APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Plaintiff who brought action under the Fair Credit Reporting Act appeals the dismissal of the case on statute of limitations grounds. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment dismissing the case.   

We granted this appeal to reconsider our decision in State v. Moats, 403 S.W.3d 170 (Tenn. 2013), which held that the community caretaking doctrine is not an exception to the federal and state constitutional warrant requirements. Having concluded that Moats was wrongly decided, we overrule Moats and hold that the community caretaking doctrine is analytically distinct from consensual police-citizen encounters and is instead an exception to the state and federal constitutional warrant requirements which may be invoked to validate as reasonable a warrantless seizure of an automobile. To establish that the community caretaking exception applies, the State must show that (1) the officer possessed specific and articulable facts, which, viewed objectively and in the totality of the circumstances, reasonably warranted a conclusion that a community caretaking action was needed; and (2) the officer’s behavior and the scope of the intrusion were reasonably restrained and tailored to the community caretaking need. We conclude, based on the proof in the record on appeal, that the community caretaking exception applies in this case. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court and Court of Criminal Appeals declining to grant the defendant’s motion to suppress are affirmed on the separate grounds stated herein.

The defendant, Charles Edward Phillips, III, was convicted by a Benton County Circuit Court jury of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; interference with emergency communications, a Class A misdemeanor; and driving while license suspended, revoked, or cancelled, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court reduced the aggravated assault conviction to simple assault, a Class A misdemeanor, and sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to an effective term of twelve years at 100% in the Department of Correction. The sole issue the defendant raises on appeal is whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the sentencing imposed by the trial court.

Plaintiff/Appellant appeals from the dismissal of his civil rights claims based upon the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations contained in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-3-104. Because Appellant's complaint, taken as true at the motion to dismiss stage, sufficiently alleges post-contract formation conduct on the part of the Defendants/Appellees, we conclude that the four-year federal catchall statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 1658 applies to Appellant's claims in this case. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's dismissal of Appellant's civil rights claims and remand for further proceedings. Because Appellant did not designate the dismissal of his state law contract claims as issues on appeal, however, we affirm the dismissal of those claims.

The defendant, David Anderson Hatcher, appeals the revocation of the probationary sentence imposed for his Blount County Circuit Court conviction of aggravated burglary. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Aaron T. James, appeals as of right from the Morgan County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his judgment is void because his guilty plea to second degree murder was unknowing and involuntary. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Ryan Robert Haase, filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Marshall County Circuit Court, alleging that his counsel were ineffective for failing to advise him correctly on his range classification and that as a result, he chose to reject a plea agreement and proceed to trial.  The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Antonio L. Nelson, pled nolo contendere in the Cheatham County Circuit Court to aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, aggravated rape, and two counts of theft of property valued over $1,000 but less than $10,000.  The trial court sentenced the Appellant to a total effective sentence of forty years.  On appeal, the Appellant challenges the length of the individual sentences imposed by the trial court and the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After its closure, a Class II landfill continued to discharge contaminants into a creek that flowed into a lake located on adjoining property. Following years of investigations and multiple failed remedial measures, the landfill owner and the state agency with authority to direct landfill cleanup operations agreed that the most feasible, practical, and effective way to abate the discharge was for the landfill owner to divert water from entering the landfill and, over a four-year period, to remove and relocate the landfill waste. The neighboring landowner of the property on which the lake affected by the discharge was located objected to the plan, arguing that the landfill owner should also be required to treat or divert water leaving the landfill site. The Tennessee Solid Waste Disposal Control Board (“the Board”) heard the case and approved the landowner’s plan of action and did not require diversion of the water leaving the landfill. The neighboring landowner appealed, and the trial court affirmed the Board’s decision. The Court of Appeals, dissatisfied with the ruling, remanded the case to the Board to take additional proof on whether the neighboring landowner was willing to pay for the costs of diverting the discharge, the costs of implementing the diversion option, and the landfill owner’s ability to pay for the diversion plan. We granted the Board’s application for permission to appeal. We hold that the Court of Appeals failed to properly apply the judicial review provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322(h) (2011) and substituted its judgment for that of the Board. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 

The workers' compensation claimant was an independent contractor for the defendant, a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce. The claimant and the defendant agreed that the defendant would provide workers' compensation coverage to the claimant based on Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-106(1)(B) (2012). The claimant was injured while driving a tractor trailer for the defendant. The claimant's claim for benefits was denied, and he sued for workers' compensation benefits. The defendant moved for summary judgment, asserting that the claimant's employment agreement was void because of alleged material misrepresentations made by the claimant regarding his physical condition during his pre-employment medical examination. The trial court granted the defendant's motion, based on its finding that the claim was barred by claimant's pre-employment material misrepresentations and Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-103 (2012). This appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We vacate the grant of summary judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Joseph Anthony Rivera, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder committed during the attempt to perpetrate a kidnapping, first degree felony murder committed during the attempt to perpetrate a burglary, second degree murder, a Class A felony, especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a)(2) (2014) (felony murder), 39-13-210(a) (2014) (second degree murder); 39-14-404 (2014) (especially aggravated burglary), 39-13-102 (2010) (aggravated assault). The trial court merged the felony murder committed during the attempted perpetration of a kidnapping and second degree murder convictions with the felony murder committed during the attempt to perpetrate a burglary conviction and sentenced the Defendant to concurrent terms of life imprisonment for felony murder, ten years for especially aggravated burglary, and five years for aggravated assault. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his felony murder convictions, (2) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's motion to sever, (3) the trial court erred by admitting inadmissible hearsay evidence, (4) the trial court erred by admitting autopsy photograph evidence, (5) the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to question two witnesses relative to an unrelated homicide, and (6) the prosecutor made improper statements during his closing argument. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Brian Allen Cathey, pled guilty to possession with intent to sell or deliver over one-half ounce of marijuana and to possession with the intent to use drug paraphernalia in exchange for a one-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court after a sentencing hearing. The trial court denied alternative sentencing. On appeal Defendant challenges the denial of an alternative sentence. We determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Larry Malone, of theft of property valued $10,000 or more but less than $60,000 and vandalism of property valued $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, Class C felonies. On appeal, the appellant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon the record and the parties' briefs, the appellant's conviction of felony theft is modified to theft of property valued $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. The appellant's felony vandalism conviction is affirmed.

The Appellant, Albert Taylor, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. On appeal, the Appellant argues that the trial court erred (1) by determining that, because his sentences had expired, he was not entitled to a motion hearing and (2) by treating his motion as a petition for habeas corpus relief. At first, the State conceded that the trial court erred. We originally determined that, even though the Appellant’s sentences were expired, he had stated a colorable claim and was entitled to a hearing, and therefore, we reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with Rule 36.1. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted the State’s application for permission to appeal and remanded the case to this court for reconsideration in light of the supreme court’s recent opinion in State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200 (Tenn. 2015). After revisiting the issue, we conclude that the Appellant is not entitled to a hearing because his sentences have long ago expired. As such, we now affirm the trial court’s denial of the Appellant’s Rule 36.1 motion.

Defendant, Roderick Williams, appeals his convictions for assault, aggravated assault, and aggravated criminal trespassing, and his effective sentence of sixteen years as a persistent offender. He argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in its determination of his offender classification; and (3) his convictions of assault and aggravated assault should be merged. We affirm the judgments of the trial court and remand for entry of a judgment regarding the charge dismissed before trial.

This appeal arises from a termination of parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children‘s Services ("DCS") filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Sevier County ("the Juvenile Court") seeking to terminate the parental rights of James W. ("Father") to his children Aniston and Chloe ("the Children"). After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Father‘s parental rights to the Children on the ground of wanton disregard and, also, finding that termination of Father‘s parental rights was in the Children‘s best interest. Father appeals, arguing that the Juvenile Court‘s failure to grant his request for appointed counsel during the earlier dependency and neglect proceeding warrants reversal of the Juvenile Court‘s order terminating his parental rights to the Children. We hold that any alleged deficiencies in the dependency and neglect proceedings were remedied by the protections afforded by the termination proceeding, and that, in any event, Father was not disadvantaged by any alleged deficiencies. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court in its entirety.

The Petitioner, Charles Wayne Dalton, filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, seeking relief from his convictions of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and two counts of aggravated kidnapping.  The Petitioner contended that he entered guilty pleas and forfeited his right to appeal without knowing that he would be required to be on the sexual offender registry for life.  The trial court denied relief, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Although I am compelled to agree with the majority’s conclusion affirming the denial of coram nobis relief, I write separately to elaborate on the conundrum the petitioner faces in this case.  It is significant to me that the petitioner was convicted by a jury of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and two counts of aggravated kidnapping.  The State, the defense, and the trial court stipulated that at the time of his guilty plea to other charges and waiver of his right to appeal his jury convictions, the petitioner was not advised that he would be required to register as a sex offender, see T.C.A. § 40-39-211(a), (c), and that the petitioner’s offenses did not involve an element of sex. Despite the parties’ efforts to rectify the inequity of placing the petitioner on the sexual offender registry, because the petitioner’s kidnapping related convictions automatically trigger the Tennessee Sex Offender Registry Act, they were constrained by statute to comply.

The Petitioner, Dallas Jay Stewart, appeals from the denial of his petition seeking post-conviction relief from his convictions of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and exhibition of harmful material to a minor.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by finding that trial counsel was not ineffective by failing to object to testimony that the Petitioner took a polygraph test and by “opening the door” to evidence of an uncharged allegation that the Petitioner committed a sexual offense in Williamson County.  The Petitioner further contends that the post-conviction court erred by refusing to grant a continuance to allow the Petitioner additional time to prepare for the post-conviction hearing.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, AAAA Bonding Company, LLC, appeals the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s revocation of its authority to write bail bonds.  The State concedes that the trial court erred because the evidence failed to show that the owner of the company and his wife, the circuit court clerk, commingled funds and, therefore, that she received an indirect benefit from his ownership of the company to justify the revocation.  However, the State requests that we remand the case to the trial court in order for the court to consider additional proof and make additional findings as to whether the court clerk is receiving some other direct or indirect benefit from her husband’s ownership of AAAA Bonding Company, LLC.  Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the judgment of the trial court but decline to remand the case for further proceedings.  Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is vacated.

Pro se petitioner, Carl Jones, Jr., appeals the Bledsoe County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In this appeal, the petitioner argues that his judgment of conviction is void because the trial court failed to award him jail credit for time served on community corrections. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the habeas court and remand this matter for entry of an amended judgment awarding the petitioner 259 days of jail credit.

This appeal involves a trust. A beneficiary of the trust filed this lawsuit against the bank that served as trustee of the trust, alleging that the bank mismanaged the trust in various respects and violated several duties owed to the beneficiary. After a five-day bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the trustee-bank on all claims. The bank was awarded its attorney's fees and expenses. The beneficiary appeals. We affirm.

The petitioner, William T. Minton, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Sara Anne Neumann, was charged with one count of driving under the influence (“DUI”). The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence from the traffic stop, arguing that the arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion that she was committing a traffic violation to justify the stop. The trial court agreed and granted the motion to suppress. The State now appeals, arguing that the officer’s observation of the defendant and his radar gun constituted reasonable suspicion. Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we conclude that the evidence preponderates against the findings of the trial court. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The pro se defendant, Pamela Moses, appeals the Shelby County Circuit Court’s dismissal of her appeal of her convictions in the Bartlett Municipal Court for speeding and illegally parking in a handicapped parking space. Among other things, she argues that her notice of appeal was timely and that the trial court’s dismissal for failure to prosecute was improper because she was not notified of her trial date, in violation of her substantive and procedural due process rights. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the appeal.