APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Harakas Construction, Inc. appeals the judgment of the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) granting summary judgment to Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) and Dale and Associates, Inc. (“Dale”). We find and hold that the Trial Court correctly granted summary judgment to Metro based upon sovereign immunity and that the Trial Court correctly granted summary judgment to Dale because Dale had negated essential elements of Harakas’s claim. 

A trial court designated the father of a child born out of wedlock as the primary residential parent and imputed additional income to the mother for purposes of child support after determining she was underemployed. The mother appealed the trial court’s judgment. During the pendency of the appeal, dependency and neglect proceedings in the trial court resulted in the child’s removal from the father’s residence and his placement with the mother in California. The dependency and neglect proceedings rendered moot the mother’s challenge of the trial court’s designation of the father as the primary residential parent, leaving the imputation of additional income to the mother as the only issue on appeal. Concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating additional income to the mother for child support purposes, we affirm that aspect of the trial court’s judgment.

The primary claim at issue in this appeal is for breach of an insurance contract. The insured property at issue, Opry Mills Shopping Mall, sustained catastrophic damages from the May 2010 flood in Nashville, Tennessee. Following the flood, the insureds contended the policy provided $200 million of coverage. The insurers insisted the policy limit for the claim was $50 million pursuant to the High Hazard Flood Zones Limit due to the fact the location of the Mall had been designated on a Flood Insurance Rate Map as a Special Flood Hazard Area. The trial court summarily ruled that the policy limits were $200 million finding, inter alia, the insured properties that were limited to $50 million of coverage were listed on the High Hazard Flood Locations schedule in Endorsement 6 of the policy, and Opry Mills Shopping Mall was not listed. Therefore, the trial court ruled that the policy limits for the claim were $200 million. Following a lengthy trial, the jury awarded the insured a judgment of almost $200 million. The insurers appealed. We have determined the policy limits are $50 million. Because the insurers paid the insureds $50 million before the commencement of this action, which is all the insurers are obligated to pay on the claim, the judgment of the trial court is reversed. We have also determined that the trial court did not err by summarily dismissing the insureds’ alternative claim that was based on promissory estoppel.

The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment by demonstrating a wanton disregard for his child’s welfare. DCS failed to offer evidence that Father knew of the child’s existence when Father was engaging in the behavior that demonstrated wanton disregard. Accordingly, we reverse the termination of Father’s parental rights.

The Defendant, Michael Eugene Rhodes, Jr., appeals the trial court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence and resentencing him to ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in revoking his community corrections sentence and in increasing his sentence to ten years. Following our review, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court.

The Petitioner, William Greene, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner pled guilty to aggravated assault, being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, and intentionally evading arrest in a motor vehicle. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received an effective three-year sentence. The Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not voluntarily and intelligently entered because trial counsel failed to inform him of a special condition waiving his ability to petition to suspend the remainder of his sentence. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Petitioner contends the trial judge should have recused himself because Petitioner “was directly involved in a decision-making process that ultimately resulted in an effect on the [judge’s] finances.” Petitioner also contends recusal is required because “the Judge based his ruling almost exclusively on his own statements that he was unaware of the Petitioner’s involvement in his loan application process,” which statements made him “a material witness.” Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal, pursuant to the de novo standard as required under Rule 10B, § 2.01, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal.

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, Corbyn Davis, of first degree premeditated murder and being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life in prison for the murder conviction and to four years for the firearm conviction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support each conviction. Upon reviewing the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This action, which involves the plaintiff’s claims of assault and battery against her former co-workers and a medical doctor at the hospital where she was previously employed, is before this Court on appeal for the second time. See Lacy v. HCA Tristar Hendersonville Hosp., No. M2015-02217-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 4497953 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2016) (“Lacy I”). The first appeal arose from an involuntary dismissal, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02(2), following the close of the plaintiff’s proof during a bench trial. The plaintiff, proceeding without benefit of counsel, had filed a statement of the evidence, which was subsequently stricken from the record by the trial court upon an objection filed by the defendants. The first appeal came before this Court without a statement of the evidence in the record. Determining that the trial court had failed to resolve the parties’ conflicts concerning the plaintiff’s statement of the evidence, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(c) and (e), and that the trial court had failed to make sufficient factual findings in its final order, this Court vacated the order of involuntary dismissal and remanded to the trial court for appropriate factual findings and a resolution of the conflicts concerning the statement of the evidence. Lacy I, 2016 WL 4497953, at *3. On remand, the defendants submitted a statement of the evidence, which, upon review, the trial court approved as accurate. The trial court then entered an order setting forth findings of fact and conclusions of law, determining that the plaintiff had failed to present proof of causation and damages during the bench trial. The trial court subsequently entered a final order dismissing the plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. The plaintiff timely appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.  

Billy Tankersley (“Employee”) worked for Batesville Casket Company (“Employer”) for thirty-seven years. He injured his right shoulder and arm on December 12, 2012. He ultimately was unable to return to work. He filed this action in the Chancery Court for Coffee County seeking permanent total disability benefits. The trial court found him to be permanently and totally disabled. The award was apportioned 90% to Employer and 10% to the Second Injury Fund. Employer has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Linda Wimmer (“Plaintiff”) sued Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority d/b/a Erlanger Health System (“Erlanger”) with regard to an incident in which Plaintiff was hit with an interior door and seriously injured. After a trial without a jury, the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) entered its Memorandum and Judgment finding and holding, inter alia, there was no evidence that the location of the door constituted a defective design and no evidence that the door itself was defective, and that even if Erlanger had a duty to post a sign or put a glass window in the door, there was no evidence of causation. The Trial Court entered judgment in favor of Erlanger. Plaintiff appeals to this Court. We find and hold that Erlanger was immune from suit pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101, et seq., that Plaintiff failed to prove that said immunity was removed, and, in the alternative, that Plaintiff failed to prove causation. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court’s judgment in favor of Erlanger.

The Defendant, William D. Lennox, Jr., appeals from the Sevier County Circuit Court’s order denying his motion to correct illegal sentences. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1. The Defendant’s counsel has filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to Rule 22 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that counsel’s motion is welltaken and, in accordance with Rule 22(F), affirm the trial court’s judgments pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

The majority holds that Erlanger was immune from suit pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-101, et seq., the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”); that Ms. Wimmer failed to prove that said immunity was removed; and, in the alternative, that she failed to prove causation. I think the hospital is liable for this injury and the plaintiff should prevail.

Following the end of the three-year term of a commercial real estate lease, the tenant continued to occupy the leased premises and pay rent to the landlord. The landlord accepted the rent payments for six months and then notified the tenant that the amount of the required rent had increased. The tenant paid the increased rent but notified the landlord that it was ending its tenancy in thirty days. Contending that the tenant had in effect exercised its option to renew the lease for an additional three years, the landlord demanded that the tenant pay rent for the remainder of the renewal term. The tenant refused, and the landlord brought this action for breach of the lease agreement. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. Because the trial court found that the lease had not been renewed and the tenant properly terminated the resulting periodic tenancy upon thirty days’ notice, the court denied the landlord’s motion and awarded summary judgment to the tenant. We agree that the lease was not renewed, but because we conclude that the resulting periodic tenancy was year-to-year, the tenant was required to give at least six months’ notice prior to the end of the periodic tenancy. Thus, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

This appeal arises from an alleged breach of contract. Lew Winters (“Winters”) sued Southern Heritage Bank (“the Bank”) in the Circuit Court for Bradley County (“the Trial Court”) for, among other things, breach of contract. Specifically, Winters asserted that the Bank wrongly backed out of a tripartite agreement involving the Internal Revenue Service (“the IRS”) which would have allowed Winters to obtain financing for new tractors and therefore be able to continue operating his trucking company. The Bank filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that no such agreement was reached. Instead, according to the Bank, the parties only engaged in discussions about a possible resolution. The Trial Court granted the Bank’s motion for summary judgment. Winters appealed to this Court. We hold, inter alia, that the purported oral agreement violates the Statute of Frauds. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

This appeal arises from a judgment of divorce and an award of damages in tort.  The trial court awarded the wife an absolute divorce and full custody of their minor child.  After determining that the husband was willfully and voluntarily underemployed, the court set child support based on his earning capacity rather than his actual gross income.  Then, the court classified, valued, and divided the marital property and awarded the wife both alimony in futuro and alimony in solido.  The court also granted the wife a judgment for compensatory damages on her tort claim.  On appeal, the husband challenges the court’s determination that he is willfully and voluntarily underemployed, the valuation of the marital residence, the alimony awards, and the award of damages in tort.  After careful review, we vacate the court’s award of damages to the wife for her child’s pain and suffering.  In all other respects, we affirm.

A father filed a petition to modify his child support obligation based on a reduction in income. Following a trial, the court determined that there was a significant variance between the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines and the amount of support ordered, and the court reduced the father’s child support obligation. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Aaron Westbrook, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel relating to the entry of his guilty plea. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Defendant, Thomas J. Privett, entered a guilty plea to vehicular homicide by intoxication, with an agreed sentence length of ten years and the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. The trial court held a sentencing hearing and determined that the Defendant would serve his sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing and in fully revoking his probation on a prior conviction. After a review of the record, we determine that there was no abuse of discretion, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In May 2015, the Montgomery County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Christopher D. Linsey, for possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, simple possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and resisting arrest. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted as charged, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant, as a Range III persistent offender, to a total effective sentence of twenty-three years. On appeal, he contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, and he challenges his sentence as excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Appellant’s parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by willful failure to support or visit; (2) abandonment by an incarcerated parent by wanton disregard; and (3) on grounds codified at Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) et seq. Because Appellees did not meet their burden to show that Father willfully failed to support or visit the child, and because Appellees did not meet their burden to show that Father had the financial means to pay for his reasonable share of prenatal and postnatal support, we reverse the trial court’s findings as to these grounds. We affirm as to the other grounds found by the trial court. We also affirm the trial court’s finding that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the best interest of the minor child.

The petitioner, Randy Poole, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial and in filing his motion for new trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Appellant Mother’s parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by willful failure to support; and (2) failure to substantially comply with the reasonable requirements of the permanency plan. Because Appellees did not meet their burden to show that Mother willfully failed to provide support for the children, we reverse the trial court’s order as to the ground of abandonment by willful failure to support. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed.

This is a personal injury case involving a motor vehicle accident. The alleged tortfeasor died subsequent to the injury-causing accident. The plaintiffs were unaware of the decedent’s death and commenced this suit naming him as a defendant. Some months later, after learning of the decedent’s death, the plaintiffs sought the appointment of an administrator ad litem in the Probate Court and amended their complaint naming the administrator ad litem as a party as required by the survival statute. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the plaintiffs’ complaint was not properly filed until after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court agreed and granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs timely appealed. Having concluded that the plaintiffs did not properly commence their lawsuit within the time afforded by the applicable statute of limitations, we affirm.

This case involves various issues related to an ordinance the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County enacted to address short-term rental properties. Among other things, the enacted ordinance provided that no more than 3% of
non-owner-occupied single-family or two-family residential units would be granted short-term rental permits in each census tract. The plaintiffs, who previously listed their home on Airbnb.com, filed suit against the Metropolitan Government challenging the enforceability of the ordinance on several fronts. In addition to asserting that the enacted ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, the plaintiffs contended that the 3% cap on certain short-term rentals was an unlawful monopoly. After competing motions for summary judgment were filed, the trial court held that the definition of a “short-term rental property” was unconstitutionally vague as-applied to the plaintiffs, but it also held that the 3% cap did not constitute a monopoly. Given the plaintiffs’ success on their constitutional “vagueness” claim, the trial court found them to be prevailing parties under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and awarded them certain attorney’s fees. On appeal, both sides raise issues asserting error. Because several definitions contained within the governmental ordinance have been amended since the filing of this appeal, we conclude that the plaintiffs’ constitutional “vagueness” claim is now moot. Concerning the propriety of the 3% cap on non-owner-occupied short-term rentals, we have determined that the cap is constitutionally permissible even assuming that it constitutes a monopoly. For reasons discussed herein, we vacate the award of attorney’s fees and remand the issue for reconsideration.