APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Lori Reel (“Employee”) was employed by Jenny Craig Operations, Inc. (“Employer”) as a Jenny Craig consultant. On January 8, 2010, Employee fell while at work and struck her right knee on the floor. Suit was filed. Employee alleged that she sustained a work-related injury to her right knee that aggravated pre-existing arthritis in that knee and ultimately necessitated a total knee replacement. While conceding that Employee sustained a temporary injury to her knee from the fall, Employer denied liability for the total knee replacement and for any permanent impairment. The trial court found that Employee’s work-related fall caused an acceleration, advancement, or progression of her osteoarthritis, such that she required a total knee replacement, that Employee’s January 8, 2010 injury was compensable, and that Employee retained a permanent partial disability of 46.5% to her right lower extremity. Employer has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Charles Phillip Maxwell, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis from his driving with a suspended license conviction and his thirty-day sentence, which was suspended to probation after twenty-four hours in confinement. The Petitioner contends that the court erred by denying relief and improperly ordered him to pay court costs associated with his petition. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Defendant, Latoya Britton, appeals the trial court’s revocation of her community corrections sentence and the imposition of additional consecutive sentencing and confinement upon resentencing. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, David Dwight Hester, pleaded guilty to initiation of methamphetamine manufacture, and two counts of aggravated child neglect. He received an agreed effective sentence of twenty-five years at thirty percent as a Range I offender. Petitioner subsequently filed a post-conviction petition that was denied by the post-conviction court. On appeal, Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the indictments charging him with aggravated child abuse or neglect because each indictment charged him with “two distinct offenses.” He also argues that trial counsel told him that he was required to receive the same sentence as his co-defendant and that Petitioner risked serving his sentence at one-hundred percent eligibility if the case went to trial. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Defendant, Javonta Marquis Perkins, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for aggravated robbery, carjacking, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a dangerous felony. Defendant was convicted as charged by a jury and sentenced by the trial court to ten years each for his aggravated robbery and carjacking convictions and six years for the possession of a weapon conviction. By operation of law, the trial court ordered Defendant’s six-year sentence consecutive to his concurrent ten-year sentences, for an effective sentence of 16 years. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that: 1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the victim’s pretrial identification; 2) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on criminal responsibility; 3) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and 4) his sentences are excessive. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we find no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Joseph Kolby Willis (“Employee”) alleges that he sustained a compensable injury to his left knee while working for All Staff (“Employer”). After his petition for interlocutory relief was denied, discovery was taken, and a compensation hearing was held. The court of workers’ compensation claims (“trial court”) bifurcated the issues of compensability and relief. After the hearing, the trial court issued a compensation order finding the injury was compensable. Employer appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (“Board”) pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-217 (2014). The Board reversed the trial court’s order, finding that Employee had failed to establish causation, and remanded the case to the trial court for entry of an order dismissing the claim. After the order was entered, Employee appealed to the Supreme Court. Employee’s appeal has been referred to this Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of dismissal.

This appeal arises from the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights with respect to their two minor children. The children were removed from the parents’ custody by the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) in July 2013 after investigators responded to a call where the children’s sibling was found deceased at home. DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father on the grounds of severe abuse and best interests. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence of grounds supporting termination and that termination of their parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Mother and Father separately appealed. After review, we affirm the trial court.

The Petitioner, Alexander R. Carino, appeals the Trousdale County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 2010 convictions for two counts of second degree murder and his effective forty-three-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred by summarily denying relief. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Jose Holmes, appeals the habeas corpus court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief in which he challenged his conviction for especially aggravated robbery and his sixty-year sentence as a career offender. Because the Petitioner filed an untimely notice of appeal and the interest of justice does not support waiver of the timely filing requirement in this case, this appeal is dismissed.

This case involves a post-divorce modification of a parenting plan. Appellee/Mother filed a petition to modify the parties’ parenting plan, alleging that: (1) Father had moved, requiring a modification in the transportation arrangements; (2) Father had preemptively refused to pay the oldest child’s private school tuition at Girl’s Preparatory School (“GPS”); and (3) Father should be found in contempt for failing to pay the children’s extracurricular expenses, in violation of a prior court order. Father counter-claimed for contempt, stating that, without his consent, Mother had enrolled the older child in a private school. The trial court found Father in civil contempt, entered two monetary judgments against Father, and modified Father’s child support and the parties’ transportation schedule. Determining that the parties agreed to Catholic education for the children, and Father is not liable for private school tuition costs when the parties did not agree on the private school, we reverse the ruling regarding Father’s share of the tuition for the older child. We also reverse the trial court’s judgments against Father for $6,209.40 in extracurricular expenses, $787.59 for out-of-network dental expenses, and its finding of contempt, and its assessment of $150.00 per month prospective piano and dance lesson fees against Father. Finally, we affirm the trial court’s entry of Mother’s child support worksheet and modification of the parties’ transportation arrangements. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Clifford Barker (“Employee”) worked for The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company (“Employer”) from 1969 until 1999, when he retired. He filed this action seeking benefits for alleged work-related hearing loss on March 18, 2014. Employer disputed that Employee’s hearing loss was work-related. The trial court awarded benefits for 30% permanent partial disability to both ears. Employer has appealed from that award, contending the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding of causation. In the alternative, Employer argues that Employee sustained no vocational disability as a result of his hearing loss. The appeal has been referred to a Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment in part, modify in part, and remand to the trial court for entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion.

Petitioner, Antonio Braden, appeals from the denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion alleging that his sentence is illegal because the trial court erred by applying enhancement factors and sentencing him four years “beyond the statutory minimum.” Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Christopher D. Hodge, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that the trial court was without jurisdiction to convict him because the grand jurors were not picked from more than one county in the district; and that the trial court illegally amended his judgment 60 days after entry of the judgment to change his release eligibility from 35 percent to 100 percent. Upon review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

The plaintiffs initiated this health care liability action against two defendant medical providers, a dermatology practice and a certified physician’s assistant employed by the practice. The defendants filed separate motions to dismiss, with each respectively asserting that the plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed for failure to substantially comply with Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121(a)(2)(E), which provides that a pre-suit medical authorization must be compliant with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”). Following a hearing, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims without prejudice upon finding that the medical authorization forwarded by the plaintiffs was incomplete and failed to substantially comply with HIPAA’s release requirements. The plaintiffs have appealed solely the dismissal of the health care liability claim against the dermatology practice. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This is a health care liability action in which a patient alleged that an emergency room nurse practitioner violated the applicable standard of care in her treatment of him by failing to order proper tests and failing to perform a proper examination. The case was tried before a jury for three days. At the close of proof, the trial court granted a partial directed verdict in favor of the Appellee, dismissing Appellant’s claims that Appellee breached the standard of care by not ordering a CT scan. The court also refused to allow the jury to consider whether Appellant’s vision loss was due to Appellee’s negligence. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellee. We affirm.

This case arises out of the demise of a long-term marriage. The trial court granted the wife a divorce based on the husband’s inappropriate marital conduct and, after finding the wife economically disadvantaged, awarded her transitional alimony for a duration of 12 years. The husband appeals the final decree of absolute divorce solely on the issue of alimony. Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the trial court did not err in awarding alimony, nor did it err in the amount or duration of its award. However, we modify the court’s award of transitional alimony to an award of alimony in futuro. We affirm in all other respects.  

At an earlier time, in 2011, John O. Threadgill brought an action against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. In doing so, he was acting as the trustee for the owner of real property, upon which mortgagee Wells Fargo intended to foreclose. That case ended in summary judgment against the trustee. When the decision became final following an appeal to this Court and an unsuccessful request for Supreme Court review, Threadgill almost immediately filed this action. For the purpose of the second suit, he admits that the current complaint asserts the same claims and involves the same parties as in the earlier suit. In the second suit, Wells Fargo again moved for summary judgment upon the ground of res judicata. Threadgill acknowledges that res judicata applies to bar his claim. He argues, however, that he is entitled to a judgment declaring that Wells Fargo is estopped from asserting any claim that is based upon the note and deed of trust, because Wells Fargo failed to assert such a claim in the first lawsuit. Threadgill argues that a claim based on the note and deed of trust is a compulsory counterclaim under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 13.01. The trial court disagreed, ruling that Wells Fargo’s “nonjudicial foreclosure is, by definition, nonjudicial and was not required to be raised in the [earlier case] as a counterclaim.” Threadgill appeals. We affirm

The Appellee, Tedd A. Tjornhom, was charged in the Williamson County Circuit Court with driving under the influence (DUI) and DUI per se and filed a motion to suppress his blood alcohol report due to the State’s destruction of his blood sample. The Williamson County Circuit Court granted the motion, and the State appeals. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, the order of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This case involves misrepresentations allegedly made to a husband and wife, purchasers of real estate. On June 16, 2006, Daniel D. Hall and Julie K. Hall executed a contract to purchase lot 25 in the Preserve at English Mountain (the Preserve). On June 30, 2006, the transaction closed. In November 2009, the Halls learned, for the first time, that public sewage disposal was not available to lot 25. Because of this deficiency, the Halls were restricted, against their wishes, to a dwelling with only two bedrooms. On December 14, 2012, based upon the misrepresentation that lot 25 would have access to public sewage disposal, the Halls filed a complaint against various entities and individuals involved in the sale. Refusing to pierce the corporate veil as to individual defendants Phillip Joseph and Daniel L. Barnett, the trial court dismissed all of the individual defendants and some of the other defendants. The court found material misrepresentations and granted the Halls rescission of the purchase contract and a refund of $123,000. In addition, the court awarded the Halls attorney’s fees under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) against Blue Ridge Realty, Inc. (Blue Ridge) predicated upon the failure of the Halls’ agent to disclose that he was a member of the entity selling the property. Eagle Rock Development, LLC (Eagle Rock) and Blue Ridge (collectively the entity defendants) appeal. We affirm

The Petitioner, Joseph Miles, filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, asserting that newly discovered evidence entitled him to relief. The coram nobis court summarily dismissed the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The defendant, Susan Lynette Baker, appeals her Sequatchie County Circuit Court jury convictions of felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and setting fire to personal property, claiming that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress the pretrial statement she provided to the police, the evidence of her theft of property from the victim’s residence, and the surveillance video from a motel; that the trial court erred by denying her motion to sever the arson charge from the remaining charges; that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery; and that “the very nature” of the felony murder statute violates principles of due process. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Deann Anelia Walls, appeals the trial court’s order requiring her to serve in confinement her effective ten-year sentence resulting from her guilty plea to nineteen counts of prescription medication fraud and thirty-six counts of identity theft. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Mandrell Sanders, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and was sentenced to fourteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence and erred in denying his request for probation. After review, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court.

This appeal involves the termination of the parental rights of the mother and father of two minor children. The trial court held that the parents were in substantial noncompliance with three permanency plans, primarily for drug abuse and the failure to seek treatment, and subsequently terminated the parental rights of each. Both parents appeal. We affirm.