APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his two children. The juvenile court terminated his parental rights on three grounds: abandonment by willful failure to support, failure to provide a suitable home, and persistence of conditions preventing reunification. The court also found clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights was in the children’s best interests. After reviewing the record, we conclude that DCS did not meet its burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, the grounds of failure to provide a suitable home or persistence of conditions. But, we conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence of willful failure to support and that termination was in the best interests of the children. Therefore, we affirm the termination of parental rights.  

The Appellant, Antonio Clifton, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Appellant contends that the trial court erred in concluding that Rule 36.1 relief was not available because his illegal sentence had long ago expired. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the Appellant’s Rule 36.1 motion.

The appellant, Bridget Bondurant Shirer, pled guilty in the Moore County Circuit Court to five counts of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; seven counts of theft of property valued $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony; one count of failure to appear, a Class D felony; and one count of forgery in the amount of $500 or less, a Class E felony.  After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to an effective fourteen-year sentence to be served as eight years in confinement followed by six years on community corrections.  On appeal, the appellant contends that the length and manner of service of her effective fourteen-year sentence is excessive.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

On June 17, 2011, a Davidson County grand jury indicted the defendant, Jerry Brandon Phifer, for twelve crimes against five different victims.  The defendant pled guilty to one count of aggravated burglary (Count 11) and one count of theft of property greater than $1000 (Count 12) as charged in the original twelve-count indictment.  The trial court sentenced the defendant to thirteen years for aggravated robbery and twelve years for theft of property to be served consecutively.  On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court improperly enhanced his sentence for aggravated robbery from the minimum of ten years to thirteen years.  The defendant also argues the trial court improperly ordered his sentences for Counts 11 and 12 to run consecutively.  After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves a challenge to fees awarded to a guardian ad litem. The juvenile court ordered the child’s parents to each pay half of the fees awarded. After the juvenile court made its fee award, Mother appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court conducted a de novo hearing and found the fees awarded reasonable. On appeal to this Court, Mother raises several issues with respect to the award, including a lack of notice that fees would be assessed to the parents, improper limits on discovery, unauthorized and unnecessary actions by the guardian ad litem, and violations of Supreme Court Rules. The guardian ad litem argues Mother’s appeal to the circuit court was untimely and requests that we vacate the decision of the circuit court and remand with instructions to dismiss the appeal. We do not find the appeal to the circuit court to be untimely, but we do find the award of fees to the guardian ad litem appropriate. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 

An attorney, representing herself, filed suit against a juvenile court judge and clerk after she was prevented from accessing recordings of juvenile court proceedings to which she claimed she was entitled under state law. She sought a writ of mandamus and a judgment declaring the juvenile court local rule, under which the judge denied her requests, invalid. The attorney amended her complaint, joining four clients that she had previously represented before the juvenile court. The judge and clerk then filed a motion to dismiss, which the chancery court granted. We conclude, as did the chancery court, that two of the plaintiffs lacked standing and that state law does not entitle plaintiffs to the recordings. Therefore, we affirm the chancery court’s dismissal of the amended complaint. 

This case began as a petition for dependency and neglect filed in juvenile court by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). The juvenile court found the child to be dependent and neglected, and Mother and Father appealed to the circuit court. A discovery dispute arose when their attorney requested records from a court appointed special advocate volunteer. In connection with the dispute, the parents’ attorney filed a petition for civil contempt and a petition for criminal contempt against the volunteer. The circuit court did not grant either petition, and in response, the non-profit organization with which the volunteer was affiliated filed motions for sanctions against the attorney under Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The circuit court granted the non-profit’s motions finding, among other reasons, that both petitions were filed for improper purposes. Mother and Father appeal the circuit court’s dismissal of their criminal contempt petition and the court’s decision to impose sanctions against their attorney. Because we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the criminal contempt petition or in imposing sanctions against the attorney, we affirm. 

This appeal concerns premises liability in a slip and fall case. Vicki Matherne and Rodney Matherne ("Plaintiffs") sued Jerry West and Carolyn West ("the Wests"), owners of a vacation cabin rented by the Mathernes, and American Patriot Getaways ("APG"), which managed the cabin, (collectively, "Defendants") after Mrs. Matherne injured herself falling off an elevated parking level at the cabin. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The Circuit Court for Sevier County ("the Trial Court") granted Defendants‘ motion, finding that any hazardous condition was open and obvious and that Mrs. Matherne was at least 50% at fault. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court. We hold that there are genuine disputed issues of material fact regarding what Defendants could or should have done to prevent the risk of a fall from the elevated parking level and whether Mrs. Matherne was at least 50% at fault. Therefore, the Trial Court erred in granting Defendants‘ motion for summary judgment. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand this case for further proceedings.

Appellant was injured while attempting to leave the defendant hospital against medical advice. Appellant appeals the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant hospital, concluding that the hospital owed no duty to prevent Appellant from leaving the hospital. Discerning no error, we affirm.  

The defendant, Vanessa Renee Pinegar, was convicted of one count of facilitation of delivering 0.5 or more grams of cocaine within a school zone and two counts of attempted delivery of 0.5 or more grams of cocaine within a school zone.  The trial court merged her attempted delivery convictions and imposed an effective sentence of nine years and a fine of $2000.  The defendant appeals her convictions, challenging the denial of her motion to sever the trial of the defendants, certain evidentiary rulings, the jury instructions, the sufficiency of the evidence, and her sentence.  Upon review, we affirm the convictions and sentences.

The Petitioner, Richard Earl Madkins, Jr., filed a petition in the Hardeman County Circuit Court seeking habeas corpus relief from his especially aggravated robbery conviction and resulting twenty-five-year sentence, alleging that his sentence had expired and that he was being imprisoned for a conviction that was overturned by our supreme court. The habeas corpus court denied relief without a hearing, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The defendant, Todd Dewayne Scruggs, was convicted of selling and delivering heroin and possessing drug paraphernalia, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty-six years.  The defendant appeals his convictions, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and his sentence.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this post-divorce proceeding, ex-husband filed a petition for civil contempt to compel ex-wife to allow him to retrieve certain items of personal property awarded to him in the parties’ marital dissolution agreement. The trial court entered an order holding ex-wife in civil contempt for her failure to turn over certain items. We have reviewed the record and have determined that the trial court erred in finding ex-husband was entitled to a boat trailer that was not enumerated in the property list; however, we affirm the trial court’s finding of civil contempt.     

Plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s ruling: (1) dismissing their claims against a church; (2) dismissing the plaintiff-daughter’s claim against the remaining individual defendant for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and (3) granting the remaining individual defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff-father’s claim of assault. With regard to the dismissal of the claims against the church, we conclude that Appellants’ notice of appeal was untimely, and we therefore dismiss their appeal concerning the claims against the church for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We dismiss the remainder of Appellants’ appeal because of profound deficiencies in Appellants’ brief to this Court.

Mamie Marshall (“Employee”) developed a gradual shoulder injury as a result of her work for Pinnacle Food Group (“Employer”). She underwent three surgeries and was eventually referred to a pain management specialist. After the third procedure, she was placed in a modified duty job. Two months after her return to work, she retired. Two of her treating physicians assigned 4% impairment to the body as a whole. Employee’s evaluating physician examined Employee on three occasions and assigned impairments of 7% to the body as a whole after the second surgery and 11% to the body as a whole after her retirement. A physician chosen from the Medical Impairment Registry (“MIR”) assigned 4% impairment to the body as a whole. The trial court found that Employee overcame the presumption of correctness attached to the MIR physician’s rating and adopted the evaluating physician’s 11% impairment. The trial court also found that Employee did not have a meaningful return to work and awarded 66% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. Employer has appealed, contending the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings concerning impairment and meaningful return. The appeal was referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We modify the judgment.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict for conversion of property. The property owners, Appellees, received a judgment of $24,999.99 in general sessions court, and Appellants filed an appeal to the circuit court. At the jury trial, jurors awarded Appellees a verdict of $40,000.00. Appellants appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In 2012, the Defendant, Julie Fuller-Cole, pleaded guilty in Shelby County to theft over $10,000. The trial court sentenced her to ten years of incarceration to run consecutively to a probation sentence from a prior Fayette County conviction. The Fayette County probation sentence was later revoked. In 2015, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, seeking to correct an illegal sentence. The Defendant asserted that the Shelby County sentence was illegal because it was aligned consecutively to the Fayette County sentence and because the Fayette County sentence was not revoked until after she was sentenced in Shelby County. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that there was nothing illegal about the alignment of the sentences. On appeal, the Defendant maintains that her sentence is illegal and that the sentences should be run concurrently. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, George Prince Watkins, pleaded guilty to burglary in 1989 and was given a probationary sentence. The Defendant violated his probation, and while on bond for his probation violation, he committed four new offenses, to all of which he subsequently pleaded guilty. The trial court ordered concurrent sentencing for all of the convictions. The Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, contending that his sentence was illegal. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion, and the Defendant appealed. This Court held that the Defendant had presented a colorable claim and remanded the case to the trial court for Rule 36.1 proceedings. State v. George Prince Watkins, No. W2014-02393-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 6145899, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Oct. 15, 2015), no perm. app. filed. The Defendant moved forward with his Rule 36.1 motion, and the trial court again summarily dismissed the Defendant’s motion finding that he failed to state a colorable claim since his sentences were expired and citing State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 211 (Tenn. 2015), which was released in December 2015. Based upon Brown, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The father of two children opposes the relocation of the children with their mother from middle Tennessee to Harrison, Arkansas. He also contends he is entitled to a child support deviation. At trial, testimony revealed that the mother wants to relocate because her husband accepted a position in Harrison that resulted in an annual salary increase of $20,000, plus a bonus. The mother also testified that she was offered a job in Harrison that pays more than her current position. The trial court granted permission to relocate, finding that the relocation had a reasonable purpose because the mother and her husband would receive a significant increase in annual income and increased opportunities for advancement in Arkansas. The trial court also found that relocating would not result in serious harm to the children and was not intended to defeat the father’s visitation. In addition, the trial court denied the father’s request for a child support deviation. The father appealed, contending that the court’s findings about the relocation are erroneous and that he is entitled to a child support deviation. The evidence supports the trial court’s findings regarding the purpose and nature of the relocation. Additionally, the father is not entitled to a child support deviation under the plain language of the regulations. Accordingly, we affirm.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Arterious North, of four counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter and four counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-two years of confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to sever his case from the cases of his co-defendants and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we reverse the trial court's judgments of conviction and dismiss the charges for the attempted voluntary manslaughter of L.P. and for employing a firearm during the commission of the attempted voluntary manslaughter of L.P. We affirm the trial court‟s judgments in all other respects.

The mother of three sons appeals the termination of her parental rights. A juvenile court magistrate determined that one son was the victim of severe abuse and that the other two sons were dependent and neglected. The magistrate also found that the mother was the perpetrator of this abuse, dependency, and neglect. The magistrate’s order was not appealed. All three sons were placed with the same foster mother. They remained with her for around two years during which time they had some visitation with their biological mother. Subsequently, the Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights alleging severe abuse and persistence of conditions as grounds for termination. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)-(4). The mother opposed the petition, and the children’s maternal grandmother and uncle each filed separate petitions for custody. After two hearings, the trial court found that DCS had proven both alleged grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence and that terminating the mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. The court also dismissed the petitions for custody filed by the grandmother and the uncle. The mother appealed, arguing that termination was not in the best interests of the children and that the trial court erred by failing to place the children with their grandmother as a less drastic alternative to foster care. Mother also argues that DCS failed to make a diligent search for the children’s fathers. The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s best-interest findings, and the mother cannot appeal the dismissal of the grandmother’s petition or the termination of the fathers’ parental rights. Additionally, by the time a court considers whether to terminate parental rights, it is too late to bring a less drastic alternative before the court. Accordingly, we affirm.

On June 27, 2013, James Austin (“Employee”) operated a piece of machinery in the course of his employment with Roach Sawmill & Lumber Company (“Employer”). The machine trapped his right hand, injuring Employee and resulting in the amputation of his right ring finger. In a post-injury drug screen, Employee tested positive for amphetamine, nordiazepam, oxazepam, temazepam and alpha-hydroxyalprazolam. Employer operated as a drug-free workplace program as described in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-9-101 et seq. The trial court found that Employee did not rebut the presumption that the drugs were the proximate cause of his injury and dismissed the action. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-110(c)(1) (Supp. 2012). Employee appealed, asserting that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s decision. The Supreme Court referred this appeal to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment.

The petitioner, Billy DeBow, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which petition challenged his 1999 conviction of first degree murder. Because the interest of justice does not require that we waive the timely filing of the notice of appeal in this case, the appeal is dismissed.

In this appeal, the State challenges the ruling of the trial court granting the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence and dismiss the two-count indictment charging the defendant with driving under the influence (“DUI”) and driving with a blood alcohol content greater than .08 percent (“DUI per se”). Because the trial court failed to consider the effect of a search warrant and because, at any rate, probable cause supported the defendant’s arrest, the trial court erred by granting the defendant’s motion to suppress. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.