeal. He further asserts that the cumulative effect of trial counsel‘s errors entitles him to post-conviction relief. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Judgment debtor appeals the entry of a charging order which subjected the debtor’s interest in a limited liability company to satisfaction of the judgment debt.  Finding that the charging order is not a final judgment for purposes of appeal, we dismiss the appeal and remand the case for further proceedings.

On remand from a prior appeal, the parties engaged in discovery and the defendants then moved for summary judgment on the two remaining issues – claims of false light invasion of privacy against a television station and its employees. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the standard of actual malice was not met and awarding discretionary costs against the plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed. We affirm.  

The Defendant, Joseph Harris, appeals as of right from his jury conviction for aggravated robbery. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because violence was only used after the taking of the automobile had been completed; (2) that the trial court should have declared a mistrial when an alleged violation of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), took place by a witness's reference to a co-defendant's statement that incriminated the Defendant; (3) that the trial court should have instructed the jury on joyriding as lesser-included offense of theft; and (4) that the trial court should have issued a special instruction on when a “taking” occurred by including additional language from State v. Swift, 308 S.W.3d 827 (Tenn. 2010). Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 2003, an employee sustained injuries to his spine, pelvis, and shoulder while working for his employer. In 2007, the trial court determined that the employee was permanently and totally disabled as a result of the work-related injury and that his employer was responsible for authorized future medical treatment directly related to the work-related injury. In 2013, the employee filed a motion to compel medical benefits, asserting that his employer had refused to pay for medical treatment determined to be reasonable and necessary by his authorized treating physician. The trial court denied the motion, and the employee appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Father appeals the trial court's determination that termination of his parental rights is in the child's best interest. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to terminate Father's parental rights on grounds of abandonment by wanton disregard, persistent conditions, and substantial non-compliance with a permanency plan. The trial court thereafter determined that termination is in the child's best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm both the trial court's rulings regarding grounds and its determination that termination is in the child's best interest.

Father filed a petition to modify the parties’ permanent parenting plan to make him the primary residential parent. The trial court granted Father’s petition, finding that there had been a material change of circumstances and that a change of primary residential parent was in the best interest of the two younger children. Because the trial court applied an erroneous legal standard in making its determination of a material change of circumstances, we vacate and remand.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the appeal should be dismissed. However, when the issue is addressed on its merits, the convictions should be affirmed. The trial court found that Defendant was not wearing his seatbelt, which was a violation of the law, and that fact gave the trooper legal grounds to stop Defendant. By the limited issue in the certified question of law, Defendant (who presumably drafted the certified question) challenged only the stop and seizure of his vehicle on the ground that he was driving without wearing his seatbelt. The State could have insisted that the certified question include the issue relied upon by the majority in order to justify the seizure of the drug evidence, but did not. Thus, neither the State nor this court can go beyond the precise issue presented. The appellate court is “limited to consideration of the question preserved.” State v. Day, 263 S.W.3d 891, 900 (Tenn. 2008).

The defendant, Justin Tyler, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to twenty-five years and ten years, respectively, to be served consecutively in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in admitting the video of the victim's forensic interview, (2) the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, and (3) the cumulative effect of the errors warrants reversal. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Greene County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jeremy Curtis Workman, of five counts of rape of a child and two counts of incest, and the trial court sentenced him to serve twenty-five years, at 100%, followed by twelve years, at 30%. This Court affirmed the Petitioner's convictions. State v. Jeremy Workman, No. E2010-02278-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 6210667 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Dec. 13, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2012). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged, inter alia, that his trial counsel failed to present a defense by not presenting witnesses on the Petitioner's behalf and by failing to subpoena Dr. Chang, a doctor who examined the victim and who the Petitioner asserts gave “different conclusions.” After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the Petitioner relief. We affirm the post-conviction court's judgment.

The Defendant, Randy Jackson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and attempt to commit aggravated robbery, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-402 (2014), 39-12-101 (2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to consecutive terms of eleven years for aggravated robbery and nine years for attempted aggravated robbery, for an effective twenty-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Kevin Anthony Dickson Junior, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner's primary contention is that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because he is a sovereign citizen who is not subject to the laws of the State of Tennessee, though he also includes an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel as well as other alleged constitutional violations. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, Ricky Duvil Lunsford, of attempted voluntary manslaughter and employing a deadly weapon during the commission of a dangerous felony. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it: (1) failed to properly instruct the jury; (2) excluded an email from the Defendant to the victim about the decline of their marriage; (3) prevented the Defendant from testifying about the victim's prior aggressive tendencies; and (4) excluded evidence of the victim's prior domestic assault charge. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury as to self-defense. We reverse the judgments of conviction and remand for a new trial.

The Defendant, Nicholas Grace, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-402. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Alexander K. Carney, pled guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class C felony; possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, for which he received an effective sentence of five years in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to his sentence for a conviction in a separate case. As a condition of his guilty plea, the defendant attempted to reserve a certified question of law regarding the legality of the traffic stop that led to the discovery of the drugs. Because we agree with the State that the certified question of law is not dispositive of the case, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

George Lambert ("Lambert") sued John Arnold Fitzgerald ("Fitzgerald") in connection with money that Lambert gave to Fitzgerald to invest alleging claims for, among other things, fraud, intentional misrepresentation, violation of the Tennessee Securities Act of 1980, and unjust enrichment. After trial and a hearing on a motion to amend, the Chancery Court for Rhea County ("the Trial Court") entered its order awarding Lambert a judgment against Fitzgerald for $33,840.28 in principal, pre-judgment interest, and attorney‘s fees pursuant to a promissory note, and dismissing Lambert‘s remaining claims. Lambert appeals to this Court raising issues with regard to the dismissal of his claims for fraud, intentional misrepresentation, violation of the Tennessee Securities Act of 1980, and unjust enrichment.

The petitioner, Tiffany Amos, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of relief from her theft and criminal impersonation convictions, arguing that she received ineffective assistance of counsel and that her guilty pleas were unknowingly and involuntarily entered. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This appeal arises from a default judgment entered in a divorce action, wherein the wife was granted, inter alia, a permanent order of protection against the husband. The husband sought to have the permanent order of protection provision contained in the parties' divorce decree set aside, asserting that the statutory scheme pertaining to orders of protection did not provide authority for entry of a permanent, open-ended order of protection. The trial court entered an order denying relief to the husband and affirming its entry of a permanent order of protection. Husband timely appealed. Determining that the trial court was without statutory authority to enter a permanent order of protection with no time limitation, we vacate that portion of the trial court's order.

This is a grandparent visitation case. Sven Hadjopoulos (“Grandfather”) and Mary Lou Hadjopoulos (“Grandmother”) (“Grandparents,” collectively) filed a petition seeking visitation with their minor granddaughter (“the Child”). Alexandra Sponcia (“Mother”) and Christopher Sponcia (“Father”) (“Parents,” collectively) opposed the petition and the requested visitation. After a trial, the Chancery Court for Greene County (“the Trial Court”) found that substantial harm likely would come to the Child should visitation with Grandparents cease. The Trial Court, therefore, ordered grandparent visitation. Parents filed an appeal to this Court. We hold that the Trial Court’s final judgment is insufficient in a number of ways detailed herein, including its lack of a required best interest determination. We vacate the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for the Trial Court to enter a new, clarified final judgment in this case consistent with this Opinion.

The petitioner, Alonza Grace, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief, arguing that his guilty plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered because he was under the influence of prescription medication. He further contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a forensic evaluation to determine his competency and in failing to investigate alleged missing evidence. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Paul David Childs, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief.  The Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel.  Specifically, the Petitioner alleges that trial counsel was ineffective (1) for failing to “adequately inform” the Petitioner about “his rights regarding a preliminary hearing” and failing to request a preliminary hearing; (2) for failing to impeach the victim with an alleged prior inconsistent statement; (3) for preventing the Petitioner from testifying at trial; (4) for failing to sufficiently prepare for the trial, failing to present any witnesses at trial, and pursuing a “highly questionable” trial strategy; and (5) for advising the Petitioner to waive his right to appeal his conviction.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Lona Parker, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.