APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal from an order denying relief under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the order as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

Defendant, Raymond Antonio Smith, appeals from his convictions for first degree premeditated murder and theft of property valued at $2,500 or more but less than $10,000, for which he is serving a sentence of life plus twelve years. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient relative to premeditation and to the stolen property’s value. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm.

The Defendant, Cedric Peter Hopgood, pleaded guilty to multiple felony drug possession offenses and received an agreed-upon sentence of thirty-three years. See T.C.A. § 39-17- 417 (2025). The Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, which the trial court summarily denied. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to reconsider. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal with the Clerk of the Appellate Court within thirty days after entry of the order as required by Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss the appeal.

The Defendant, John Bassett, appeals from his conviction for first degree premeditated
murder, for which he received a life sentence without the possibility of parole. On appeal,
the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction
because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was responsible for the
victim’s death and that he acted with premeditation and (2) the evidence was insufficient
to support an enhanced sentence based upon the aggravating circumstance that the murder
was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court with respect to the Defendant’s conviction. However, we reverse the judgment
of the trial court with respect to the Defendant’s sentence and remand the case for the entry
of an amended judgment sentencing the Defendant to imprisonment for life.

The defendant, Vidal Chad Bryant, pled guilty to attempted possession with the intent to
sell butyrylfentanyl, a Class C felony; possession with the intent to sell less than half a
gram of methamphetamine, a Class C felony; and possession of a firearm after having been
previously convicted of a felony drug offense, a Class C felony, for an agreed-upon
effective sentence of six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). On
appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion
to suspend the remainder of his sentence to probation. Following our review of the record,
the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s
motion.

Movant, John Valentine, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, he argues that the indictment was defective and that his double jeopardy rights were violated. After our review, we affirm.

This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial with neither the mother nor her counsel present, the court found that clear and convincing evidence established several grounds of termination and that termination was in the best interest of the child. The mother argues on appeal, inter alia, that the court erred in permitting counsel to withdraw on the day of the hearing. We vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Tony Charles Davenport, was convicted by a Cumberland County jury of
reckless homicide, attempted second degree murder, and attempted voluntary
manslaughter, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty-five years’
incarceration to be served as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, the Defendant
claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of attempted second
degree murder and attempted voluntary manslaughter and that the trial court erred in
imposing consecutive sentencing. The State responds that the Defendant’s appeal is
untimely and should be dismissed. Because we conclude that the Defendant’s notice of
appeal was untimely filed and that the interests of justice do not merit waiver of the
untimeliness, we dismiss the appeal.

This case arises out of the demise of a 20-year marriage. The trial court declared the parties divorced, equitably divided the marital estate, and awarded the wife alimony in solido, transitional alimony, and alimony in futuro. The husband appeals. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s decision in all respects.

On February 4, 2026, the pro se Appellant filed an application for an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. On February 6, 2026, this Court issued an order noting that the Appellant failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 10 by failing to attach to his application any order issued by the trial court for which review may be available. See Tenn. R. App. P. 10(a), (c). However, the Appellant also requested relief pursuant to the writ of mandamus, asserting that the trial court had failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. This Court requested a response from the State regarding the current status of the trial court proceedings and the appropriateness of the writ of mandamus.

The Petitioner, Jacob Evan Coyne, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s
denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he
received the ineffective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel’s (1) failure to
investigate or file pretrial motions challenging the credibility of an officer who investigated
his case, (2) failure to sufficiently meet with or to advise the Petitioner regarding the nature
of his case, and (3) failure to adequately advise the Petitioner regarding the status of plea
negotiations. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In 2011, a Knox County jury convicted the Petitioner, Joshua Bowman, of multiple
offenses stemming from the robbery and killing of the victim. He appealed his convictions,
all of which were affirmed save one: his conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping,
which we remanded for a new trial based on a jury instruction error. State v. Bowman, No.
E2012-00923-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 4680402, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 29, 2013),
perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 11, 2014). In 2022, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ
of error coram nobis saying that there was newly discovered evidence in the form of his
mental and counseling records, which supported his “intellectually diminished capacity
argument.” The State did not file its response until 2025, and it asserted that the records
were not newly discovered because they were his own records and, therefore, known to
him. After a hearing, the coram nobis court dismissed the petition finding that the petition
was untimely and that the Petitioner was not entitled to tolling because he was aware of his
educational limitations before trial and had discussed those limitations with his trial
attorney. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this divorce matter, the trial court classified and valued the parties’ assets, subsequently fashioning a distribution of the marital assets and liabilities that the court deemed equitable. The husband has appealed. We reverse the trial court’s determination regarding the classification and valuation of two assets and remand those issues to the trial court for further determination. Accordingly, because of these unresolved classification and valuation issues, we vacate the trial court’s overall distribution of marital property and remand that issue for further determination as well.

Defendant, James Andrew Paige, appeals from his three convictions for rape, for which he is serving an eleven-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred (1) by admitting the victim’s hearsay statements; (2) by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and (3) by failing to inquire into defense counsel’s unintentional contact with a juror or declare a mistrial. Defendant also argues that the cumulative effect of these errors entitles him to a new trial. Because we find that Defendant has failed to timely file his notice of appeal and the interest of justice does not support waiver of that requirement, we dismiss the appeal.

Defendant, Byron Becton, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The juvenile court magistrate denied Appellant/Father’s petition for custody of the minor child on its finding that Tennessee was not the child’s home state under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. Father filed a timely request for review by the juvenile court judge under Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-107(d)(1)(A). Because the trial court’s order denying review fails to comply with section 37-1-107(d)(1)(E), it is vacated.

The Petitioner, Juan Cerano, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of certiorari or supersedeas. Specifically, he contends that he is entitled to relief because he was twice punished for a single act in violation of double jeopardy and that merger of his convictions for aggravated sexual battery and rape of a child was improper. The Petitioner’s notice of appeal was filed almost two and one-half months late; an issue pointed out by the State on appeal. Following our review, we conclude that the interest of justice does not require waiver of the timely filing requirement because the Petitioner has given no explanation for the untimely filing, and the nature of his double jeopardy issue does not warrant such. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

The Petitioner, Kenneth Lee Cross, appeals as of right from the Trousdale County Circuit Court’s summary denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He argues that his probation was revoked at a January 4, 2023 “furlough termination” hearing without counsel and without a valid waiver, rendering the judgment void. The habeas corpus court denied relief, finding noncompliance with statutory filing requirements and concluding the petition failed to state a cognizable habeas corpus claim. Based on our review, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of the petition.

I agree with the underlying facts of this dispute as stated in the majority opinion. I disagree with the trial court and the majority in their application of Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-17-1206 (“UM statute”). My disagreement is two-fold. First, the trial court should not have looked any further than the plain language of section (d) of the UM statute. Second, although I would hold section (e) of the UM statute inapplicable here, I also take issue with the trial court’s findings that led to its grant of summary judgment under section (e).

The Defendant, Mario Reed, was convicted in the Montgomery County Circuit Court of evading arrest involving risk of death or injury, a Class D felony; attempted tampering with evidence, a Class D felony; and reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the reckless endangerment conviction into the evading arrest conviction and sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent seven-year sentences for evading arrest and attempted tampering with evidence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss the indictment due to a violation of Article IV of the Interstate Compact on Detainers (“ICD”), (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of attempted tampering with evidence and the jury rendered an inconsistent verdict for that offense, and (3) his seven-year sentence for evading arrest is excessive. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case to the trial court for sentencing on the reckless endangerment conviction.

Great-Grandmother appeals the denial of her petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. The trial court found one ground for termination but concluded that termination of Mother’s parental rights was not in the child’s best interest. We affirm.

Defendant, Albert Dejuan White, appeals his Tipton County Circuit Court trial convictions of possession with intent to deliver twenty-six grams or more of cocaine, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence and statements obtained during the search of his residence and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal from an interpleader action filed by a trustee of a trust who held funds that were to be distributed to a beneficiary but were subject to claims by other parties. The trial court granted the trustee permission to deposit the funds, discharged him from liability, and ordered some of the funds to be disbursed in accordance with settlement agreements the beneficiary had entered into in other litigation involving his children. The trial court proceeded to consider the claims of various other parties to determine who was entitled to the remainder of the interpleaded funds. Law firms who had represented the beneficiary in separate litigation filed an answer and claimed that they had an attorney charging lien against the trust distributions. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court determined that the law firms presented no proof of an attorney lien against the trust distributions. As such, the trial court ordered the remaining funds to be distributed to other parties. After an additional hearing on motions to revise, the trial court again found that no attorney lien existed. The law firms appealed. For the following reasons, the decision of the trial court is hereby affirmed and remanded.

I write separately from the well-reasoned majority opinion because I would reach a different conclusion regarding whether law enforcement officers violated Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), as explained below. In all other respects, I agree with the opinion and concur in the results.