APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Christopher Mimms, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Trousdale County Criminal Court. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that his drug-related convictions are void because the trial court amended the indictment without his consent. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

A bank filed a complaint to reform a Deed of Trust to correct a scrivener’s error in the legal description of a parcel of property in order to foreclose on the property. While the litigation was pending, the mortgagors conveyed title to the property to a third party, who claimed to be a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. The trial court concluded that the third party did not qualify as a bona fide purchaser because he was aware of the bank’s litigation when he obtained title to the property. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Mother appeals the trial court’s decision to terminate her parental rights to two children on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; (2) abandonment by willful failure to provide support; (3) substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plans; and (4) persistence of conditions that precipitated the children’s removal from Mother’s custody. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children. We reverse in part and affirm in part.

In this divorce case, Terry Joe McBroom appeals the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro to Kelly Loretta Folkerts McBroom in the amount of $980 per month for three years or until Husband began drawing his retirement pension. The trial court ordered that once Husband began drawing his pension, which the parties agree will happen no later than April of 2019, the amount of spousal support will be reduced to $720. The court further ruled that Husband’s support obligation would cease when Wife began drawing Social Security benefits. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

We granted this interlocutory appeal to determine whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-272(c)(1) of the Healthcare Quality Improvement Act (“HCQIA”), as applied to the facts of this case, violates the separation of powers provisions in the Tennessee Constitution. Plaintiff, a physician whose medical staff privileges were terminated by Summit Medical Center, sued the hospital, alleging, inter alia, that it acted in bad faith and with malice during the peer review process. Following a lengthy discovery process, the hospital filed a motion for summary judgment asserting, inter alia, that Plaintiff’s anticipated evidence was confidential, privileged, and inadmissible under the HCQIA because it was derived from the activity of a Quality Improvement Committee (“QIC”). At the same time, the hospital filed a motion in limine to exclude all records of quality improvement activity pursuant to the evidentiary privilege under Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-272(c)(1). After ascertaining that Plaintiff intended to rely on QIC evidence, the trial court ruled that the peer review privilege could not be waived, and that Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-272(c)(1) violated the separation of powers provisions because it deprived the court of its inherent authority to make evidentiary decisions affecting “the heart of this case.” This Tenn. R. App. P. Rule 9 interlocutory appeal followed. We agree with the trial court’s ruling that the privilege cannot be waived. However, we disagree with the trial court’s ruling that Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-272(c)(1), as applied to the facts of this case, violates the separation of powers provisions in the Tennessee Constitution. This is because the General Assembly created the evidentiary privilege to effectuate one of its powers, the enactment of legislation that promotes the safety and welfare of our citizens. To that end, the primary concern of the challenged legislation is not to create court rules, but to promote candor within a hospital’s quality improvement process to ensure effective evaluation measures. Furthermore, Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-272(c)(2) provides an “original source” exception to the privilege whereby documents not produced specifically for use by a QIC, and are otherwise available from original sources, are both discoverable and admissible into evidence even if the information was presented during a QIC proceeding. Thus, the privilege is reasonable and workable within the framework of - 2 - evidentiary rules already recognized by the judiciary. For these reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

In this divorce action, the trial court awarded alimony in futuro and attorney’s fees to Wife; Husband appeals both awards. Concluding that the court did not make adequate findings as to whether rehabilitative or transitional alimony was feasible, we vacate the award of alimony in futuro and remand for further consideration of the nature and duration of the alimony award; we affirm the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Wife; and we decline to award attorney’s fees to either party for the appeal.

The Appellant, Michael Eugene Jones, pled guilty in the Marshall County Circuit Court to selling one-half gram or more of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class B felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court was to determine the length and manner of service of the sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the Appellant serve ten years in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the length of his sentence is excessive and that the trial court erred by not sentencing him to community corrections. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition against Anthony G. (“Father”) in the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate Father’s parental rights to his son, Jase P. (“the Child”). Father had been incarcerated and unable to parent the Child since the Child’s birth. After a trial, the Juvenile Court terminated Father’s parental rights on the grounds of wanton disregard and various grounds coming under the putative father statute at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(g)(9)(A). Father appeals. We affirm all grounds for termination found against Father. We further affirm that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court in its entirety.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Christopher Collier, of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to twelve years of incarceration as a persistent offender. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, George Martin Zickefoose, pleaded guilty to vandalism valued between $1,000 and $10,000, theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000, and burglary, with the trial court to determine the sentences. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered concurrent four-year sentences for each count for an effective four-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court erred when it denied him an alternative sentence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The issue in this workers’ compensation appeal is whether a Tennessee trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over a workers’ compensation claim.  James and Elizabeth Russell, residents of Johnson City, Tennessee, were employed by Transco Lines, Inc. (“Employer”), an Arkansas company headquartered in Russellville, Arkansas.  The Russells, who were team truck drivers, were injured on July 5, 2013, in a motor vehicle accident near Shreveport, Louisiana.  Employer and its insurer, Triangle Insurance Company (“Insurer”), accepted the Russells’ workers’ compensation claims as compensable and paid benefits under Arkansas law.  In October 2013, the Russells, through their counsel, filed a Request for Benefit Review Conference with the Tennessee Department of Labor.  No additional action occurred in Tennessee, and benefits continued to be paid according to Arkansas law.  After the administrative process was exhausted, the Russells filed this action in the Circuit Court for Washington County against Employer and Insurer, requesting compensation benefits under the workers’ compensation laws of Tennessee.  Employer argued that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim and that even if it had jurisdiction, the Russells had made an election of remedies and were precluded from pursuing benefits in Tennessee.  The trial court ruled for the Russells, holding that it had subject matter jurisdiction and that the Russells had not made an election of remedies.  The trial court awarded Mr. Russell 65% permanent partial disability and Ms. Russell 85% permanent partial disability.  Employer and Insurer appealed.  The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Humphreys County jury convicted the Defendant, Stephen W. Jaco, of driving under the influence (DUI) and unlawfully possessing a firearm while under the influence of alcohol. The trial court sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days for each conviction to be served concurrently and on probation, after serving four days in jail. The trial court fined the Defendant $350 for his DUI conviction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his DUI conviction, the trial court’s imposition of a fine, the trial court’s failure to join all charges in one indictment, and the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy principles. We conclude that the trial court erred in imposing the fine for the Defendant’s DUI conviction, and we reverse the trial court’s imposition of the fine and remand the matter for the empaneling of a jury to fix the fine. The trial court’s judgments are otherwise affirmed.

The State appeals from the post-conviction court’s grant of post-conviction relief to Petitioner, Charles Bradford Stewart. Petitioner was convicted of vehicular assault and originally sentenced to serve twelve years as a career offender, with split confinement of one year in jail and eleven years in community corrections. The State appealed the sentence on the basis that community corrections was erroneously granted. This court reversed and remanded. State v. Charles B. Stewart, No. M2010-01948-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 4794942, at *1 and *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 11, 2011). Upon remand the trial court sentenced Petitioner to serve the entirety of the twelve-year sentence by incarceration. This Court affirmed. State v. Stewart, 439 S.W.3d 906, 907-08 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013). Petitioner timely filed, pro se, a petition for post-conviction relief. Counsel was appointed, and Petitioner subsequently filed a “corrected” petition. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court granted relief. After review, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and reinstate the judgment of conviction.

The Defendant, Montreal Portis Robinson, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and robbery, a Class C felony. He was sentenced to eight years for the aggravated robbery conviction and three years for the robbery conviction, to be served consecutively in the Tennessee Department of Correction for an effective term of eleven years. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence convicting him of aggravated robbery and the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A property owner who wished to construct and operate a quarry sought a declaratory judgment that a Sumner County Zoning Resolution, which was alleged to exclude quarrying and mining activities, is unconstitutional and in violation of the Tennessee zoning enabling statutes. A group of adjoining property owners were permitted to intervene in the proceeding, and the court granted summary judgment to the county and adjoining property owners. The property owner now appeals. We find that the evidence relied upon by the property owner does not establish that the ordinance at issue prohibits all quarrying activities and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The defendant, Deangelo Taylor, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of second degree murder and attempted aggravated robbery, claiming that the trial court erred by admitting certain witness testimony and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm.

We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal in this case in order to determine whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in concluding that the evidence was not sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction of aggravated stalking. The Court of Criminal Appeals reduced the Defendant’s conviction to misdemeanor stalking after concluding that the State had not adduced sufficient evidence to establish that the Defendant knowingly violated an order of protection. We hold that the Court of Criminal Appeals misapplied the standard of review and so committed reversible error. Because the proof was sufficient to support the jury’s determination that the Defendant had actual knowledge of the order of protection issued against him on August 20, 2010, the evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction of aggravated stalking. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgment.

This post-divorce case concerns parental relocation.  Mother, the primary residential parent, sought to relocate to Texas, citing an employment offer.  Father objected to the relocation, arguing that the move had no reasonable purpose and that Mother’s real purpose for relocating is to be closer to her boyfriend. The trial court denied mother’s request to relocate based on mother’s perjury in the trial court’s presence and on the finding that the real purpose of mother’s proposed move is to be closer to her boyfriend. We reverse the trial court’s decision because we determine that father failed to carry his burden of proof.

The defendant, Marcus Puckett, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of driving under the influence (“DUI”), claiming that the trial court erred by permitting the State to play the video recording of the defendant’s traffic stop in its entirety in violation of his constitutional rights. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves an attempt to challenge the legality of a gun show ban that was adopted for the Tennessee State Fairgrounds. The trial court dismissed the complaint on numerous alternative grounds. We affirm.

The pro se Appellant, Felicia Annette Mitchell, appeals as of right from the Sullivan County Circuit Court’s order summarily dismissing her motion to correct illegal sentences. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s order pursuant to Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the order of the trial court.

Roger Elliott (“the Appellant”) was found guilty of “improper passing” by the city judge of the Municipal Court of Church Hill and appealed to the circuit court. In a trial de novo, the Appellant was found guilty of violating Tennessee Code Annotated section 55- 8-118 and was fined twenty-five dollars. Because the Appellant was found guilty in municipal court of violating a municipal ordinance, a civil offense; the subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court in the trial de novo was limited to a violation of the municipal ordinance. The circuit court erred in finding the Appellant guilty of violating a state criminal statute. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial to determine if the Appellant violated a municipal ordinance of the City of Church Hill.

Father appeals the trial court’s denial of his request for equal parenting time with the parties’ children and failure to grant father a fault-based divorce based on mother’s infidelity. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Kaylecia Woodard, appeals her Knox County Criminal Court jury conviction of aggravated robbery, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction and that the criminal gang enhancement statute, which was applied to enhance her sentence, is unconstitutional. We discern no infirmity relative to the guilt phase of the defendant’s trial and affirm the defendant’s conviction of aggravated robbery. Because, as this court has now repeatedly concluded, that portion of the criminal gang enhancement statute used to enhance the defendant’s sentence is unconstitutional, we vacate the criminal gang enhancement and the 15-year sentence, modify the judgment to reflect a Class B felony conviction of aggravated robbery, and remand the case for resentencing.

A Rutherford County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Brandon Frost, of two counts of aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated robbery, and one count of attempted aggravated robbery.  The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his convictions, contending that he did not demand money or property from the attempted aggravated robbery victim and that his confinement of the kidnapping victims was incidental to the robbery offenses.  The Appellant also contends that the trial court erred by failing to consider mitigating factors when determining the length of his sentences and by failing to grant alternative sentencing.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.