APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Rutherford County jury convicted the defendant, Vernice Darlene Farrar, of three counts of first-degree felony murder, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and three counts of fraudulent use of a debit card, for which she received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus twenty-five years. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support her convictions for first-degree felony murder during the perpetration of a kidnapping, especially aggravated kidnapping, and fraudulent use of a debit card. She also contends that the trial court erred in affirming her convictions as the thirteenth juror and that her sentence was excessive. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this case, Mother appeals the trial court’s severe abuse finding, after one of her children was killed in a car accident while she was driving. The trial court found that Mother failed to protect her children when she failed to ensure that the children were properly restrained in the automobile. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Richard Rand, Jr., was convicted of the possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver. The trial court sentenced him to a term of four years on probation. Thereafter, the Defendant violated the terms of his probation by absconding from supervision. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked his suspended sentence in full and ordered the original sentence into execution. On appeal, the Defendant argues that his conduct amounted only to a technical failure to report rather than an absconsion. We respectfully disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Mario Rogers, appeals his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to establish his identity as the perpetrator or that he acted with the requisite mental state. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Upon competing motions for declaratory judgment in this action involving an oil and gas lease, the trial court granted declaratory judgment in favor of the plaintiff, who owned the mineral rights to the real property on which the oil well was located. The court found that although the oil well had been in production as required by the lease, the defendant corporation had failed to comply with the lease’s requirement that it make at least one oil sale within a one-year period. The court thereby found that the lease had terminated pursuant to its own terms. The defendant has appealed, and the plaintiff has raised an issue regarding the trial court’s finding that the well was in production as required by the lease. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Because no final order has been entered in the underlying trial court proceedings, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment,
this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This is a breach of contract action involving the sale of real property in which the plaintiff seller alleged that the defendant buyer withdrew from the sale in violation of the terms of the contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Carlos Key, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his post-conviction petition, seeking relief from his convictions of first degree premeditated murder and two counts of attempted first degree premeditated murder and resulting effective sentence of life plus fifty years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post conviction court erred by summarily dismissing his petition. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post conviction court.

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights. Amanda L. W. (“Foster Mother”) and Brian L. W. (“Foster Father”) (“Foster Parents,” collectively) filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Madison County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Angel T. (“Mother”) and Fortrell C. (“Father”) to their minor children Treylynn T. and Amelia C. (“the Children,” collectively). The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”), the Children’s legal custodian, supported the petition. This matter arose after Amelia received a suspicious head injury while in Father’s care. Mother never accepted that Father was responsible despite Father’s ensuing nolo contendere plea to attempted aggravated child abuse. After a hearing, the Trial Court terminated Mother’s parental rights on three grounds. The Trial Court found further that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. Mother appeals, arguing only that the Trial Court erred in its best interest determination. We find, as did the Trial Court, that the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody were proven against Mother by clear and convincing evidence. We further find by clear and convincing evidence, as did the Trial Court, that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We affirm.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the defendant, Kireek Kaseem Steele, of rape, sexual battery, rape of a child, and two counts of aggravated sexual battery for which he received an effective sentence of thirty years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence on all five counts. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case involves the claimant’s pro se appeal from the Tennessee Claims Commission’s dismissal, on res judicata grounds, of his claims of libel and malicious prosecution against the State of Tennessee. The claimant timely appealed to this Court. Because the claimant’s appellate brief does not comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 6, we hereby dismiss the appeal.

The petitioner, Gary Lee Emory, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction
relief, which petition challenged his multiple convictions of aggravated robbery, robbery,
aggravated burglary, and facilitation of aggravated burglary, alleging that he was deprived
of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of postconviction
relief.

This appeal arises from a dispute over the construction of a swimming pool. The defendant entered into a written contract with the plaintiff for the construction of a pool at the defendant’s home. The plaintiff later filed a complaint alleging that the defendant failed to pay the amount due under the contract. The defendant filed a counter-complaint and alleged breach of contract, fraud and/or misrepresentation, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. After a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant subsequently filed a motion for relief from the judgment, which the trial court denied. The defendant appeals. We affirm the trial court’s decision and remand for determination of appellate attorney’s fees.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s determination that Tennessee law does not require a testator to sign their will prior to an attesting witness subscribing their signature as a witness to the will. Upon review of the relevant statutory language and associated case law, we conclude that Tennessee law requires that a testator sign their will prior to an attesting witness subscribing their own signature, and therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant filed this premises liability action against Appellee after she fell inside Appellee’s store. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Appellant failed to establish that a dangerous condition existed or that Appellee had actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition, if it did exist. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Demetrius A. Brooks, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his eight-year sentence for his guilty-pleaded convictions of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a legal malpractice suit filed by John Doe Corporation (“Plaintiff”) against its former counsel, Kennerly, Montgomery & Finley, P.C. (“Defendant”). The case arises from the expiration of a judgment obtained by Plaintiff against a defendant (“the third party”) in a suit that concluded more than a decade ago, and
Defendant’s alleged failure to advise Plaintiff of the judgment’s impending expiration. The legal malpractice
action was before Judge William T. Ailor, who had represented the third party in the underlying suit before
becoming a judge. Judge Ailor granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss based on Plaintiff’s failure to bring the
action within the time set by the relevant statute of limitations. After becoming aware of Plaintiff’s and the
third party’s identities, Judge Ailor recused himself while Plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend the judgment was
pending. Plaintiff sought to void the judgment dismissing the case. Chancellor Christopher D. Heagerty was
assigned to sit by interchange over the case and denied Plaintiff’s motion. Plaintiff appealed. Discerning no
reversible error, we affirm.

In this case involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her child, the trial court found that three
statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further
found that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in
the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed. Having determined that the trial court erred by failing to make
sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the ground of abandonment by failure to visit and the best interest analysis, we vacate those portions of the trial court’s judgment and remand for further findings of fact and conclusions of law. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After a tragic motor vehicle accident caused her husband’s death and her minor child’s serious injuries, the plaintiff filed this products liability action against several manufacturers and sellers. The plaintiff appeals from the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc., a booster seat manufacturer. Based on the Tennessee Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Carolyn Coffman, et al. v. Armstrong International, Inc., et al., 615 S.W.3d 888 (Tenn. 2021), and the relevant provisions of the Tennessee Products Liability Act, we affirm the trial court.

Petitioner, Andre Terry, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition
for post-conviction relief. Petitioner asserts on appeal that the post-conviction court erred
in concluding that he received the effective assistance of trial counsel, specifically as it
related to his failure to procure a plea offer from the State. The State counters that the postconviction
court properly denied relief. We ordered supplemental briefing as to whether
the post-conviction court had jurisdiction to consider this petition. We hold that the postconviction
court did not have jurisdiction to consider the petition because the pro se postconviction
petition was deficient, and thus a nullity, and the amended petition was filed
outside of the statute of limitations. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the postconviction
court and dismiss the petition.

The Defendant, Jarvis Miller, appeals his twenty-five-year sentence at 100 percent in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) for his second degree murder conviction. Specifically, he challenges the length and manner of his sentence as excessive because the trial court (1) failed to mitigate the Defendant’s sentence based on “mistakenly recollected” facts from trial; (2) misapplied and gave improper weight to two enhancement factors; and (3) failed to give meaningful consideration to imposing an alternative sentence. After review, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Brandon Marquell Brown, appeals the Robertson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, challenging his guilty-pleaded convictions for two counts of coercion of a witness and one count of aggravated assault. The Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition for post-conviction relief. Specifically, the Petitioner alleges that (1) his guilty pleas were not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and prepare the Petitioner’s cases by interviewing pertinent witnesses and for failing to meet with the Petitioner and review discovery with him. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Willis Holloway, of two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of aggravated burglary, and the trial court sentenced him to 135 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. After an unsuccessful appeal, post-conviction filing, and extraordinary relief filing, in December 2022, the Defendant filed a Rule 36.1 motion challenging an unconstitutional jury instruction. He then filed a supplemental motion claiming “actual innocence.” The trial court denied his Rule 36.1 motion. The Defendant filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied, and the Petitioner now appeals. The State asserts that, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), the appeal is untimely. After review, we dismiss the appeal as untimely.

After a 2022 bench trial, the trial court convicted the Defendant, Rickie Lumley, of felony evading arrest, and subsequently sentenced him as a Career Offender to twelve years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his Class D felony conviction for felony evading arrest because his flight did not create a risk of death or injury to innocent bystanders or other third parties. He contends that his conviction should have only been for a Class E felony. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.