APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following the Decedent’s death, no original will could be found. One of his daughters filed a petition to administer a copy of a lost will, which the trial court granted. We reverse, concluding the evidence does not overcome the strong presumption in favor of revocation of the lost will.

The Defendant, Gary Lynn Hart, was convicted in the Chester County Circuit Court of two counts of possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a violent felony, a Class B felony; one count of theft of property valued more than one thousand dollars, a Class E felony; and one count of resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor, and received an effective sentence of thirty-one years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

The trial court granted Appellee’s motion for extension of an order of protection against
Appellant. Appellant argues that her due process rights were violated insofar as she was
denied the opportunity to confront witnesses and offer testimony. Based on the statement
of the evidence, we agree. Vacated and remanded.

This appeal arises from a business relationship that deteriorated. F.W. White & Associates, LLC (“FWA”), through Fenton W. White, Jr. (“White”) (“Appellees,” collectively), sued John R. Chilton (“Chilton”), Centennial
Village Apartments, LLC, and Centennial Village Development, LLC (“Appellants,” collectively) in the Chancery
Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”) for breach of contract and quantum meruit. Appellants, in turn,
sued Appellees for slander of title based on Appellees’ having recorded a document asserting an interest in the
real property at issue. Appellants also sued FWA’s attorney Gregory Pratt (“Pratt”), who recorded the document. The Trial Court granted summary judgment to Pratt based on the litigation privilege. Following a
bench trial, the Trial Court awarded FWA judgment against Appellants in the amount of $125,000.00 for money
owed under a May 2008 consulting agreement (“the 2008 Agreement”). Regarding Appellants’ slander of title
claim, the Trial Court found that White believed he was owed money and did not act maliciously. Appellants
raise several issues on appeal. Meanwhile, Appellees contend that the Trial Court erred in declining to award
FWA its attorney’s fees and costs under the 2008 Agreement. We affirm the Trial Court. On remand, the Trial
Court is to determine and award to FWA its reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred on appeal related to
the enforcement of the 2008 Agreement.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the defendants, Jevon Brodie and Tavares Harbison, each of one count of aggravated robbery, one count of theft of property greater than $10,000, but less than $60,000, and one count of theft of property under $500. Brodie was additionally convicted of two counts of reckless homicide and received an effective sentence of sixteen years in confinement. Harbison was also convicted of two counts of criminally negligent homicide and received an effective sentence of fourteen years in confinement. On appeal, the defendants contend that (1) the juvenile court erred in transferring their cases to circuit court without making individualized findings; (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for theft greater than $10,000; and (3) the trial court erred in sentencing the defendants. Additionally, Brodie insists that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on causation and that the prosecutor’s statements during summation were improper. Upon review of the record, the parties’ briefs, oral arguments, and considering the applicable law, we affirm the decisions of the juvenile and trial courts. However, we remand for the limited consideration by the trial court as to the application of the Wilkerson factors in determining the propriety of consecutive sentencing for Tavares Harbison.

The trial court granted Appellee/Father’s petition to change his son’s surname from Appellant/Mother’s surname to Father’s. Mother appeals. Because Father did not carry his burden of proof to demonstrate that changing the child’s name is in the child’s best interest, we reverse and remand.

The Defendant, Jeffrey L. Brousseau, appeals from his guilty-pleaded convictions for
possession with the intent to deliver or sell one-half gram or more of methamphetamine;
possession with the intent to deliver or sell marijuana; theft of property valued at $1,000
or less; driving while in possession of five grams of methamphetamine; and driving on a
suspended license. Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, the Defendant received an
effective ten-year sentence, and the trial court was to determine the manner of service. The
trial court subsequently denied the Defendant’s request for alternative sentencing, a
decision the Defendant now appeals. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of
the trial court.

Bobby V. Summers, Defendant, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his pro se Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 motion in which he sought to have his plea-bargained conviction for facilitation of first degree murder dismissed. Defendant’s motion did not seek correction of his sentence, and the trial court found that the motion failed to state a colorable claim. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Kenneth D. Cook, appeals from the denial of his petition seeking post-conviction relief from his guilty plea convictions of solicitation of first-degree murder, robbery, and aggravated assault with serious bodily injury. Upon our review, we affirm. 

A Henry County jury convicted the Defendant, Joshua Lee Enoch, of two counts of rape and one count of aggravated statutory rape, and the Defendant received an effective sentence of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) whether the trial court committed plain error in denying two motions for a competency evaluation; (3) whether the trial court committed plain error in denying his motion for a continuance; and (4) whether he is entitled to relief on the basis of cumulative error. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this divorce appeal, the husband challenges the trial court’s classification of real estate as marital property and
its ruling regarding dissipation of the marital estate. Following a thorough review of the record, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.

A tenured teacher sought judicial review of her reprimand and one-day suspension. The chancery court modified the discipline imposed by the director of schools. Because we conclude that the teacher did not timely petition for judicial review, we vacate the judgment with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

A Dyer County jury found the Defendant, Gerald Myers, guilty of attempted second degree murder and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions because he acted in self-defense. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Pro se petitioner, Curtis Keller, appeals the summary dismissal of his second petition seeking error coram nobis relief.1 Upon our review, we affirm.

Defendant, Servadio M. Boyd, was convicted on a plea of guilty of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell before the Davidson County Criminal Court in 2014. As part of his plea agreement with the State, Defendant agreed to an eight-year sentence with the manner of service to be decided by the trial court at a sentencing hearing. Prior to his sentencing hearing, however, Defendant left the jurisdiction. He was then arrested and convicted of dealing in cocaine and conspiracy to commit dealing in cocaine in the Vanderburgh Circuit Court of Indiana, for which he received a sentence of thirteen years’ incarceration. Based upon his failure to appear at his sentencing hearing in Davidson County, the trial court issued an arrest warrant and lodged a detainer against Defendant. In 2019, Defendant filed, in the Davidson County Criminal Court, a motion to dismiss the detainer, arguing that the charges against him should be dismissed with prejudice based on an alleged violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. Following a hearing and briefing by the parties, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion and dismissed the case against Defendant. The State appealed. Following a thorough review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

Defendant, Ambreia Tavaris Washington, was convicted in a bifurcated trial by a Madison County jury of attempted first degree murder where the victim suffered serious bodily injury (count one), unlawful employment of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony (count two), three counts of unlawful possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony crime of violence (counts three, four, and five), unlawful possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony drug offense (count six), and two counts of unlawfully employing a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony after having been previously convicted of a dangerous felony (counts seven and eight). Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sixty-three-year sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues that because there was insufficient evidence of serious bodily injury, his conviction in count one should be reduced to attempted first degree murder without the serious bodily injury sentencing enhancement, and that the trial court erred in imposing discretionary consecutive sentencing. Following review of the entire record, oral arguments, briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment,
this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Petitioner, Daniel Ward, was convicted of ten counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to fifty-four years of incarceration, and this court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and cumulative error. The post-conviction court denied the petition after a hearing, and Petitioner now timely appeals. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Hollie Whipple, pled guilty to especially aggravated burglary, aggravated
assault by use of a deadly weapon, and aggravated assault in connection with her
perpetration of a home invasion in Fayette County. After a sentencing hearing, the trial
court imposed an effective sentence of ten years’ incarceration at 100% service rate. She
argues on appeal that her sentence is excessive and the trial court erred in denying
probation. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Terrance Holliday, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition
for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred by denying his
motion for recusal and by finding that he received effective assistance of counsel. Based
on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Larry E. Orozco, was originally convicted of two counts of attempted
second-degree murder, two counts of unlawful employment of a firearm during an attempt
to commit a dangerous felony, and seven counts of reckless endangerment committed with
a deadly weapon, for which he received an effective sentence of thirty-one years’
imprisonment. This court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal; however, appellate
review of his sentence was waived because the record did not include the sentencing
hearing transcript. The Defendant subsequently filed a post-conviction petition alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel, and the trial court granted a delayed appeal. The
Defendant now challenges the consecutive nature of his sentence and contends the trial
court erred in finding that he was a dangerous offender, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-
115(b)(4), and in failing to make the necessary findings pursuant to State v. Wilkerson,
905 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1995). Upon our review, we detect clerical errors in the judgments
and remand for entry of corrected judgments in counts 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, and 19. In all
other respects, we affirm.

The Petitioner, acting pro se, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. Upon our review, we affirm.

Loring Justice (“Justice”) filed a complaint against Kim Nelson (“Nelson”); David Valone (“Valone”) and the Law
Office of David Valone (collectively, “Valone Defendants”); and Martha Meares (“Meares”), and Meares and
Associates and/or Meares and Dillard (collectively, “Meares Defendants”), (collectively, “Defendants”) in the
Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). Justice alleged, inter alia, wrongful execution of judgment and
abuse of process. Nelson filed a motion to classify Justice’s action as an abusive civil action (“ACA”) pursuant to
Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-41-101, et seq. The Trial Court granted Nelson’s ACA motion, and Justice appealed. Having
reviewed the evidence, we affirm, albeit for somewhat different reasons than provided by the Trial Court.

The Defendant, Denver Christian Smith, was convicted by a Washington County Criminal
Court jury of first degree felony murder, attempted second degree murder, and attempted
carjacking. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2014) (subsequently amended) (first degree
murder), 39-13-210 (2014) (subsequently amended) (second degree murder), 39-13-404
(2018) (carjacking), 39-12-101 (2018) (criminal attempt). On appeal, the Defendant
contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress
his statements to the police and (2) no reasonable trier of fact could find that the Defendant
failed to establish his insanity defense by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm the
judgments of the trial court.

This case involves a dispute over recovery under the Tennessee uninsured/underinsured motorist statutory scheme. The plaintiffs initiated a lawsuit against the defendant driver and served notice on their own insurance carrier. The plaintiffs also served notice on the insurance carrier covering the borrowed vehicle that the plaintiffs had been utilizing when the accident occurred. The plaintiffs’ insurer entered into a settlement with the plaintiffs for $50,000 each, an amount that equaled the policy limit of the uninsured motorist coverage provided in the policy covering the borrowed vehicle. The defendant driver’s insurer also entered into a settlement with the plaintiffs, paying them $30,000 each. The uninsured motorist carrier covering the borrowed vehicle filed a motion for summary judgment. Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance carrier upon concluding that Tennessee Code Annotated § 56-7-1201(b)(3)(D) and the policy covering the borrowed vehicle limited the plaintiffs’ recovery via judgment to an amount no greater than the policy providing the highest limits of uninsured motorist coverage. Plaintiffs have appealed.
Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.