APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Nearly thirty-five years from the date Petitioner, David C. Duncan, burglarized the home of, raped, and then killed a victim in Sumner County, he appeals the summary denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. Upon our review of the record, not only is the petition untimely filed, it also fails to allege any newly discovered evidence that may have affected the outcome of Petitioner's trial. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, John Lowery, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. Eleven years after Petitioner’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, which was summarily dismissed by the trial court. In his petition, Petitioner asserted that two witnesses recanted their identification of Petitioner as the shooter, and a previously unknown witness said that Petitioner was not at the scene of the crime. On appeal, this court reversed the court’s summary dismissal of the petition and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. On remand, the State filed a response, asserting that the statute of limitations had run. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief, finding the two witnesses who recanted not credible and that the testimony of the newly discovered witness did not meet the test that it “might have” changed the outcome of the trial. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Ricky Lee Palmer, appeals from his conviction of aggravated assault for which he was sentenced to six years. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We determine that the evidence was monumentally sufficient to sustain the conviction for aggravated assault. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Defendant, Timothy Reynolds, pled guilty to the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine. As a result of the guilty plea he was sentenced to six years with one year to serve and the remainder to be served on supervised probation. After Defendant’s probation was partially revoked on two separate occasions, a third probation violation resulted in the complete revocation of probation. Defendant appeals the revocation of probation. We affirm the trial court’s decision to revoke Defendant’s probation.

Petitioner, Anthony Dodson, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he alleged that his conviction for attempted first degree murder is illegal. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a motor vehicle accident. Christopher Lea Williams (“Williams”) and John Buraczynski (“Buraczynski”) both worked for Progression Electric, LLC (“Progression”). In January 2015, Buraczynski was driving his vehicle with passenger Williams as part of a carpool arrangement when they were involved in an accident. Williams subsequently claimed he was entitled to and received workers’ compensation benefits. Williams then sued Buraczynski, personally, in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). Buraczynski filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Williams’ exclusive remedy was in workers’ compensation. The Trial Court granted Buraczynski’s motion. Williams appealed. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

The Petitioner, Jeffrey S. Petty, appeals the Dickson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  On appeal, he argues that trial counsel was ineffective by (1) failing to move for a mistrial based on juror misconduct; (2) failing to file a motion to suppress evidence found in the Petitioner’s car; and (3) failing to include certain issues in his motion for new trial.  Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Barbara Rains (“Employee”) filed this action in the Circuit Court for Hardin County, alleging that she sustained a back injury in the course of her work as a cashier for Wal-Mart (“Employer”). The issues were bifurcated, with compensability to be tried first and any remaining issues to be heard later. After the hearing about compensability, the trial court found that Employee had failed to sustain her burden of proof and dismissed the complaint. Employee has appealed, alleging various errors by the trial court. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. Because Employee failed to present any expert medical evidence to support her claim, we conclude that the trial court’s finding regarding compensability was correct. All other issues raised by Employee are pretermitted. Therefore, we affirm the judgment.

Jeffrey Scott Beck (“Employee”) filed a workers’ compensation complaint claiming he suffered a back injury six months earlier during the course and scope of his employment with the City of Brownsville (“Employer”). Employer denied that the alleged injury arose out of his employment and maintained that Employee failed to give timely notice of the alleged injury. The trial court determined that Employee’s notice was untimely and that Employee’s excuse for not providing timely notice was unreasonable. The trial court also concluded that Employee failed to establish causation. Employee appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Paul Avery Reno, pleaded guilty to statutory rape, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. § 39-113-506 (2014). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Defendant agreed to a six-year sentence as a Range III offender, with the method and manner of service to be determined by the trial court. The court ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the court erred by (1) denying judicial diversion, (2) denying alternative sentencing, and (3) ordering the Defendant to register as a sex offender. We affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for a new sentencing hearing.

The Petitioner, John H. Brichetto, Jr., and his wife were convicted of Class B felony theft of property. The Petitioner was sentenced to ten years’ incarceration. As part of an agreement for a reduced sentence for his wife, the Petitioner executed a written waiver of his right to appeal, his right to file for post-conviction relief, and his right to collaterally attack his conviction. The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Finding that the waiver was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, the post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Anna Chick, appeals her Williamson County Circuit Court conviction of failure to appear, see T.C.A. 39-16-609, arguing that Code section 39-16-609 is unconstitutional; that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction; that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence in violation of the defendant’s constitutional right to confront the witnesses against her; that the State failed to establish that the offense was committed before the finding of the indictment; and that the six-year sentence imposed in this case constitutes unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Shawn Bough, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis regarding his convictions for felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, for which he is serving an effective life sentence. The coram nobis court dismissed the petition after a hearing because it determined the newly discovered evidence was not credible and would not have led to a different result at the trial. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the court erred by dismissing the petition. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The Defendant, Whitney Kristina Harris, was convicted upon her guilty pleas of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony, and accessory after the fact to first degree murder, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-16-503 (2014) (tampering with evidence), 39-11-411 (2014) (accessory after the fact). The Defendant pleaded guilty as a Range II offender as a term of the plea agreement and agreed to an effective ten-year sentence. The manner of service of her sentence was reserved for the trial court’s determination. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in imposing incarceration rather than an alternative sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court, and we remand the case for correction of a clerical error on the accessory after the fact judgment.

The Tennessee Supreme Court has remanded this case for reconsideration in light of State v. Reynolds, 504 S.W.3d 283 (Tenn. 2016). See State v. Micah Alexander Cates, No. E2014-01322-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 5679825, at *1-6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2015), perm. app. granted, case remanded (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2016). Relevant to the current remand, this court concluded in the previous appeal that a new trial was necessary because the warrantless blood draw was not justified by exigent circumstances and that the evidence obtained from the blood draw should have been suppressed. Upon further review, we conclude that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule permitted the admission of the relevant evidence, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case in which the mother and stepfather sought termination of the biological father’s parental rights to his child. The trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination on the statutory ground of abandonment for failure to remit child support. The court further found that termination was in the best interest of the child. The father appeals. We affirm.

Petitioner, Joletta Summers, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her convictions for voluntary manslaughter, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that she received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel mentioned during opening statement an inculpatory statement that was never introduced into evidence; failed to adequately argue for severance of her case from her codefendant’s; failed to object to the State’s improper closing argument; failed to file a timely motion for new trial; and failed to argue on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to specify the predicate felony in the jury instructions for the employment of a firearm charge. Upon our review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A judgment creditor moved to extend her judgment for an additional ten years under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 69.04, and the trial court issued an order requiring the judgment debtor to show cause why the judgment should not be extended. Almost a year later, the judgment debtor filed a motion for relief from the judgment based upon an error in the certificate of service on the show cause order. In her response, the judgment creditor acknowledged that the address shown for the judgment debtor was incorrect but stated that, after the order was returned by the post office, it was mailed to the correct address. The judgment creditor also asserted that the motion for relief was premature because the court had not yet entered an order extending the judgment. The trial court entered an order extending the judgment for an additional ten years. We affirm.

This post-divorce case involves the interpretation of a paragraph in a marital dissolution agreement regarding the allocation of a portion of Husband’s military retirement benefits to Wife. Both parties petitioned the trial court to interpret the terms of the agreement. The trial court held that the agreement awarded Wife 33% of Husband’s actual disposable military retirement pay at the rank of Captain (his rank at the time of the divorce). On appeal, Husband contends that the award was intended to be alimony in solido calculable at the time of the divorce based on the value of his accrued benefits at that time. He also contends that Wife should be bound by her acknowledgment in pre-litigation discussions of $465.86 per month as the correct amount of the award. Having considered the issues advanced on appeal, we agree with the trial court’s interpretation of the marital dissolution agreement and affirm its judgment in all respects. Additionally, we hold that Wife is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees incurred on appeal pursuant to the terms of the marital dissolution agreement and remand this case to the trial court for a determination of the appropriate amount of those fees.  

This appeal arises from an enforcement action by the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) against the owner of a restaurant located within the Broadway Historic Preservation District in Nashville, Tennessee. Metro commenced the action to require the owner to comply with Metropolitan Code of Laws (M.C.L) § 17.40.410 and the preservation permit the Metropolitan Historic Zoning Commission (“the Commission”) issued upon the application of the owner. Following discovery, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted Metro’s motion and denied the owner’s motion. The order required the owner to remove the portion of the installation that did not comply with the permit. This appeal followed. The owner raises three principal issues. It contends: (1) the glass panels it was ordered to remove do not fall within the purview of the Commission; (2) Metro cannot enforce a permit that has expired; and (3) summary judgment is inappropriate because material facts are in dispute. Metro contends we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the appeal is untimely. We have determined the appeal is timely, and the issues raised by the owner are unavailing. Therefore, we affirm. 

Defendant that admitted liability for vehicle accident appeals the award of damages to the injured Plaintiff, contending that the awards for lost wages, lost future earnings, pain and suffering, past and future, loss of ability to enjoy life, past and future, and permanent impairment awards, are against the preponderance of the evidence. Upon a thorough review of the record, we modify the award for past medical expenses; affirm the awards for past pain and suffering, permanent impairment, past loss of ability to enjoy life and for loss of ability to enjoy life in the future, and for lost wages; reverse the award for future pain and suffering; and vacate the award for loss of earning capacity and remand the case for further consideration of the award.

The Defendant, Dwayne Jones, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to five years of incarceration. The trial court also imposed the $7000 fine assessed by the jury. The Defendant raises three issues on appeal: whether the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction due to the Defendant’s pending petition to remove the case to federal court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1443; whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction because the proof did not show that the victim suffered serious bodily injury; and whether the trial court erred in imposing the $7000 fine without making any specific findings of fact regarding the Defendant’s financial circumstances and ability to pay. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pro se petitioner, Robert Allen Territo, appeals the summary dismissal of his Rule 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence by the Circuit Court for Jackson County. On appeal, the petitioner argues that (1) he should have been sentenced as a Range I offender; (2) the trial court erred by improperly enhancing his sentence above the statutory minimum; (3) the trial court violated Rule 11 by accepting his guilty plea; and (4) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant was indicted for driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI); driving with a blood alcohol concentration of .08 or more (DUI per se); DUI, second offense; and unlawful possession of a weapon. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a blood draw taken pursuant to a search warrant, and the trial court granted the motion. The State sought and was granted permission to appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9. We hold that the police officer’s execution of the search warrant was unconstitutional, that exigent circumstances did not justify the blood draw, and that the good faith exception does not apply. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment suppressing the results of the blood draw and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Appellant, an inmate in the custody of Appellee Tennessee Department of Correction, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for declaratory judgment under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. Specifically, Appellant challenges the Tennessee Department of Correction’s calculation of his criminal sentence, and also challenges the constitutionality of the criminal statutes, under which he was convicted. We conclude that the calculation of Appellant’s sentence comports with the judgments of the criminal court. Appellant’s constitutional arguments challenge his criminal sentence. As such, he has no recourse under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. Affirmed and remanded.