APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Appellant, Randel Lee Burnett, II, pled guilty in the Fayette County Circuit Court to vehicular homicide by intoxication, aggravated child neglect, and three counts of vehicular assault. After a sentencing hearing, he received an effective twenty-four-year sentence. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court improperly enhanced his sentences and erred by ordering consecutive sentencing based upon his being a dangerous offender. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court improperly applied two enhancement factors during sentencing but that the length of the Appellant’s sentences is not excessive. We also conclude that the trial court did not err by ordering consecutive sentencing. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

A Hardin County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Darlene F. Hottiman, of operating a motor vehicle after having been declared a motor vehicle habitual offender, a Class E felony, and driving on a revoked license, a Class A misdemeanor, and she received an effective four-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions due to her defense of necessity; that the trial court made improper comments to an alternate juror, made improper comments about the length of jury deliberations, and made improper comments about plea negotiations during the sentencing hearing; and that the trial court improperly enhanced her felony sentence based upon her prior criminal history and should have granted her request for probation. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Cedric Taylor, filed a post-conviction petition, seeking relief from his convictions of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. In the petition, the Petitioner alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective by calling an alibi witness whose testimony was not favorable to the Petitioner. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Stephen D. Demps, the Defendant, was convicted of five counts of rape of a child and four counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court merged counts six and eight, aggravated sexual battery, into counts two and four, rape of a child. He received a total effective sentence of twenty-five years’ incarceration. On appeal, he argues that: (1) his statement during his December 2013 interview with law enforcement should have been suppressed because he was in custody and was not informed of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); (2) his statement during his January 2014 interview with law enforcement should have been suppressed because he was coerced into confessing; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial after individuals spoke to the sequestered victim during trial; and (4) the State failed to properly submit a bill of particulars and he was prejudiced by this failure. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm.

This complaint is a forcible entry and detainer action. Appellant appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for default judgment. The order appealed is not a final judgment so as to confer subject matter jurisdiction on this Court pursuant to Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. Because the trial court entered its order dismissing Appellant’s complaint while the appeal was pending in this Court, we vacate the order of dismissal.

The Petitioner, Bobby Daniel Pettie, appeals from the Bedford County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he is entitled to post-conviction relief due to numerous instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Dwayne Scott Franklin, of three counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony. The trial court imposed sentences of twenty-five, thirty, and thirty-five years in prison for the crimes, and the sentences were ordered to run partially consecutively for an aggregate sentence of sixty years. The Defendant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the State’s alleged failure to preserve evidence, and sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Shawnte L. Shade, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because of the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This case involves the grant of a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss a complaint for declaratory judgment. Two years after the parties’ final divorce was entered, Mr. Karsonovich lost his job and filed a complaint for declaratory judgment to determine his alimony obligations. Mr. Karsonovich sought a declaration that the alimony provision was void and unenforceable because the provision was ambiguous and against public policy. Ms. Kempe filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the provision was unambiguous and not void against public policy. The trial court agreed with Ms. Kempe and granted the motion to dismiss. The court also awarded Ms. Kempe her attorney’s fees incurred from defending the suit. We reverse the trial court’s decision to dismiss the complaint because there was an actual controversy for the court to decide. However, the trial court also decided the controversy at issue when it determined that the provision was neither ambiguous nor void against public policy, with which we agree. Thus, we affirm the court’s decision on the merits of the complaint. We reverse the trial court’s decision to award Ms. Kempe her attorney’s fees and remand for the trial court to determine whether attorney’s fees are still appropriate based upon our reversal of the dismissal. 

This is an appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of the pro se plaintiff’s discrimination action against Tennessee State University and certain administrators. The court determined that the plaintiff had requested relief beyond its authority to award and granted the motion to dismiss in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Regina Mullins (petitioner) sought an order of protection against Amy Hernandez (respondent), the grandmother of one of petitioner’s children. The parties were living together in an apartment when respondent allegedly threatened petitioner and her mother with a handgun. After a hearing, the trial court found that respondent did threaten petitioner, and that “there was a gun involved,” but held that these facts did not constitute “legally sufficient proof for an order of protection to be issued.” We hold that the facts found by the trial court provide a legal basis for the issuance of an order of protection under the statutes governing such orders, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-601 et seq. (2017). Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for the issuance of a protective order.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Appellant/Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights on the grounds of: (1) failure to establish/exercise paternity; (2) abandonment by willful failure to support; and (3) abandonment by an incarcerated parent for wanton disregard. Appellant also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Because Appellee Tennessee Department of Children’s Services did not meet its burden to show that Father has the ability to pay support, we reverse the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to support. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed.

After a bench trial, a judge found the Defendant, Artt Tanner Horne, guilty of theft of property valued less than $500 and sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days of unsupervised probation. The trial court also ordered that he stay away from Walmart, where the theft occurred, and continue with his mental health treatment. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is the fourth appeal in a case primarily concerned with whether two individual defendants are liable on loan guaranties. Following the third appeal, we remanded the case to the trial court to determine: (1) whether one of the defendants is liable under a Guaranty of Validity of Collateral (“GVC”); (2) whether prejudgment interest should be awarded to the lender on personal guaranties both defendants signed; and (3) whether the lender is entitled to recover additional attorney’s fees incurred in enforcing the guaranties since the previous appeal. On remand following the third appeal, the trial court found that the defendant was not liable on the GVC. The trial court also found that the lender was not entitled to prejudgment interest because the lender committed fraud, and it declined to award the lender any additional attorney’s fees. Although the defendants prevailed on all three issues, they appeal, seeking reconsideration of this court’s determination in an earlier appeal that the defendants failed to prove their claim of fraud, which would relieve them of any liability. The lender counters, insisting that this court’s previous decision, wherein we affirmed the trial court’s determination that the defendants failed to prove fraud, is the law of the case. The lender also raises its own issues for our consideration, including whether the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning fraud, as stated in the final order drafted by counsel for the defendants, reflects the trial court’s independent judgment. A careful review of the trial court’s oral ruling from the bench and the written order, as well as previous findings of fact made by the trial court, leads us to conclude that some of the findings of fact stated in the final order do not reflect the trial court’s independent judgment. Therefore, the presumption under Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d) that a trial court’s specific findings of fact are supported by the evidence shall be limited to those findings that appear to reflect the independent judgment of the trial court. We have also determined that the law of the case doctrine precludes us from reconsidering the defendants’ claim of fraud. We affirm the trial court’s determination that one of the defendants is not liable on the GVC, albeit, on different grounds. We reverse the trial court’s decision not to award the lender prejudgment interest and additional attorney’s fees, finding that the lender has a statutory right to prejudgment interest and a contractual right to recover reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees that the lender incurred to enforce the guaranties. Therefore, we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A Stewart County jury convicted the defendant, Toby Shane Earhart, of two counts of child abuse. On appeal, the defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict; the trial court erred by admitting a videotaped forensic interview of the victim; the trial court erred by excluding the defendant’s expert witness; and the trial court erred when imposing consecutive sentences. Based upon our thorough review of the record, we agree the trial court erred when admitting the forensic interview; however, this error was harmless. Additionally, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when excluding the defendant’s expert witness, and the trial court properly ordered consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Barry Leon Ferguson, pled guilty in the Dyer County Circuit Court to possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver, possession of oxycodone with intent to sell or deliver, and possession of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver and reserved a certified question of law concerning the sufficiency of the affidavit underlying the search warrant issued in this case. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress.

The Appellant, Martiness Henderson, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of first degree felony murder and received an automatic life sentence. On appeal, he contends that he is entitled to a new trial because he was denied proper jury selection and that his life sentence violates the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court committed reversible error during jury selection. Therefore, the Appellant’s conviction is vacated, and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.

The Petitioner, Jeffrey Perry, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and resulting effective sentence of twenty-one years in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he did not enter his guilty pleas voluntarily and that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The Petitioner, Antonio Munford, filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis relief and a petition for post-conviction relief. Following a hearing on the petitions, the trial court denied relief, finding that the Petitioner’s post-conviction claims were time-barred and that the coram nobis claims were without merit. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he is entitled to due process tolling of the
post-conviction statute of limitations and that the trial court abused its discretion in denying coram nobis relief. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent. It is clear that the State committed prosecutorial error three times during closing arguments: (1) argument regarding “adequate provocation,” (2) argument regarding a hypothetical of the victim dying, and in so doing misstated the law, and (3) arguments that vouched as to the truth of State witnesses: (a) the victim, (b) Renardo Hibbler, (c) Javier McKissick, and (d) the police officers who worked the case. All of the improper arguments are set forth in the majority opinion.

The Defendant, Laylon Ward, Jr., was convicted by a Dyer County jury of reckless aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges his classification as a Range II offender, arguing that the trial court erred in considering two previous convictions as felonies. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Jerry Brandon Phifer, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for aggravated burglary and theft of property valued over $1000. Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his convictions were based on evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. After a review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we determine Petitioner has failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim is waived. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Carey Goodman, appeals the trial court’s order requiring him to serve his sentence in confinement after the revocation of his probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in accordance with Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The juvenile court established a permanent parenting plan for the minor child of unwed parents and ordered the father to pay child support. The father argues that the juvenile court erred both in fashioning the parenting plan and in calculating his child support obligation. Because the court’s order lacks sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to explain its calculation of the father’s gross income for child support purposes, we vacate the court’s child support order and remand for entry of an order in compliance with Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. In all other respects, we affirm.

The Defendant, Angela Smith, appeals her conviction for aggravated arson and her resulting sentence of thirty-five years at 100% as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, the Defendant raises issues challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the photographic line-up, and her sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.