APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In 2008, the Defendant, Xavier Sanchez Skaggs, pleaded guilty to possession of contraband in a penal institution, and the trial court sentenced him to a suspended sentence of eight years, as a Range II offender. The trial court ordered this sentence to be served consecutively to other sentences being served by the Defendant. In 2016, the Defendant’s probation officer filed an affidavit alleging that the Defendant had failed to regularly attend relapse prevention classes and that he also failed two drug screens. The Defendant pleaded guilty to violating his probation, and the trial court revoked his probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement because the trial court failed to address the Defendant’s underlying problem of persistent drug use. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, from the denial of a motion for judicial recusal filed by Nedra B. Drayton (“Plaintiff”) in her case against Cooper & Cooper Moving, Inc. DBA J. Cooper Self-Storage, Inc., identified in the style of the case below as Cooper Moving Services (“Defendant”). Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Plaintiff, and discerning no reversible error in the Chancellor’s ruling, we affirm.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Virgil Lucas Baker, of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; vandalism of property valued more than $500 but less than $1,000, a Class E felony; and assault, a Class A misdemeanor. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of fifteen years; six years; and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the victim’s identifications of him and that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal from the entry of a six-month order of protection. Because the order of protection has already expired by its terms, we dismiss the appeal as moot.

The Petitioner, Charles D. Sprunger, appeals the Cumberland County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2010 conviction for sexual exploitation of a minor and his eight-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that (1) he was denied his right to trial counsel of his choice because his “untainted” real property was seized before the trial pursuant to the civil asset forfeiture statutes and (2) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A customer at a car dealership filed suit against the sales manager and others for injuries she allegedly sustained due to an assault and battery by the sales manager. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendants because Plaintiff failed to submit any affidavits setting forth specific facts that showed a genuine issue existed for trial, as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Defendants. Perceiving no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to Defendants.

The Defendant, Elijah Ogle, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, robbery, aggravated assault, three counts of aggravated domestic assault, three counts of illegal possession of a firearm, domestic assault, possession of a weapon with the intent to go armed, possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. He received an effective ten-year sentence which was to be served on probation. A violation of probation warrant was issued against the Defendant, charging him with having been arrested for aggravated domestic assault, failing to report the arrest to his probation officer, failing to refrain from contact with the victim, and continuing to engage in assaultive behavior. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in prison. The Defendant appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Randall Turner, filed a motion to reopen his post-conviction petition in which he challenged his guilty pleas to first degree murder, aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of aggravated robbery and his effective sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The post-conviction court denied the motion, and the Petitioner subsequently filed two motions to rehear, both of which the post-conviction court denied. The Petitioner filed a notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we dismiss the appeal.

A mother’s parental rights to her child were terminated on the ground of mental incompetence and upon the finding that termination was in the child’s best interest. Mother appeals, contending that the ground is not supported by the evidence and that termination of her parental rights is not in the best interest of the child. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The owner of a truck was charged with driving on a revoked license, and the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security initiated a proceeding to forfeit the truck. An administrative hearing was held, which resulted in an order that the truck be forfeited. The owner sought review of the forfeiture in Chancery Court pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, and the court affirmed the forfeiture.  Finding that the seizure of the truck constituted an excessive fine in violation of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions, we reverse the judgment.  

This appeal involves competing petitions to modify a residential parenting schedule in a permanent parenting plan.  The child’s mother sought changes to the day-to-day schedule, a modification of the existing child support order, and to be named sole decision-maker.  The child’s father sought additional parenting time.  Following a trial, the juvenile court modified the residential schedule, granting the father more parenting time.  The court also ordered the father to pay his portion of the child’s preschool tuition, but the court denied the mother’s requests for sole decision-making authority and for attorney’s fees.  Upon review of the record and the juvenile court’s findings concerning the father, we conclude that the court erred in adopting the modified residential schedule.  We, therefore, vacate and remand for further proceedings on this issue.  We affirm in all other respects. 

The plaintiff filed this action against the defendants, alleging that the plaintiff had been wrongfully expelled from the Prince Hall Masonic organization. The plaintiff further alleged that he had been defamed and his reputation damaged. The action was dismissed by the trial court due to the plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff timely appealed. Because the plaintiff has failed to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 6, we dismiss this appeal.

The Petitioner, Clyde Green, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of facilitation of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of facilitation of felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, criminal conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, criminal conspiracy to possess more than twenty-six grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, possession of more than twenty-six grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, and maintaining a dwelling where controlled substances were used or sold. He received an effective twenty-two-year sentence. The Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, asserting that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which rendered his pleas unknowing and involuntary. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

Tonnie Jelks, the Petitioner, claims that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner claims that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because trial counsel incorrectly advised him concerning his offender classification, failed to adequately investigate his case, failed to inform him of the elements of the charged offense, and failed to challenge a show-up identification procedure and because the State failed to file the notice of enhanced punishment mandated by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-202(a). After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The defendant, Brandon Scott Donaldson, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of second degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, claiming that the trial court erred by excluding certain evidence and by giving certain jury instructions, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions of second degree murder and attempted second degree murder, that the sentence imposed was excessive, and that the cumulative effect of these errors prevented a fair trial. In addition, the defendant raises a number of challenges to the statute regarding the death of a fetus. Because the trial court committed prejudicial error by excluding as hearsay certain witness testimony, because this exclusion violated the defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense, we reverse the defendant’s convictions and remand for a new trial.

The Defendant, Daniel Edrick Lutrell, pled guilty to vehicular homicide by reckless conduct, reckless aggravated assault, and passing in a no-passing zone. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of six years as a Range I standard offender. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying probation, by ordering the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement, and by ordering the Defendant to serve the maximum sentence for a Range I standard offender. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

I concur in all parts of the lead opinion, except section II.B., “State of Passion” and Sequential Jury Instructions. As to that particular section, I concur in the result that Defendant is not entitled to relief on his challenge to the use of acquittal-first instructions pursuant to State v. Davis, 266 S.W.3d 896 (Tenn. 2008) and that he is not entitled to relief on the issue challenging the jury instruction that passion and provocation are elements of voluntary manslaughter.

The defendant, Yangreek Tut Wal, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping and especially aggravated robbery, claiming that his 40-year effective sentence is excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Timothy Waymond Henderson, pled guilty to sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine and to delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine, Class C felonies, with the sentencing to be left to the trial court’s later determination. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to any unexpired sentences. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence and erred in denying alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the sentencing determinations of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Shanterrica Madden, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. The Petitioner contends that due process concerns should toll the one-year statute of limitations to allow review of her underlying claims. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights based on the following grounds: (1) abandonment by wanton disregard for the welfare of the child; (2) persistence of conditions; and (3) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans. We reverse the grounds of persistence of conditions and substantial noncompliance. We, however, affirm the remaining ground of abandonment by wanton disregard for the welfare of the child and the trial court’s determination that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.

Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) requires a person who asserts a potential claim for healthcare liability to include with pre-suit notice a HIPAA compliant medical authorization permitting the healthcare provider who receives the notice to obtain complete medical records “from each other provider being sent the notice.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). Here, the plaintiff sent pre-suit notice of her claim to a single healthcare provider and included a medical authorization. After the plaintiff filed suit, the defendant healthcare provider moved to dismiss, asserting the plaintiff had failed to provide a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization. The trial court granted the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We hold that a prospective plaintiff who provides pre-suit notice to one potential defendant is not required under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) to provide the single potential defendant with a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization. We reverse the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. 

Defendant, Matthew Allen Thompson, filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. The trial court denied the motion, and Defendant appeals. Although Defendant filed his motion pursuant to Rule 36 and quoted Rule 36 in his motion, the trial court treated the motion as a Rule 36.1 motion. We conclude under either Rule 36 or 36.1 that Defendant is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion.

This appeal concerns the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Hamilton County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of George C. (“Father”) to his minor child Kenya H. (“the Child”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights. Father appealed. We reverse the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan and willful failure to visit, but affirm the ground of wanton disregard. We further affirm that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. The judgment of the Juvenile Court is affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part.

Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment to Defendants related to the foreclosure of Plaintiff’s home. She contends the trial court erred in summarily dismissing her complaint. She also contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend. Defendants insist the trial court should be affirmed in all respects. They also contend the appeal should be dismissed due to Plaintiff’s failure to comply with Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Appeals. As Defendants contend, Plaintiff’s brief fails to comply with our appellate rules of advocacy and for this reason alone we would be justified in affirming the trial court. Nevertheless, we reviewed the record and the trial court’s actions and affirm the trial court in all respects. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.