APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Wilson J. B. Jones, the Defendant, filed a Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion for relief from an allegedly illegal sentence. The trial court found that the motion failed to state a colorable claim because the Defendant’s sentence had expired and dismissed the motion. The Defendant “concedes that his sentences have expired” and acknowledges that our supreme court in State v. Brown, 479 S.W. 3d 200 (Tenn. 2015), “held that Rule 36.1 does not authorize the correction of expired illegal sentences.” The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Shelby County Grand Jury returned a two-count indictment charging the Defendant, Deangelo Norton, with rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery. Pursuant to Rule 412 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence, prior to trial the Defendant filed a notice of his intent to introduce evidence at trial of the child victim’s knowledge of sexual matters. The trial court held a pretrial evidentiary hearing on the subject and denied the request, finding the proposed testimony to be irrelevant. A jury trial followed, and the Defendant was convicted of both counts. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant to twenty-five years at 100%. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his request to introduce evidence and that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted Antonio Sykes (“the Petitioner”) of first degree premeditated murder, especially aggravated robbery, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. He received an effective sentence of life without parole plus seventy-five years. The Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, arguing that the State had withheld exculpatory evidence that one of the State’s witnesses received a plea deal in exchange for favorable testimony, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and that the exculpatory evidence constituted “newly discovered evidence” within the meaning of the coram nobis statute. The State filed a response and motion to dismiss, arguing that the Petitioner “fail[ed] to allege any new evidence relating to the matters litigated at trial[]” and that the petition was barred by the statute of limitations. The coram nobis court summarily dismissed the petition and found that the Petitioner failed to present actual evidence of a plea deal between the witness and the State. On appeal, the Petitioner concedes that his petition was untimely filed but argues that this court should toll the statute of limitations and address the merits of his petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm.

The plaintiff initiated this action, claiming, inter alia, a breach of contract. The plaintiff alleged that he was bringing the action as the assignee of a limited liability company, which was an original party to the contract at issue. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant estate, also an original party to the contract at issue, determining that the plaintiff lacked standing to file the action. The plaintiff timely appealed. Determining that the plaintiff possessed standing, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. We affirm the trial court’s decision to allow the estate to amend its responses to the requests for admission propounded by the plaintiff.

The pro se petitioner, John Joseph Kratochvil, appeals as of right from the Johnson County Criminal Court’s order summarily dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion to affirm the habeas corpus court’s order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the order of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Robert Webb, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely upon its conclusion that the Petitioner’s mental incompetence did not toll the statute of limitations. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This appeal involves post-judgment proceedings following a final judgment in favor of the city that the appellants pay $45,175 for unpaid maintenance fees on their commercial real property. The appellants appeal the trial court’s action overruling a motion to pay the judgment by installments under the so-called “slow-pay” statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 26-2-216. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Defendant, Roy D. Moore, through counsel, appeals as of right from the Blount County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s order pursuant to Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the order of the trial court.

This is an appeal by Stoney’s Bail Bonding, Inc., (“Stoney’s”) of an order of the Maury County Circuit Court, sitting en banc, which denied Stoney’s Renewed Motion for Relief from Bond. Stoney’s argues the single issue that the trial court erred in its application of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-201(c) because the State failed to commence extradition proceedings, as previously ordered by the en banc panel. Following our review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion.

Defendant appeals from the denial of his motion pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure in which he sought to correct his allegedly illegal sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendants, Arthur and Michelle Graham, were indicted on August 31, 2010, for theft of property valued at $60,000 or more from the State of Tennessee based on their fraudulent medical billing practices at the children’s therapy facility they owned and operated, which resulted in overpayments in excess of $200,000. According to the indictment, the thefts occurred between March 6, 2002, and October 31, 2003. The delay in indicting the matter resulted from the fact that the United States Attorney’s Office had first investigated the thefts and did not release the matter to the Shelby County District Attorney General’s Office until the applicable federal statute of limitations had run. The Defendants each filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, claiming their rights to a speedy trial had been violated by the pre-indictment delay. The trial court denied the motions. Subsequently, the Defendants filed a joint motion to reopen proof on their earlier motions to dismiss. The court entered an order granting in part and denying in part the motion. While the court held that the Defendants had failed to present proof of actual prejudice between the last alleged criminal act and the return of the indictment, it found that the eight-year statute of limitations had run as to the thefts alleged to have occurred prior to August 31, 2002. As a result, the State could proceed only as to those thefts occurring between August 31, 2002, and October 31, 2003. The Defendants then filed a joint motion, asking that the court reconsider its earlier order, again asserting the pre-indictment delay violated their rights to a speedy trial. After hearing the testimony of witnesses, the trial court reversed its previous order, this time finding that the Defendants had been prejudiced by the pre-indictment delay, and dismissed the indictment. The State appeals this order. As we will explain, we reverse this order of the trial court and reinstate the indictment.

The Petitioner, Jeffrey King, pleaded guilty to multiple drug and money laundering crimes, and the trial court sentenced him to forty years of incarceration to be served at 100%. The Petitioner attempted to reserve certified questions of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) about whether wiretaps used in the investigation of the crime were lawful. This court determined that the Petitioner was not entitled to relief on the basis of the certified questions and affirmed the judgments on appeal. State v. King, 437 S.W.3d 856, 889 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013). In 2015, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and, after a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Appellant/Mother’s parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; (2) substantial non-compliance with the permanency plan; and (3) severe child abuse. Because Appellee, Tennessee Department of Children’s Services, did not meet its burden to show that it exercised reasonable efforts to assist Mother in obtaining suitable housing, we reverse the trial court’s finding as to the ground of abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home. The other grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights are met by clear and convincing evidence, and there is also clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

The Petitioner, Jeffrey King, pleaded guilty to multiple drug and money laundering crimes, and the trial court sentenced him to forty years of incarceration to be served at 100%. The Petitioner attempted to reserve certified questions of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) about whether wiretaps used in the investigation of the crime were lawful. This court determined that the Petitioner was not entitled to relief on the basis of the certified questions and affirmed the judgments on appeal. State v. King, 437 S.W.3d 856, 889 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013). In 2015, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and, after a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Appellant was injured in an automobile collision with a State Trooper. After a trial, the Claims Commissioner found in favor of the State and dismissed the claim. Discerning no error, we affirm. 

After a jury trial, the defendants, Lenardo Dewayne Spencer, Reginald Tyrone Baxter, Jr., and Deandre Jajuan Dean, were convicted of robbery and theft of property over $1000. On appeal, the defendants assert the evidence was insufficient to support their robbery convictions, arguing the alleged taking was not accomplished by the use of violence or fear. The defendants also claim prosecutorial misconduct in the State’s closing argument and challenge the State’s expert witness testimony. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Insurer brought a declaratory judgment action asking the court to determine the proper beneficiary of the proceeds of a life insurance policy rider insuring the life of the named insured’s child; the named insured had designated her mother as the beneficiary of the policy and rider. Upon the child’s death, the named insured was prevented by law from receiving the proceeds, and the insurer asked for a declaration of whether the named insured’s disqualification also prevented the named beneficiary from receiving the proceeds or whether the estate of the child would receive the proceeds, in accordance with the designation of beneficiary in the policy. The trial court determined that the policy’s designation was inequitable and awarded the proceeds to the estate of the child.  We have determined that the disqualification of the named insured from receiving the proceeds of the policy does not invalidate the designation of beneficiary and, accordingly, reverse the decision of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jarvis D. Cohen, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. After review, we affirm the denial of the Defendant’s Rule 36.1 motion.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of C.F.B. (mother) and J.W.B (father) with respect to their two children, C.J.B. and C.C.B. As to mother, the trial court found clear and convincing evidence of four grounds supporting termination. By the same quantum of proof, the trial court found that termination of mother’s rights is in the best interest of the children. As to father, the trial court found clear and convincing evidence of three grounds supporting termination. By the same standard of evidence, the trial court found that termination of father’s rights is in the best interest of the children. Mother and father appeal. As modified, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Stephen Lynn Hugueley, was sentenced to death for the 2002 first degree premeditated murder of a prison counselor, Delbert Steed, while the Petitioner was housed at the Hardeman County Correctional Facility, following two prior first degree murder convictions for the shotgun slaying of his mother and the later killing of another inmate. See State v. Hugueley, 185 S.W.3d 356, 364 (Tenn. 2006). He filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, alleging that his 2013 MRI, which showed that he had congenital brain defects, was “newly discovered evidence” that he was incompetent at the time of his 2003 capital trial, as well as in 2008 when he withdrew his petition for postconviction relief. The coram nobis court concluded that the Petitioner had made an insufficient showing for the granting of relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the court erred in this determination, asserting that, had his incompetency been known at the time of trial, no judgment of conviction would have been entered and that, as well, he had not been competent to waive the presentation of mitigating evidence at trial or to waive his right to utilize post-conviction procedures. Further, he argues that a relative may pursue, in his behalf, his petition for writ of error coram nobis. Following our review, we conclude that the Petitioner’s claim of incompetency before and after his trial does not constitute “newly discovered evidence” and, further, that this claim was untimely. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the coram nobis court denying relief.

The Petitioner, Andrew Hayes, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his first degree felony murder and aggravated robbery convictions, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This appeal involves a post-divorce order of protection. Mother obtained an ex-parte order of protection on behalf of the parties’ thirteen-year-old son alleging that Father had punched the child in the mouth while drunk on a family vacation. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed Mother’s petition for order of protection finding that she had not met her burden of proof. Mother appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Shaun Rondale Cross, appeals as of right from the Marshall County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that his guilty plea was not voluntary because one of his trial attorneys “terrorized” him by threatening that he would receive “an all[-]white jury” that would “hang” him if he went to trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Elgain Ricky Wilson, pleaded guilty to first degree felony murder, armed robbery, and two counts of assault with the intent to commit armed robbery in 1984 and received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus fifty years. Almost thirty-two years later, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 requesting that the trial court correct an illegal sentence because although the indictment alleged the murder victim was killed when the victim was being robbed, the evidence showed the murder victim was killed during the robbery of another person. As a result, the Defendant argued that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion after determining that the Defendant’s motion failed to state a colorable claim for relief because the motion was not based upon the imposition of an illegal sentence but rather upon insufficient evidence and the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jose Dimas Alvarado, appeals as of right from his conviction for aggravated sexual battery. See Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 39-13-504. The Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred in admitting the victim’s forensic interview as substantive evidence; (2) that the trial court erred in allowing the State to present evidence and argument that the Defendant had characteristics typical of perpetrators of child sexual abuse; (3) that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to make improper statements during closing argument that referenced facts outside the record and shifted the burden of proof to the Defendant; (4) that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on aggravated sexual battery as a lesser-included offense of rape of a child; and (5) that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.